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This dissertation problematizes the “state dossier system” (SDS): the production and 
accumulation of personal information on citizen subjects exceeding the reasonable bounds of risk 
management. SDS — comprising interconnecting subsystems of records and identification — 
damage individual autonomy and self-determination, impacting not only human rights, but also 
the viability of the social system. The research, a hybrid of case-study and cross-national 
comparison, was guided in part by a theoretical model of four primary SDS driving forces: 
technology, political economy, law and public sentiment. Data sources included government 
documents, academic texts, investigative journalism, NGO reports and industry white papers. The 
primary analytical instrument was the juxtaposition of two individual cases: the U.S. and China.  
Research found that constraints on the extent of the U.S. SDS today may not be significantly 
different from China’s, a system undergoing significant change amidst growing public interest in 
privacy and anonymity. Much activity within the U.S., such as the practice of suspicious activity 
reporting, is taking place outside the domain of federal privacy laws, while ID systems appear to 
advance and expand despite clear public opposition. Momentum for increasingly comprehensive 
SDS appears to be growing, in part because the harms may not be immediately evident to the data 
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subjects. The future of SDS globally will depend on an informed and active public; law and 
policy will need to adjust to better regulate the production and storage of personal information. 
To that end, the dissertation offers a general model and linguistic toolkit for the further analysis 
of SDS. 
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CHAPTER 1:  SURVEILLANCE AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
This dissertation “problematizes” a particular domain of surveillance practice I call the 
“state dossier system.” This phrase is not intended to be normatively neutral, but to diagnose a 
social problem. At appropriate times neutral terms such as “information system,” database, and 
record will be used, but the goal of this work is to illuminate and contribute to the further analysis 
and regulation of what may be the single most important threat of states to the public interest this 
century: the unconstrained production and accumulation of personal information on state subjects 
that exceeds the reasonable bounds of the state’s mandate to manage risk.  
The concept of problematization, notes Foucault (1985) is “an ‘answer’ to a concrete 
situation which is real” (p. 115).1  Key to the problematization is the language that is used and 
developed — specific terms and concepts which help illuminate the relevant elements of the 
problem. The problematization of madness, for example, was built upon words like “mania” and 
“melancholia.” A problematization is not a theory per se. It is not intended to create a definitive 
model with predictive power, but to highlight key aspects of a real world problem, that, once 
properly identified, may be amenable to management and regulation. 
As the scope and depth of a state dossier system grows, the interface between the state 
and its subjects tends to grow more tense and unfriendly. An increasing number of citizens fall 
under clouds of suspicion that tend to hang over them throughout their lives; they are “suspect 
until proven guilty.” State dossier systems damage individual autonomy and self-determination, 
impacting not only the human rights of the subject population, but also the overall ability of that 
social system to adapt to change. 
                                                     
1 Problematization is described in more detail later in the chapter. 
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The dossier system is a particular state practice that falls within the more general 
definition of surveillance. By focusing on the term “state dossier system” rather than “state 
surveillance,” I avoid the conflation of necessary state information practices with those that are 
specifically harmful to the public interest.2  Nevertheless, extant “surveillance theory” will be 
drawn upon frequently in the course of this analysis.  
The primary analytical instrument for this problematization is the juxtaposition of two 
individual cases of state dossier systems: the U.S. and China. It is important to note that the two 
cases are not given equal weight in either the data set or the subsequent analysis. The U.S. case is 
the focal case, while the China case serves more of an instrumental role which can be broken 
down into two primary functions: 1) the China case serves as yardstick for assessing the severity 
of the U.S. state dossier problem;  and 2) the consideration of dossier practices within what are 
generally understood to be highly contrasting social systems affords the efficient development of 
generalized terms and concepts that one can expect to apply to a wide range of state dossier cases. 
This is not to diminish the intrinsic importance of the China case. The U.S. case, however, is in 
many ways more complex and less well understood than China. The Chinese surveillance and 
dossier systems have already been problematized within western academia and popular discourse 
to such a degree that it would be more difficult to make significant contributions in this area. We 
will see, however, that assumptions about the authoritarian nature of the Chinese state and the 
intensity of the dossier system (ID and personal record systems) do not always hold up under 
                                                     
2  Napoli (2001) distinguishes between three different conceptualizations of the term "public interest:" 
majoritarian, procedural and unitary. The majoritarian approach assumes that the public interest is served when the 
interests of a majority of people are met, regardless of how the rest might be impacted. The procedural definition is 
almost tautological — that the public interest is whatever the policy process concludes is in the public interest. Finally, 
the unitary approach, which I adopt here, assumes that the public interest has a normative definition, and that such a 
definition comprises a set of guiding principles. Although these principles are assumed to be held in high regard by the 
average person, they must be articulated within a particular policy context if they are to have any force. In the context 
of media ownership, diversity has become a core principle that policy makers publicly support, although their strategies 
for achieving this principle may be highly divergent. The guiding principles that inform the public interest in the 
context of state surveillance are self determination, autonomy and freedom of expression — key to any functioning 
democracy. I elaborate on this point in chapter 2. 
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scrutiny. There is more life to the public as an opposition force to the states authority than many 
acknowledge. 
This chapter’s primary goal is to orient the reader to the broader literature that approaches 
surveillance as a social problem and examine some of the most common choices of language and 
framing that drive them. The chapter is divided into five sections: Global Surveillance as a Social 
Problem  introduces the general concept of surveillance as a “social problem” and its apparent 
relentless growth and expansion worldwide;  Problems, Frames, and Social Change  examines 
the role of language and social change within the context of surveillance studies;  Definitions and 
Theoretical review elaborates upon the notion of “problematization” and its relationship to 
theory, defines surveillance and reviews the major strands of surveillance theory;  Popular 
Surveillance Problem Frames identifies and critiques popular problem frames that frequently 
appear within the “surveillance studies” literature;  finally, Plan of Dissertation outlines the 
essence and rationale for the six subsequent chapters. 
GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
It is fair to say that in the years since September 11th, 2001, the issue of surveillance, the 
systematic production or capture of information about people, processes and institutions that is 
then integrated into schema for social action, has become particularly salient in public discourse. 
Anthony Giddens (1985) and Michel Foucault (1979) have helped us to understand that 
surveillance plays a critical regulatory role in any complex social system. The emerging sub-
discipline “surveillance studies,” however, has called our attention to the intensification of 
surveillance worldwide and its negative impact on human rights, privacy and self-determination 
(Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 2001; Ball & Webster, 2003; Marx, 2002; Monahan, 2006). 
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Despite the growing volume of academic texts defending the right to privacy for 
individuals and groups, the scope of global surveillance systems continues to expand along with 
the depth of personal information they record and store. The ACLU’s “The Surveillance-
Industrial Complex: How the American Government Is Conscripting Businesses and Individuals 
in the Construction of a Surveillance Society” (Stanley, 2004) details how  U.S. government 
surveillance practices have come to rely on a multi-billion dollar industry led by private data 
aggregators Acxiom and Choicepoint, and how this moves many surveillance practices outside 
the realm of privacy law. The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, prevented state law enforcement 
from maintaining information on citizens who were not the subject of investigation. Not only are 
private corporations exempt from this distinction, but there are no legal restrictions on the 
government for using this information or presenting it as evidence in a court of law. Further, the 
report details how data gathered by companies on their customers in the normal course of 
business — flight records, credit card reports, phone logs, email — are often freely provided to 
the government upon request. For those companies that do resist, the state has made increasing 
use of the “National Security Letter” to compel companies to release data.  
The International Campaign Against Mass Surveillance  (ICAMS) 2005 report, “The 
Emergence of A Global Infrastructure for Mass Registration and Surveillance” goes beyond the 
U.S.-centered context of the ACLU report, detailing how, since September 11th, once substantial 
nation-state to nation-state boundaries in surveillance formations have been dissolving as the 
states become embedded in a “global infrastructure:” 
The result has been an emerging trend toward the harmonization and integration of 
security functions on a global scale. In democratic countries, this has led to a rollback of 
rights, freedoms, and civil liberties that have been won by centuries of popular struggle. 
In undemocratic countries, repressive regimes have been enabled and strengthened, and 
development assistance has been diverted to bolster security apparatuses. Internationally, 
the post-World War II order — which enshrines the universal, inalienable human rights 
of all individuals — has been seriously eroded. (p. 7) 
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The literature on surveillance today appears overwhelmingly weighted to the inevitability 
of increasingly expanding surveillance regimes across the globe (Hunter, 2002; O’Harrow, 2006). 
For political economists, there seems to be something built into the logic of global capitalism and 
the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy that drives the expansion of monitoring, cataloging, 
and data storage and retrieval systems (Gandy, 1993; Robins & Webster, 1999). For technology 
scholars, the incessant growth in computer processing, storage and network bandwidth capacity 
vastly expands the possibilities for surveillance, possibilities which human actors inevitably begin 
to make use of (Winner, 1978; Lyon, 2002; Marx, 2002). Although these long term political 
economic and technological factors have been driving the growth of state surveillance for quite 
some time, a single geopolitical event, the September 11th terrorist attacks, appears to have 
precipitated a “perfect storm” of state surveillance. A range of formerly effective social 
constraints are rapidly losing their relevance and force, while state surveillance systems across the 
globe become more all encompassing and centralized (“International Campaign Against Mass 
Surveillance (ICAMS),” 2005). 
This new, fuzzy threat of terrorism is now increasingly used to justify a dramatic change 
in not just the intensity of surveillance but the architecture of global data flows. The failure of the 
U.S. government to properly anticipate and “manage” the attacks has been blamed on a lack of 
centralized intelligence powers and the presence of too many institutional boundaries. In a 
contemporary social environment in which many citizens value their security over their privacy 
and see increased surveillance as a practical necessity, there has been little public resistance to a 
series of laws which only begin with the Patriot Act, and include the Real ID Act, the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) and ongoing revisions to the FISA Act, which are either rolling back or 
eliminating prior legal constraints on state surveillance, many in place since the 1970s. Further, 
legal boundaries that have protected citizens from state surveillance — namely the Privacy Act of 
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1974 and the Fourth Amendment — have been rapidly losing their relevance (Sundstrom, 1998; 
“Privacy’s Gap,” 2003; Ko, 2004; Solove, 2006). 
PROBLEM FRAMES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Ball and Haggerty (2005) have suggested that scholars within the sub-discipline of 
surveillance studies may have inadvertently contributed to a sense of helplessness in the face of 
the global expansion of the surveillance grid. 
As a group we tend to produce a cumulative image of the inevitable expansion of 
surveillance and cooptation of efforts to resist surveillance systems. Hence, rather than 
motivating political action an unintended consequence of how we typically present our 
accounts might be to induce in the public a form of resigned fatalism and political 
paralysis. (p. 136) 
The specific presentation of accounts of the surveillance problem that Ball and Haggerty 
refer to here can be classified in terms of their “frames,” or particular uses of language that 
interpret or highlight a problem in a certain way.  As Bennett (2008) reminds us, “[for] any group 
that seeks to change public policy, or indeed the structural conditions that give rise to that policy, 
how issues get ‘framed’ is crucial” (p. 1).  
The term “frame”, originating in the work of Erving Goffman, is generally understood to 
mean the use of language that interprets and highlights a problem in a specific way. Snow and 
Benford (1992) describe a frame as an 
interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively 
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of 
actions within one’s present or past environment (p. 137) 
Entman (1993) notes that the purpose of a frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52) in order to promote a 
particular way of defining a problem, its cause, and a potential solution. Further, Tarrow (1994) 
reminds us that: 
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Social movements are deeply involved in the work of “naming” grievances, connecting 
them to other grievances and constructing larger frames of meaning that will resonate 
with a population’s cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to 
power holders and others. 
Although not always in the forefront of discussion about frames, the use of metaphor, or 
the “understanding and experiencing of one kind of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980) can play a major role in the framing of social problems. Schon (1979) argues that “the 
framing of problems often depends upon metaphors underlying the stories which generate 
problem setting and set the direction of problem solving” (p. 138). Metaphors may become so 
established within a particular discourse on a social problem that their presence is hardly noticed 
(Deignan, 2005). 
In his highly influential work, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty (1989) deftly 
describes the contingent nature of the language we use and the futility of asserting the existence 
of some independent reality beyond words. The words we use facilitate other words and 
particular frames which become intertwined with and help to stabilize specific conceptual models 
and forms of practice. According to Rortian pragmatism, changing these words is a critical first 
step in changing social practice.   
What the Romantics expressed as the claim that imagination, rather than reason, is the 
central human faculty was the realization that a talent for speaking differently, rather than 
for arguing well, is the chief instrument of cultural change. What political utopians since 
the French Revolution have sensed is not that an enduring, substratal human nature has 
been suppressed or repressed by “unnatural” or “irrational” social institutions but rather 
that changing languages and other social practices may produce human beings of a sort 
that never before existed. (Rorty, 1989, p.7) 
New uses of language can help constitute new social opportunity spaces and offer 
innovative concepts that promote the solution of problems. The use of new language does not 
necessarily equate to the development of formal theory, however. When active language hardens 
into theory, especially successful ones, human subjects of the theory can begin to lose some of 
their self-determination. 
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Politically, the more territory a theory covers, the more it is preferred, the better it will be 
remembered, and the more likely it will be applied. Thus, theorizing supports a 
conceptual imperialism; the urge to oversee, predict, control, and govern ever-growing 
territories.... 
The requirement that theories be both rational and consistent thus reduces them to 
monological constructions in the dual sense of being the product of a single voice and of 
being cast in terms of one (coherent) logic. This has considerable implications for social 
theorizing. (Krippendorff, 1993, pp. 4-5) 
Not only can the imposition of an overarching explanatory logic contribute to a kind of 
conceptual imperialism, but it can also interfere with and otherwise constrain a scholar’s ability to 
perceive important subtleties of individual real-world cases. In domains of high complexity and 
rapid change, all-encompassing theories can inhibit understanding: 
... surveillance and privacy are part of a bigger picture. They are embedded in the 
construction of identity, political culture, the practices of everyday life, and in forms of 
power and resistance. It is dangerous both intellectually and politically to abstract them 
from the totality of concrete experience.... It is surely valuable to make theories of 
privacy (e.g., Schoeman 1984), but after a certain point these theories can become 
misleading unless they incorporate a substantive analysis of historically specific 
formations of institutionally organized embodied activity. (Agre, 1999, p. 9)  
... the quest for an abstract grand theory of surveillance is a wild-goose chase, particularly 
if it is yoked with particular concepts and is supposed to have universal relevance. The 
theoretical task is better seen as an ongoing conversation in which concepts and theorems 
that prove helpful should be explored and used, but even if they loom large they should 
not be permitted to dominate the debate. (Lyon, 2007a, pp. 46-7)  
DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL REVIEW 
PROBLEMATIZATION 
The goal of this dissertation is not to develop a comprehensive theory of state dossier 
systems, but to “problematize” the concept of the state dossier system. I define this term 
following Foucault: 
Some people have interpreted this type of analysis as a form of “historical idealism”, but 
I think that such an analysis is completely different. For when I say that I am studying the 
“problematization” of madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality 
of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real 
existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The 
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question I raise is this one: how and why were very different things in the world gatherer 
together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, “mental illness”? What are 
the elements which are relevant for a given “problematization”? And even if I won’t say 
that what is characterized as “schizophrenia” corresponds to something real in the world, 
this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think there is a relation between the thing 
which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an 
“answer” to a concrete situation which is real. (Foucault, 1985, n.p.) 
Foucault considered problematization in two ways. The first, which characterized a great 
deal of his work, was as something in one’s history that can be studied, a discursive process 
which has left traces of its evolution in texts. The second is simply a realization that 
problematization is a reaction to a concrete situation out in the world, a strategy that affords the 
target problem’s regulation. This dissertation is a problematization in Foucault’s second sense, 
but it is also not without its historical roots. Previous scholars including Donner (1980) and 
Laudon (1986) have focused on the problematic of unmonitored, unchecked state aggregation of 
personal information on citizens without criminal records. Solove (2004) has brought our 
attention to the important role of electronic communication technology in affording “digital 
dossiers” and their impact on information privacy, autonomy and self-determination. 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to dismiss the role of the state or at least minimize it in 
comparison to the more general problem of surveillance by public and private institutions alike. 
The focal tool in the process of problematization is language; problematization comprises 
a collection of related terms used to speak to the problem. In this dissertation, most of these terms 
have well established meanings within the relevant literature; others are commonly used but their 
specific meaning is under some dispute; still others have emerged as part of the exploration and 
require more explicit definition. The goal, again, is not to end up with a general model that has 
predictive power, but to focus our thinking on emergent, increasingly significant state practices 
that endanger the public interest. 
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To properly situate this problematization of state dossier systems within the larger 
literature of surveillance studies, I will now offer an explicit definition of surveillance, review the 
main strands of surveillance theory, and critique popular frames for surveillance 
problematizations that appear frequently in the literature.  
DEFINING SURVEILLANCE 
Surveillance, according to Ball & Webster (2003), involves the “observation, recording 
and categorization of information about people, processes, and institutions.” Lyon (2004) offers a 
definition of surveillance that is similar to Ball & Webster’s, but with an important addition. 
According to Lyon, surveillance involves the “rationalized control of information within modern 
organizations, and involves in particular processing personal data for the purposes of influence, 
management, or control” (p. 135).The key distinction here is that the information is gathered for a 
purpose and that that purpose involves some form of action. Data that is simply gathered, but 
never acted upon or attended to by a human being, does nothing. 
Surveillance differs from the more general form, observation, in its more systematic 
nature. It is practiced by institutions, not individuals. Using the language of cybernetics, I define 
surveillance in society as the systematic production of informational feedback about people, 
processes and institutions which facilitates the internal regulation of a social system. We can 
break down this feedback into two branches: 1) the continuous flow of real-time information 
about the system in question to the regulator and 2) the matrix of stored historical data about this 
system (memory) accessible to the regulator. While the regulators of many simple cybernetic 
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systems may operate without this second channel of feedback 3 , social systems and their 
institutions of surveillance have become very reliant on them.   
SURVEILLANCE IN THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Lyon (2001, p. 109) identifies four, often interwoven, strands in modern surveillance 
theory: nation state, bureaucracy, political economy, and “technologic.” I will describe each of 
these threads in turn. 
NATION STATE 
State institutional actors have a different set of interests than the private sector, although 
at times these interests merge. In cybernetic terms, the basic function of the state is to act as 
regulator of the social system, to keep the system within a stable state of homeostasis.4  Part of 
that duty is being able to rapidly shift resources to citizens of the state who may most need them 
and to be able to respond to human threats such as crime, natural disasters, or economic 
dislocation quickly. In order to perform its job, the regulator must have continuous feedback from 
the system it is regulating. 
 Institutions of surveillance are the primary mechanism for providing this feedback 
function in social systems.  The connection between state policing institutions and the reduction 
of street crime has been traced back to 19th century France (Gillis, 1989).  Dandaker (1990) and 
Giddens (1985) describe the importance of surveillance for internal pacification of nation states 
and in the provision of social services. Gilliom’s (2001) ethnography of the welfare bureaucracy 
                                                     
3 A thermostat is the most basic example. Simple life forms, such as amoeba operate on purely real-time 
sensory feedback as well. Social systems are second order cybernetic systems, a term used in the literature to account 
for a shift from the cybernetics of observed systems to the "cybernetics of observing (systems)" (Krippendorff, 1996). 
4 According to the Principia Cybernetica, a homeostatic system "is an open system that maintains its structure 
and functions by means of a multiplicity of dynamic equilibriums rigorously controlled by interdependent regulation 
mechanisms. Such a system reacts to every change in the environment, or to every random disturbance, through a series 
of modifications of equal size and opposite direction to those that created the disturbance. The goal of these 
modifications is to maintain the internal balances." See http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HOMEOSTA.html. 
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in   Appalachian Ohio provides a detailed picture of the state’s interest in knowing intimate 
details of the lives of its beneficiaries. And Ericson & Haggerty (1997) have shown how tightly 
interwoven state surveillance institutions have already become with the private sector in the 
management of risk, describing the role police officers play as knowledge workers for the 
insurance  industry.  
The “risk society,” a concept developed by Ulrick Beck (1999), describes a social system 
oriented around the identification and management of risk. Beck suggests that the risk society 
emerged as part of an almost evolutionary succession moving from a focus on the importance of 
institutions in communal and collective structures to an emphasis on individual agency.  The risk 
society is an approach that attempts to mitigate the problems unleashed by modernism itself, such 
as the increase in crime and sickness that accompanied the growth of densely populated urban 
areas, or the increase traffic accidents from the proliferation of motor vehicles, or the threat of 
global warming from industrial pollution. Beck’s notion of the risk society can be considered 
another formulation of the cybernetic definition of surveillance, where regulation of instability 
becomes the management of risk. For Beck, the increase in risk that world society is experiencing 
is leading people to rethink the importance of state institutions and governance, but with an 
emphasis on transnational configuration that can deal with the increase in “de-bordered” risks: 
There is a surprising parallel between the reactor catastrophe of Chernobyl, the Asian 
financial crisis, 9/11 and the consequences of Hurricane Katrina for the American self-
image. In each case they led to world-wide discussion of the question, to what extent the 
dynamic of world risk society must be regarded and evaluated as a historic refutation of 
the neo-liberal conception of the minimal state. For example, a result of the jolt given by 
the revelation of the hidden Third World face of the United States has been that, despite 
the sceptical attitude of many Americans to the state, there has been an opening up of the 
question as to an appropriate role of government. 5 
                                                     
5 From a 2006 speech, Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture, February 15, at the Old Theatre, London School 
of Economics. 
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BUREAUCRACY 
Max Weber, the central theorist of this strand, sees surveillance as part of the process of 
instrumental rationalization, the driving force of the bureaucratic process: 
Irrationalities may successfully be eliminated by bureaucratic means, producing 
rationably calculable administrative action. The surveillance function lies primarily in the 
files, those dismal dossiers that store information on each individual, the knowledge of 
which produces and reproduces power. For Weber, bureaucratic surveillance is a means 
of procuring efficiency, especially in the large scale and unwieldy tasks that confront any 
expanding modern nation state (Lyon, 2001, p. 110).  
By rationalization “Weber meant the process by which explicit, abstract, intellectually calculable 
rules and procedures are increasingly substituted for sentiment, tradition, and rule of thumb in all 
spheres of activity” (Wrong, 1970, p. 26). Weber’s work addressed this process of rationalization 
in economic life, law, administration and religious ethics. As Brubaker (1984) remarks “[i]n each 
of these institutional spheres, rationalization has involved the depersonalization of social 
relationships, the refinement of techniques of calculation, the enhancement of the social 
importance of specialized knowledge, and the extension of technically rational control over both 
natural and social processes” (p. 2). Weber believed that scientific rationalism “heightens the 
possibility for political, social, and economic manipulation” (Gandy, 1993, p. 40). More recently, 
Beniger (1986) interpreted Weber’s rationalization as an instrumental need to reestablish control 
through efficient management of information. Dossier systems, then, can be conceived as a 
primary tool of the administrative rationalization of the state. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Political economy comprises a number of related approaches, all of which manifest a 
concern with the way power, as a social resource, becomes unequally distributed and how social 
inequalities tend to accrue as actors with resources use them to their advantage.  The actors may 
try to influence the law and policy or influence public opinion (Gandy, 1982; Etzioni, 1988). 
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Political economy challenges the mainstream neo-liberal economic model which largely replaces 
the concept of power with the invisible hand of the market (Reder, 1999). Information itself is a 
key resource for the accrual of power. 
Robins and Webster (1999) demonstrate how the growth of surveillance practices pre-
dated advanced communication and computing technologies, and is instead due in large part to 
the logic of capitalism. Specifically, surveillance practices began in earnest with “Taylorism,” the 
emergence of scientific management introduced by F. W. Taylor in the early 20th century. 
Taylorism was a prescription for dramatically improved efficiency of the production process in 
factories through increased planning and the concentration of skill and information at the 
managerial level. Information gathering, central to the planning process, led to the increased 
importance of workplace surveillance, although this was originally managed without the 
assistance of computers or other advanced communication technologies. As the utility of 
Scientific Management in the production cycle became clear, its basic principles were extended 
from the cycle of production to the cycle of consumption, what became known as “Sloanism” 
after Alfred P. Sloan. As the Taylorist principles of calculation were extended to the marketing 
sphere, industry started to gather growing amounts of information on individual consumers, on 
their needs, wants and dispositions, on their demographic and socio-economic backgrounds, 
leading to the emergence of market research firms. The increasing commodification of 
information has led to the emergence of the data mining industry in which firms such as Acxiom 
and Check Point focus exclusively on producing massive databases of personal information that 
can then be sold to both the public and private sector (Piatetsky-Shapiro, 1999).  
Corporations with economic wealth often use their resources to influence government 
policy in ways that increase the profitability of their business (Etzioni, 1988). Corporations find 
that investing in policy (often through the lobbying process) they can get a far superior return on 
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investment than if they make an equivalent investment in improving their product or service.  
Corporations may also choose to influence debate by providing information to journalists writing 
about targeted topics, through press releases or more subtle means, such as buzz marketing, and 
other approaches to manufacturing consent, what Gandy (1982) calls an information subsidy. For 
many corporations, surveillance and identification systems are good business. The copyright 
industry has been very vocal about its support for surveillance initiatives. Operating in the other 
direction, states are driving the growth and transformation of surveillance markets with their own 
large-scale initiatives, contributing to what the Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC) 
has projected will be a nearly $300 billion global market by 2018.  
TECHNOLOGIC 
Innovations in communication technologies over the past few decades dramatically 
increase the scope and reach of possible state surveillance programs. The contribution of 
technology to surveillance practice is significant enough to warrant a distinction between what 
Marx (2002) calls traditional surveillance and the “new surveillance.” Gordon Moore, cofounder 
of Intel, observed in 1965 that the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had 
doubled approximately every 18 months. This pattern, which persists and is known as Moore’s 
law, is integrally tied to the fundamental shift in surveillance potential inherent in the emerging 
electronic social space mediated by computers and the global telecommunication network. As 
Norris (2003) discusses, the reach and depth of video surveillance has been dramatically 
expanded with the shift from analog, disparate video tape banks to digitized, networked video 
surveillance.  
The cost of storing data continues to drop dramatically, an average of 40% per year since 
the late 80s, twice as fast as Moore’s law (Orzech, 2003). The cost to store one terabyte of data 
was $1 million in 1992 and around $127 in 1997. In 2004, Wal-mart alone was storing 460 
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terabytes of data (Hays, 2004). Internet companies now routinely store customer data even 
without any extant plan for exploiting the data, on the assumption that it may be valuable to them 
sometime in the future. 
Although technology obviously has played a key role in the character, scope and extent 
of surveillance in recent human history, scholars must be careful to avoid giving technology too 
large a role, discounting the critical role of human thought and action. Technology is best thought 
of as an enabler (or constrainer) of surveillance practice that determines nothing on its own. For 
example, real time communication between two geographically distinct points was not possible 
until the invention of the telegraph, but individual, real instances of communication were always 
the result of human will, of specific human decisions shaped by complex human needs. Gary 
Marx (2002), who has written extensively about the significance of new technologies in allowing 
for a quantum increase in the extensiveness of surveillance, is careful to stress that the presence 
of technological capacity does not mean it will be used. Marx’s “surveillance 
slack”conceptualizes the space between potential and actual surveillance practices: 
With sensationalist and often unrepresentative examples, the media talk of the death of 
privacy with implicit reference to a supposed utopian past and privacy advocates are 
constantly documenting new risks. In contrast entrepreneurs too often discuss 
hypothetical benefits of new technologies as if they were fact. In the rhetorical excesses, 
which shape public awareness, there is a failure to differentiate the potential of a tactic 
from its actual use. This suggests the need for a broad comparative measure of 
surveillance slack which considers the extent to which a technology is applied, rather 
than the absolute amount of surveillance. (p. 23)  
Nevertheless, the possibilities introduced by certain recent technological innovations, 
such as the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chip, are significant enough that they create 
the conditions for possibly discontinuous increases in surveillance practice (Garfinkel, Jules & 
Pappu, 2005) and dramatically increase the potential reach, scope and depth of state dossier 
systems. 
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POPULAR SURVEILLANCE PROBLEM FRAMES 
The various frames for addressing surveillance as a social problem can be a mixture of 
particular concepts, metaphors and literary references. Frames may be mixed and matched 
occasionally, so a particular frame becomes an element of a larger argument strategy. Below, I 
consider a number of common frames and frame elements as well as their weaknesses in 
facilitating solutions: the word surveillance itself, the concept of privacy, the metaphor of the 
Panopticon, the term surveillant assemblage, and the phrase data collection.   
SURVEILLANCE 
 Though not often conceived of as a frame itself, it does play that function in the general 
discourse of surveillance studies, for example, when scholars worry about the emerging 
“surveillance society.” A major problem with the term surveillance as a problem frame is that the 
actions surveillance affords include vital aspects of modern society.  
… there is now some critical debate about the breadth and inclusiveness to the concept of 
surveillance, which has been expanded to embrace any capture of personal information, 
whether identifiable or not, and whether having positive or negative implications for the 
individual. It too, therefore, is a concept that carries a lot of theoretical baggage, and is 
being in danger of being stretched so far that it, like “privacy,” might mean everything 
and nothing. (Bennett, 2008, p. 17) 
In order to distinguish between the positive and negative aspects of surveillance, further 
distinctions and additional frame elements are required. 
PRIVACY 
The English language concept of “privacy” has been a key rallying point for academics 
and activists who resist global surveillance regimes. Despite its importance, however, there 
appears to be a growing chorus of criticisms of the concept’s problematic entailments and 
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seemingly intractable ambiguity. In his book, Surveillance Studies: an Overview, Lyon (2007a) 
writes: 
Conventionally, in the West, privacy has often been seen as the concept around which 
resistance to intensive or extreme surveillance may be mobilized . . . privacy helpfully 
alerts us to dimensions of human existence that should rightly be treated with caution and 
respect, in tandem with principles such as “fair information practices,” offers some vital 
guidelines as to how surveillance should be regulated. But privacy is also hard to define 
and varies tremendously from culture to culture and from era to era. It is also associated 
with possessive individualism, with property and with a dubious notion of persons as 
autonomous agents. (p. 7) 
There is considerable disagreement within American legal and philosophical discourse as 
to how to define privacy. Posner (1978), for example, notes that the concept of privacy is “elusive 
and ill defined” (p. 393).  Scholars continue to struggle over whether privacy is best thought of as 
some instrumental term invoked to protect more core values, or if there is something intrinsic in 
the concept itself that needs to be respected (Fried, 1968; Posner, 1978; DeCew, 1997; Etzioni, 
1999). Arguments claiming the intrinsic nature of privacy must tread a fine line. There are other 
important concepts under the rubric of human rights, such as liberty, security and justice, which 
privacy cannot simply trump. Baker (2004), for example, argues convincingly that free speech 
should trump “privacy rights” in many cases (although not for corporate entities). Allen (2003) 
has made a convincing case that privacy can conflict with accountability in ways that may raise 
the likelihood of certain social injustices. Etzioni (1999) has shown how strong privacy rights for 
individuals could have dramatically negative effects on public health. Several government 
officials and academics make the case  that privacy can compromise security and thus should 
have even less sway in the 21st century than it did in the simpler past (Posner, 2006; Singel, 
2007a).  Many argue that the privacy value always puts individual over group interests. As Rule 
(2007) notes, “[d]esires for privacy often map efforts to assert one’s own interests or individuality 
in the face of countervailing claims” (p. 10). 
19 
 
THE PANOPTICON  
Perhaps the most common metaphor used when problematizing surveillance in social 
systems is the “Panopticon.” Foucault (1979) uses the architectural design of a prison, conceived 
by Jeremy Bentham, as a diagram of modern systems of power, discipline and punishment. The 
Panopticon is composed of a central tower surrounded by a number of isolated cells arranged 
around the tower in a circular pattern. The cells have two windows, one opening to the outside, to 
allow light to come in and illuminate the occupant, and the second facing the central observation 
tower. Each cell is walled off from the others, while the lighting and design of the central tower 
makes it impossible for cell occupants to see the guards that may or may not be watching them. 
This arrangement leads to a dramatic imbalance in the flow of information between watcher and 
watched: 
The Panopticon is a machine for disassociating the see/being seen dyad: in the periphic 
ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything 
without ever being seen. (pp. 210-2) 
The result, Foucault writes, is a power play, the habitual inducement of discipline and 
institutional normality in the subjects of surveillance: 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things 
that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; 
that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that 
this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power 
relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be 
caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (p. 201) 
Although the oft-used panoptic metaphor suggests perfect centralization, academic 
treatments of surveillance over the past two decades rarely attempt to suggest that such integrated 
totalizing surveillance is the reality of the world today. Instead, there is an expectation that many 
key mechanism of surveillance remain largely separate from one another.  For example, Ball & 
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Webster (2003) note important questions regarding just how centralized systems of surveillance 
have become: 
It might be noted that recent Foucaultian accounts of the panopticon tend to resist the 
suggestion that panoptic techniques have become homogenized and centralized …in the 
hands of say, linked transactional corporations or integrated government agencies…. 
Gandy (1998), for instance, asserts that it would be a mistake to assume that surveillance 
in practice is as complete and totalizing as the panoptic ideal type would have us believe. 
For instance, it may be that educational institutions and retail corporations operate as 
huge panoptic machines in themselves, but these are both internally differentiated and 
externally hard to access by others, while the surveillers within education and the retail 
industry are themselves surveilled by many other panoptic-like organizations such as 
insurance companies and tax agencies. In this sense, today’s surveillance may more 
accurately be seen as at once more pervasive and less centralized than might have been 
imagined by earlier proponents of panopticism. (Ball & Webster 2003, p. 6) 
THE SURVEILLANT ASSEMBLAGE 
Other scholars, such as Haggerty & Ericson (2000) have argued that surveillance systems 
are far more interconnected than Ball & Webster suggest, although they replace Foucault’s 
centralized panoptic architecture with Delueze and Guattari’s metaphor of the rhizome.6 
... we are witnessing a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems to 
the point that we can now speak of an emerging ‘surveillant assemblage’. This 
assemblage operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and 
separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into 
distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention. In the 
process, we are witnessing a rhizomatic leveling of the hierarchy of surveillance, such 
that groups which were previously exempt from routine surveillance are now increasingly 
being monitored. (p. 606) 
To speak of the surveillant assemblage risks fostering the impression that we are 
concerned with a stable entity with its own fixed boundaries. In contrast, to the extent 
that the surveillant assemblage exists, it does so as a potentiality, one that resides at the 
intersections of various media that can be connected for diverse purposes. Such linkages 
can themselves be differentiated according to the degree to which they are ad hoc or 
institutionalized. By accentuating the emergent and unstable characteristic of the 
surveillant assemblage we also draw attention to the limitations of traditional political 
strategies that seek to confront the quantitative increase in surveillance. As it is multiple, 
unstable and lacks discernible boundaries or responsible governmental departments, the 
surveillant assemblage cannot be dismantled by prohibiting a particularly unpalatable 
                                                     
6 A rhizome is a biological term, referring to a kind of horizontal stem that sports a large number of shoots 
and roots growing from its multiple nodes. The term was first used in critical theory by Deleuze and Guattari and was 
adopted by Haggerty & Ericson (2000) in their "surveillant assemblage" concept. 
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technology. Nor can it be attacked by focusing criticism on a single bureaucracy or 
institution. In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices, 
struggles against particular manifestations of surveillance, as important as they might be, 
are akin to efforts to keep the ocean’s tide back with a broom — a frantic focus on a 
particular unpalatable technology or practice while the general tide of surveillance 
washes over us all. (p. 609) 
Although they are right to point out the inadequacy of the panoptic metaphor, Haggerty 
& Ericson (2000, above) fail to consider the potential applicability of Foucault’s broader work in 
discourse theory to help consider the “structuring structures” of surveillance. Although they 
suggest that their “surveillant assemblage” helps elucidate the futility in adopting surveillance 
policies technology-by-technology or issue-by-issue, they fail to make clear how the concept of 
an assemblage provides a more useful purchase for public interest policy. There is certain 
inevitability in their talk of surveillance that is very common in the literature today. The plus side, 
they seem to think, is that the gaze will be on people throughout the hierarchy and not just some 
lower class: 
New media, particularly television, allow the general public to scrutinize their leaders as 
never before (Meyrowitz 1985). We need only consider the media circus which surrounds 
Britain’s royal family to acknowledge this point. Furthermore, the monitoring of the 
powerful has been eased by the proliferation of relatively inexpensive video cameras. 
These allow the general public to tape instances of police brutality, and have given rise to 
inner-city citizen response teams which monitor police radios and arrive at the scene 
camera-in-hand to record police behaviour….While not a complete democratic leveling 
of the hierarchy of surveillance, these developments cumulatively highlight a fractured 
rhizomatic crisscrossing of the gaze such that no major population groups stand 
irrefutably above or outside of the surveillant assemblage. (p. 618) 
While it is certainly true that the ubiquity of camera-equipped cell phones and other ICTs 
have made police and other government agents more susceptible to citizen surveillance, it would 
be a mistake to assume that there has been even a partial leveling of the surveillance hierarchy vis 
a vis the state. Further, while it the “surveillant assemblage” may provide and accurate model for 
how surveillance activities takes place in real time, surveillance data in stored form flows most 
significantly in one direction, toward state database systems. 
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DATA COLLECTION 
 In her examination of the role of language and metaphor in science, Anne Salmond 
(1982) argues that, in the West, knowledge is nearly always conceived as a landscape, while facts 
are objects to be found within this landscape: 
Facts are depicted as hard, solid, concrete and tangible — they are to be picked up, 
collected, gathered, dug up, sorted, sifted, weighed, balanced, arranged and looked at.... 
Facts are objects, described in group nouns, with a physical existence and of natural 
origin....A fact may be mineral, to be mined and excavated, or vegetable, to be gathered 
and preserved, cultivated and even cooked (from raw facts to half-baked theories). This is 
the true metaphorical basis of “objectivity”, presupposed in our everyday talk about what 
is. It is also the linguistic rationale for the persistent idea that field-work is data gathering, 
as though the important features of another society will be lying about on the ground for 
our collection (p. 75) 
Major privacy advocates today regularly define problems related to surveillance and 
privacy in terms of personal information collection. In his book, the Digital Person, one of the 
most important works today warning of the dangers of the emerging dossier society, Solove 
(2004) writes “[j]ust as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food and drugs . . . we 
need a federal agency to regulate the collection and use of personal information” (p.108). David 
Lyon defines surveillance as “any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable 
or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” 
(2001:2). Gary Marx (2005) writes that the contemporary commercial state is “inconceivable 
without the massive collection of personal data” (n.p.). 
When we speak of “collecting” or “gathering” personal information, we are participating 
in the long, linguistic tradition of treating information and facts as natural objects existing out 
there in the landscape.  In many contexts, particularly in those circumstances where real-time 
surveillance, or third-party aggregation and analysis (data mining) is a concern, this particular 
metaphoric approach works quite well. As with any metaphor, however, the approach highlights 
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certain aspects of the problem while hiding others. The terms “collection” and “capture” include a 
built-in assumption that the information gathered already exists “out there” before it is collected. 
Although collection is an active term, it is passive in relation to the data itself.  Focusing on 
collection ignores the very critical processes that lead to the creation and storage of personal 
information in the first place, processes which need to be much better understood if policy is to 
have any chance at regulating the emergence of dossier systems worldwide. The problem society 
faces is not simply about the collection and aggregation of data, but of modes of practice that 
produce particular kinds of personally identifying information, information that then leads to a 
particular way of seeing state subjects that may not always be in the public interest. 
The weakness of a particular frame or frame element can be due to a number of different 
factors. It might be that the term itself is too abstract or difficult to define, or it may be too 
strongly associated with individual over collective interests (privacy); its entailments might seem 
a poor fit for the problem in its current configuration  or overestimate the powers of certain 
relevant institutions (panopticon); it may be so general and all encompassing as to include both 
critical social functions and problematic behavior (surveillance); it may define an emergent 
phenomena in a way that it appears to be a fait accompli for which nothing can be done 
(surveillant assemblage); or it may suggest a passive relationship to personal data that hides the 
logic of its production (data collection). Clearly, no frame is perfect. And just because a frame 
has a particular weakness does not render it useless for analysis or political advocacy. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the relatively young field of surveillance studies would benefit 
from some alternate frames.   
The primary goal of this dissertation is to introduce, explore and demonstrate the utility 
of one such alternate frame: the emergence and continued development of state dossier systems, 
massive databases of comprehensive personal information linked to national identification 
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systems. In this problematization of the state dossier system, the dissertation seeks to answer the 
following core research questions: what are the major components of dossier systems and what 
are the forces that propel and hinder their construction?  
PLAN OF DISSERTATION 
CHAPTER 2, PROBLEMATIZING THE STATE DOSSIER SYSTEM 
This chapter introduces the “state dossier system” as a problem frame. It is divided into 
four major sections: Origins of State Dossier Problematization examines the origins of 
this frame from a literature and historical perspective; Conceptual Elaboration introduces 
the frame’s key concepts, uses them to expound upon the core problem, and introduces 
the primary research questions; The Problem defines the general model of the state 
dossier system, examines its three key dangers, identifies the core research questions and 
presents four driver's of dossier systems drawn from surveillance studies scholarship; 
finally, Method describes the method of data gathering and analysis that drove the 
dissertation research process. 
CHAPTER 3, U.S. HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
This chapter provides a brief historical and legal context for understanding the current 
configuration of the U.S. dossier system. As a largely heuristic device, and to simplify a 
very complex tapestry of law and policy that has impacted the evolution and 
configuration of the U.S. dossier system over the past several decades, I break down the 
U.S.’s “dossier history” into three phases. In the first phase, from the mid 1920s to the 
mid 1979s, the U.S. exhibits all the characteristics of a full-fledged state dossier system. 
In the second phase, from the mid 1970s until 2001, federal laws and policies are in place 
to put “walls” blocking information flow between government agencies. In the third 
phase, beginning in the fall of 2001, the “walls” policy is reversed and replaced with new 
government thinking that “connecting the dots” and information sharing between and 
across government agencies should be paramount. 
CHAPTER 4, U.S. CASE 
This chapter examines the current state of the U.S. dossier systems in terms of the two 
primary components of the general model: ID systems and systems of records. The ID 
systems section first provides a brief historical overview of state driver’s licenses and the 
social security system before analyzing the federal government’s case and the public’s 
reaction to a set of national standards for state-issued driver’s licenses, the Real ID 
initiative.  The systems of records section, divided into three sub-sections, considers U.S. 
record systems at two levels of analysis: 1) record systems as wholes and 2) types of 
records.  
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CHAPTER 5, PRIVACY ACROSS CULTURES 
This chapter has two primary goals: 1) to establish common ground for the 
problematization of state dossier systems connecting two highly distinct case studies on 
the basis of information privacy and 2) to advance the academic discourse concerning the 
role and meaning of privacy within the global context of surveillance studies.  
CHAPTER 6, CHINA CASE 
This chapter describes China’s state dossier system as it existed in the 1980s and explores 
four primary sites of production — government departments, schools, work places, and 
local public security bureaus — each with their own slightly different but ultimately 
harmonious logics. Next, it describes three major transitional forces that have helped to 
revolutionize the production of the dossier: 1) labor mobility, 2) globalization and 3) ICT 
modernization.  After reviewing these transitional forces, it looks more specifically at the 
current state of the two primary dossier system components, ID systems and systems of 
records. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the problem of the state dossier system in 
China today - in particular, its unfinished, contingent nature. 
CHAPTER 7, SYNTHESIS 
The two case studies were chosen for two primary reasons: 1) to provide some 
independent gauge for the intensity of the current U.S. dossier problem and 2) to help 
drive the development of general terms for the problematization of state dossier systems. 
That the U.S. and China come from two entirely different political traditions is 
indisputable, but the practical differences today, when it comes to the ongoing evolution 
of state dossier systems and the specific constraints they encounter, are not as significant 
as we might assume. This chapter juxtaposes the two cases more directly to make this 
point. The chapter revisits the four drivers of dossier systems outlined in chapter 2 and 
explores in more detail the linguistic toolkit that has been developed for state dossier 
system analysis, including terms like the “sites” and “logics of production and the 
“targeted person.” Next, the chapter reviews some of the more potentially controversial 
propositions that have been presented here and the evidence on which they are based, and 
offers some concluding thoughts. 
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEMATIZING THE STATE DOSSIER SYSTEM 
The primary goal of this chapter is to introduce the “state dossier system” as a problem 
frame. It is divided into four major sections: Origins of State Dossier Problematization examines 
the origins of this frame from a literature and historical perspective; Conceptual Elaboration 
introduces the frame’s key concepts; The Problem defines the general model of the state dossier 
system, examines its three key dangers, identifies the core research questions and presents four 
driver’s of dossier systems drawn from surveillance studies scholarship; finally, Method describes 
the method of data gathering and analysis that drove the dissertation research process. 
ORIGINS OF STATE DOSSIER PROBLEMATIZATION 
The whole dossier continues to circulate, as the regular official routine demands, passing 
on to the highest Courts, being referred to the lower ones again, and then swinging 
backwards and forwards with greater or smaller oscillations, longer or shorter 
delays....No document is ever lost, the Court never forgets anything. One day - quite 
unexpectedly - some judge will take up the documents and look at them attentively.... 
“And the case begins all over again?” asked K. almost incredulously. “Certainly” said the 
painter. (Kafka, The Trial, 1925, cited in Solove, 2004, pp. 36-37) 
Franz Kafka’s The Trial tells the story of Joseph K., a citizen of what he has always 
thought was a free country, who suddenly finds himself accused of a crime. Joseph K. is 
forbidden from knowing his crime or seeing the evidence the state has amassed against him. The 
unseen documents that comprise Joseph K.’s dossier remain in circulation and may be used by the 
state as evidence against him at any time in the future. In the story, that future eventually arrives 
and Joseph K. is seized from his house and summarily executed. 
Legal scholar and privacy expert Daniel Solove (2004) has argued that the metaphor of 
Kafka’s The Trial should be invoked to complement the much more common uses of Foucault’s 
Panopticon and George Orwell’s 1984 in academic and popular writing about surveillance as a 
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social problem. The Trial communicates, through exaggeration, the helplessness individuals can 
feel in the face of these massive personal data stores that they can never really see but have so 
much power over their lives. I find The Trial metaphor particularly compelling because of its 
focus on the danger of the stored data that persists. The ultimate force that is haunting Joseph K. 
is not some powerful state institution watching his every move 24 hours a day. Rather, it is an 
immense mass of stored data about him that will persist and shadow him throughout the course of 
his life. While the Panopticon emphasizes the real-time watchful eye of the state, Kafka’s story 
focuses on the practically eternal mass of symbolic stored data — personal information that may 
easily outlast a particular state or regime, and which can serve as the raw material for the 
construction of new crimes and the development of new punishments. 
As we see in The Trial story, the dossier is a file of tremendous social force that can 
contain personal information that is highly broad in scope and deep in detail. The dossier is 
actively compiled by agents of the state and thus is always changing. The dossier is perpetually 
incomplete and error ridden, but also full of information among the noise. The state dossier 
system frame, which I will introduce in detail below, is focused on the three-way relationship 
between the state, the dossier, and the people.  
Although the term will be discussed more fully in the paragraphs that follow, it is helpful 
to first begin with a simple definition of “state dossier system.” In short, a dossier system is 
composed of two key subsystems: 1) personal identification and 2) a system of records containing 
personal information. A dossier system contains a range of information types regarding dossier 
subjects, both in semantic content and quality, from raw data listing websites visited in a given 
day to polished, psychological profiles prepared by trained professionals, such that the combined 
data paints a relatively “complete” picture of the data subject.   
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Below, I will consider  the state dossier system’s historical association with government 
oppression, and then consider some of the major entailments, key concepts of the frame that need 
to be defined before a more detailed elaboration on the categorization of state dossiers as a social 
problem can be made. Once I have reviewed the chief concerns of this frame and how it can be 
distinguished from other frames, I will return to and expand upon the definition of state dossier 
system and the relationship between its primary components:  identification technology and 
personal record systems. 
DOSSIERS IN HISTORY 
If one looks at recent history, one can see in several nation states, including Nazi 
Germany, Soviet Russia, Communist China, South Africa, East Germany and Rwanda, a strong 
association between the key components of the state dossier system and government oppression. 
In the worst, most well known cases of oppression, including Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and 
modern China in the late 60s through early 80s, both components of the system were in active use 
and worked in concert. The Soviet Union and modern China developed particularly detailed 
personal record systems that reflected a total (totalitarian7) interest the citizen subject, an interest 
that went beyond keeping them inline and obedient to include their active spiritual and cultural 
cultivation.  
… the collection of information was not an end in itself: surveillance was not primarily 
intended to reflect public opinion, nor was it meant merely for the preventive, protective 
task of forestalling any possible opposition (although it was most certainly put to that use, 
too). Surveillance was an instrumental endeavor, aimed at reshaping society and 
transforming every individual in it. And it was only as part of this larger project of 
transforming each and every individual that surveillance was used to recognize the 
recalcitrant (so they could be singled out for special attention) and, later, to identify those 
impervious to improvement (so they could be eliminated and no longer pollute the body 
politic….This is not a minor or semantic distinction. Soviet citizens knew surveillance 
was instrumental. They knew (though how extensively most could not guess) that, 
through surveillance, the state was not only reporting what they said and wrote but also 
                                                     
7 This term will be addressed in detail below. 
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seeking to use this information to change and correct them and their views. Surveillance 
was not a passive, observational endeavor; it was an active, constructivist one. (Holquist, 
1997, p. 417) 
At times, such as in the case of Nazi Germany, South Africa and in earlier Soviet history 
under the Cheka secret police, the state’s interest in gathering information was primarily to 
identify and constrain or eliminate “enemies of the state,” a term that could be very widely 
construed. 
Information is the alpha and omega of our work. 
Our work should concentrate on the information apparatus, for only when the Cheka is 
sufficiently informed and has precise data elucidating organizations and their individual 
members will it be able ... to take timely and necessary measures for liquidating groups as 
well as the individual who is harmful and dangerous. (Cheka circulars, 1920-21, quoted 
in Holquist, 1997, p. 
In Nazi Germany, the Third Reich made use of a complex data system of punch cards maintained 
by International Business Machines (IBM), a system which was instrumental in the roundup and 
eventual extermination of millions of Jews: 
Jews could not hide from millions of punch card thudding through Hollerith machines, 
comparing names across generations, address changes across regions, family trees and 
personal data across unending registries...Even as Hitler’s fanatic followers 
thundermarched through Nuremberg, Hollerith machines in Berlin were dispassionately 
clicking and rattling through stacks of punch cards slapping into hoppers to identify the 
enemy for the next drastic measures. (Black, 2001, p. 105, quoted in Sobel, 2002) 
In South Africa, the white minority government’s practice of apartheid was greatly facilitated by 
a computerized passbook system made possible by a number of U.S. IT corporations including 
IBM and Burroughs:  
More than any other single technological advancement, the computer has fostered the 
concentration of administrative power in the hands of South Africa’s white elite. Since 
the days of the first automated population register, computer use has spread to virtually 
every government department, playing a key role in Pretoria’s ability to manage the 
African, Asian and Indian population. (“Automating Apartheid,” 1982, p. 14) 
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Historians largely agree that the Rwandan genocide in 1994, in which more than 500,000 
ethnic Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus were killed, was greatly facilitated by the presence 
of national ID cards with ethnic group classification introduced by the Belgian colonial 
government in 1933 (Longman, 2001). The ID card system, in addition to facilitating the 
identification of genocide targets, served to psychologically distance the killers from the civilians 
they were instructed to kill. This type of distancing, argues Fussell (2004), occurs “whether the 
task is genocide, deportation or applying discriminatory restrictions” (p. 65). 
Soldiers had orders to take identity cards from those whom they killed. According to one 
witness, Nizeyimana regularly received these cards from his men as they reported on the 
progress of the killings. They often appeared at his house shortly after a volley of gunfire 
was heard and handed the cards to the captain with the report, “Mission accomplished.” 
In the captain’s absence, his wife received the cards. (p. 65) 
The Rwandan genocide appears to be connected mostly to an identity card and the ethnic 
classification it bore, rather than any detailed system of personal records. It is important to 
recognize that the decision to place the identity on the card, indeed the decision to make the 
ethnic distinction in the first place, merely afforded the genocide. It still took a failure of 
humanity for the act that followed. Once in place, however, dossier systems may be appropriated 
by states with different intentions.  
Although a detailed “population registry” system had been part of the Dutch bureaucracy 
since the early 1800s, the program was not an instrument of government oppression until it was 
put to different use by the occupying Nazi army during WWII. The Dutch “personal card system” 
contained information about each citizen’s religion, occupation, disabilities, and other 
characteristics. Writing in the General Archive of Statistics, about the modern population registry 
in 1936, overseeing statisticians Methorst and Lentz wrote “[t]heoretically, the collection of data 
for each person can be so abundant, and even complete, that we can speak at last of a paper 
human who represents the natural human” (Aly et al, 2004, p. 66). In the state’s comprehensive 
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population registration system, all civil rights, duties, and benefits of citizenship were based on 
registration. The Dutch registry provided the invading Nazi army with detailed lists of Jews and 
their locations that were unavailable to them in other European countries like France, and was 
further developed into a highly sophisticated ID card system which made it particularly difficult 
for Jews to go underground or find black market jobs (Moore, 1997). 
As we explore this term in detail, we will see that state dossier systems are in many ways 
relatively new phenomena, as they are dependent on modern electronic networked 
communication technology to achieve their scope and depth of coverage. Nevertheless, states in 
history have implemented national ID card systems and comprehensive file systems on their 
citizens, and these practices have been associated with government oppression so extreme that it 
led to the emergence of a new term: totalitarianism.   
Historically, when states begin to keep comprehensive detailed files on their citizens, 
injustice has often followed. Can we conclude that state dossier systems are in essence 
totalitarian? Solove, points out that Kafka’s story of The Trial shows us a world in which the 
personal file can end up terrorizing us without any larger, socially disruptive program organized 
and directed by the state. In Kafka’s world, there was no active state program to spiritually mold 
and educate its citizen or to terrorize and eliminate the “opposition,” only a simple reverence for 
files, documents and bureaucratic procedure.  
In order to examine the concept of the state dossier system in more detail, we need to 
consider its key entailments and core concepts, including the concept of totalitarianism, its 
definition, and its present utility in illuminating potentially dangerous scenarios of our global 
future that political leaders, social activists and academics must work together to prevent.  
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CONCEPTUAL ELABORATION 
To better understand the entailments of the state dossier system frame, I will introduce a 
set of key concepts to which I refer when considering the problem. These concepts vary in their 
level of abstraction, in the formality or informality of their definitions, and in their diffusion into 
the lexicon of broader academia and public discourse, but they play an important role in helping 
to illuminate the space of relations (actual and possible) that constitute a state dossier system: 
privacy, totalitarianism, identity, system of records, personally identifying information, 
production, data shadow/ data double,  and affordance. These are not in all cases “components” 
of the state dossier system, but concepts of distinction which help us to both problematize and 
make sense of it. Although it would be possible to present these terms in a continuous logical 
narrative, it would be artificial and eventually constricting to their utility in analysis. Instead, I 
present each concept on its own terms, under its particular heading. Once I have discussed these 
key concepts, I will then elaborate more specifically how the state dossier system should be seen 
as a significant social problem. 
PRIVACY 
As was discussed in chapter 1, there is considerable disagreement within American 
academic discourse as to how to define privacy. For the purposes of this dissertation, I wish to 
focus on the work of two privacy scholars which have particular relevance to the study of state 
dossier systems, Altman’s (1981) work on privacy as an “interpersonal boundary process” and 
Nissenbaum’s (2004) theory of “contextual integrity.” 
INTERPERSONAL BOUNDARY PROCESS 
Social psychologist Irwin Altman (1981) presents a comprehensive, but highly abstract 
model of privacy as an “interpersonal-boundary process.” Individuals and groups negotiate a 
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dialectic tension between a need for openness and “closedness” to the outside world, as 
conditions and circumstances change: 
. . . privacy is not solely a “keep-out” or “let-in” process; it involves a synthesis of being 
in contact with others and being out of contact with others. The desire for social 
interaction or non-interaction changes over time and with different circumstances. The 
idea of privacy as a dialectic process, therefore, means that there is a balancing of 
opposing forces-to be open and accessible to others and to be shut off or closed to others-
and that the net strength of these competing forces changes over time. (p. 23)  
Altman’s boundary negotiation model consists of eight distinct “privacy situations” accounting 
for management of both inputs and outputs and the difference between desired and achieved 
privacy. Cases 1-4 deal with the control of input from others, while cases 5-8 deal with the 
control of output to others. Half of all cases involve situations in which individuals managing 
their interpersonal boundaries have achieved a desired level of privacy while half represent some 
type of imbalance, either too little privacy or too much privacy.  
Key to Altman’s boundary negotiation theory are the resources — what he calls “privacy 
mechanisms” — individuals and groups have available to them in the management of boundaries. 
Altman makes four primary distinctions here: 1) verbal, 2) non-verbal, 3) environmental, and 4) 
culturally-based privacy mechanisms. Verbal mechanisms would include specific requests to be 
left alone or, when a couple or small group desires privacy from surrounding “others,” the use of 
a foreign language. Non-verbal mechanisms include various forms of body language and facial 
expressions. “Gaze aversion,” for example, can be a signal to others that one is not interested in 
interaction, and thus can be used for limiting contact. Environmental mechanisms include the use 
of clothing and adornment, the management of personal space, and finally, the use of more 
general environmental features such as territories, areas and objects. Finally, culturally-based 
privacy mechanisms refer to the distinct norms and customs of particular societies and cultures. 
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Going forward, I am less concerned with Altman’s attempt to categorize privacy 
mechanisms than his more general abstract notion that privacy is a dialectic negotiation afforded 
by resources. Instead of using his term “privacy mechanism,” however, I will use the term 
“boundary resource.” As we shall see, numerous subcategories of these “boundary resources” 
may be identified, including legal, technological, normative and linguistic resources. By leaving 
the categorization scheme open and recursive, however, we can avoid blind spots that might 
emerge from too strict a taxonomy, while facilitating research across cultural and discursive 
systems. Boundary resources are key to the negotiation of privacy within any social system. Their 
distribution is dependent on state policies, law and individual cultural and technological 
innovations, but they may transfer effectively between even highly dissimilar nation states such 
as China and the U.S.. 
Altman’s theory of privacy as boundary negotiation has been highly influential within the 
social sciences (Margulis, 2003). The dialectic approach to privacy appears to avoid some of the 
pitfalls of arguing over instrumentality vs. basic right. Rather than attempt to define privacy in 
more explicit or static terms, we can focus our attention on the distribution and availability of 
boundary resources. A focus on boundary resources (legal, normative, technological, linguistic) 
may also allow policy makers and cultural innovators opportunities to make incremental changes 
to the privacy environment without whole cloth reconfiguration of communication practices that 
broader reconceptualizations might entail.  
The theory’s high level of abstraction and focus on the role of one’s physical 
environment rather than mediated communication, however, has made it difficult to apply to 21st 
century situations without further conceptual development. Scholars have offered a wide range of 
classificatory schema for boundaries in the hopes of adding empirical analytical power (Derlega 
& Chaikin, 1977; Petronio, 2002; Palen & Dourish, 2003), but they have yet to converge, in part 
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because of the complex and dynamic nature of the privacy concept itself. Rather than follow this 
path, I wish to narrow Altman’s general definition of privacy to more specific circumstances of 
“information privacy.” With this added semantic constraint, I consider openness and closedness 
to the outside world in terms of the creation and flow of personal information, a phenomenon that 
can be observed in all cultures of the world. 
CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY 
Rather than attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of privacy, Nissenbaum (2004) 
carves out a narrower goal of developing a “theoretical account of a right to privacy as it applies 
to information about people.” 8  Nissenbaum notes that public deliberations over privacy are 
usually based on three prevailing principles: 1) protecting the privacy of individuals against 
intrusive government agents, 2) restricting access to intimate, sensitive, or confidential 
information, and 3) curtailing intrusions into spaces or spheres deemed private or personal. 
Although these principles have been effective in protecting privacy in traditional scenarios such 
as a policeman seeking to gain entry into your home or someone gaining unauthorized access to 
the case notes of your psychologist, these principles apply less well to what Nissenbaum 
describes as technologically mediated instances of “public surveillance.” Such cases include the 
availability of public records online and consumer profiling and data mining. To deal with these 
new scenarios, Nissenbaum offers the concept of contextual integrity. 
In short, contextual integrity is a principle which is designed to limit access to and 
distribution of personally identifiable information that on its own may not be considered sensitive 
and may not require intrusions into private spaces by government or private agents to acquire. It 
is designed to protect your privacy in information that may be stored on databases far from your 
place of residence. 
                                                     
8 This is often referred to in the literature as "informational privacy." 
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Contextual integrity is based on two informational norms: appropriateness and 
distribution. Norms of appropriateness “dictate what information about a person is appropriate, or 
fitting, to reveal in a particular context” (p. 120). It may be appropriate, for example, to reveal 
information about your sexual habits to your doctor, or your salary to your banker, but not vice 
versa. Further, it might be appropriate for your doctor to reveal information about your latest 
medical procedure to your insurance company, but not your employer. Distribution deals with the 
“movement or transfer of information from one party to another or others” (p. 122). Norms of 
distribution focus not on whether the information is appropriate for a given context but whether 
its flow respects contextual norms of information flow. If Amazon stores the purchase and book 
browsing patterns of its customers so that it may offer suggestions of new books of interest and 
does not sell this information to third parties, it is not in violation of the norm of distribution. 
Contextual integrity is violated if one or both of the two norms is violated. 
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity provides a powerful conceptual tool for 
analyzing the potential impact of emerging state dossier systems: 
According to the theory of contextual integrity, it is crucial to know the context - who is 
gathering the information, who is analyzing it, who is disseminating it and to whom, the 
nature of the information, the relationships among the various parties, and even larger 
institutional and social circumstances. It matters that the context is, say, a grocery store as 
opposed to, say, a job interview or a gun shop. When we evaluate sharing information 
with third party users of data, it is important to know something about those parties, such 
as their social roles, their capacity to affect the lives of data subjects, and their intentions 
with regard to subjects. It is important to ask whether the information practice under 
consideration harms subjects; interferes with their self determination; or amplifies 
undesirable inequalities in status, power, and wealth. (p. 137) 
PRIVACY VS. INFORMATION PRIVACY 
With the new reality of ubiquitous network communication technology, the emphasis of 
privacy concerns appears to be squarely upon information privacy. Yet how do we distinguish 
between privacy and information privacy? Are they distinct or is one reducible to the other? This 
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is ultimately a philosophical question that I do not intend to solve in this dissertation, but it is also 
a practical one. Allen (1996) advises theorists to tread carefully: 
Is physical privacy reducible to informational privacy? The Fourth Amendment restricts 
access to people, households and other private areas, while also restricting access to 
information of the sort that might be contained in a person’s papers, effects, and 
conversations. Since physical contact can yield new information, one might take the view 
that concerns about restricting physical access ultimately boil down to concerns about 
information learned through sensory exposure. . . . 
From the point of view of the person whose privacy is at issue, uncovering information 
about a person and uncovering the person can be invasions of different dimensions. For 
example, although both invasions are offensive, it is probably less assaultive to have 
one’s sexual orientation revealed as a result of unauthorized access to one’s bedroom 
during a sex act (a physical invasion). (p. 148) 
I believe it is fair to say that privacy has much broader connotations that are lost under the rubric 
of information privacy, but what we lose in richness we may gain in analytical clarity. I offer a 
working definition of information privacy (which can in many cases stand in for the more elusive 
“privacy”) in the following way: a state of successfully shielding the observation or creation of 
any piece of extant data (a record, a sentence, an image, a sound recording) that is linked to a 
unique individual; a negotiation to reach this state that is afforded by boundary resources 
(Altman’s privacy mechanisms). 
By focusing on the term information privacy, I do not want to dismiss more direct, 
physical aspects of its parent concept. Nevertheless, information privacy can be understood to 
apply to a wide range of situations in which the common denominator is personal information, 
regardless of its form or medium. Further, information privacy is resonant with Altman’s dialectic 
negotiation model. As individuals, we expect to exercise some control over the extant information 
that is associated with us, for example, by choosing when to speak and when to hold our tongues, 
when to write a letter to the editor and when to make a notation in our locked diary, or when to 
simply forget. To lose control over this process is to lose control over the construction of our own 
identities (Gavison, 1980; Cohen, 2003).  
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Information privacy is about information that is associated with individual people. How 
we determine this, how we classify a piece of information as being “personally identifiable” turns 
out to be a highly complex question with no simple answer. Whether a particular piece of 
information is personally identifiable depends a great deal on the resources of the observing 
party, not to mention the specific content and context of a message. How the information is 
created and how it is associated with its subjects is a key question in need of more research. 
Technologies of identification, which afford the production of personally identifiable information 
(PII), are developing at a rapid pace.  
TOTALITARIANISM 
… the control and monopolisation of information permitting the surveillance of a 
population, with the disappearance of the more disaggregated class-divided societies, is a 
potent medium of power. ‘Classical social theory’ did not recognise the potentiality of 
what has become in our day a fundamental threat to human liberties, totalitarian political 
control maintained through a society-wide system of surveillance, linked to the ‘policing’ 
of day-to-day life. The expansion of surveillance in the hands of the state can support a 
class-based totalitarianism of the right (fascism); but it can also produce a strongly 
developed totalitarianism of the left (Stalinism). (Giddens, 1985, pp. 174-5) 
The concept of totalitarianism, most famously promulgated by Hannah Arendt (1951), has been 
subject to considerable debate and criticism within academia. Outside of a general agreement that 
Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia exhibited historically unprecedented control over the lives of 
their citizens, many have criticized Arendt’s conceptualization as essentially too brittle to be 
useful as a tool for general political theory. I will not attempt to provide a definitive definition of 
the term here, but explore some of the most common associated characteristics and their 
relevance for the problem of state dossier systems today. 
What distinguishes a totalitarian government from a merely tyrannical or despotic 
government is the degree to which the totalitarian government “penetrates every pore of the social 
organism” (Tucker, 1965, p. 560). This penetration of the mass public dramatically reduces the 
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potential for violent resistance that simmers under the surface of any tyrannical state. The public 
is shaped and molded according to a unitary state ideology, while at the same time being stripped 
of any potential for spontaneous human associations. “Individual spontaneity-in thinking, in any 
aspiration, or in any creative undertaking-that sustains and renews the human world is obliterated 
in totalitarianism. Totalitarianism destroys everything that politics, even the circumscribed 
political realm of a tyranny, makes possible” (Kohn, n.d., n.p.). 
For Arendt, a key aspect of the totalitarian state, the chief means through which it 
reduced humanity’s capacity for creativity, innovation or any form of resistance to the state’s 
agenda, was the widespread, indiscriminate visitation of terror upon the mass public. Highly 
sophisticated population registries linked to internal passports or national identity cards were an 
instrumental part of this process in the prototypical totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and 
Stalinist Russia.  
While the visitation of violence and terror upon the mass public was a critical component 
of Arendt’s conceptualization of totalitarianism, other scholars have suggested a different 
scenario. Kassof (1964) conceived a form of totalitarianism in which such active violence is not 
necessary, where the penetration of the mass public is achieved via highly efficient forms of 
bureaucracy and administration. 
Convinced that there should be complete order and predictability in human affairs, the 
elite is concerned not merely with the “commanding heights,” but also to an 
overwhelming degree with the detailed regulation of the entire range of social life, 
including those institutions which, in the West, typically have been regarded as lying 
beyond the legitimate scope of public authority and political intervention. The rulers of 
the administered society refuse to grant the possibility of unguided coordination and 
integration; they believe, on the contrary, that not only the masses but responsible 
subgroups (for example, the professions) are incapable of maintaining viable social order 
on their own, without the precise and detailed supervision of an omniscient political 
directorate. (p. 559) 
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Similarly, Los (2006) suggests that different forms of terror can be visited upon the 
public without the widespread mass violence of the prototypical totalitarian regimes. Instead, the 
regime atomizes the mass public via the radical destruction of trust: 
… totalitarian surveillance aims at a radical destruction of trust. Its key mechanism 
involves a conversion of every member of society into a police surrogate for both oneself 
and others. The penetration of society by the secret police and its collaborators induces 
pervasive fear, suspiciousness and mistrust. Consequently, each individual not only views 
all others as potential spies but must also be aware of being similarly viewed by others. 
This creates painful barriers of fear and humiliation that divide and terrorize society. 
People have no way of verifying who is a secret agent and have no way of preventing 
others from suspecting them of being one. The resultant culture of fear and suspicion 
atomizes society and thwarts social resistance. (p. 83) 
For the extant literature on totalitarianism to be of relevance to the current study of 
dossier systems, it is not necessary to define the term definitively or engage in all or nothing 
propositions about whether this or that state government is or will be “totalitarian”” but rather “to 
a study of how states might (or might not) employ certain practices in a totalitarian manner” 
(Holquist, 1997, p. 450).  Although it may be tempting to think we have learned from history, and 
current safeguards in the law and practical political wisdom will keep living, real-world social 
systems far from the “basin of attraction” that is the totalitarian project, avoiding this eventuality 
will take continued vigilance and a deep understanding of the factors that could both propel and 
inhibit the emergence of a “dossier society” centered around extremely powerful state 
institutions.  
IDENTITY 
Identity is such an important, salient topic for humanity as a whole that it can be very 
difficult to talk about it without raising controversy. Identity is about who we are as individuals 
and as groups. A key distinction we need to bear in mind right up front is that between identity 
and identification: 
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Identity is associated with individual agency because it is related to the ability of the 
individual to shape her identity beyond the gaze and influence of powerful others. Those 
who advocate the defense of privacy against the threats of technology and social practice 
do so, in part, because of the belief that the “right to be left alone” is fundamental to the 
development of the autonomous individual. Identification on the other hand, is 
understood in the context of the exercise of power and authority. (Gandy, 2000, p. 2) 
In other words, we can think of identity as something that is determined by an individual on their 
own (self-determination) or something that is ascribed to them. This ascription of identity may be 
done without the knowledge of the person (subject) or it may be assigned to them against their 
will. In the normal functioning of society it is quite natural and necessary for both types of 
identity to be constructed. Reputation, for example, is part of a person’s identity that is socially 
determined and is critical to the functioning of any complex society (Solove, 2007; Allen, 2003; 
Posner, 1978). 
Although the term identity is highly controversial, it is possible to define it in a neutral 
manner that is inclusive of both self-determined and ascribed entities. The definition comes from 
the NRC ID card primer IDs, Not that Easy (Kent & Millet, 2002): 
Identity: The identity of X according to Y is a set of statements believed by Y to be true 
about X....Identity generally refers to a set of information about X, especially in the 
context of a particular identity system. (p. 12) 
Using this definition, we can see that substituting Y for X, identity can be self-defined. My 
identity, as I would like to believe it, consists of the total set of true statements that I can make 
about myself. As we begin to explore the implications of this definition in detail, we will begin to 
see how an identity is ultimately a discursive object whose subject is the identified person.  
Our identity, this collection of statements, can be a mixture of statements that we produce 
intentionally, statements that are produced by others about us, and statements that represent traces 
of mediated interactions we have engaged in the past. There at times may be disputes about this 
identity, with more powerful discourses often winning out over weaker ones, regardless of any 
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inherent truths contained in the entities themselves. In the past, individual citizens of modern 
civilizations have been able to construct multiple identities both serially and in parallel, in a 
manner entirely harmonious with the stability and security interests of society. Parents, for 
example, have had one identity they shared with their children and another they shared with each 
other. Employees have a particular identity they share with an employer and a different identity 
they share with old college friends.  
SYSTEM OF RECORDS 
The term “system of records” is used in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 to describe “a 
group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the 
name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular 
assigned to the individual.” A record, as the Privacy Act defines it, “means a group of any records 
under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual 
or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual” 
(5 U.S.C. § 552a ). 
This term has been criticized by some within the computer science field as unclear, 
inaccurate, and out of date: 
Quite unlike a system of records, today’s databases are heterogeneous, having complex 
structures determined by the purposes for which they were constructed, and plagued by 
difficulties in semantic interoperability because of different vocabularies and different 
perspectives on the use of the data. Further, they are often maintained by multiple sites, 
are capable of linkage of records across databases, and may not be under the control of a 
single authority. This makes the application of existing law and administrative procedures 
problematical. (Duncan, 2003, p. 6) 
Similarly, Clarke (1994) points out that “information system” is a better, general term which is 
understood to include not only records, “but also computer-based processes, manual procedures 
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and man-machine interfaces” (n.p.). Clarke concludes “[t]his article therefore avoids the term 
“system of records” and suggests that legislative draftsmen do likewise” (n.p.). 
While these critiques certainly have validity, the term “system of records” remains the 
language of U.S. law and policy and has a certain value despite its entailments and assumptions. 
While the term “record” implies a type of data object that is standardized and controlled by a 
particular institution, there is a great deal of data out there containing personally identifying 
information that is not part of an institutional record system. While it is true that the term does not 
address this greater ontological range of personal data elements, any state dossier system will 
necessarily involve a “system of records” to facilitate the retrieval of data linked to a particular 
person. As with any fixed definition, the term does remain open to certain semantic games. Some 
agencies have avoided the Privacy Act requirement for notice of any time a “new” SoR is planned 
by claiming that although the database itself may be new, the records of which it is comprised 
were produced within other systems of records subject to their own notice requirements. Clarke 
argues for the term “set of records,” a suitably vague term to indicate a grouping of records held 
under the auspices of a single institution; but again, this is not the current legal term in use. 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
It is important, for the analysis that follows, to make clear distinctions between three 
terms that are often conflated in academic and policy literature: personal information, personally 
identifying information, and personally identifiable information. We can define personal 
information as any information that was produced by or describes some aspect of a person. That 
information may later be used to develop an understanding of an individual person or human 
behavior in general.  Personal information, though it is drawn from specific individuals, is not 
necessarily linked to them. If someone participates in an anonymous computer survey about 
particular health behaviors and no data is stored related to their IP address, their personal data is 
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very likely to be anonymous data. Within this broad class of personal information, when the 
record includes specific text that specifically points to that person, such as a social security 
number or driver’s license, then this constitutes personally identifying information.  Other 
information, such as a phone number or address, is also specific enough to be considered 
personally identifying information, since it will correspond to one or only a handful of people.  
Personally identifiable information describes records of personal information where it may be 
possible, depending on the specific information and the resources of a particular actor, to trace the 
information back to the specific individual who was sourced. So called anonymous information is 
personal information that has no chance of being traced back to the individual in question. As we 
will see, the range of definitively anonymous personal information is quite small.  
Philips (2004) distinguishes between three different forms of identification: lexical, 
descriptive, and indexical. Lexical identification is the assigning of a name to a particular class of 
thing, like the Latin names given to individual plant species. Descriptive identification, on the 
other hand, assigns attributes to an entity that distinguishes it in some way from another entity. 
Telling a police officer that we saw someone with blonde hair and a limp is descriptive 
identification. Finally, indexical identification points to a specific entity. Pointing at someone 
running down the street and yelling “stop thief” is indexical identification, but so is assigning a 
unique tag such as a social security or driver’s license number.  
When we talk about personally identifiable information instead of personally identifying 
information, we are generally talking about a distinction between indexical and descriptive 
identification. If description is detailed enough, it can make indexical identification possible, but 
only when the combined attributes in the description represent a unique combination not 
possessed by others. This is why it is important to consider very carefully the actual data stored in 
a supposedly anonymized record. 
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It is helpful in this context, to add a fourth class of identification between descriptive and 
indexical information, which we might call contextual indexical identification. This type of 
identification is more than simple description, because it is used to distinguish a particular entity, 
a customer, from all other entities that an institution deals with, but it does not necessarily 
facilitate the identification of the individual outside the context of the particular business 
relationship. Consider, for example, if Amazon stored a database of individual customer book 
purchases indexed by a customer number, rather than a driver’s license, credit card, or social 
security number.  If this database were leaked and accessed by someone outside the company, 
this book purchase information (most likely) could not be linked to specific individuals and 
joined with other data such as their medical or employment history. 
Determining whether a data set, even if contains only contextual, indexical identifiers, is 
truly anonymous, is not a simple task. Although a number of models for anonymity within a data 
set have been developed by computer scientists, including k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002), l-
diversity (Machanavajjhala et al, 2006) and t-closeness (Li et al, 2007), many of these models 
have been shown to be vulnerable to different types of attack, particularly when the attacker has 
access to additional sources of personal data. 
PRODUCTION 
Cognition is the most socially conditioned activity of man, and knowledge is the 
paramount social creation. (Fleck, 1979, p. 42) 
A great deal of work in the academic field known as “social construction of reality” has 
challenged the notion that “facts” exist out there in the world waiting to be discovered.  Latour & 
Woolgar (1986), for example, have shown that seemingly objective scientific facts are not 
discovered but are thoroughly constituted by the material setting of the laboratory. Summarizing 
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the early work of Fleck on the Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Golinksi (2005) 
explains: 
The social character of knowledge is revealed by the circumstances of its production 
within a specific interactive community ... which sustains a distinctive mode of 
reasoning....  ( p. 32) 
I do not wish to enter the active discourse over the relative merits of the social constructivist 
critique of modern science, but the insights they offer are particularly useful when considering the 
world of personally identifying information. Personal information is not simply, “out there.” It is 
produced within specific social, institutional, and technological contexts. Without first the 
production of information, its “objectivation” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) into material form 
manifested in our common world, information cannot be collected.   
The production of information occurs at the moment a symbolic representation takes 
physical, persistent form in a medium of storage, the moment that information becomes bound to 
an artifact. Two people talking on the telephone, in this definition, are not producing information; 
rather, they are communicating. If, on the other hand, the telephone company is secretly recording 
the conversation (storing it, for example, on a reel-to-reel tape that that is then labeled and stored 
away in a file cabinet) a form of information has been produced. My use of “production” then, is 
intended to highlight two aspects of personal information that tend to be hidden within the more 
common, “collection” frame. First, that the storage of otherwise “immaterial” information within 
a specific medium is contingent, dependent upon specific institutional and individual choices. 
Second, that the information itself encodes a particular symbolic structure implicated within a 
larger structure of meaning that creates as much as it captures regarding the data subject. 
As part of the exploration of personal information production within state dossier systems 
I will use the terms “site” and “logic” of production. The term “site of production” has multiple 
meanings depending on context. It may refer to the institutional site of production of a particular 
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system of records, such as the IRS or the FBI. It may refer to the actual physical location of 
record production, whether it occurs within an office at the subject’s place of employment or 
inside a police car on a state highway, or a combination of physical locales that may be involved 
in the production and storage of electronic records. Consideration of the site of production 
includes an examination of the record itself and its attributes, not only the physical form it takes 
(paper and ink, stone, compact disc) but the specific attributes of the symbols that comprise the 
specific media object (in other words, the content of the record) and the discursive formation of 
which they are a part. Questions about what is produced, who produces it and where they produce 
are also critical to understanding the sites of production. 
The term, “logic of production,” refers primarily to both the how (specific procedures and 
affordances) and the why (criteria, justification) of production. It helps us consider the specific 
schema which are used to determine specific moments of production. What is the justification for 
producing PII within this particular context (at this particular site)? Is the justification based on 
the utility of the information or its potential profit value or something else? What specific criteria 
for producing PII records are given to the producers and do they end up following these criteria? 
How does the development and diffusion of information technology impact how PII records are 
ultimately produced (or not produced). Other aspects of the how of production might include 
specific training scenarios given to potential producers, such as state agents for programs 
connected to specific systems of records like suspicious activity reports. How is a particular 
system of records configured to produce records? What situational conditions must be present for 
production to be triggered? How is the production of the record afforded? What resources 
facilitate production? Is it produced by a human agent with specific training or is it automatically 
generated within a technologically enabled system?  
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Within any state dossier system there are multiple sites and logics of PII production. As 
we examine a specific case, we want to be able to speak to the most important sites and logics and 
underline what might be “problematic” about them. That is, particular logics of production may 
be unsound and may afford extremes in practice that are ultimately contrary to the public interest.  
DATA SHADOW/DOUBLE 
The term “data shadow,” the totality of individually identifiable data left behind by 
people as they go through their daily lives, was first coined by privacy scholar Alan Westin 
(1967). Although the phrase did not catch on initially, its increasing relevance in the Internet age 
has led to its resurgence, and the emergence of a new, more ontologically distinct notion, the 
“data double” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). 
We can think of the difference between data doubles and data shadows in terms of 
discourse theory, where the data double is the object produced within a particular discourse and is 
the collection of statements about an individual within that discourse that constitutes their 
identity. Poster (1990) was one of the first communication scholars to talk about this discursive 
relationship between databases and individual identity via what he called the Superpanopticon:  
... the discourse of databases, the Superpanopticon, is a means of controlling masses in 
the postmodern, postindustrial mode of information….the population participates in its 
own self-constitution as subjects of the normalizing gaze of the Superpanopticon. We see 
databases not as invasion of privacy, as a threat to the centered individual, but as the 
multiplication of the individual, the constitution of an additional self, one that may be 
acted upon to the detriment of the “real” self without the “real” self ever being aware of 
what is happening. (Poster, 1990, pp. 97-8) 
The additional self of which Poster speaks is discursively constructed (drawing on 
Foucault’s (1972) theory of discourse) through a process known as interpellation. The process 
generates the subject out of the space of relations emerging from the objects of the particular 
discourse. For example, in the discourse of psychiatry, concepts such as manic depression or 
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libido establish a space of relations in which individuals are constituted as mental patients. Poster 
points out that the process of interpellation via database is much different in character than in the 
classroom or the doctor’s office, in which the interpellated subject is present and (at least 
somewhat) able to influence the process: 
With databases, most often, the individual is constituted in absentia, only indirect 
evidence such as junk mail testifying to the event. Interpellation by database in this 
respect is closer to the instance of writing, with the reader-subject being hailed by an 
absent author. But here again there are important differences: from the standpoint of the 
person being interpellated, the writer is known, even if only as a writer, and is an 
individual or finite group of individuals. The reader very often intentionally selects to be 
interpellated by the particular author, whereas in the case of computer databases that is 
rarely if ever the case. Interpellation by database is a complicated configuration of 
unconsciousness, indirection, automation, and absentmindedness both on the part of the 
producer of the database and on the part of the individual subject being constituted by it. 
(p. 187) 
 This process of interpellation which leads to the creation of the data double takes place 
within a single database, a single system of records. The data double has become the preferred 
focus of attention in place of living, breathing people, as institutional agents make decisions about 
them. Individuals remain at least partial producers of their data doubles and can exercise certain 
choices that impact their size and character. This control, however, is highly correlated with one’s 
available economic resources, and can be reversed into suggestibility; a process Zarsky (2003) 
calls the “autonomy trap.” 
The data shadow, on the other hand, is a more diffuse entity than the data double. One’s 
data shadow is the totality of all data one might associate with an individual. While the shape and 
depth of a sun shadow is a straightforward combination of the person, the ground and the light 
behind them, the production of one’s data shadow is far more complex, with a far more dubious 
connection to the subject herself. It comprises all personally identifying data indexed to a unique 
individual in systems that may or may not interconnect, data that includes errors and willful 
misrepresentations. At any given moment, the data double in use during institutional praxis is 
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unlikely to contain anywhere near this totality of information (though it certainly may contain 
errors). In the ideal dossier system, however, all data from an individual’s data shadow would be 
accessed in the process of interpellation, yielding a data double of unusual detail and scope.  
Data doubles, in and of themselves, are often useful and necessary things. Without them, 
much of what we take for granted in the modern world, such as buying things on credit, doing 
business with people with whom we have had no prior relationship, drawing unemployment 
insurance, getting customized book recommendations, or getting accepted into an educational 
institution without first having to fly there in person, would be impossible, or at the very least, 
much more difficult. We cannot expect private or public institutions to stop producing data 
doubles without dramatic, often negative impact on our daily lives. At the same time, data 
doubles can be the cause of great injustice and inequality. As data doubles grow in importance in 
our lives, they begin to erode the significance of our own selves: 
The notion of individual biographical truth, already weakened by current epistemologies, 
is further marginalized by pragmatic institutional choices, where both actuarial 
calculations and data-matching procedures constantly produce real consequences for 
individuals represented by their ersatz doubles. (Los, 2006, p. 86) 
AFFORDANCE 
Originally developed by Gibson, the concept of affordance addresses the physical 
properties of an object or environment and its impact on the possibility for action. In Gibson’s 
theory, physical objects and features, when considered in conjunction with physiological 
attributes of specific animal species, afford certain actions. Trees afford climbing for squirrels. 
Tree branches afford perching for owls. Chairs afford sitting for people. Key in Gibson’s original 
argument is that affordances emerge out of a relation between physical characteristics of the 
environment and those physiological capabilities of a particular species; they are not inherent in 
the environment or physical objects. The very conception of affordance requires the presence of 
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both nodes in the relation. This protects the analyst from independently assigning intrinsic 
properties to external objects without the participation of living beings and thereby falling into the 
“essentialist trap.” 
Hutchby (2001) extends Gibson’s concept of affordance to include not just features of 
natural and man-made objects in the environment but our relationship to technology of all kinds: 
I want to propose an approach to the study of technologies and social life which offers a 
reconciliation between the opposing poles of constructivism and realism. This involves 
seeing technologies neither in terms of their ‘interpretive textual’ properties nor of their 
‘essential technical’ properties, but in terms of their affordances (Gibson 1979). I will 
argue that affordances are functional and relational aspects which frame, while not 
determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object. In this way, 
technologies can be understood as artefacts which may be both shaped by and shaping of 
the practices humans use in interaction with, around and through them. This ‘third way’ 
between the (constructivist) emphasis on the shaping power of human agency and the 
(realist) emphasis on the constraining power of technical capacities opens the way for 
new analyses of how technological artefacts become important elements in the patterns of 
ordinary human conduct. (p. 444) 
In the course of this dissertation I will make use of the concept of affordance in two 
senses: first, as particular kinds of communication technologies develop, they can afford the 
production and exchange of personal information; second, the presence of certain kinds of records 
within a state information system affords, though does not necessarily determine, certain types of 
behavior.  
THE PROBLEM 
Laudon (1986) introduced the term “dossier society” to frame the problem of database 
surveillance specifically in terms of state power and the aggregation of personal data into large-
scale information systems: 
From the individual’s point of view, the most significant characteristic of the dossier 
society is that decisions made about us as citizens, employees, consumers, debtors, and 
supplicants rely less and less on personal face-to-face contact, on what we say or even 
what we do. Instead, decisions are based on information that is held in national systems, 
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and interpreted by bureaucrats and clerical workers in distant locations. The decisions 
made about us are based on a comprehensive “data image” drawn from diverse files. 
From a technical and structural view, the central characteristic of the dossier society is 
the integration of distinct files serving unique programs and policies into more or less 
permanent national databases.... 
From a political and sociological view, the key feature of the dossier society is an 
aggregation of power in the federal government without precedent in peacetime America. 
From a cultural view, the dossier society is one which exposes thousands of officially 
selected moments in your past to confront you with the threads of an intricate web, 
revealing your “official life,” the one you must live with and explain to whatever 
authority chooses to demand an explanation. (pp. 3-4) 
The state dossier society that Laudon warns about here is facilitated by the nexus of two 
systems: 1) a national system of identification and 2) one or more systems of records for the 
storage and management of personal information. These two components work synergistically to 
enable a “dossier system” in which the production of personal information expands in an 
accelerating feed-back loop. As state bureaucracies and large scale private corporations have 
become more effective at producing and enforcing the use of personal ID, they have learned to 
check claims directly against their own data rather than having to take the individual at his or her 
word. Not only do these cards facilitate direct access to the data in state databases, but they lead 
directly to the production of more information. 
At the beginning of the 20th century there were few organizations which could be counted 
on to generate authoritative personal information on a mass basis. Even birth certificates 
probably covered no more than half of those being born. And without sources of “breeder 
documents,” the bases for generating further documents were weak. 
As sources of authoritative personal data available for direct checking grow, however, the 
costs of mass surveillance drop. Indeed, viewing the broad sweep of historical change, we 
conclude that mass surveillance through personal documentation feeds on itself. The 
more important events in life entail production or consumption of personal 
documentation, the more feasible it is to institute effective surveillance through direct 
checking based on such data. Imaginative administrators of surveillance organizations are 
constantly seeking new uses of personal data in these ways. (Rule et al, 1983, p. 232) 
As states build information systems that can potentially create extremely detailed and 
comprehensive data doubles, the identity and self-determination of the individual subject 
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becomes endangered. In the dossier society, these files, retrieved or updated upon presentation of 
an identity card, become an integral part of how powerful institutions discriminate in their 
treatment of individuals, informing decisions regarding their right to travel, hold a job, or receive 
medical treatment or government assistance. The culmination of this process of mass surveillance 
through personal documentation is the national identity card. National identification systems 
enable the production, management, and retrieval of PII via their links to associated databases and 
national registries and, through this process, the social sorting of individuals into categories of 
privilege and exclusion. They represent the most visible component of a state’s surveillance 
infrastructure and enhance its power (Stalder & Lyon, 2003). According to Lyon (2007), national 
identification systems “may turn out to be the single most significant development of information 
systems for governance, globally” (p. 111).  
A national ID card system in principle offers a government a single means of entry into 
the myriad databases that currently incorporate personal records of many different kinds. 
Analogously (in some ways) to the so-called Clipper Chip, which would have given the 
U.S. government sole and ultimate access to encrypted on-line messages, national 
electronic ID cards enhance the power of the nation state. Such systems facilitate 
searches throughout those flexibly integrated discrete databases that currently — in the 
USA, Canada, and the UK — currently have no such single key. Of course, it is correct to 
argue that in today’s increasingly networked information infrastructures no single, 
integrated national ID card is needed for such comprehensive searches to be made 
possible. The unique identifier would just make such searches easier. (Stalder & Lyon, 
2003, p. 90)  
Much academic work today that problematizes the growth of personal information 
databases focuses on the impact of private institutions such as retailers and insurance companies 
on the life chances of individuals. Gandy (1993) has shown how the growing corporate practice 
of gathering information on individual consumers has resulted in the growing marginalization and 
exclusion of significant sectors of the society. Turow (2006) argues persuasively that the growing 
trend of database marketing is “beginning to engender new forms of envy, suspicion and 
institutional distrust” (p. 19). Andrejevic (2007) shows us how the explosion of personal 
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information allows private company and state institutions to steer its information subjects into 
certain desirable patterns of behavior, a phenomenon Zarsky (2003) originally labeled the 
“autonomy trap.” 
The problem of the state dossier system is potentially much more dangerous to the public 
interest than issues related to private data mining and the interpellation of consumer identities. 
The state has unique authority to collect and produce records of personal information and to use 
physical force based on this information.  Further, states appear to have a bureaucratic tendency 
(Weber’s rationalization) to expand records of personal information to the limit of one’s data 
shadow and work to expand the data shadow itself through the promotion and promulgation of 
ubiquitous ID systems and technologies. The data double produced by a state which commands 
access to a particularly wide range of personal information is likely to push back on its subject in 
ways that less detailed, more narrowly constituted data doubles would not. The dossier system 
does not produce the subsequent oppression, but it at least affords it and is often understood as 
direct expression of that oppression. 
It is vital here to distinguish between the “state dossier system” as a problematic 
configuration of state information systems that traffic in personal information and those 
configurations which are necessary for the state to function as intended. In cybernetic terms, the 
basic function of the state is to act as regulator of the social system, to keep the system within a 
stable state of homeostasis.  Part of that duty is being able to rapidly shift resources to citizens of 
the state who may most need them and to be able to respond to human threats such as crime, 
natural disasters, or economic dislocation quickly. In order to perform its job, the regulator must 
have continuous feedback from the system it is regulating. 
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A dossier system, on the other hand, is a kind of generalized data aggregation that cannot 
be successfully defended on the grounds of legitimate state functions such as the provision of 
resources or management and negotiation of risk. Dossier systems emerge when coverage begins 
to expand beyond obvious dangerous populations to include innocent citizens. Dossier systems 
emerge when built in bureaucratic logics of rationalization are not countered by public awareness, 
legal arguments and technological fixes in the public interest. Dossier systems emerge when the 
public is not educated to the dangers of the loss of anonymity from the state. 
One can think of a state dossier system as an extreme form of domestic intelligence 
system in which there is an excess of PII on an excess of individuals, overloading intelligence 
agents to the point where their jobs become more difficult and the potential grows for increasing 
instances of needless, oppressive interactions between members of the public and state agents, 
ranging from delays in boarding airplanes to physical abuse, confinement, torture and even death. 
The boundary between a domestic intelligence system and a dossier system, however, is not clear 
cut. There is a grey area where different scholars and policy analysts might disagree as to whether 
the extent of personal information included within a data system is justifiable given the state’s 
role in managing their risk of terrorism or whether it is contrary to the public interest.  
THREE KEY DANGERS 
The following section advances the argument that state-centered dossier systems pose 
three key dangers to society: 1) political repression; 2) the loss of individual autonomy and 
gradual surrender of self-determination; and 3) poorer adaptability in the social system as a whole 
due to the loss of “cultural variety,” a form of biodiversity. 
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(1) POLITICAL REPRESSION  
Information contained on subjects of state dossier systems is often collected and acted on 
for political reasons, to cultivate particular classes of actor while marginalizing and hindering 
others. While this negative effect of the SDS system is clearly associated with historical regimes 
such as Nazi Germany and Soviet Union, and with contemporary regimes like the People’s 
Republic of China, it is important to recognize the history of dossier systems and political 
repression in the U.S., covered most comprehensively in Donner’s (1981) epic study of U.S. 
intelligence programs of the 20th century.  
Political intelligence is a by-product of diplomatic and military conflict, and despite its 
domestic provenance, is marked by a similar hostility toward the intelligence target (itself 
a revealingly hostile term of art). Like its military model, political intelligence 
reductively divides the world into patriots and traitors, friends and enemies, us and them. 
Even though the target is an American national, engaged in lawful political activities in 
his own country, he is viewed in an adversary context. Life in a relatively open society, 
which boasts of its freedom, makes the target enormously vulnerable when his politics 
come under hostile investigation by a secret police unit with an anti-subversive mission. 
Nowhere else in our society is the private life of unprotected individuals subjected to 
such intensive scrutiny by an agency of the government, and for reasons unrelated to any 
familiar and recognized government function such as law enforcement. The individual’s 
vulnerability is intensified by the secrecy of the probe and the knowledge that even if no 
“derogatory” information is developed he or she will become a permanent file subject. 
Inevitably, surveillance and even the fear of surveillance on the part of those not actually 
monitored produce a pervasive self-censorship. (p. 6) 
For many educated individuals, Donner’s claim is extreme and of doubtful validity. 
Evidence of intelligence abuses by successive administrations in the 20th century is chronicled in 
considerable detail in the 1973 Church Committee reports.9 Even over the past ten years, as will 
be detailed in subsequent chapters, numerous incidents of dossier production and harassment of 
peace and civil rights activists have been noted by investigative journalists and subsequently  
confirmed by the government’s own investigations.  
                                                     
9 See chapter 3, p. 91. 
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Political repression is but one, acute form of discrimination that can emerge from the 
state dossier system. Below, I consider the more general problem of self-determination and 
autonomy. 
(2) INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SELF-DETERMINATION VS. DISCRIMINATION 
... control over personal information is control over an aspect of the identity one projects 
to the world, and the right to privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the 
construction of one’s own identity. (Agre & Rotenberg, 1997) 
“Autonomy” connotes as essential independence of critical faculty and an imperviousness 
to influence. But to the extent that information shapes behavior, autonomy is radically 
contingent upon environment and circumstance. The only tenable resolution — if 
“autonomy” is not to degenerate into the simple, stimulus-response behavior sought by 
direct marketers — is to underdetermine environment. Autonomy in a contingent world 
requires a zone of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and interference — a field of 
operation within which to engage in the conscious construction of self. The solution to 
the paradox of contingent autonomy, in other words, lies in a second paradox: To exist in 
fact as well as in theory, autonomy must be nurtured. (Cohen, 2000, p. 1424) 
To fail as a poet — and thus, for Nietzche, to fail as a human being — is to accept 
somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program, to 
write, at most, elegant variations on previously written poems. (Rorty, 1990, p. 28) 
The more individuals lose control over the production of “statements” (propositions 
about them) that comprise their identity, the more they surrender their own self-determination. 
Much academic work today has focused on this problem in the context of private institutions such 
as retailers and insurance companies. Gandy (1993) has shown how the growing corporate 
practice of gathering information on individual consumers has resulted in the growing 
marginalization and exclusion of significant sectors of the society. Turow (2006) argues 
persuasively that the growing trend of database marketing is “beginning to engender new forms 
of envy, suspicion and institutional distrust” (p. 19). Andrejevic (2007) shows us how 
intensifying asymmetric flows of personal information both from consumers to private 
corporations and from citizen subjects to their states afford a higher degree of malleability and 
suggestibility among the general public. The consumer citizen is shaped into desirable patterns of 
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behavior by what appears to them to be the exercise of free choice, via mechanisms just beyond 
the horizon of awareness. 
Discrimination is “the end result of the social construction of difference in the pursuit of 
profit and social control” (Gandy, 1995, p.37).  The difference can be understood as the particular 
categorical distinction upon which an institutional decision is made. Any categorical assignation 
contained in a particular set of identity records implicates a much more detailed set of 
propositions which all members in that group share. This association within the identity may be 
willingly adopted by the subject or it may be ascribed to them. In democratic court situations, the 
citizen has a chance to be aware of certain categorical ascription (you are a criminal) and to 
defend against them. When these categories recede into the background beyond human 
awareness, injustice will multiply and continue to evade traditional schema of social redress.  
Zarsky (2003) has coined the term “autonomy trap” for scenarios he has drawn up that 
show how marketing firms might use data about their customers to “lead them” into certain 
purchases. In this situation, the consumer is the target of a cybernetic system directed at changing 
their behavior. Not only might categorized and classified consumers find certain market options 
discouraged or not available to them, but they might be “steered” into certain patterns of 
consumption that are not in their interest. The autonomy trap  “creates a setting in which the 
individual is lead into a new market and is purchasing a product she has no initial interest in, as 
opposed to being overpriced for a product she initially wanted to purchase.” The autonomy trap 
operates via a complex feedback loop between the commercial sector and the consumer.  
Zarsky relates the hypothetical story of an individual who wishes to quit smoking. Mr. 
Orange, who usually buys his cigarettes through an online retailer, purchases a “nicotine patch” to 
help him kick the habit. The online retailer, upon receiving information about this purchase, sends 
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him a set of email vouchers for free cigarettes and, at the same time, sees to it that ads promoting 
smoking are served more frequently to the web pages he visits. Mr. Orange, who has something 
less than an iron will, is thrilled by the free cigarettes and puts his newly acquired nicotine patch 
on a back shelf in his medicine cabinet. 
How this loss of autonomy manifests itself is not always easy for the subject to perceive. 
He or she may be simply feel unlucky. While it is quite possible to experience the oppression of a 
dossier system directly, decision making can be integrated into cybernetic algorithms in such a 
way that it is hidden from the subject. The man in Zarsky’s autonomy trap may fall back into his 
smoking behavior none the wiser that it was his personal information that did him in. The 
subject’s behavior is gently prodded and nudged into the desired norm. 
In the context of the state dossier system, this loss of autonomy and discrimination is 
potentially much more acute and unavoidable. The state can draw on a much broader range of 
data to inform the process, thereby claiming higher authority for its particular categorical 
ascription. The state also has available to it a much broader range of life altering decisions and 
actions on data subjects (including incarceration and execution) than does the private firm, with 
far fewer options for “exit.” 
How many categorical distinctions and distinct watch lists emerge, or already exist today, 
within the local, state and federal domestic intelligence assemblage is difficult to know or predict. 
Within the market, the diversity of these categories goes far beyond the green, yellow and red 
categories most commonly associated with federal passenger risk assessment programs for the 
airline system. The Claritas PRIZM system’s “66 demographically and behaviorally distinct” 
psychographic categories derived from demographic, consumer behavior, and geographic data, 
for example, include “Money and Brains,” “New Empty Nests,” and “Mobility Blues.” There are 
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no laws at either the state or federal level that would limit the number of such risk categories and 
associated treatment protocols that might emerge.  
As is detailed in chapter 4, records of suspicious activity increasingly produced within the 
United States by agents of local, state and federal governments can include unvalidated 
statements and have no minimum standards regarding the degree of supporting evidence. These 
reports may then flow into federal risk assessments leading to the ascription of a higher than 
normal risk category on a watch list of some form that then triggers less than respectful treatment 
protocols and the subsequent loss of economic and social opportunities. These practices appear to 
be growing largely outside traditional schema of due process, such as the right to know the 
charges against you and the evidence that led to the charges.   
It is important to be clear about just what the problem is here. To say that the social 
construction of difference, as a general practice, produces this discrimination would argue against 
all human knowledge. As I will explain in more detail below, social systems theories such as 
cybernetics and complexity theory highlight the value and significance of informational variety 
and its role in system regulation and adaptability. Critical are the logics of how this informational 
variety is produced, where it is stored, and whose interests it serves. Today, both citizens and 
consumers are surrendering much of their autonomy and self-determination because they do not 
participate and often cannot even see the creation and ascription of these categories.  
(3) CHILLING EFFECT AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURAL VARIETY 
Well established within legal and political discourse is the notion that obtrusive 
surveillance may lead to a chilling effect in which people are afraid to speak their minds. The 
chilling effect has a negative impact on the quality of deliberation, limiting the chances for 
innovations and insights to emerge. Foucault has elegantly described the manner in which 
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continued surveillance can cause subjects to internalize norms of their institutions. Records of 
personal information that persist can extend this normalizing force beyond a particular moment of 
observation, as they may be attended to and enrolled in a potentially life changing decision 
making algorithm any time in the future. 
The potential for durable expressions and logs of activity to persist may have a 
dampening effect on symbolic expression and “deviant” behaviors that can produce innovation. 
In other words, extending the logic of the “chilling effect” to its more systemic implications, the 
extent and scope of dossier systems is inversely related to the production of “cultural variety.” As 
cultural variety decreases, so does the overall social systems capacity for adapting to 
environmental change and other instabilities. 
In purely biological terms, the case for conservation of diversity, biodiversity, is well 
established. For example, Tillman & Downing’s (1994) study of the North American grasslands 
demonstrated that systems with more biodiversity recovered more quickly from drought than 
those systems with less diversity. In the 1990s, scholars began to suggest that one could map the 
inferences about ecology and diversity from the domain of biology to that of language and 
culture. As this work has gained momentum, it has begun to carve out its own discursive identity, 
what Maffi (2005) has called the emergence, of the field of “biocultural diversity.” 
The abundance of species and language systems both play key roles in evolution and 
survival, a reflection of more general cybernetic principles such as Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety. The Law of Requisite Variety answers the question: how much internal variety must a 
regulator have available within a system to maintain order in the face of outside disturbances?  
Ashby argues that there must be at least as much variety within the system as there is variety in 
the potential for disturbances. Heylighen (1992) develops and partially restates Ashby’s law in his 
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Principle of Selective Variety: the greater the number of configurations (states) a system can take, 
the greater the possibility that one of the configurations will be retained as a solution to the 
threatening instability. It follows logically, then, that systems with a wider range of possible 
solution configurations to attend to are better able to deal with a wider range of problems than 
those systems with less variety. 
The difficulty, however, lies in measuring cultural variety. The field, to date, has largely 
relied on a very basic measure of linguistic/cultural variety: the number of individual languages 
within a social boundary. Language diversity is used by Harmon (2002) explicitly as a proxy for 
the richer “cultural variety.” Other proxies for cultural variety have included the number of 
religions and identified ethnicities within a national census.  
Notwithstanding these challenges, and the importance of making further distinctions 
within this category (such as between linguistic and epistemological variety,) one can understand 
the general proposition that excessive surveillance systems have a normalizing function that 
dampens overall variety. The key question is whether this variety is useful, harmful or simply 
irrelevant.  
An effective surveillance system would dampen harmful variety such as violent crime 
and pandemic disease while preserving or enhancing the development of knowledge and ideas. 
While this makes sense in the abstract, achieving such an ideal will involve the creation and 
destruction of variety that is not so easily labeled either way. Heylighen argues, in fact, that we 
cannot distinguish between useful and non-useful variety and merely select from available variety 
on a random basis until something “works.” At that point we select this bit of variety and forget 
others.  
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The problemetization of the state dossier system holds that the indiscriminate creation 
and storage of personally identifying information specifically constrains the development of 
knowledge and ideas, both useful and non-useful, while simultaneously failing to protect the 
citizen subjects from the bad variety of terror and crime. State dossier systems suffocate 
discursive/expressive margins where significant new ideas and innovations might emerge, thus 
limiting the overall system’s ability to adapt to environmental changes. 
DISCUSSION 
What does it matter if state institutions collect information on citizens if nothing is done 
with the information other than to protect them from terrorists? Recalling my cybernetic 
definition of surveillance, it is important that we consider the full circle, from feedback to 
regulation. It is not just the collection of information about environments and their objects, but 
actions based on this information that matter. A surveillance system in which masses of personal 
information are recorded but ignored by the state is a vastly different condition from one where 
wide ranges of personal data are regular attended to and acted on, especially when those actions 
are oppressive. As we can see above, however, these actions may not be directly visible to the 
subject while still having tremendous impact on their lives. Even if our present government does 
not use the information it collects for anything but narrowly targeted counter-terrorism 
operations, the simple presence of wide ranging data on innocent Americans affords possible 
future scenarios in which this information is abused. State dossier systems afford, do not 
determine, oppression. 
Although the history of state dossier systems in the 20th century shows us that citizens 
very much felt the oppression of the dossier system, both physically and psychologically, one 
could imagine a 21st century form in which the average citizen were entirely unaware of their 
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oppression, gently nudged and guided into a particular norm that seemed to them to be a life 
largely self-determined. 
I should make it clear that I am not arguing for the right of an individual to have complete 
control over their own identity creation. Clearly, reputations have great social utility. 
Nevertheless, as individuals become deprived of spaces in which to experiment with new ideas 
and practices, or begin to see themselves more as objects of scrutiny than as autonomous beings, 
they will fall within narrower ranges of life expression. They will innovate less. Not only does 
this take away from the power and freedom of the individual life, it also impacts the viability of 
the social system as a whole. The social system will inevitably support a narrower range of 
individuals and thus have accessible to it fewer resources for innovation and the resolution of 
unanticipated problems. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
So far in this chapter, we have established a new frame for surveillance as a social 
problem, focusing on the emergence of state dossier systems as a precursor to government 
oppression and totalitarianism. This dissertation focuses on the following primary research 
questions that flow from this problem frame: What are the primary components of state dossier 
systems and what are their interrelationships? What are the forces that propel and hinder the 
construction of state dossiers systems today? How do states justify their construction and how do 
publics resist them? While the dissertation largely assumes that expanding dossier systems afford 
more authoritarian and totalitarian government configurations that manifest in tense, negatively-
valenced interface between the state and the public, it will also provide examples of how 
Americans are already experiencing these negative effects. The primary goal of this dissertation is 
to gain enough understanding of this ongoing, real-world U.S. case to facilitate better policy 
analysis and new legal regimes that can help minimize the likelihood of totalitarian scenarios in 
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the future. As part of this process, and with the instrumental use of the Chinese case for 
juxtaposition, I will offer a set of more general terms, a “problematizer’s toolkit” so to speak, for 
effective discourse illuminating the ins and outs of state dossier systems. 
FOUR DRIVER’S OF STATE DOSSIER SYSTEMS 
In chapter 1 (p. 11), I introduced Lyon’s four major strands of surveillance theory. On the 
basis of this extant theoretical work, I have identified four factors that serve as significant drivers 
of state dossier systems: law, technology, political economy and public sentiment. Two of these 
drivers, technology and political economy, are drawn directly from the theoretical strands that 
Lyon identified. The other two, law and public sentiment, can be understood as driving factors 
identified within the overall nation-state strand of surveillance theory. Since technology and 
political economy have already been described in detail above, here I focus only on the remaining 
drivers: law and public sentiment. 
LAW 
Although the topics of law and public sentiment are addressed directly within the theory 
of political economy, they warrant distinct research and analysis categories. Laws have great 
power to both enable and constrain state surveillance in ways that can only become clear in 
focused legal analysis. As Balkin (2003) puts it, law “is a form of cultural software that shapes 
the way we think about and apprehend the world” (p.8). Legal doctrines establish facts as well as 
systems of rights and responsibilities associated with the social actors and their objects (Tiller & 
Cross, 2005). In the U.S., the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution has long been one of the 
most significant constraints on state surveillance practices. How this amendment has become 
close to irrelevant in the world of 21st century communication (Sundstrom, 1998; Solove, 2002) is 
best understood via focused legal analysis that leaves broader political economic questions 
largely in the background. 
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The force of law in a particular nation state depends on its political context and history. 
While Chinese modern society has typically had little respect for law, the political system has 
been undergoing great change in recent years. China’s legal system is in the midst of transition 
from what the state calls “too much emphasis on the rule of person and insufficient emphasis on 
the rule of law” to a system modeled after Western democracies, “from supremacy of the power 
to supremacy of the law” (“Human Rights Achievements in China,” 2000, n.p.). China’s legal 
system has continued to gather strength (Peerenboom, 2002), a trend which began to accelerate as 
the country approached the Olympics (Harris, 2007). This expansion of law serves more to 
constrain the activities of businesses and lower level government institutions than party elite. 
Although law plays much more of a role in society than it did a decade or more ago, legal code is 
often unclear and contradictory, and often fails to act as a constraint on the activities of law 
enforcement. Articles 242 and 245 of the General Principles of Criminal Law criminalize 
unauthorized searches of homes and reading of private mail respectively, but law enforcement 
officials can issue search warrants on their own authority. 
PUBLIC SENTIMENT 
Public sentiment is also an important topic in need of individual study. Although state 
and private actors will always try to influence public opinion in ways that political economy can 
certainly explain, public sentiment can be observed and measured on its own terms and may not 
always cooperate with elite attempts to mold it. 
Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a 
selfconscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to 
understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of 
how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political 
premise. (Lippman, 1922) 
Whether or not a political system of government has specific channels for the public to 
exert its will, such as democratic elections, public sentiment usually enters into the policy 
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decisions of governments (Kluegel, Mason & Wegener, 1995). Public sentiment can have 
powerful effects on the political capital a given state may have to engage in various kinds of 
surveillance practices and can influence both the creation and interpretation of laws. 
Public sentiment can be measured using different kinds of proxies, from formal public 
opinion polls, to activity in the court system, to public protests and demonstrations, and can also 
be discerned in the very conceptualization of privacy and its value compared to other social 
values, such as security and accountability. Public opinion polls are conducted regularly in both 
China and the U.S., but we must be cautious not to assume that poll data in either country can 
give us some truly objective notion of what the public thinks. The results of polls are highly 
dependent on the questions that are asked, and, in the U.S., the decisions on what questions to ask 
are often made by private corporations with particular agendas. 
Businesses that depend on unfettered access to personal and transaction-generated 
information will be especially concerned to represent the public as unconcerned about, or 
supportive of, businesses having that access (Gandy, 1993). They will use estimates of 
public opinion to help convince policy makers of the wisdom of supporting the policy 
opinions that they prefer (Herbst, 1993). As a result, skillful public relations often explain 
the disparity between what the public actually believes and the character of their beliefs 
as they are represented in the press (King & Schudson, 1995) (Gandy, 2003, p. 287).  
To speak of public sentiment in China is itself a complex matter. There are vast 
differences of experience and world view between China’s urban, largely coastal residence and 
the rural peasants. Most polls do not reflect the views of this much larger economic class. Public 
opinion research is quite new in China and there remain questions about the validity of the data. 
Urban polls rarely account for migrant workers, a sizable population of the big cities.  Guo Liang 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, for example, notes that a traditional Chinese cultural bias to 
tend toward the mean (Confucianism) is likely to decrease the utility of questions based on 
Leichert scales. Still, methods have been improving and Chinese citizens are increasingly willing 
to speak their mind (Tang, 2005). 
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Further, mass media outlets including newspapers and Web sites in China have 
conducted and published public opinion polls that appear to constrain certain policy positions of 
the state. There are certainly boundaries which such polls may not cross, but the range of 
tolerable questions has been expanding by fits and starts. Though perhaps gaining strength in 
recent years, public opinion has always had to be reconciled with state policy initiatives. 
It is difficult to imagine that any regime, democratically elected or not, can sustain itself 
for very long without taking public opinion into consideration. The Chinese rulers, long 
before the invention of modern elections, compared public opinion to the river and the 
state to the boat — a boat that, if misguided, could easily be overturned (shui neng zai 
zou, yi neng fu zou). (Tang, 2005, p. 198)  
It seems unlikely that PR firms in China have developed to the level of sophistication 
they have in the U.S. to influence the production and distribution of poll data within policy 
discussions, but of course there remain other concerns about just how much we can trust the data. 
Nevertheless, we will see in chapter 6 that published public opinion and public demonstrations 
seem to have successfully challenged state plans and policy initiatives.  
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR DRIVERS 
The four factors, far from mutually exclusive, exhibit a great deal of interaction. For 
example, the production and distribution of new technologies may afford new kinds of practices 
that become unpopular with the public. Strong public sentiment against these emerging practices 
may result in the passage of laws constraining such practices. This is a simple but largely accurate 
description of how the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 emerged after academics and activists became 
concerned about the potential abuse of computer systems and databases which were just gathering 
momentum at that time (Solove, 2006). On the other hand, if it moves in the opposite direction, 
public sentiment can result in very different laws. 
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METHOD 
Before providing some notes on the research process for this chapter, I would first like to 
acknowledge and briefly describe a few major research efforts that I place within the U.S. state 
dossier system (SDS) problem frame. That is, they are works that directly address and contribute 
to our understanding of the U.S. SDS. Although these texts may use different terminology and 
different methods, they all have been major contributions to the subject and help highlight 
important ways in which the present study differs (and thus may serve to contribute new 
perspective). 
With a sweeping account of U.S. intelligence abuses gathered in the course of years of 
data collection, Donner’s (1980) Age of Surveillance describes the height of abuses by U.S. 
domestic intelligence agencies and other federal departments from the 50s to the 70s. Though 
published within a few years of the Church and HEW committees, the Privacy Act of 1974 and 
FISA, Donner remained quite pessimistic that the role of intelligence as a tool for quelling 
political decent could be effectively constrained. Donner’s research method, which involved, 
“collecting materials from a wide range of sources — press clippings, legal documents and court 
records, pamphlets, interviews, reports, government publications, to name the salient ones —
dealing with official attacks on non-conformity,” (p. xi) is similar to my own method, though it 
used a different sampling procedure (as I will explain below).  
Laudon’s (1986) definition of the problem and his term “dossier society” is very close in 
meaning to my phrase “state dossier system.” Laudon’s research method, however, was to focus 
on a specific SoR, the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), also known as the 
national  Computerized Criminal History (CCH) system, and then interview local police, 
prosecutors, judges and other decision makers who would act as users of the FBI’s then proposed 
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system. This study does not focus solely on one SoR or one institution. A more recent work in 
this area by David Sobel (2002) uses the term “national identity system” (NIDS). While it appears 
that he is interested in not only a system of identification but the potentially massive set of 
personal records that it could contain, I want to distinguish the notion of a national ID system 
from the larger question of an overall dossier system. The dossier system comprises not only 
some form of ID system and its supporting record systems (such as to verify the unique holder of 
a driver’s license or birth certificate), but a potentially much more vast universe of PII that the 
state has the power to produce, acquire and act on. As I will show in the pages that follow, this 
includes, perhaps most importantly, the state’s vast apparatus of intelligence gathering. While 
domestic intelligence apparatuses are understood to take place within an environment of legal 
constraint within this U.S. democracy, these constraints now appear to be weaker than at any time 
in the past two centuries.  
Solove’s (2004) Digital Person is perhaps the most significant book related to the SDS 
problem in the past decade, but its focus is more general, on the general availability of personal 
data within both public and private spheres, rather than focusing specifically on the state’s 
specific orientation to PII as Laudon and Donner do. It is an excellent resource for studying law 
relevant to the SDS problem frame. 
Shorrock’s (2008) Spies for Hire is another major contribution to the SDS problem 
frame. Its coverage of the intimate relationship between the private sector and U.S. intelligence 
agencies is important and highly detailed. It documents the tremendous size of the private sector 
that contributes to the U.S. intelligence system and points out that it is largely free from legal 
constraints and affords widespread opportunity for corruption. This dissertation does not focus on 
the role of private companies. Rather, it looks more specifically at the state’s role, the relevance 
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of law, policy and specific state practices that can make possible (that afford) such a significant 
private sector role. 
 COMPARISON-CASE STUDY HYBRID  
This case study approaches this problem of the U.S. SDS from an initially very broad 
frame — in essence, the basic model of the dossier system as consisting of two subsystems: 1) ID 
systems and 2) systems of records. It focuses primarily on the state rather than private actors and 
avoids selecting particular institutions or well known SoRs as the starting point for research.  
The research design for this study is based primarily on the case study, but with some 
important differences. First, rather than begin with a specific database or a specific institution, 
which the researcher might then examine by traveling to the site of the particular database and 
interviewing direct participants (or even more direct observation akin to an ethnography,) I use 
publicly available, electronic documents as the general data source and approach them first based 
on abstract concepts.  Second, the analysis makes important instrumental use of cross-national 
comparison as a tool for developing a general vocabulary of state dossier systems and gauging the 
intensity of the U.S. SDS problem. 
COMPARISON 
The idea of directly comparing media systems has been developed most extensively in 
the work of Hallin & Mancini (2004). The observation of differences and similarities between 
media systems, they argue, can help to clarify thinking about each system, challenge culturally 
and geographically situated assumptions, and reveal important gradations in what may mistakenly 
be viewed as black and white concepts.  The notion of “objective” news, for example, so widely 
associated with the American media system, was challenged by Hallin & Mancini’s (1984) own 
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comparative work between Italian and U.S. television journalism. American newscasters 
appeared to engage in far more interpretation of news compared to their Italian counterparts.  
Ferdinand Braudel (1980) was one of the first sociologists to point out the benefits of this 
kind of analysis in understanding what otherwise may appear to be very familiar contexts: 
Live in London for a year and you will not get to know much about England. But through 
comparison, in the light of your surprise, you will suddenly come to understand some of 
the more profound and individual characteristics of France, which you did not previously 
understand because you knew them too well. (p. 37) 
A binary comparison of nation states with very different histories, political systems and 
cultures provides an ideal format for this kind of research. As Dogan & Pelassy (1990) note in 
their highly influential work, How to Compare Nations, “the perception of contrasts makes 
researchers sensitive to the relativity of knowledge and consequently helps liberate them from 
cultural shells” (p. 9). A binary comparison, they add, “permits a kind of detailed confrontation 
that is almost impossible when the analysis encompasses too many cases” and “makes possible a 
study in depth” (p. 127). In his address to the American Sociological Society, president Melvin 
Kohn (1987) stated that cross-national comparisons were “potentially invaluable” and “grossly 
underutilized” (p. 713). 
In more general terms, Marshall McLuhan (1964) argued that direct juxtaposition of 
otherwise unrelated elements can lead scholars to unexpected insights and analytical clarity of 
their objects of study that may otherwise be elusive: 
“Interface” refers to the interaction of substances in a kind of mutual irritation. In art and 
poetry this is precisely the technique of “symbolism” (Greek “symballein” — to throw 
together) with its paratactic procedure of juxtaposing without connectives. It is the 
natural form of conversation or dialogue rather than of written discourse. In writing, the 
tendency is to isolate an aspect of some matter and direct steady attention upon that 
aspect. In dialogue there is an equally natural interplay of multiple aspects of any matter. 
The interplay of aspects can generate insight or discovery. 
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CASE STUDY 
Although it is common for cross-national comparisons to be designed to contribute to the 
development of general theory or to isolate particular causal factors in social systems, the 
rationale also derives from its basic utility in adding analytical clarity through contrast, as a way 
of gaining deeper insight into the real-world cases in question. The case study approach — an 
empirical investigation, using multiple sources of evidence that targets a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-world context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
context are unclear (Yin, 1984) — is the second component of this methodological hybrid. 
There is a tension in case study analysis between what Stake (2000) calls intrinsic and 
instrumental studies. In the intrinsic case study, the researcher is interested in the particular case 
itself, without the need to develop general understanding of a generic phenomenon. In the 
instrumental case study, the case is chosen “to provide insight into an issue or redraw a 
generalization” (p. 437). Stake laments the common assumption that case studies are valueless if 
they cannot provide instrumental value beyond understanding the target case itself. “Damage 
occurs when the commitment to generalize or to theorize runs so strong that the researcher’s 
attention is drawn away from features important for understanding the case itself” (p. 439).  In the 
present study, even though China’s role is primarily instrumental, both cases of interest are large 
in size and scope and important to understand in their own right.  
DATA GATHERING AND SELECTION 
Data gathering and analysis for this dissertation is heavily influenced by Checkland’s 
(1981) Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). SSM is designed for the investigation of systems that 
are not well defined and whose internal structures are undergoing continual change. Using 
Checkland’s method, the researcher not only analyzes the real-world situation in terms of its 
systemic features, he/she also incorporates the systems concept into the very process of 
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investigation. That is, the research method forms its own feedback loop, between the real-world 
situation that is being investigated and the conceptual model that is developed to illuminate its 
dynamics. Rather than create a rigid analytical framework in which all data are forced to 
conform, the research process is the primary driver of analytical resolution.  
Case study research is resonant with SSM, often commencing without predetermined 
analytical categories; instead, categories are allowed to emerge naturally in the process of 
investigation (Stake, 1995). Cross-national comparisons, on the other hand, are expected to begin 
with clear categories or dimensions on which the comparison will be based (Dogan & Pelassy, 
1990). The amount of data a researcher might collect in a cross-national comparison could be so 
voluminous as to be overwhelming. Beginning with categories or dimensions for research helps 
guide, channel and limit the research process. As a result, this study works both with pre-
determined categories (the four drivers of dossier systems, described above) and an open-ended 
process of model building. Comparisons between the two countries are made along these four 
dimensions, while more intrinsic aspects of each individual case were allowed to emerge in the 
process of data gathering.  
BOUNDING THE DATA RETRIEVAL PROCESS 
Given the potential volume of data involved, case study approaches must have some 
technique for limiting the data set that will be then subject to analysis. As Stake (2000) notes, 
after a particular case has been chosen, “there are subsequent choices to make about persons, 
places and events to observe (p. 447).” Because these case studies are focused on publicly 
available documents rather than on site research, the process for making these choices is distinct 
enough to merit detailed description here.  
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How one bounds the research process when the available documents are in very large 
number is one of the challenges for researchers fully engaging Internet research methods. In her 
work Virtual Ethnography, Hine (2000) points out that traditional ethnographers rarely had to 
consider the issue of data bounding in any significant way, since the remote locations they chose 
had their own physical boundaries and settings which constrained the flow of information. In the 
absence of such boundaries, Hine suggests that the ethnographers focus “on flow and connectivity 
rather than location and boundary as the organizing principle.” (p. 64) 
Although this dissertation is not an ethnography, research is bounded in a similar fashion, 
in the process of following links and associations between documents based on their lexical and 
semantic content. It is useful to consider this problematization as in part the construction of an 
identity (the state dossier system) via the linking or propositions. Since the term “state dossier 
system” itself is an abstraction, it is not possible to simply draw together all available documents 
which contain the phrases “state dossier system” and extract their propositions. Such documents 
would be very few in number and represent a poor distribution of available information. It is also 
not possible to simply collect all documents which in the abstract speak to this general concept, 
because the researcher would be quickly overwhelmed in information exceeding his or her ability 
to assess. 
The vast majority of the data for this dissertation were collected from two general pools 
of electronically accessible documents: 1) real-time news streams using RSS feeds and 2) active, 
“archival” searches using both Google and Lexis-Nexis. Archival in this sense does not 
necessarily mean that the documents are stored in a formal archive, only that they have been 
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stored and are electronically accessible. The choice of documents was driven by an iterative 
process of keyword selection and snowball sampling with increasing semantic specificity.10   
DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL CYCLE  
Publicly available documents serve as the source of data for this study. Documents are 
collected and analyzed according to an open but systemic process which operates in five cyclic 
steps: 1) search terms, 2) results, 3) scanning, 4) selection and 5) tagging. Each cycle generates a 
set of documents that comprise the data for each case study. The cycle continues as decisions are 
made to refine or alter research questions to better understand the case on its own terms.  
                                                     
10 By semantic specificity, I am referring to the relative generality or specificity of a word or phrase as it 
might appear in a subsumption hierarchy or hierarchical category tree, such as the Tree of Porphyry, developed by the 
Greek Philosopher Porphyry in the 3rd century AD as part of a commentary on Aristotle's categories. Subsumption 
hierarchies, or definitional networks (Sowa, 2002) "emphasize the subtype or is-a relation between a concept type and a 
newly defined subtype." The network defines the rules of inheritance, showing how properties in more general 
categories are related to their subtypes. The earliest known network of this type was the Tree of Porphyry, drawn by the 
Greek philosopher Porphyry in the 3rd century AD as part of a commentary on Aristotle's categories. The network 
included the "substance" category at the top of the hierarchy, defined as the "supreme genus," with increasingly specific 
subcategories, such as "living" and "mineral" or "animal" and "plant" branching out below. A more modern version of 
the definitional semantic network is the Open Directory Project, "the largest, most comprehensive human-edited 
directory of the Web." The directory facilitates the navigation of information and knowledge on the web through its 
classification in a hierarchy of general to specific categories. 
 
Although the Open Directory Project is an attempt to classify all knowledge, one can easily imagine a similar 
kind of hierarchical directory focused on state dossier systems, where words and terms move from generally applicable 
across large-scale cases to highly specific and context dependent. The more specific words and terms are necessary for 
the detail of a case study while the more general terms provide context and abstractions that help the researcher 
position the cases within a broader phenomenological umbrella. 
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Search terms: A combination of keywords and phrases that reflect a particular moment of 
the searching process, the evolution of which is described in detail below. 
Results: total set of documents retrieved in search, ranked (by provider) in relevance or 
chronology. From this total set of results, the percentage of documents that can be 
subsequently scanned varies according to the number of documents and their relevance to 
the research question. 
Scanning: Resulting documents are scanned from the top, beginning with title and source, 
indicated on the results page. Articles and news items which do not fit the definition of 
dossier system are immediately discarded. Documents with relevant titles and respected 
sources are then retrieved and scanned directly for content. In cases where available 
documents exceed my ability to read them, retrieval continues until the novelty rate of 
retained documents begins to fall, suggesting adequate data coverage of the case node has 
been reached.  
Selection: Authoritative documents that fit within the broader conceptual and case 
boundaries and add new and useful information are retained. Articles found that do not 
add new data to the emerging picture of the dossier system for that country are discarded.  
Tagging: Retained documents are tagged using multiple keyword tags to facilitate their 
subsequent integration in analysis and next stage document searches. Tags are based on 
relevant keywords and concepts that represent emergent case nodes. Tagging includes 
both the use of the web-based delicious11 application and a local data archive indexed and 
organized using the Freemind12 mind mapping application. Tagging incoming data with 
                                                     
11 Del.icio.us allows me to store the URL, title, brief notes, and multiple keyword tags for each item that I 
choose to retain. 
12 Freemind is a knowledge organization tool that allows the storage of documents and other electronic files 
within multiple, nested nodal hierarchies. As case nodes were identified in the course of case study analysis, data was 
stored under those nodes within a Freemind mind map, facilitating the retrieval of all documents linked to a particular 
case node. Any given document may be stored within multiple node hierarchies - case nodes, data source, driver - 
increasing its subsequent "findability". The term "findability" was coined by information architect Peter Morville 
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multiple tags/codes, rather than forcing it into a specific category, facilitates the article’s 
subsequent retrieval at multiple points of analysis and allows associations between data 
objects to emerge naturally.13   
Search terms: A new set of search terms is generated based on analysis of interpretation 
of existing document set, including the construction of narratives and identification of 
knowledge gaps. Resulting documents continue to expand the document set, building 
understanding of the overall dossier system case and the specific case nodes identified in 
the course of research. 
LOGIC OF SEARCH PATHS 
In addition to using the rather standard method of citation sampling, where document 
collection follows notable, formal citations within the bodies of already collected texts 
(Krippendorff, 2005), I noted the presence of particular, semantically specific, words and phrases 
within these documents which could stand as important sub nodes for further research. These 
phrases were not common phrases, but unique in some way that characterized important 
documents and helped identify more targeted paths for further keyword searches. Amazon.com 
calls these “statistically improbable phrases” (SIPs). I will refer to this method later in the 
dissertation as the “SIP snowball.” 
SIPs are used as part of Amazon’s “Search Inside!” service to facilitate both the location 
and characterization of its books in stock.  
To identify SIPs, our computers scan the text of all books in the Search Inside! program. 
If they find a phrase that occurs a large number of times in a particular book relative to all 
Search Inside!  books, that phrase is a SIP in that book. 
SIPs are not necessarily improbable within a particular book, but they are improbable 
relative to all books in Search Inside!. For example, most SIPs for a book on taxes are tax 
related. But because we display SIPs in order of their improbability score, the first SIPs 
                                                                                                                                                              
(2005) and refers to the attributes of an object (physical or digital) that make it more or less findable. For physical 
objects, this might include distinctive colors or shapes, or the specific location that happen to be at a particular time. 
For digital objects, this would include their titles, keywords associated with them, and links pointing toward them. 
13 For example, let's say I retrieve an article "NSA Teams up with the Chinese government to limit Internet 
anonymity." After quickly scanning the article, I might decide to assign it the following tags: surveillance (default), 
NSA, China, U.S., anonymity and tech. Later, on, in the process of analysis, I might want to retrieve all articles I have 
retained that deal with the concept of anonymity, or those articles that deal specifically with China and anonymity, or 
all those articles that deal with technology as a driver of dossier systems. The delicious tool allows me to retrieve 
stories that fit any keyword combination. 
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will be on tax topics that this book mentions more often than other tax books. For works 
of fiction, SIPs tend to be distinctive word combinations that often hint at important plot 
elements (“Amazon.com, What are Statistically…” 2009, n.p.). 
At the beginning stages of research, keywords are very general and the incoming data is 
very broad. The identification of particular SIPs within the course of document analysis lead to 
the establishment of important “case nodes” for the individual case studies The earliest SIPs end 
up being (historical, conceptual) touch points for the researcher to understand this large problem 
domain, but their individual significance is hard to measure early on. As research under a 
particular SIP progresses, other SIPs appear within this narrower class of documents, which can 
either help add to understanding of the particular case node or point to other, potentially more 
significant/fruitful nodes of investigation. 
The diagram to the right represents, in most 
basic form, the major signposts of my SIP snowball 
research flow for the U.S. case as it unfolded. Search 
began based on the two subsystem concept of the 
general SDS model: ID systems and systems of records 
(SoR). As should be apparent in the diagram, the ID 
research was more straightforward than the SoR 
research. The initial keyword/SIP, RealID, remained of useful focus for the duration of the 
project, with the Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL) emerging as an SIP of likely future 
significance.  
As emergent terms are entered back into the document search process, the set of retrieved 
documents fluctuates with the specificity of various terms. In general, the longer and more 
complex the search term, or the more semantically specific or improbable the term is, the lower 
the number of results. Terms may be either semantically or lexically derived. In other words, 
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search terms may be considered close to one another in meaning, or they may be discovered 
within documents that have already been, retained, stored, scanned and tagged. Statistically 
improbable phrases connected to emergent case nodes facilitate more efficient search. In the 
course of the research process, I made decisions about which particular SIP case nodes would 
anchor the research process. Appendix A provides a more detailed narration of this process. 
SOURCES OF DATA 
Rather than employing on site or ethnographic research common to case studies, this 
dissertation relies exclusively on publicly available documents. Increasingly, government 
documents produced at both the state and federal levels are available online. Since the 
Government Printing Office Electronic Information Access Enhancement Act of 1993, online 
access to U.S. federal documents including the Congressional Record and Federal Register has 
been required by law. Virtually all major U.S. newspapers are accessible online, with extensive 
archives available either directly on the newspaper web site or via database services such as 
Lexis/Nexis or Proquest. In China, online accessibility of government documents was formalized 
with the initiation of the 1999 Government Online project. Most of the country’s current legal 
code is available on line in Chinese, often with English language translations available. 
Newspapers of records are available online and are generally archived at least 10 years back. 
The Chinese government today does not have the same laws for public release of 
information that the United States has. It is not legally required to publish “Privacy Impact 
Assessments” of new programs or notify citizens about any new database that is expected to 
contain personally identifiable information. Further, there is considerably less leeway among 
journalism institutions as to their targets of investigation and reporting. As a result, there is a 
much lower volume of information produced by Chinese institutions that directly address the 
development and current configuration of the state dossier system. Nevertheless, a considerable 
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amount of information is still available. Privacy and anti-surveillance NGOs see China as the 
epitome of an Orwellian surveillance state and this spend a great deal of their own resources to 
gather and disseminate data. Further, the Chinese government itself willingly makes much of this 
information available. 
For the China case, research focused on English-language source data. While I am fluent 
in Mandarin Chinese, opening the data gathering to Chinese language material would have 
dramatically raised the volume of incoming data while slowing analysis time. Available English 
language material, including official government news sources, NGO reports, Western 
investigative journalism, academic journals, books, and authoritative blogs, all of which I 
evaluated based on more than seven years of personal experience within the Chinese IT 
industry14, provided a complete enough picture of the system today to, at the very least, serve its 
instrumental role as a suitable comparison case and reference point for the United States.  
                                                     
14 From 1996 to 1998 I was the senior Internet consultant for the Xiamen Xindeco Corporation. I oversaw all 
web related operations, including the production of the award winning website ChinaVista.com and helped bring the 
company to a successful listing on the Shenzhen stock exchange. During this three year period I interacted frequently 
with government officials including public security agents assigned to the public Internet. I later founded, obtained 
venture capital financing and served as CEO of VirtualChina.com. Although the company closed its doors shortly after 
the 2000 dotcom crash, VirtualChina.com was once a well known player in the China Internet industry and is the 
subject of a 2000 Harvard Business Case VirtualChina.com: The Building of a Virtual Community. Between 2001 and 
2003, I continued to consult for Chinese Internet companies while living in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone. 
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BREAKING DOWN DOCUMENT TYPES 
 
A wide range of documents were found and stored. I break down these documents 
according to seven general categories: 1) government documents; 2) investigative journalism; 3) 
NGO reports; 4) trade press; 5) western media; 6) academic scholarship and 7) authoritative 
blogs. U.S. Government documents, which comprise roughly 1/3 of the acquired material for the 
U.S. case, can be further broken down into multiple categorical schemes, such as the originating 
government department or the document type. Documents included System of Records Notices 
(SORNS) and Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) published in the U.S. Federal Register, 
congressional testimony available from the Congressional Record, departmental reports such as 
those from the DOD Inspector General or more general research and accounting departments like 
the GAO and the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Chinese government documents can be 
broken down into state run media, public opinion surveys, national and regional laws, and any 
other documents available in the public record.15 For a more extensive breakdown and list of key 
sources see Appendix B.  
                                                     
15 Examples would include documents such as a Public Security bureau letter to Yahoo requesting the 
personal information of a particular Yahoo account or the published findings of the associated court case. 
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DATA ANALYSIS: ASSESSMENT 
I am making inferences about the dossier systems in each country based on publicly 
available documents. The degree to which the representations of these documents match the 
reality of the situation of interest is an obvious question. On what basis can I claim to make valid 
inferences about these systems based on public documents, rather than first-hand investigation of 
the systems themselves? Clearly, direct investigation of the systems themselves would be 
preferable but impractical for a number of reasons. Most importantly, at the outset of the U.S. 
case study, I had not yet chosen a specific database or system of records to target for research, 
making it impossible to indentify a specific institutional or physical location to conduct such a 
firsthand search. Second, it would be highly unlikely that the U.S. or Chinese governments would 
provide me the kind of access to such a system given the implications for national security. 
Given the nature of the systems in question, it is certain that entire databases that store 
and analyze personal information are kept secret from the public with little or no published 
information indicating their existence. At the same time, in the case of both the U.S. and China, 
publicly available data does describe real systems whose configuration and use can tell us a great 
deal. 
Saiz and Simonsohn (2007) have shown that the relative number of online documents 
discussing a particular phenomenon can be used as a proxy for its actual occurrence in the world. 
Comparing the frequency of occurrence of the word “corruption” associated with states in the 
U.S. and other counties, they found that high frequency states and countries correlated strongly 
with other available measures of corruption, such as the Transparency International (TI) index. 
Based on this validation of their method, Saiz and Simonsohn offered the first ever city by city 
index of corruption in America. Though clearly much corruption in any given country goes in the 
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darkness beyond public scrutiny, enough of this activity makes its way to public light such that it 
is possible to make inferences about the relative degree of the problem from country to country.  
This dissertation operates on a similar assumption, that although I am no doubt missing 
certain aspects, certain components of the dossier system in each country, I am able to gather 
enough information from each country to assess the intensity and character of the problem in 
question. Since I am looking to do more than measure simple intensity — to explore the character 
of these systems — I cannot simply measure the frequency of stories related to dossier systems. 
Instead, I must evaluate propositions about these systems contained within these documents. As 
Dibble (1963) has pointed out, historians and social science researchers must be circumspect 
when making inferences from different types of documents and not simply take the propositions 
contained therein at face value. There is a dichotomy between documentary evidence and the 
facts or events external to the documents themselves that can vary widely with the type of 
document and the facts to be established. 
Propositions within certain U.S. governments documents detailing specifics of certain 
record systems such as “system of records notices” (SORNs) published within the Federal 
Register were taken at face value. That the Automated targeting System (ATS) exists, is designed 
to assess risk of air travelers, and makes use of particular public and private data sources, is 
accepted on the documents legal authority alone. Public statements by officials denying the 
existing of a particular system, on the other hand — for example, Chertoff denying that the U.S. 
government has a central database storing information on U.S. citizens — are considered with 
more skepticism.  
Propositions contained within works of investigative journalism, no matter the reputation 
of the news source, are evaluated and ideally triangulated with other sources before accepting the 
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enclosed propositions as representing accurate details of the system in question. For Chinese 
sources, certain government documents, such as the announcement of a new record or ID system, 
are also taken at face value. As I mentioned above, I also leverage over seven years of personal 
experience within the Chinese IT industry, which included direct interactions with public security 
officials, to judge the validity of investigative reports or other, more controversial government 
statements. 
As is illustrated in the two tables below, the multiple source categories inform research 
and analysis for each selected case node and serve to triangulate key claims. The first table shows 
the seven basic types of documents retrieved in the left hand column and then lists important case 
nodes for both the U.S. and China cases along the top row. The case nodes are addressed in detail 
in the text of this dissertation. All case nodes draw data from multiple document types.   
Data type U.S.: Real ID SAR China: Hukou Dangan 2nd gen ID 
Gov Docs X X X  X 
Journalism X X  X  
NGO Reports X X X  X 
Trade Press X X   X 
Western media X  X X X 
Academic    X X X 
Blogs X    X 
 
NOTE ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND CHINA CASES 
As we will see in the following chapters, research for the two cases proceeds on their 
own terms. In the Chinese case, the SIP snowball method was not as critical to the research 
outcome as it was for the U.S., due primarily to two factors: 1) the volume of data is considerably 
lower, in part due to the design of the study and in part because the state simply produces less 
publicly available information about its system;. 2) the fact that China does indeed have a state 
dossier system is not really in dispute. There is no claim, from the state itself or any researcher, 
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that China does not now have a national ID system or a national population registry. There is little 
doubt that it has had and hopes to continue to have, detailed files on a large sector of the 
population. Searches to identify documents were thus more straightforward with the China case. 
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CHAPTER 3: U.S. CASE, HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
This chapter provides a brief historical and legal context for understanding the current 
configuration of the U.S. dossier system. As a largely heuristic device, and to simplify a very 
complex tapestry of law and policy that has impacted the evolution and configuration of the U.S. 
dossier system over the past several decades, I break down the U.S.’s “dossier history” into three 
phases. 
In phase 1, a period lasting from the late 1920s until the mid 1970s, intelligence agencies 
monitored, produced files on, and interfered with the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans 
for political reasons, free from significant oversight or practical legal constraint, under programs 
like COINTELPRO and CHAOS.  
In phase 2, a period lasting from 1974 to 2001, initial horror at the degree to which the 
executive branch abused its domestic intelligence agencies motivated the legislative branch of 
government to make available a new set of “boundary resources,” most importantly the 
construction of a “wall” between the government’s policing and intelligence institutions and 
between individual agencies of the U.S. government. The flow of personal information across 
these walls was to be highly restricted and monitored by the judiciary branch. While these 
restrictions did appear to place some limits on what could be done, government agencies 
increasingly found ways around these general restrictions while Congress focused on sector-
specific data protection laws.  
Finally, in phase 3, beginning in 2001 and continuing today, this status quo was shattered 
after September 11th, where walls have become nothing more than barriers to “connecting the 
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dots”16  that might protect America from its next attack. While vestiges of the initial boundary 
resources remain, such as the Privacy Act and contemporary institutional recognition of the 
principles of Fair Information Practice first articulated by the Department of Health Education 
and Welfare (HEW) Committee in 1974, there appears to be an emergent state belief that national 
security interests justify a basic state right, which citizens should trust them not to abuse, to 
access and produce information on everyone and everything. While the FBI has resumed its 
earlier (phase 1) role in domestic intelligence, these practices are expanding into the regular 
police force and, in fact, the broader private workforce.  
There is a vast amount of constitutional, statutory and common law relevant to 
information privacy in the United States. This review focuses on those laws that are most 
important to understanding the problem of the dossier system and its two primary subsystems: ID 
systems and systems of records. While the laws are presented in chronological order, they could 
also be categorized in terms of their impact on the state dossier system; that is, whether or not the 
law is likely to constrain or afford problematic dossier system configurations. Laws that, at least 
on the surface, would appear to constrain state dossier practices include the Fourth Amendment, 
the Privacy Act of 1974, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the E-Government Act. 
In this chapter I will discuss these laws, both their limitations and their strengths. Laws that 
would appear to most significantly increase the risk of dangerous SDS configurations are the 
USA Patriot Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (2004). This section 
will also introduce two key legal distinctions: information in storage vs. information in 
transmission, and content vs. envelope information. Finally, this section will conclude with a 
review of the Fair Information Practices (FIPs), originally conceived by the HEW Committee and 
                                                     
16  This was a "mantra" of the 9/11 Commission Report, a phrase which underlined its most forceful 
recommendation, that the barriers to information sharing imposed on state agencies and departments in the mid 1970s 
be dissolved within a new Information Sharing Environment (ISE). After all, it was a failure to "connect the dots" that 
had blinded the U.S. government to the attacks. 
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now accepted as general guidelines for handling PII. In the interest of brevity, I do not address 
sectoral laws targeted at narrow domains of PII collection such as the Health Insurance Protection 
and Portability Act (HIPPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) and Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). A more thorough analysis of laws impacting information 
privacy can be found in Solove (2006). 
PHASE 1 
The Fourth Amendment, historically, has been the most significant legal constraint 
against the state penetrating the privacy boundaries of the average American citizen. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment, however, were obscured with the 
development of electronic communications technology. Juridical confusion can be traced back to 
1928, with the Supreme Court decision Olmstead v. United States, which found that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to wiretapping a person’s home phone. In the majority opinion, Chief 
Justice Taft wrote: 
This Court has frequently said that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments should be construed 
liberally; but it is submitted that by no liberality of construction can a conversation 
passing over a telephone wire become a “house,” no more can it become a “person,” a 
“paper,” or an “effect.”  (Olmstead v U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 1928, n.p.) 
Although Congress subsequently filled in the void with the 1934 Communications Act, 
expressly forbidding wiretapping without court order, such activity was considered outside the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment for the next thirty years. In 1967, Olmstead was reversed with 
the Supreme Court Decision Katz v. United States. In the majority decision, Justice Stewart 
asserted that the Fourth Amendment “protects people not places” and introduced the notion of a 
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“reasonable expectation of privacy,” which has been the guiding frame for legal interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment ever since. In a nutshell, the reasonableness clause says that American 
citizens are protected whenever things they say or do would be expected by a “reasonable” person 
to be neither seen nor heard by someone else. 
Despite this Supreme Court decision, it would be another seven years before widespread 
and often politically-motivated domestic intelligence gathering that had been going since the 
1950s would see any significant legal constraints. During this time, America had essentially an 
active, insidious state dossier system which directly affected the lives of more than 100,000 
Americans who had done nothing but use their First Amendment rights to assemble or speak or 
write in public. U.S. military, CIA, NSA and FBI members were actively opening and reading 
mail, eavesdropping on telephone conversations, and keeping files on large numbers of political 
dissidents.  
COINTELPRO (an acronym for Counter Intelligence Program) was a series of covert and 
often illegal projects conducted between 1956 and 1971 by the FBI, under the direction of J. 
Edgar Hoover, aimed at investigating and disrupting dissident political organizations. 
COINTELPRO focused on infiltrating, disrupting, and/or marginalizing groups suspected of 
being subversive, including communist and socialist groups, the women’s movement, and civil 
rights organizations. The program remained secret until 1971, when a group of left-wing radicals 
calling themselves the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI broke into an FBI office in 
Media, PA, stole files and leaked them to news agencies (Davis, 1992). 
By 1973, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the newly energized Fourth Estate began 
to pay increased attention to the federal government’s excessive monitoring of and interfering 
with otherwise legitimate political activity: 
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... only four months later, New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh disclosed that the 
government’s crimes went beyond Watergate. After months of persistent digging, Hersh 
had unearthed a new case of the imperial presidency’s abuse of secrecy and power: a 
“massive” domestic spying program by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
According to Hersh, the CIA had violated its charter and broken the law by launching a 
spying program of Orwellian dimensions against American dissidents during the Vietnam 
War. The Times called it “son of Watergate.” 
These revelations produced a dramatic response from the newly energized post-
Watergate Congress and press. Both houses of Congress mounted extensive, year-long 
investigations of the intelligence community. These highly publicized inquiries, headed 
by experienced investigators Senator Frank Church and Congressman Otis Pike, 
produced shocking accusations of murder plots and poison caches, of FBI corruption and 
CIA incompetence. In addition to the congressional inquiries, the press, seemingly at the 
height of its power after Watergate, launched investigations of its own. The New York 
Times continued to crusade against CIA abuses; the Washington Post exposed abuses and 
illegalities committed by the FBI; and CBS’s Daniel Schorr shocked the nation by 
revealing that there might be “literal” skeletons in the CIA closet as a result of its 
assassination plots. (Olmsted, 1996, p.1) 
PHASE 2 
The committees that Olmstead refers to helped paint a very clear picture of how the 
government had come to abuse its policing powers to enforce a political status quo. Frank 
Church’s Senate investigation made it clear just how wide the specific abuses of the FBI, CIA, 
military are other agencies were in the 30s through the early 70s, while HEW provided a more 
abstract, philosophical approach to the problems of personal information held by the government, 
especially in the context of the emergent computer age. 
CHURCH COMMITTEE 
Senator Frank Church (D-ID) chaired the “United States Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities” in 1975. Over a period 
of nine months, the committee interviewed more than 800 officials and held 250 executive and 21 
public hearings, investigating widespread intelligence abuses by the CIA, FBI and NSA. The 
Church Committee’s 14 reports, issued between 1975 and 1976, have been called the most 
thorough investigation of U.S. intelligence agencies ever released to the public. The reports 
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chronicled widespread intelligence abuses by the CIA, the FBI, and the U.S. military. The 
following excerpt from Book II, “Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,” helps 
illustrate the degree to which U.S. intelligence activities were monitoring the lives of and keeping 
files on ordinary Americans: 
United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number of American citizens 
and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 
domestic intelligence files, and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI 
Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone.  
In fact, substantially more individuals and groups are subject to intelligence scrutiny than 
the number of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence 
file contains information on more than one individual or group, and this information is 
readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Index. 
The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is 
further illustrated by the following statistics: 
— Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the 
United States by the CIA between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of 
nearly one and one-half million names.  
— At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 
1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.  
— Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files 
were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during 
the course of CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).  
— Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were obtained 
by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with 
three United States telegraph companies.  
— An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army intelligence 
files created between the mid 1960’s and 1971.  
— Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the 
Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on 
the basis of political rather than tax criteria.  
— At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to 
be rounded up in the event of a “national emergency.”  (Church, 1976, Book II, section 1, 
intro and summary) 
The report also offers considerable details on how this abuse of personal information 
ended up impacting the lives of American citizens. Again, it is worth quoting a large portion of 
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the report, as it provides clear evidence that the U.S. during the 50s and 60s was already 
exhibiting many of the characteristics of a state dossier system: 
Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American citizens and 
domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. Although it is sometimes 
difficult to prove that a target’s misfortunes were caused by a counter-intelligence 
program directed against him, the possibility that an arm of the United States 
Government intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself 
abhorrent. 
The Committee has observed numerous examples of the impact of intelligence 
operations. Sometimes the harm was readily apparent — destruction of marriages, loss of 
friends or jobs. Sometimes the attitudes of the public and of Government officials 
responsible for formulating policy and resolving vital issues were influenced by distorted 
intelligence. But the most basic harm was to the values of privacy and freedom which our 
Constitution seeks to protect and which intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale. 
(a) General Efforts to Discredit. — Several efforts against individuals and groups appear 
to have achieved their stated aims. For example: 
— A Bureau Field Office reported that the anonymous letter it had sent to an 
activist’s husband accusing his wife of infidelity “contributed very strongly” to 
the subsequent breakup of the marriage.  
— Another Field Office reported that a draft counsellor deliberately, and falsely, 
accused of being an FBI informant was “ostracized” by his friends and 
associates.  
— Two instructors were reportedly put on probation after the Bureau sent an 
anonymous letter to a university administrator about their funding of an anti-
administration student newspaper.  
— The Bureau evaluated its attempts to “put a stop” to a contribution to the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference as “quite successful.”  
— An FBI document boasted that a “pretext” phone call to Stokeley 
Carmichael’s mother telling her that members of the Black Panther Party 
intended to kill her son left her “shocked.” The memorandum intimated that the 
Bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmichael’s flight to Africa the 
following day. (Church, 1976, section I.C.3) 
The Church Committee recommended that the domestic intelligence functions of U.S. 
agencies and departments be dramatically curtailed, limiting the collection of U.S. domestic 
intelligence to the FBI and reducing its intelligence role to criminal activities and terrorism: 
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… the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal government’s domestic security 
function that will ensure that the FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative 
agency, concentrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric or 
association. Our recommendations would vastly curtail the scope of domestic security 
investigations as they have been conducted, by prohibiting inquiries initiated because the 
Bureau regards a group as falling within a vaguely defined category such as “subversive,” 
“New Left,” “Black Nationalist Hate Groups,” or “White Hate Groups.” The 
recommendations also ban investigations based merely upon the fact that a person or 
group is associating with others who are being investigated (e.g., the Bureau’s 
investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference because of alleged 
“Communist infiltration”).  
The simplest way to eliminate investigations of peaceful speech and association would be 
to limit the FBI to traditional investigations of crimes which have been committed 
(including the crimes of attempt and conspiracy). The Committee found, however, that 
there are circumstances where the FBI should have authority to conduct limited 
“intelligence investigations” of threatened conduct (terrorism and foreign espionage) 
which is generally covered by the criminal law, where the conduct has not yet reached the 
stage of a prosecuteable act. (Church, 1976, Book II) 
In its 1976 final report, the committee proposed a “comprehensive legislative charter 
defining and controlling the domestic security activities of the Federal Government.” While no 
legislation was passed, U.S. Attorney General issued a new set of FBI guidelines that largely 
resonated with Church Committee recommendations. Under the “Domestic Security Investigation 
Guidelines,” (also known as the Levi guidelines) the FBI  adopted a “criminal standard” (Shulsky 
and Schmitt, 1991) that would focus the bulk of its operations on specific criminal activities and 
not on open ended threats that tended to characterize the abuses of prior decades.  
The Guidelines placed specific limits on techniques the FBI could use and distinguished 
three types of domestic security investigations: 1) preliminary investigations, 2) limited 
investigations, and 3) full investigations. The Guidelines provided that the FBI could 
commence a full domestic security investigation only on the basis of “specific and 
articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or group is or may be engaged 
in activities which involve the use of force or violence.” (U.S. DOJ, 2005, September, ch. 
2, sec. 3A) 
Although Congress did not pass specific legislation restricting the domestic intelligence 
activities of the FBI, it did pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. FISA 
established a secret court responsible for issuing warrants for domestic wiretapping activity, 
comprising seven judges, appointed by the Chief Justice who serve for seven years. 
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It is of critical importance to understand the difference between the gathering of 
intelligence and a criminal investigation. I will use here the definition of “domestic intelligence” 
offered by the RAND Corporation (2008), in its recent white paper, “Reorganizing U.S. Domestic 
Intelligence.” 
We define domestic intelligence as follows: efforts by government organizations to 
gather, assess, and act (see Figure 2.1) on information about individuals or organizations 
in the United States or U.S. persons elsewhere that is not necessarily related to the 
investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned criminal activity. 
(Treverton, 2008, p. 15) 
In his epic work, Age of Surveillance, Donner (1980) reflects on the role of intelligence in 
the state: 
“Intelligence” is best understood as a sequential process, which embraces the selection of 
the subject (an organization or individual) for surveillance, the techniques, both overt and 
clandestine, used in monitoring the subject or target, the processing and retention of the 
information collected (files and dossiers), and its evaluation in the light of a strategic 
purpose (the intelligence mission). Intelligence also includes an activist or aggressive 
aspect, specifically designed to damage or harass the target. But whether formally 
classified as passive data collection or aggressive intelligence, the intelligence function is 
dominated by a punitive or proscriptive purpose. Even the selection of a target embodies 
a judgment of deviance from the dominant political culture. (p. 3) 
Donner’s work, a detailed account of the domestic intelligence abuses in the U.S. from just after 
WWI until the early 70s, sees intelligence primarily as a tool of political coercion. In the years 
following the Church hearings, it was understood as general policy for agencies operating on U.S. 
soil to be constrained in their intelligence activities. 
In reaction to the Church committee hearings, the FBI and other federal departments were 
constrained in domestic intelligence gathering. The FBI, under the new AG directive, moved 
away from intelligence and focused on criminal investigations. Heyman, in the passage below, 
describes the culture of the FBI just after the September 11th attacks and prior to its repurposing a 
domestic intelligence agency to fight terrorism. 
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The FBI’s background as a law enforcement agency means that it has primarily 
emphasized reaction-capturing and prosecuting criminals after the fact-more than 
prevention. In cases where the FBI has, for example, infiltrated groups to prevent a crime, 
the focus again is on law enforcement and prosecution. A law enforcement agency is not 
accustomed to the jobs of providing warning, assessing vulnerabilities, or informing 
policy-makers. Rewards and incentives in the FBI have tended to be for law enforcement 
successes, and movement to an emphasis on intelligence successes has been halting. On 
the other hand, there are important synergies between the law enforcement and 
intelligence roles. The basic mechanisms of collection-surveillance, use of human 
sources, undercover operations, and review of records -are similar between the two 
disciplines, so many skills transfer from one to the other. But there are also differences, 
primarily that law enforcement conducts cases on activities one is generally already 
aware of; intelligence, by contrast, attempts to uncover things one was not aware of. 
(Heyman, 2008, p. 159) 
HEW COMMITTEE 
In 1972, then-Secretary of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) 
Elliot L. Richardson, appointed an Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems to 
explore the impact of computerized record keeping on individuals. The following year, the 
“Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems” released what is now 
commonly referred to as the HEW report, entitled “Records, Computers, and the Rights of 
Citizens.” The report focused more on the abstract, philosophical problems related to the 
government’s use of personal information combined with the new affordances of electronic 
communication technology (specifically, computers), rather than recounting the specific abuses 
that had taken place to date that the Church committee report provides. The HEW report is a 
powerful articulation of the public interest in information privacy and the inherent dangers of 
states with too much power to traffic in records of personal information:  
The report examines the characteristics and implications of a standard universal identifier 
and opposes the establishment of such an identification scheme at this time. After 
reviewing the drift toward using the Social Security number (SSN) as a de facto standard 
universal identifier, the Committee recommends steps to curtail that drift. A persistent 
source of public concern is that the Social Security number will be used to assemble 
dossiers on individuals from fragments of data in widely dispersed systems. Although 
this is a more difficult technical feat than most laymen realize, the increasing use of the 
Social Security number to distinguish among individuals with the same name, and to 
match records for statistical-reporting and research purposes, deepens the anxieties of a 
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public already suffused with concern about surveillance. If record-keeping systems and 
their data subjects were protected by strong safeguards, the danger of inappropriate 
record linkage would be small; until then there is a strong case to be made for 
discouraging linkage.  
Concern about abuses of authorized access to “integrated” data systems maintained by 
State and local governments can have a particularly debilitating effect on people’s 
confidence in their governmental institutions. Ambitiously conceived integrated systems, 
no matter how secure technically, may have the effect of blurring, either in fact or 
appearance, established lines of political accountability and constitutionally prescribed 
boundaries between branches of government. When different branches arrange to share 
an integrated data-processing facility and its data, the executive usually will operate it. 
This happens partly because operational functions are normal for the executive, and 
partly because executive agencies usually have more experience with computer systems. 
It leads people to fear, however, that the needs of executive claimants may be met before 
the needs of legislative bodies and the judiciary. The priority system for allocating 
computer support will, of course, look fair on paper, but in practice the result may often 
be to shortchange the passengers on the system in favor of the driver.5 The recent 
development of mini-computers, much cheaper than the big systems of only five years 
ago but of comparable power, is providing an attractive economic alternative to large 
integrated systems. Large systems, however, are also becoming less expensive and there 
is no assurance that they will not become even more so as the result of new technological 
advance. (U.S. HEW 1973, Summary and Recommendations, n.p.) 
The most lasting contribution of the HEW report has been the Code of Fair Information 
Practices, basic principles which have influenced the passage of numerous privacy laws 
worldwide, including the Privacy Act of 1974.  
 1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is 
secret; 
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what information is in his or her file 
and how the information is being used; 
 3. There must be a way for an individual to correct information in his or her records; 
4. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of personally 
identifiable information must assure the reliability of the data for its intended use and 
must take precautions to prevent misuse; and 
5. There must be a way for an individual to prevent personal information obtained for one 
purpose from being used for another purpose without his or her consent.  (U.S. HEW, 
1973, p. viii) 
The Hew Committee also made specific recommendations dealing with the use of social 
security numbers as indexes for agency systems of records containing personal information.  
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We recommend against the adoption of any nationwide, standard, personal identification 
format, with or without the SSN, that would enhance the likelihood of arbitrary or 
uncontrolled linkage of records about people particularly between government or 
government-supported automated personal data systems. (quoted in Smith, 2004) 
Unfortunately, as we will see,  the ambitious code it presents as the basis for a general 
legal policy affecting both the public and private sector did not survive the process of political 
compromise that concluded in the Privacy Act of 1974. The Act, though regularly referred to in 
name today by government institutions that traffic in PII and who pledge their compliance, is 
really best thought of as set of guidelines rather than a law that is strictly enforced. In the legal 
review section I will describe both immediate compromises that took place prior to Ford’s signing 
the bill into law and in the subsequent years. The HEW and Church committees represent, 
perhaps, the height of official state concern with the potential dangers of an emergent state 
dossier system.  
THE PRIVACY ACT 
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) was designed to protect American citizens 
from excessive government monitoring and emergence of a centralized, national dossier system. 
To understand its impact over the subsequent four decades it is useful to focus on two key 
provisions of the law. The first provision, 552a(b),17 forbids the disclosure of any records from 
one agency to another without written request from the subject of the given record, except under 
certain mitigating circumstances which will be addressed below. A second stipulation of the law, 
552a(e)(4), requires that an agency notify the public of any planned new system of records 
indexed by individual persons and contain personal information  by first publishing a “systems of 
records notice” (SORN) in the Federal Register.  
                                                     
17 See relevant U.S. Code at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/5/552a.html. 
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Restrictions on external disclosure are what Gellman (1997) calls “almost certainly the 
biggest failure of the Privacy Act.” Acknowledging the impossibility of establishing some fixed 
statutory test of when disclosure of records was warranted, the authors of the Act left these 
judgments to the agencies themselves, creating the “biggest loophole in the law.” Perhaps the 
most significant extenuating circumstance for disclosure is “routine use,” meaning that an agency 
can disclose a record to another agency if such disclosure is compatible with the original purpose 
for producing the record: 
This vague formula has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclosure of 
personal information. Agencies generally operate under the belief that they can disclose 
any record for almost any purpose if the law’s procedural requirements of publishing a 
notice in the Federal Register is met. Limited oversight of routine use by the OMB and 
by the Congress had little general effect. (p. 198) 
While the notification clause of the Privacy Act has not been without its own problems, 
one can argue that SORNs have, at times, helped to galvanize resistance to some systems before 
their deployment. The January, 2003 Federal Register notice of the CAPPS II air traveler risk 
assessment program quickly circulated among privacy NGOs including EPIC, CDT and the EFF, 
which rallied support among the public and Congress, leading to a congressional bill prohibiting 
public funding of the program until many critical privacy questions were answered. Subsequent  
SORNs published to provide details of the successor program, SecureFlight, have also served as 
rallying points for privacy advocates, leading to a continuing delay and reworking of the program 
(Bennett, 2008a). 
The Privacy Act did address the use of SSNs to some degree and placed new restrictions 
on their use, but the restrictions were watered down by exemptions. Section 7 of the Privacy Act 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government agency to deny to any 
individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such individual’s 
refusal to disclose his social security account number. (Sec. 7(a)(1)) 
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While this would appear to heavily restrict the usage of the SSN by federal, state and 
local agencies, the clause has been rendered largely irrelevant by a number of important 
exceptions.  
… although this provision applies beyond federal agencies, it does not apply to: (1) any 
disclosure which is required by federal statute; or (2) any disclosure of a social security 
number to any federal, state, or local agency maintaining a system of records in existence 
and operating before January 1, 1975, if such disclosure was required under statute or 
regulation adopted prior to such date to verify the identity of an individual. 
This meant that the IRS, Medicare and Medicaid, the Pentagon and other federal agencies could 
all continue to use it and require the information before providing benefits. Second, the Tax Act 
of 1976 exempted all state level agencies “in the administration of any tax, general public 
assistance, driver’s license, or motor vehicle registration law within its jurisdiction” from the law 
and stipulated that any other federal law conflicting with this exemption was “null, void, and of 
no effect”  (“Privacy Act Overview,” n.p.). 
Further, the Privacy Act contains no restriction on the use of the SSN within the private 
sector, which grew rapidly in the ensuing decades. Not only does the Privacy Act not cover the 
private sector, but public sector enforcement has also been weak from the very beginning. Before 
the Act reached his desk, President Ford warned Sam Ervin of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that he would veto the Act unless the proposed Privacy Commission was downgraded from an 
independent agency to a “Privacy Protection Study group,” with enforcement power relegated to 
the Office of Management and Budget, an executive branch agency under Ford’s authority. In 
subsequent administrations, the OMB has done little to enforce the Act in any significant way 
(Laudon, 1986). For example, Laudon (1986) notes that the Carter and Reagan administrations 
“sabotaged the ‘routine use’ clause by claiming routine use is any use the agencies say is routine” 
(p. 375). 
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In the 27 years following the Privacy Act and before the September 11th attacks, 
protections of the Privacy Act began to erode, while Congress passed a series of sector-specific 
PII protection laws. One major exception to this rule is the Electronic Privacy Communication 
Act of 1996. 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (ECPA) 
While the reasonableness criterion appeared to rescue the Fourth Amendment from its 
apparent limits to physical, Cartesian space, the steady evolution of electronic information 
technology has led to its continuing dilution. As technologies with the capacity to monitor 
individuals in their daily lives increasingly diffuse into the population and become commonly 
used, the notion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” changes along with them. As Gandy 
(1993) notes: 
As the technological means to gain or facilitate access to personal information about 
individuals continue to develop and to become all the more broadly available as the cost, 
complexity, and skill requirements necessary to use them are all diminished, it will soon 
be the case that no expectation of privacy at all could be reasonable.(p. 203) 
Indeed, as use of the Internet for private communications continues to grow, legal 
scholars have questioned whether the reasonableness clause can apply at all. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly ruled that citizens do not have a reasonable expectation to privacy when their 
communications are stored by a third party (Kerr, 2004). For example, in the 1976 Supreme Court 
Case United States v. Miller, the court ruled: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. (United States v Miller, 425 
U.S. 438, 1976, n.p.) 
With the Fourth Amendment’s increasingly tenuous ability to protect the privacy of 
electronic communications, Congress in 1986 passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
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(ECPA) (P L 99-508, 18 U.S.C. § 2510). The ECPA was passed by the U.S. Congress to 
explicitly extend legal wiretapping restrictions from telephone to Internet-mediated 
communications such as e-mail. The ECPA consists of three primary sections, Title 1, The 
Wiretap Act; Title II, the Stored Communications Act; and Title III, The Pen Register Act. The 
ECPA is an immensely complex body of law written well before the commercial development of 
the Internet, leading to much confusion over its applicability to online communication both within 
the courts and the law review literature. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to review the 
Act in detail. Instead, we will consider a few of the titles’ most important distinctions and the 
confusion that continues to surround them. The Act distinguishes between communication in 
transmission and communication in storage, and between envelope (or transaction) 
communication and content communication. 
TRANSMISSION V. STORAGE 
Whether a particular communication is judged by a court of law to be in transmission or 
in storage is the most significant determinant of its legal protection. Communication in 
transmission, that is any communication occurring in real-time, is governed by the Wiretap Act 
and has the highest legal protection. For the state to intercept real-time communications requires a 
Title III court order, also known as a super search warrant. Violation of the wiretap act is a 
felony. Stored communications, on the other hand, is subject to much narrower protection, 
contains several exceptions, and violation generally constitutes a misdemeanor.  
The distinction between stored and transmitted communication on the Internet, however, 
remains unclear. For example, e-mail, in the course of transmission from sender to receiver, is 
temporarily stored at multiple intermediate points, sometimes for several days. In a recent case, 
United States v. Councilman, the plaintiff, Brad Interloc corporate executive Brad Councilman, 
argued that his company’s “interception” of email from Amazon to individuals who subscribed to 
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his company’s email service should be governed by the Stored Communications Act instead of 
the Wiretap Act, since the e-mails were stored on Interloc’s servers when they were accessed. 
Since Interloc was acting as an ISP in this case, they would have been exempted from prosecution 
under the Stored Communications Act. Although a three judge panel of the Massachusetts First 
Circuit Court agreed with Councilman, the decision was later reversed in a rehearing by the full 
First Circuit: 
As often happens under close scrutiny, the plain text is not so plain. The statute contains 
no explicit indication that Congress intended to exclude communications in transient 
storage from the definition of “electronic communication,” and, hence, from the scope of 
the Wiretap Act. Councilman, without acknowledging it, looks beyond the face of the 
statute and makes an inferential leap. He infers that Congress intended to exclude 
communications in transient storage from the definition of “electronic communication,” 
regardless of whether they are in the process of being delivered, simply because it did not 
include the term “electronic storage” in that definition. This inferential leap is not a plain 
text reading of the statute. (United States v Councilman, vacated en banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383)) 
Although the court’s decision has largely been interpreted as a victory by privacy 
advocates, the court neglected to extend protections of the Wiretap act to email communications 
after they have completed their routing and are stored at their destination server. As a result, there 
remains a stark difference between legal constraints on surveillance of communication in real-
time transmission and communication that has been stored.  
ENVELOPE VS. CONTENT INFORMATION 
As Kerr (2003) has shown, the legal distinction between envelope and content 
information is maintained across a range of communication technologies. For a piece of 
traditional postal mail, the content information is sealed away in the envelope, while the envelope 
information is easily viewable and facilitates its reliable passage from the sender to the receiver. 
For a telephone call, envelope information consists of the phone numbers of the calling and 
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receiving parties, and the time and duration of the call, while the content information refers to 
exactly what was said. 
Content information is subject to much higher protection than is envelope information, 
which is governed by Title III of the ECPA, the Pen Register Act. Whereas the installation of a 
wiretap that intercepts the content of communications requires a super search warrant and is 
subject to extensive judicial review, law enforcement agencies can monitor real-time 
communications for envelope information with the equivalent of a court’s rubber stamp. In 1968, 
when the original pen register act was passed, a pen register was a special device attached to a 
phone line which recorded the phone numbers of the originating caller and destination. No 
information about the content of the communication was contained in pen register data, 
maintaining the distinction between content and envelope information.  
PHASE 3 
Noted sociologist David Knoke (2004) defines the September 11th attacks as a focusing 
event, “a rare, sudden and harmful event with high media visibility that draws intense attention to 
a sociopolitical problem.” “If a focusing event so drastically disrupts conventional beliefs and 
routine practices that it alters fundamental social cognitions about causal relations and perceived 
risks,” Knoke notes, “it may trigger major structural transformations of a policy domain” (pp. 84-
5). 
Things happened very quickly after 9/11, so it is difficult to explain in a purely 
chronological narrative. The overall structure of the domestic intelligence and national security 
apparatus has changed dramatically.  
— A major new federal agency, the DHS, has been established to protect the country 
from natural and made disaster bringing a number of once separate agencies under its 
authority, including The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) the U.S. 
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Coast Guard, the new Travel Security Administration (TSA), and the United States 
Border Patrol. 
— There is a new Director of National Intelligence, who oversees and bridges the once 
separate intelligence agencies.  
— There are a growing number of “fusion-centers,” proto-institutions that serve to bring 
all state policing capacity, more directly under federal auspices.  
— A major new government data initiative has been launched, the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE). 
THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
The first major legislation to be passed in response to the 9/11 attacks was “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act” (USA PATRIOT Act) (PL 107-56). Signed into law on October 26, 2001, the Act 
was rushed through congress without following usual legislative procedure. Most members of 
Congress did not have time to read it: 
Rep. Bobby Scott said, “I think it is appropriate to comment on the process by which the 
bill is coming to us. This is not the bill that was reported and deliberated on in the 
Committee on the Judiciary. It came to us late on the floor. No one has really had an 
opportunity to look at the bill to see what is in it since we have been out of our offices.” 
Rep. John Conyers, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, declared, “we are 
now debating at this hour of night, with only two copies of the bill that we are being 
asked to vote on available to Members on this side of the aisle.” (Blumenthal, 2009, n.p.) 
The Patriot Act vastly expands the government’s powers to conduct surveillance. Two 
critical sections of the bill that most dramatically impact the potential configuration of the SDS 
are section 216, which expands the pen register act and Section 505, which significantly increases 
the authority of the FBI to demand records from private businesses without judicial oversight. 
EXPANDING THE PEN REGISTER ACT ENVELOPE VS. CONTENT INFORMATION 
In late 2001, the USA Patriot Act explicitly extended the provision of the Pen Register 
Act to the Internet. Specifically, Section 216 of the Patriot Act, “Modification of Authorities 
Relating to Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices,” added the phrase “routing, 
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addressing” to the limitations clause of the act, expanding the type of information gatherable by 
pen register to include email headers and URLs that facilitate the transaction of Internet 
communication. This expansion of the act has been subject to considerable criticism by privacy 
advocates such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who point out that URLs can be used to 
retrieve specific documents users might access in the course of an Internet session, or their own 
communications to a search engine which are often contained in a URL. The Patriot Act 
modification, however, did not modify the original wording of the clause, which continues to 
state that pen register devices should be used “so as not to include the contents of any wire or 
electronic communications.” In the fall of 2005, Judge Collings of the U.S. District Court of 
Massachusetts partially denied a Justice Department application for routing and address 
information of four accounts at unnamed service providers, stating: 
If, indeed, the government is seeking only IP addresses of the Web sites visited and 
nothing more, there is no problem. However, because there are a number of Internet 
service providers, and their receipt of orders authorizing pen registers and trap and trace 
devices may be somewhat of a new experience, the court is concerned that the providers 
may not be as in tune to the distinction between ‘dialing, routing, addressing or signaling 
information’ and ‘content’ as to provide to the government only that to which it is 
entitled and nothing more. (Collings, 2005, n.p.) 
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 
National Security Letters are an administrative tool used by the FBI to requisition 
information from private companies when they otherwise might be unwilling to provide it. The 
FBI was first given authority to use NSLs in 1988 with the passage of the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. NSLs at this time, however, were 
considered to be “narrow exceptions in consumer privacy law, enabling the FBI to review in 
secret the customer records of suspected foreign agents” (Gellman, 2005, n.p.). Recipients of 
national security letters, under the original wording of the Patriot Act, were forbidden, in 
perpetuity, from disclosing the letters to any third party, including legal counsel. Section 505 
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dramatically expanded the power and scope of NSLs via amendments to the three existing NSL 
statutes, the ECPA, RFPA, and FCRA. The former requirement that NSLs be directed only at 
foreign agents or U.S. citizens in communication with foreign agents was removed and replaced 
with a broader, looser requirement that “the NSL request be relevant to or sought for an 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities” 
(Gorham-Oscilowski & Jaeger, 2008, p.628). The number of FBI agents authorized to make use 
of the NSL was expanded from a handful of agents at FBI headquarters to more than five dozen 
supervisors, including special agents in charge of field offices and deputies in New York, Los 
Angeles and Washington (Gellman, 2005).  
The result of the loosening of standards was a major and rapid increase in the number of 
NSLs filed. In the year prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, only 8500 requests for NSLs were 
processed. In comparison, more than 143,000 NSLs were issued between 2003 and 2005. 
According to the FBI IG report, NSL requests often did not meet even the new, looser standards. 
It found many NSLs were issued without the proper authorization (U.S. DOJ, 2008, March). 
Section 505, harkening back to the Church Committee hearings, does specifically state 
that NSLs powers are granted “provided that such an investigation of a United States person is 
not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States,” but this does not keep innocent Americans from having their 
PII collected and stored in the process of these investigations. 
In 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft rescinded a long-standing Justice Dept guideline 
which required agents to destroy records gathered on ordinary U.S. citizens when related 
investigations were closed. Under Ashcroft’s new guidelines, “the FBI shall retain all records it 
collects and ‘may disseminate’ them freely among federal agencies.” In other words, all 
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information yielded to the government in the process of pursuing national security letters may 
now be stored by government databases indefinitely, changing long standing practice in which 
government agencies expunged data about innocent civilians when particular investigations for 
which they had been generated came to a close. With President Bush’s Executive Order 13388, 
access to this data was expanded from FBI units to state, local and tribal governments and to 
“appropriate private sector industries” (Gellman, 2005). 
Many new laws have passed since the USA Patriot Act expanding the power of the 
executive branch to engage in domestic surveillance or otherwise curtail constitutional rights, 
often without significant public discourse in opposition. On the other hand, specific domestic 
intelligence initiatives, such as Total Information Awareness (TIA), TIPs and TALON (described 
in the next chapter) have sparked much more directed opposition. Though in many cases public 
resistance appears to have led to the closure of these programs, in virtually every case, even when 
“outlawed” by Congress, they continue under new names, often even with the same contractors 
providing service. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the TIA initiative, and then look 
more closely at the 9/11 Commission hearings and their recommendations for institutional 
restructuring. 
TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS 
In November of 2002, investigative reporter John Markoff published a story in the New 
York Times about DARPA’s intention to implement a new “system” that would store and analyze 
virtually all of the information, including most PII, produced within the country’s borders and 
even beyond. 
As the director of the effort, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, has described the system in 
Pentagon documents and in speeches, it will provide intelligence analysts and law 
enforcement officials with instant access to information from Internet mail and calling 
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records to credit card and banking transactions and travel documents, without a search 
warrant. 
Historically, military and intelligence agencies have not been permitted to spy on 
Americans without extraordinary legal authorization. But Admiral Poindexter, the former 
national security adviser in the Reagan administration, has argued that the government 
needs broad new powers to process, store and mine billions of minute details of 
electronic life in the United States. 
Admiral Poindexter, who has described the plan in public documents and speeches but 
declined to be interviewed, has said that the government needs to “break down the 
stovepipes” that separate commercial and government databases, allowing teams of 
intelligence agency analysts to hunt for hidden patterns of activity with powerful 
computers. (Markoff, 2002, November 9, n.p.) 
Under former felon Poindexter, a new DOD agency was created, the Information 
Awareness Office (IAO). In version 1.1 of the Total Information Awareness program system 
description document, the unprecedented scope and breadth of the information gathering program 
is explained in great detail. In section 3.2.8.3, Human Identification at a Distance (HID), the 
document makes clear just how important technologies of identification will be within the TIA 
project:  
The goal of the HID program is to develop automated biometric identification 
technologies to detect, recognize, and identify humans at great distances. These 
technologies will provide critical early warning support for force protection and 
homeland defense against terrorist, criminal, and other human-based threats, and will 
prevent or decrease the success rate of such attacks against DoD operational facilities and 
installations. Methods for fusing biometric technologies into advanced human 
identification systems will be developed to enable faster, more accurate and 
unconstrained identification of humans at significant standoff distances. (U.S. IAO, 2002, 
July 19, p. 86) 
The core focus of the TIA program was that it could analyze, or “data mine” a vast (the 
total) volume of information so that it could then identify threat patterns. That is, the system, 
according to its proponents, would be able to detect, for example, a plan to bomb a local mall 
because of a specific change in buying patterns, communication behavior, or even web browsing. 
Although most commentary tended to focus on the concept of a super database, ignoring 
the equally, if not more chilling plans for ID systems, public reaction to the program was very 
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negative. Using a former disgraced government official, who had been convicted of multiple 
felonies for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal, seemed reckless and dismissive of the public 
interest. The idea that the U.S. government would now watch everything we did and said seemed 
too out of step with the broad American cultural moral sense of freedom from tyranny. In a 
November 14, 2002 column, William Safire wrote: 
He [Poindexter] is determined to break down the wall between commercial snooping and 
secret government intrusion. The disgraced admiral dismisses such necessary 
differentiation as bureaucratic “stovepiping.” And he has been given a $200 million 
budget to create computer dossiers on 300 million Americans. (Safire, 2002, November 
14, n.p.) 
The first DOD response to public reaction was to change the name of the program from 
Total Information Awareness to Terrorist Information Awareness and drop the suggestion that 
new legislation, such as the then in process Homeland Security Act, would be required to 
authorize the deployment of the program. Instead, the IAO claimed that it would make sure that 
the system was harmonious with the existing legal environment. The name change and the 
promise by the IAO to stay within the law, however, were not enough to quell public criticism of 
the program. 
In September 2003, Congress eliminated funding for TIA and dissolved the IAO office in 
September 2003. The wording of the “conferees’ agreement” on the 2004 defense bill specifically 
prohibited funding for the TIA project or the transfer of TIA to another agency. CBS News wrote, 
“Pentagon Terror Spy Lab Closed” (Collins, 2003). USA Today wrote, “Pentagon’s ‘Terror 
Information Awareness’ program will end” (“Pentagon’s Terror,” 2003). 
The image of the TIA program as Poindexter originally described is what one might call 
a prototypical state dossier system. The project planned not only to store all available data but be 
able to reliably identify all human beings at even considerable distances. A superficial view of the 
U.S. SDS history might lead one to believe that the potential for the U.S. to move into a deeper, 
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more explicit form of SDS was there in 2002, but responding to public pressure, Congress put the 
legislative reins on the DOD and successfully ended the threat.  
It is important to consider, however, how virtually every aspect of the TIA project, as 
described, appears to be continuing apace, though under the direction of multiple, at least 
physically separate institutions. Since the Congressional directive did not specifically address 
individual components of the program, many if not most or all of these components have in fact 
been transferred to other agencies. The basic tenets of the TIA program continue, under different 
names, often with much more subtle wording. As we will see, Total Information Awareness 
(TIA) has become the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), an initiative with such an 
innocuous, somnambulant name that it marches on without even the dimmest public awareness. 
Instead of the TIPS program, we now have the practice of “suspicious activity reports,” a term so 
generic it is easy to miss. 
Investigative reporter Shane Harris (2006) published a lengthy report, based on 
documents he recovered from TIA contractors, that two key components of the program — the 
Information Awareness Prototype System, the core database which was to store the entire array of 
TIA information, and a piece of application software — were renamed to Basketball and Topsail, 
respectively, and moved to an office under the NSA, Advanced Research and Development 
Agency (ARDA). Though the responsible agency and names had changed, many of the original 
TIA contracts were simply maintained. 
Two of the most important components of the TIA program were moved to the Advanced 
Research and Development Activity, housed at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md., 
documents and sources confirm. One piece was the Information Awareness Prototype 
System, the core architecture that tied together numerous information extraction, 
analysis, and dissemination tools developed under TIA. The prototype system included 
privacy-protection technologies that may have been discontinued or scaled back 
following the move to ARDA. 
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A $19 million contract to build the prototype system was awarded in late 2002 to Hicks 
& Associates, a consulting firm in Arlington, Va., that is run by former Defense and 
military officials. Congress’s decision to pull TIA’s funding in late 2003 “caused a 
significant amount of uncertainty for all of us about the future of our work,” Hicks 
executive Brian Sharkey wrote in an e-mail to subcontractors at the time. “Fortunately,” 
Sharkey continued, “a new sponsor has come forward that will enable us to continue 
much of our previous work.” Sources confirm that this new sponsor was ARDA. Along 
with the new sponsor came a new name.” We will be describing this new effort as 
‘Basketball,’ “Sharkey wrote, apparently giving no explanation of the name’s 
significance. Another e-mail from a Hicks employee, Marc Swedenburg, reminded the 
company’s staff that “TIA has been terminated and should be referenced in that fashion.” 
(Harris, 2006,n.p.) 
INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING 
January 27, 2003 the 9/11 Commission convened, gathering data, scheduling hearings, 
and performing analyses to better understand the institutional, epistemological and cultural 
conditions which allowed 9/11 to happen. Among its chief recommendations (formally released 
to the public on July 22nd, 2004,) the report calls for a dramatic reorganization of government and 
breaking down of existing barriers to information sharing: 
As presently configured, the national security institutions of the U.S. government are still 
the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very 
different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United 
States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of 
traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses. 
The men and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges of the 1940s 
and 1950s.They restructured the government so that it could protect the country. That is 
now the job of the generation that experienced 9/11. Those attacks showed, emphatically, 
that ways of doing business rooted in a different era are just not good enough. Americans 
should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations 
ago for a world that no longer exists. 
We recommend significant changes in the organization of the government. We know that 
the quality of the people is more important than the quality of the wiring diagrams. Some 
of the saddest aspects of the 9/11 story are the outstanding efforts of so many individual 
officials straining, often without success, against the boundaries of the possible. Good 
people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to. (9/11Commission Report, 
2004, p. 399) 
Structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work. National intelligence is still 
organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. 
The importance of integrated, allsource analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not 
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possible to “connect the dots.” No one component holds all the relevant information. (p. 
408) 
The commission report did not explicitly call for the establishment of the DHS but did 
call for a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) to “be a center for joint operational 
planning and joint intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies” (p. 403). The 
commission’s broad call for “connecting the dots” and information sharing and its call for the 
NCTC were answered in the comprehensive, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act 
(IRTPA) of 2004. Not only did the act establish the NCTC and a new Director of National 
Intelligence to oversee all coordination and analysis of terrorist and subsequent actions upon that 
data, but it also established a new office of Information Sharing, whose mission could be 
described as a further rephrasing of the original TIA program. 
The federal government, under these new initiatives, increased the role of existing 
institutions that could share terrorist information. The number of the FBI-led Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs) grew from 34 in 2001 to more than 100 in 2007 (Johnson, 2004, December 
1). New proto-institutions have emerged as well, such as fusion centers and the InfraGard, which 
will be described in more detail in chapter 4. 
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 (IRTPA) 
According to the law’s preamble, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 (PL 108-458) was enacted “[t]o reform the intelligence community and the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes.” 
IRTPA was sweeping, comprehensive legislation intended to improve coordination between U.S. 
intelligence agencies and the departments of federal, state and local governments.  
As part of the legislation, a new Director of National Intelligence was created to serve as 
head of the intelligence community, act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National 
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Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the 
national security, and oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. 
A National Counterterrorism Center was established within the office of the DNI, “[t]o serve as 
the primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to terrorism and 
counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and 
domestic counterterrorism.” 
A key section of the intelligence reform bill (section 1016) is the implementation of an 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE). According to the text of the law, “The terms 
‘information sharing environment’ and ‘ISE’ mean an approach that facilitates the sharing of 
terrorism and homeland security information, which may include any method determined 
necessary and appropriate for carrying out this section.” 
The President shall... ensure that the ISE provides and facilitates the means for sharing 
terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, and 
the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies. The President 
shall, to the greatest extent practicable, ensure that the ISE provides the functional 
equivalent of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated 
environment that- 
(A) connects existing systems, where appropriate, provides no single points of 
failure, and allows users to share information among agencies, between levels of 
government, and, as appropriate, with the private sector; 
(B) ensures direct and continuous online electronic access to information; 
(C) facilitates the availability of information in a form and manner that facilitates 
its use in analysis, investigations and operations; 
(D) builds upon existing systems capabilities currently in use across the 
Government; 
(E) employs an information access management approach that controls access to 
data rather than just systems and networks, without sacrificing security; 
(F) facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of security; 
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(G) provides directory services, or the functional equivalent, for locating people 
and information; 
(H) incorporates protections for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties; and 
(I) incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance accountability and facilitate 
oversight, including audits, authentication, and access controls. 
The ISE initiative is critical to understanding the ongoing development of the SDS in the U.S.. 
Programs which fit under its rubric. including fusion centers, suspicious activity reporting and 
InfraGard are discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
Sections 7208-7220 of the IRTPA lay the legal foundation for the establishment of a 
national, biometric identity card system and allow the federal government to set minimum 
standards for birth certificates, driver’s licenses and other forms of state issued identification. The 
law directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish new standards for ID for domestic air 
travelers. Although IRTPA is now the basis on which the federal government claims the authority 
to issue ID standards, the specifics of these standards were left to subsequent legislation such as 
the Real ID Act. 
Section 4012 and Sections 7201-7220 provide the legal basis for an “advanced airline 
passenger screening system” that “will allow the Department of Homeland Security to assume the 
performance of comparing passenger information, as defined by the Assistant Secretary, to the 
automatic selectee and no fly lists, utilizing all appropriate records in the consolidated and 
integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal Government.” The system proposed in the 
law, which would become known as the “Secure Flight” system, was the third attempt by the 
federal government to assess travelers for their potential risk without running afoul of general 
civil rights protections. 
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RECENT CHALLENGES TO NSLS 
The issue of national security letters raised and continues to raise profound questions. 
Two court cases, Doe v Ashcroft and Doe v Gonzalez, challenged the FBIs use of NSLs on 
constitutional grounds.  
In Doe v Ashcroft, an internet service provider sued the government after receiving an 
NSL, arguing that section 2709 of the ECPA, as amended by the Patriot Act, violated both its 
First and Fourth Amendment Rights. The plaintiff argued that the law “gives the FBI 
extraordinary and unchecked power to obtain private information without any form of judicial 
process” and that the NSL gag order “burdens speech categorically and perpetually, without any 
case by-case judicial consideration of whether the speech burden is justified.” 18  A similar 
argument was made in Doe v Gonzalez, although First Amendment issues were emphasized. The 
plaintiff argued that the NSL gag order forbid the librarian who received the NSL from taking 
part in the then ongoing debate on the Reauthorization of the Patriot Act. In both cases, the courts 
found in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that “the NSL statutes could not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny unless more explicit provisions were made for judicial review and permissible disclosure 
by recipients” (U.S. CRS, 2007, March 20, p. 8). 
Partially in response to the court’s findings, Congress modified section 505 of the USA 
Patriot Act in the Reauthorization 2005. Section 115 of the Reauthorization Act gives the 
recipient of an NSL the power to petition the U.S. District court to modify or set aside the 
request. “The court may modify or set aside the request if compliance would be unreasonable, 
oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.” The Reauthorization also modified the non-disclosure 
provision. Under section 116 of the Reauthorization, disclosure of the receipt of an NSL is now 
no longer automatically attached to the NSL. Rather, disclosure is prohibited upon certification 
                                                     
18 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
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that doing so “may endanger the national security of the United States, interfere with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or 
endanger the life or physical safety of any person.” Even if the recipient is compelled to non-
disclosure, they still have the right to communicate with “any person whose assistance is needed 
to comply with the NSL request or to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance 
concerning the NSL.” 
Following these changes to the law, the U.S. government appealed the lower court 
findings of the two NSL Court cases to the Second Circuit in Doe I et al. v. Gonzalez. The Second 
Circuit found that the changes to the Patriot Act in the Reauthorization eliminated the 
constitutional shortcomings that had been highlighted in the original cases. 
At the outset of its opinion, the court observed that one of the effects of the 
Reauthorization Act was to “dramatically alter § 2709 [of the ECPA].” The appeals court 
vacated the Fourth Amendment portion of the district court’s opinion in Ashcroft because 
the addition of “provisions permitting NSL recipients to challenge the issuance of NSLs 
in court” rendered that portion of the appeal moot.  As to the First Amendment issues, the 
appellate court determined that the lower court was in a better position to address those 
issues in the context of revised Section 2709 and therefore remanded that portion of the 
case. With respect to the Gonzalez case, the Second Circuit held that, inasmuch as the 
government consented to the disclosure of the NSL recipient’s identity, the appeal was 
rendered moot by the government’s voluntary actions and the case was dismissed (449 
F.3d 415, 2006, n.p.). 
Despite the changes to the law, numerous concerns about NSLs remain. Although there is 
now opportunity for recipients to engage the judicial system if they feel the NSL is unwarranted, 
the broad conditions under which the FBI may issue an NSL remain. Further, judicial review does 
not occur before the NSL is issued but only after, and only if the recipient chooses to engage the 
court. Further, the court must take the government’s representation that a nondisclosure order is 
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necessary on faith. The court “has no authority to actually weigh factors in determining whether a 
gag is appropriate.”19  
E-GOVERNMENT ACT 
The E-Government Act (PL 107-347, 44 U.S.C. § 101), passed in 2002, is a law “[t]o 
enhance the management and promotion of electronic Government services and processes by 
establishing a Federal Chief Information Officer within the Office of Management and Budget, 
and by establishing a broad framework of measures that require using Internet-based information 
technology to enhance citizen access to Government information and services, and for other 
purposes.” Included within the 72 page act is a provision requiring that any government agency, 
before “developing or procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates 
information that is in an identifiable form” or beginning a new collection of identifiable 
information that will be “collected, maintained, or disseminated using information technology” 
that affords the “physical or online contacting” of ten or more individuals not under government 
employment, must first conduct a “privacy impact assessment” (PIA). The PIA must address the 
following seven issues: 
(I) what information is to be collected; 
(II) why the information is being collected; 
(III) the intended use of the agency of the information; 
(IV) with whom the information will be shared; 
(V) what notice or opportunities for consent would be provided to individuals regarding 
what information is collected and how that information is shared; 
(VI) how the information will be secured; and 
(VII) whether a system of records is being created under section 552a of title 5, United 
States Code, (commonly referred to as the “Privacy Act”). 
                                                     
19 Use of National Security Letters: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (April 11, 2007) (statement of Bob Barr, Chief Executive Officer, Liberty Strategies, 
Inc.) 
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The reporting requirements under the E-Government Act are broader than the SORN in 
the Privacy Act. While the Privacy Act is limited to a system of records, any IT system that 
contains PII, whether it is designed specifically to retrieve information based on individual 
entities, must have a privacy impact assessment. However, it is important to note that the E-
Government Act allows exceptions to this rule; it “may be modified or waved for security 
reasons.” It should be stressed, as a result, there may be IT systems developed by the federal 
government which contain personally identifiable information but, for security reasons, are not 
reported to the public. Nevertheless, as we will see, PIAs offer an important window into the 
current state of the U.S. SDS.  
FTC AND DHS ARTICULATIONS OF THE FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES (FIPS) 
Today, the most relevant codifications of the FIPs (originally articulated by the HEW 
Committee) are those of the FTC, directed at the private sector, and the DHS. It is important to 
remember that, unless otherwise encoded in law, these principles have only the strength of 
guidelines or model codes. Any activities involving the collection and use of PII by the DHS, if 
related to national security, are already exempt from the Privacy Act, meaning that compliance 
for a particular program lies within agency discretion and is ultimately not subject to independent 
oversight. It is useful to consider these articulations in some detail, as they represent the most 
direct codification of principles for dealing with PII in the public and private sectors today. 
FTC RE-ARTICULATION OF FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES 
Common to all of these documents (hereinafter referred to as “fair information practice 
codes”) are five core principles of privacy protection: (1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; 
(3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress. 
Notice 
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The most fundamental principle is notice. Consumers should be given notice of an 
entity’s information practices before any personal information is collected from them. 
Without notice, a consumer cannot make an informed decision as to whether and to what 
extent to disclose personal information.(29) Moreover, three of the other principles ... are 
only meaningful when a consumer has notice of an entity’s policies, and his or her rights 
with respect thereto. 
Choice 
At its simplest, choice means giving consumers options as to how any personal 
information collected from them may be used. Specifically, choice relates to secondary 
uses of information — i.e., uses beyond those necessary to complete the contemplated 
transaction. Such secondary uses can be internal, such as placing the consumer on the 
collecting company’s mailing list in order to market additional products or promotions, or 
external, such as the transfer of information to third parties. 
Access 
Access refers to an individual’s ability both to access data about him or herself — i.e., to 
view the data in an entity’s files — and to contest that data’s accuracy and completeness. 
Integrity 
To assure data integrity, collectors must take reasonable steps, such as using only 
reputable sources of data and cross-referencing data against multiple sources, providing 
consumer access to data, and destroying untimely data or converting it to anonymous 
form. 
Enforcement 
It is generally agreed that the core principles of privacy protection can only be effective if 
there is a mechanism in place to enforce them. Absent an enforcement and redress 
mechanism, a fair information practice code is merely suggestive rather than prescriptive, 
and does not ensure compliance with core fair information practice principles. Among the 
alternative enforcement approaches are industry self-regulation; legislation that would 
create private remedies for consumers; and/or regulatory schemes enforceable through 
civil and criminal sanctions. 20 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY 
The Department of Homeland Security’s Privacy Office also refers to the FIPs and the 
role of the Privacy Act, but articulates them in a different, more extended form than the FTC. 
The FIPPs form the basis of the Department’s privacy compliance policies and 
procedures governing the use of personally identifiable information (PII). These 
principles are: Transparency, Individual Participation, Purpose Specification, Data 
Minimization, Use Limitation, Data Quality and Integrity, Security, and Accountability 
                                                     
20 Retrieved 7/20/2009 from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm  
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and Auditing. DHS uses the FIPPs to assess and enhance privacy protections by 
analyzing the nature and purpose of the collection of PII to fulfill DHS’s mission and 
how the Department can best provide privacy protections in light of these principles. 
Again, while these principles continue to be articulated in contemporary policy 
statements, they are best thought of as guidelines and best practices rather than laws. 
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CHAPTER 4: U.S. CASE 
This chapter examines the current state of the U.S. dossier system in terms of the two 
primary components of the general model: ID systems and systems of records. The ID systems 
section first provides a brief historical overview of state driver’s licenses and the social security 
system before analyzing the federal government’s case and the public’s reaction to a set of 
national standards for state-issued driver’s licenses: the Real ID initiative.  The systems of 
records section, divided into three sub-sections, considers U.S. record systems at two levels of 
analysis: 1) record systems as wholes and 2) types of records. At the record system level, I 
consider the FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW), a record system that, according to the 
FBI’s 2004 report to the 9/11 Commission, is designed to contain all the data that can be legally 
stored in one place. At the level of individual record types, I consider the emergence of suspicious 
activity reports (SARs) and watch lists. SARs are nationally standardized records of suspicious 
activity that often contain PII. Watch lists are an increasingly important tool of the state dossier 
system that reduces potentially voluminous dossier data to a binary decision (on or off the list). 
As we will see, watch lists enable state agents to act on dossier subjects in a manner that lies 
largely outside judicial review. 21  
ID SYSTEMS  
As will become very clear in the course of this section, it can be difficult to define, 
definitively, what constitutes a national ID system. A number of scholars have argued that the use 
of driver’s licenses to prove identity and the widespread public and private use of the social 
security number to index personal records means that the U.S. had a de facto national ID system 
already in place even prior to the passage of the Real ID Act (Eaton, 1986; Sobel, 2002; 
                                                     
21 For research notes concerning how I arrived at these particular case nodes, please consult Appendix A. 
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Froomkin, 2004). The National Research Council uses the term “nationwide identity system” to 
describe any large-scale system, without restricting them to formal “national identity systems” 
(Kent & Millet, 2003, p. 3). Legal scholar Richard Sobel (2002) has coined the term National 
Identification System (NIDS) to refer to a “system of national ID numbers, databanks and identity 
cards.” Although Sobel intends the term to cover the collectivity of U.S. SoRs containing PII and 
ID systems such as social security, the term also suggests a narrower interpretation, to refer 
specifically to the ID systems and their supporting databases.  
While critics of the current Real ID initiative are largely in agreement that the program is 
a national ID, the U.S. government has maintained that it is only a flexible set of standards. The 
U.S. further argues that Real ID will lower the risk of a domestic terror attack while 
simultaneously reducing identity theft. Public resistance has been strong however, and it appears 
that the Real ID program is losing momentum. Nevertheless, careful examination of the struggle 
over Real ID reveals a different picture, one where public resistance to particular components of a 
national ID system, such as the use of RFID to track human beings, has been largely ineffective.  
This section will, first, provide some historical context on U.S. state driver’s licenses and the 
social security number system before focusing on the U.S. government’s call for and justification 
of the Real ID, public reaction to the initiative, and the state of Real ID as of summer, 2009.  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: DRIVER’S LICENSE AND ID 
Although it is often assumed that driver’s licenses were introduced to make the roads 
safer, most of the initial state programs were strictly revenue generators, without any form of test 
required, only the filling out of a form and the payment of a fee (Watner, 2004).  According to the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Massachusetts, in 1907, was the first 
state to issue a driver’s license. By 1978, there were more than 140 million driver’s licenses in the 
U.S. nationwide. Over the past several decades, the driver’s license has become the favored proof 
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of identity for commercial transactions that require identity or for general proof of age. Its role as 
general proof of identity has become so significant that by 1977 at least 40 states were issuing 
“non-driver’s licenses” for those who did not drive but needed a state-issued identity document 
for other purposes.  
State laws require drivers on public roads to carry their licenses at all times. Partially as a 
result of this legal requirement and its role as a general identifier for commercial transactions, the 
license has become ubiquitous in U.S. resident’s wallets and pocket books. State driver’s license 
programs have been traditionally outside of federal control, making them poor candidates, in and 
of themselves, to play the role of a formal national ID card. More recently, beginning with the 
Immigration Reform Act of 1996 and culminating with the Real ID Act of 2005, the U.S. 
government has been attempting to assume greater authority over the issuing of driver’s licenses. 
I will discuss this in detail after providing a brief history of the social security card and number 
system. 
In August of 1935, President Roosevelt signed into law the Social Security Act (P.L. 74-
271). The social security number was not designed to be a general purpose identifier for public 
and private institutions but rather an index for a specific system of records managing the 
provision of pensions. The act established a federally regulated pension system for Americans 
that involved deducting money in the form of a tax on worker’s paychecks, depositing the money 
in Washington, and then paying money back to the workers in the form of a monthly check after 
retirement. In order to establish the system, the government, for the first time, began to collect 
and store personally identifying information that would be used to determine benefits as 
individuals became eligible. Although the government had collected personal information from 
the majority of the public before in the ten year census, this marked the first time that personal 
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information would be collected by the federal government for anything other than statistical 
purposes (Smith, 2004). 
Many recent European immigrants, who had experienced authoritarian governments 
where papers had to be produced upon demand, were wary of the dangers of a national ID 
system. Newspaper editorials also weighed in about their concerns that the system would become 
a national database containing detailed information on all American citizens: 
The Boston American wrote, “Your personal life will be laid bare, your religion and the 
church you attend will be listed. Your physical defects will go down in black and white... 
your union affiliation will be stated.... Even your divorce, if you have one, will be 
included.” (Smith, 2004, p. 205) 
In order to get public support for the act, the Roosevelt administration was careful to 
frame social security as a limited program focused solely on the provision of pension benefits to 
the public. Promotional literature spoke of the “assigning” of social security numbers to adult 
workers. The word “registration” was never used to avoid connotations of regimentation. The 
Post Office was chosen as the venue for filling out social security applications, as surveys showed 
that American citizens trusted it much more than other government agencies (Smith, 2004).  The 
PR campaign was highly successful. Between November 1936 and June 1937 more than 30 
million applications for SSNs were processed by the Social Security Board (U.S. Social Security 
Administration, n.d.). 
While the concerns raised by newspaper editorials like the Boston American were 
factually inaccurate at the time (applicants needed only to provide their name, birth date and 
parents’ names, and the social security file itself stored only earnings information) they turned out 
to be quite prescient. Over the next several decades, the uses of the SSN and the range of data 
indexed to it, increased dramatically. 
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Although the Social Security Board had pledged that social security data would remain 
confidential even in the face of a subpoena, a 1939 executive order by Roosevelt gave the FBI 
access to social security files in the course of criminal investigations. More significantly, 
Roosevelt’s 1943 Executive Order 939722 required all federal agencies to use the SSN as the 
personal identifier for any new “system of accounts.” While not significant at the time given the 
low state of database technology, the order set the stage for an explosion in use of the SSN in the 
60s and beyond.  
In 1961, SSNs were required as taxpayer IDs for the filing of federal taxes; state tax 
bureaus soon followed suit. In April 1964, the Commissioner of Social Security approved the use 
of SSNs for students in 9th grade or above (U.S. HEW, 1973). In July 1969, the U.S. DOD 
stopped issuing serial numbers to troops and adopted social security numbers in their place. The 
DOD said the new policy would fall in line with Roosevelt’s 1943 Executive Order and increase 
efficiency in personnel record keeping (Lear & Reynolds, 2003). By the end of the 60s, social 
security numbers were being used to index personal information records for Medicaid, Medicare, 
and the Veteran’s Administration as well (U.S. HEW, 1973).  
In 1970, a new banking law required banks to record social security numbers of their 
customers, opening the floodgates to private industry use of the SSN that would extend first to 
insurance companies and then beyond to include most any form of business from cable television 
to magazine subscriptions. In 1973, the U.S. Department of Transportation was using the SSN to 
index and retrieve records in its “National Driver Register,” although it could not yet require their 
use (HEW, 1973). This changed (albeit only temporarily) twenty three years later, with the 
passing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Section 
656(b) of the Act stated that federal agencies could not accept for identification purposes a 
                                                     
22 Exec. Order No. 9397, 3 C.F.R. 283-84 (1943-48) ordering federal agencies to use the social security 
number, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/privacy/pdfdocs/EO_9397.pdf, retrieved May 19, 2009. 
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driver’s license or compatible document that did not meet specific requirements including: “a 
social security account number that can be read visually or by electronic means” (Twight, 2004, 
p. 154). States were now required to collect and display the SSN for all applicants for a range of 
state licenses, from fishing licenses to marriage licenses, to, most importantly, driver’s licenses. 
Buried within the much larger Welfare Reform Act, these two requirements together essentially 
implemented a national ID card indexed to the social security number.  
States could opt out of the initiative at the cost of losing federal funding. Unnoticed 
within this larger bill, public resistance to the SSN provisions did not stir until 1998, when states 
began attempting to implement the new regulations. In 1999, the statute was repealed (Smith, 
2004; Smith, 2006). Today, the practice of putting a social security number on a driver’s license 
is largely agreed to put the subject at significant personal risk; it is unlikely to be seriously 
proposed in legislation again. Congress revisited and reasserted the federal government’s power 
to dictate standards for driver’s licenses, however, in IRTPA (2004) and the Real ID Act of 2005. 
Also in 1996, Congress passed the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996” (PL 104-193). Often referred to as the “deadbeat dad” law, the 
legislation called for the implementation of a new system of records, the Federal New Hires 
Database, designed to identify, locate, and force payment from divorced fathers attempting to 
avoid child support. Under the law, every employer in the country is mandated to provide the 
name, address, and social security number of all new employees to state officials. The states must 
then give this information, along with wage and unemployment information, to the federal 
government for inclusion in the database (Twight, 2004; Smith, 2004). 
When the first social security cards were issued, infants and school age children were not 
issued cards because, logically, they were not working age and could not receive the benefits the 
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system was designed for. Today, most infants are issued social security cards within weeks of 
their birth, as part of a federally funded initiative:  
To facilitate the assignment of SSNs at birth, the federal government has financed state 
programs to secure issuance of the numbers as part of the birth-certificate registration 
process, an enticement that has enabled the Social Security Administration to secure 
adoption of its “Enumeration at Birth” process in all fifty states” (Twight, 2004, p. 153). 
Although the Social Security card itself was explicitly labeled “not for identification,” the 
social security number has clearly assumed this role. Criminals, armed with the numbers of 
unsuspecting victims, were able to open up credit cards and other accounts in their name, 
beginning the scourge of “identity theft” which rose to epic proportions in the 1990s.  
Of all the pieces of information to be gained, SSNs are the holy grail of identity thieves. 
With these numbers, one can potentially access all of the databases that use SSNs as 
primary database keys. Where pre-cyberspace thugs concerned themselves only with the 
cash and credit cards in a wallet, thereby limiting the “take” to the sum of the cash and 
that part of the credit limit that could be captured before the cards were cancelled, the 
bounty of the identity thief is the person’s entire credit worthiness-their ability to buy 
homes, cars, and obtain educational loans. Everything! In urban areas, identity theft rings 
eagerly pay a premium for stolen wallets that contain SSNs and other identifying data; 
stolen credit cards can be left for the street urchins. (Berghel, 2000, p. 20) 
As the growth in Internet use in the U.S. has contributed to the frequency of identity 
theft, government policy toward the use of SSNs has begun to swing in the other direction. A task 
force commissioned by President Bush to study identity theft, in its September 16, 2006 interim 
report, recommended that the government “limit the unnecessary use in the public sector of 
Social Security numbers (SSNs), the most valuable consumer information for identity thieves” 
(U.S. FTC, 2006, September 16, p. 1). As part of this, the task force recommended: 
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in conjunction with other agencies, should 
accelerate its review of the use of SSNs in its collection of human resource data from 
agencies and on OPM-issued papers and electronic forms, and take steps to eliminate, 
restrict, or conceal their use (including the assignment of employee identification 
numbers, where practicable) ( p.1). 
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Although the task force recommendation is a step forward, most federal agencies that 
already use SSNs continue to use them and there are still no restrictions on the use of SSNs by 
private businesses. Citizens have the right to refuse to submit their SSNs when demanded by 
business, but the business has the right to refuse service if the number is not provided. It does 
appear unlikely, however, that any future ID card initiative could now make a case for using the 
SSN as the unique ID number displayed on the card. The debate and ongoing struggle over the 
Real ID initiative is not focused on the issue of a unique number, but other physical aspects of the 
card, its intended uses, and the federally standardized process for issuing the card securely. 
THE REAL ID PROGRAM: KEEP TERRORISTS OFF THE PLANES 
Good morning, everybody. One of the first and most important priorities at the 
Department of Homeland Security is to protect America from individuals who are trying 
to do us harm. When we investigated the infamous attacks of September 11, 2001, one of 
the things that we discovered was that 18 of the 19 perpetrators had been issued U.S. 
identification documents, including state driver’s licenses, and that some of these 
documents had been obtained fraudulently. 
Two of the hijackers, Hani Hanjour and Khalid al-Mihdhar obtained the paperwork for 
their Virginia driver’s licenses by handing $100 to an illegal alien in a convenience store 
parking lot. And then, that alien signed the forms attesting that these two hijackers were 
local residents. And, it was that fake ID, those phony driver’s licenses that enabled these 
hijackers and others to rent cars, board planes, and otherwise take the steps they needed 
to carry out their murderous plans. (“DHS: Remarks by Secretary Chertoff,” 2007, n.p.)  
As Chertoff argues here, if the government can make it hard for terrorists to obtain 
fraudulent ID cards it will become much more difficult for them to infiltrate and endanger the 
homeland. This argument is made in more formal terms in the March 2007 “Real ID Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM):” 
In summary, if these requirements lowered by 3.60% per year the annual probability of a 
terrorist attack that caused immediate impacts of $63.9 billion (which is an estimate of 
the immediate impact incurred in the 9/11 attack and might be considered a lower bound 
estimate), the quantified net benefits of the REAL ID regulation would be positive. If 
these requirements lowered by 0.61% per year the annual probability of a terrorist attack 
that caused both immediate and longer run impacts of $374.7 billion (which is an 
estimate of the immediate and longer run impacts incurred in the 9/11 attack and might 
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be considered an upper bound estimate), the quantified net benefits of the REAL ID 
regulation would be positive. (72 FR 10820, 2007, p. 10846) 
In addition to its argument about reducing terrorism, the government claims other likely 
benefits for the program including the reduction of identity theft, fraudulent access to government 
subsidy and welfare programs, voter fraud, unlawful employment and unlawful access to 
firearms. Government claims about the improved security of Real IDs have been widely 
challenged by academics and other experts (Lemos, 2006; Vijayan, 2007; Schneier, 2007b; 
Perrin, 2009).  While it is agreed that tougher issuing standards could make it difficult for 
terrorists and criminals to fraudulently obtain driver’s licenses, no system is completely immune 
to outsider hacking and insider corruption. Further, tougher standards for the ID simultaneously 
increase the value of cracking the system, making any advances in security temporary at best. The 
value also grows as more record systems become networked together to support the identification 
and registration process: 
This is, of course, a fundamental problem inherent in the very nature of any massive, 
centralized government data-sharing plan that spans multiple agencies and connects 
untold numbers of state and federal law enforcement officers: the usefulness of such a 
system to any one individual (a white hat or a black hat) grows roughly with the square of 
the number of participants who are using it to share data (Metcalfe’s law). So the more 
white hats that any of these programs manage to connect to each other, the more useful 
the network as a whole will be to the small handful of black hats who gain access to it at 
any point. (Stokes, 2009, n.p.) 
The Real ID Act of 2005, sponsored by House Judiciary Committee chairman James 
Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), was passed as a rider to a critical military spending bill, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, 2005 (HR 1268). The bill became mired in committee and could not advance on 
its own. This lack of public support has marked its every step, from its initial passage, to the 
proposed Real ID rules released in March, 2007 and the final rules released on January 11th, 2008. 
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In the wake of the Act’s initial passage, with public sentiment aligning against the 
program, the DHS engaged in a PR program to convince the public that they were not, in fact, 
implementing a national ID. 
Critics of REAL ID often misrepresent what it is and what it is not. Probably the most 
egregious myth is the claim that the law creates a national ID that Americans will be 
required to carry. 
Wrong. REAL ID is simple. The regulation requires that states meet minimum security 
standards when they issue driver’s licenses and identification cards necessary for “official 
purposes,” like getting on a plane or entering federal buildings. That’s it. The federal 
government’s role is to make sure that states meet minimum standards of security, so that 
banks and airports in one state can count on the quality of licenses issued in another. 
(Baker, 2008, n.p.)  
SUPPORT OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
In addition to the strong backing of the U.S. federal government, the Real ID initiative 
has the support of private industry, in particular those in information technology and security 
such as the Security Industry Association (Pero, 2002), the Smart Card Alliance, and the 
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), which includes companies such as 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Verizon. In September 2007, the ITAA wrote to the U.S. Congress to 
request that $50 million dollars be appropriated for Real ID: 
Dear Chairman Byrd and Ranking Member Cochran: 
On behalf of our more than 300 member companies and the information technology 
industry at large, the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) 
respectfully urges the Senate to recognize that the federal government must share in the 
financial burden of implementing the Real ID Act by ensuring the $50 million in grant 
funding remains in the FY ‘08 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations 
bill. These sorely needed funds will allow the states to begin overhauling the driver’s 
license and identification systems that have been linked to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, thousands of identity thefts each year, and many other crimes. 
In the letter, ITAA cites a survey that they purport shows overwhelming public support for Real 
ID. The survey, sponsored by the ITAA and conducted by “Public Opinion Strategies,” asked the 
respondents to agree or disagree with the statement “[s]tates should be required to meet national 
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minimum standards for driver’s licenses and IDs to make it harder for criminals to use fake IDs to 
commit crimes, such as identity theft.” 91% per cent of respondents agreed.  
As Gandy (2003) reminds us, however “the fact that a particular question is asked may 
add legitimacy to a policy option that might otherwise not be considered” (p. 284). Another 2007 
survey, conducted by the ACLU in the same year, paints a different picture of public sentiment. 
The survey asked: “[i]n order to help the government fight terrorism, each state would establish 
new driver’s licenses that will record your personal information in a database and share it with 
other states and the federal government.” 46% opposed or strongly opposed. 
The ITAA letter helps make clear the interest of multinational corporations in the 
expansion of government supported ID systems. The size of the U.S. Homeland Security market 
has been growing at a high rate, expected to continue to more than triple over a five year period. 
$7 billion dollars in 2001, the homeland security market totaled 46.2 billion in 2005. In 1999, 
only nine private firms were receiving homeland security contracts. In 2003, 3,512 companies 
were receiving contracts. In 2005, this number had ballooned to 33,890. Lobbying firms also 
began to increasingly specialize in homeland security. By the end of 2005, 543 companies, 
individuals and lobbying firms had registered as homeland security lobbyists, up from just two in 
2001. Homeland Security Research Corporation predicts that the market will be worth $178 
billion by 2015, tripling in size twice over a ten year period. Among the business opportunities 
within this market, according to Imperial Capital, are border and perimeter security, biometrics 
and credentialing, records management and data mining, and scanning devices. 
RESISTANCE TO REAL ID: FINANCIAL COST AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Given the disagreement over just what constitutes a “national ID system,” I will not focus 
on this binary condition (is/isn’t a national ID system). Details related to this dispute, however, 
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are worth considering for other reasons, as they help us to identify key components of a national 
ID system, as well as their potential life outside and endurance beyond specific, named programs 
like Real ID. To see this struggle in its broader context, I will first consider resistance to the Real 
ID as a specific program. The policy as a whole, including the three individual aspects that I have 
already identified above, was resisted by the individual states for two primary reasons: cost and 
human rights. While the issue of cost has probably been the major determining factor in the Real 
ID’s apparent demise, human rights issues have been raised by many states and many U.S.-based 
NGOs. Combined, these two dimensions did seem likely to derail Real ID as of mid 2009, but 
again, not significantly slow down the U.S.’s march to an increasingly comprehensive national ID 
system.  
In September, 2006, the National Governors Association estimated that the total cost to 
implement Real ID would exceed $11 billion, with an initial upfront cost of $1 billion, followed 
by ongoing costs of more than $10 billion during the first five year period. This initial estimate, 
which was based solely on the Real ID Act itself and not subsequent rulemaking, projected that 
re-enrollment costs (getting the state’s entire population of adult drivers back into DMV offices to 
reapply), would make up the bulk ($8.48 billion) of this ongoing cost (“The Real ID Act: 
National Impact Analysis,” 2006). The DHS followed in March, 2007 with its own estimate of 23 
billion dollars (72 FR 10820, 2007, p. 10845), noting that it could see no way to avoid the high 
costs of 813 million projected issuances of Real ID over ten years. In a May 1st, 2007 letter to 
DHS Chairman Michael Chertoff, the AAMVA commends the DHS for offering “more realistic” 
cost estimates, but calls for federal funding:  
The fiscal year 2006 Budget included $40 million, of which only $6 million has been 
allocated for “state pilot” projects. The fiscal year 2007 Budget includes zero funding for 
states or DHS. Funding must be secured that is reliable and ongoing for the states and 
DHS. We understand that the fiscal year 2008 Budget also includes no funding for REAL 
ID. AAMVA members encourage DHS to seek and secure funding for fiscal year 2009, 
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especially for the states to begin implementation of REAL ID. The short term success of 
REAL ID requires federal funding and the long term success will require ongoing annual, 
federal appropriations. (Calvin, 2007, p. 6) 
DHS responded to these cost concerns in the Real ID final rules with a dramatically 
scaled back timeline for issuing Real IDs for current driver’s license holders and otherwise 
loosened program requirements. This reduced the estimated cost of implementation from 22 to 
just over $3 billion. Nevertheless, the states have continued to register their dissatisfaction with 
the unfunded federal mandate: 
Governors, state legislators and motor vehicle administrators are pleased that many of the 
regulations seem to reflect comments and recommendations submitted by the three 
groups to DHS, including extending compliance deadlines and giving states flexibility to 
manage their systems and make them more secure. DHS also recognized that the 
implementation cost was an issue by making changes to reduce costs to states. Their 
estimate remains significant at $3.9 billion. To date, however, Congress has appropriated 
less than 3 percent of the projected costs to assist states. (“State Groups Acknowledge,” 
2008, n.p.) 
Concerns about the human rights and privacy implications of the Real ID card have been 
widespread, with objections on this basis running the gamut from conservative Christian groups 
like Eagle Forum and more “liberal” groups such as the ACLU. To these groups, there is little 
question that the Real ID initiative is in fact a national ID program. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), quoted below, offers a typical human rights criticism of Real ID: 
Once the IDs and database are in place, their uses will inevitably expand to facilitate a 
wide range of surveillance activities. Remember, the Social Security number started 
innocuously enough, but it has become a prerequisite for a host of government services 
and been co-opted by private companies to create massive databases of personal 
information. A national ID poses similar dangers; for example, because “common 
machine-readable technology” will be required on every ID, the government and 
businesses will be able to easily read your private information off the cards in myriad 
contexts. (“Real ID: Threatening Your Privacy,” n.d.) 
Although human rights and privacy concerns took a back seat to cost issues with the 
major state associations like the NGA, there was considerable concern raised at the individual 
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state level. The 2007 State of New Hampshire law outlawing Real ID was an impassioned call to 
respect human rights and honor the Constitution: 
The general court finds that the public policy established by Congress in the Real ID Act 
of 2005, Public Law 109-13, is contrary and repugnant to Articles 1 through 10 of the 
New Hampshire constitution as well as Amendments 4 though 10 of the Constitution for 
the United States of America. Therefore, the state of New Hampshire shall not participate 
in any driver’s license program pursuant to the Real ID Act of 2005 or in any national 
identification card system that may follow there from. 23  
While human rights concerns have been effectively articulated at the state and NGO 
level, in public awareness programs and in congressional testimony, resistance to the Real ID 
program could not have gained traction without overriding concerns about cost.  
VICTORY? 
As of August, 2007, more than 17 states had passed legislation rejecting the Real ID 
mandate (Lipowicz, 2007b). When the initial, May, 2008 deadline for Real ID compliance had 
passed, no states were implementing Real ID. As of May, 2009, many states appeared ready to 
defy federal threats that citizens from states without Real ID would not be able to board airplanes 
or enter federal facilities after the December 31, 2009 deadline. Further, the governor of one of 
the states to outlaw Real ID, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, became U.S. Attorney General in early 
2009 as part of Obama’s presidential administration. Given this fact, it seemed less and likely that 
states which refused to implement the Real ID initiative would be met with any significant 
penalty.  
This led many to declare the Real ID program officially dead. In an October 2008 article 
in Reason magazine, author David Weigel asks “Who Killed Real ID?”  
Deride them all you want, but the nuts are winning real victories for liberty, assembling a 
ragtag coalition that has managed to beat back one of the most egregious recent assaults 
                                                     
23  New Hampshire, HB 685, 2007 session, approved/effective June 27, retrieved 7/20/09 from 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2007/hb0685.html. 
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on individual privacy. “I think Real ID is done in Arizona,” says Mary Lunetta, an 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) liaison who worked with Johnson on HB 2677. 
“It’s over.” Michael Hough, a coordinator for the conservative American Legislative 
Exchange Council, thinks Real ID will meet a similar fate at the federal level. “Even the 
administration has backed off of implementing Real ID,” Hough says. “It’s not going to 
happen as it stands now.” 
The left/right, mainstream/fringe hydra of a movement to defeat Real ID in Arizona is a 
template that has worked in state after state. These strange, sweet victories are a sign that 
the United States is rediscovering its civil libertarian roots after the momentous 
disruption of 9/11. (Weigel, 2008, n.p.) 
As the passage above makes clear, it is possible to look at the evolution of federal 
government requirements for Real ID into the final rules and claim that anti- Real ID activists 
won an important victory for privacy. While this may be true in the obvious sense, that the Real 
ID initiative may very well die a slow death because of public resistance, it is much harder to 
argue that this has resulted in any kind of setback to the evolution and expansion of ID and 
dossier systems. We can see this more clearly by breaking down the Real ID system, not into the 
two major logics of resistance (cost and human rights), but into its key aspects and components. 
The Real ID Act more specifically articulated requirements based on authority that the 
federal government assumed in 2004, under the IRTPA.24 The Act identifies three aspects of ID 
systems — initial card issuance, card use, and card specifications — that will outlast any 
individual system/project like Real ID, and that help us to more clearly understand the nature and 
progression of the struggle over ID systems within the context of the SDS. Each of these 
components were expressed in increasing detail from the initial text of the Act (PL 109-13) to the 
first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (72 FR 10820) and finally with the final rules in 
January 2008 (73 FR 5271). 
                                                     
24 As I discuss above, the federal government had assumed this authority under the 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Act, but Congress rescinded this power in 1999. 
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1) INITIAL CARD ISSUANCE 
One of the primary arguments for the Real ID program has been that many states need to 
have better protocols for identifying prospective driver’s license holders. Without careful 
authentication of so-called breeder documents such as birth certificates and social security cards, 
states may issue fraudulent licenses to criminals and terrorists. Under Real ID, states are required 
to check the validity of these documents by cross referencing with both federal and other state 
databases (Ramasastry, 2005). As many critics stated shortly after the initial passage of the Act, 
this requirement for breeder-document checking appeared to require the establishment of a 
federal system of records similar to the Chinese government’s population registry database.25 The 
U.S. government has been adamant in its position that it will not maintain any kind of central 
database as part of the Real ID program.  
Chertoff said, “We at the Department of Homeland Security in the federal government 
will not build, will not own, and will not operate any central database containing personal 
information. The data will continue to be held at the state level as it has traditionally been 
since they began to issue driver’s licenses. And by improving the quality of the 
documents, we’re going to make it very, very much harder for people to forge them, 
counterfeit them, or alter them.” (Moore, 2007, n.p.) 
Given the range of possible information architectures for any system of records, the 
meaning of a “central database” has to be considered very carefully. To do this, let us first look in 
a bit more detail at specific requirements for ID issuance that the Real ID Act demands of states 
(PL 109-13). Section 37.13 identifies five different forms of document verification that the state 
must perform before issuing a REAL ID to an applicant: 
1) any immigration documents issued by the DHS via Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements (SAVE) system;  2) verify SSNs with the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) or through another method approved by DHS;  3) birth certificates, using 
Electronic Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) system or other electronic systems 
whenever the records are available; 4) documents issued by the Department of State with 
the Department of State or through methods approved by DHS; 5) States must verify 
REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards with the State of issuance.  
                                                     
25 Covered in more detail in chapter 6. 
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As of March, 2009, only two of the five verification systems that REAL ID requires were 
operational nationwide: 1) the Social Security verification System or (SSOLV) and the 2) 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. A third system, Electronic 
Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) was in pilot stage. Of these three programs, two were being 
run by state agencies, the Social Security Administration (SSA) and DHS. The third, EVVE, is 
being administered by NAPHSIS, a non-profit association of state vital records and public health 
statistics offices. Since the first four of these SoRs are being developed independently of the Real 
ID system, the federal government can legitimately claim, at least with these SoRs, that they are 
not implementing a federal centralized database to support Real ID. For the fifth SoR, however, 
the Real ID verification system, such a claim is harder to make. In this case, the government is 
relying on a technical distinction, namely that any records in this new Real ID verification system 
will not be centrally stored. 
For the Real ID system to protect the integrity of its identification credentials, it must 
never be possible for one person to obtain more than one card. Before a state issues a Real ID 
card, it must check the person’s identity and confirm that no other states have issued a card to this 
unique identity. In other words, there needs to be a system of records that includes records for all 
REAL ID cards ever issued and the identities of the people to whom they were issued, and it must 
not involve central storage of this data under federal auspices.  
In 2007, privacy activist Bill Scannell claimed to have obtained internal DHS documents 
which considered three scenarios for how such a system might be built (Singel, 2007d). If valid, 
they provide an important example of the kinds of architectures that DHS was considering and 
how they would all achieve their functionality without necessarily requiring the federal 
government to store personal information on all Real ID holders. The first scenario leaves the 
process of breeder document verification to the states themselves, maximizing state flexibility, 
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but is potentially “burdensome and chaotic in implementation.” The second scenario, known as 
the “federated” or “decentralized” system, would allow states to store and maintain control over 
their records with a standardized software interface implementing a “pointer” index telling states 
where they can find relevant information about applicants. A similar system for commercial 
driver’s licenses, the Commercial Driver’s License Information System (CDLIS), is already being 
operated by the Department of Transportation. In the third scenario, the states could use an 
intermediary, perhaps a private organization, to act as a clearinghouse, but again with no data 
being centrally stored. According to the document: 
In none of these approaches would a large permanent multistate collection of individual 
records be created. The “federated” and clearinghouse alternatives are focused on the 
infrastructure among systems, and would not act as a substitute for the databases that 
hold the actual information (i.e., the databases would not “dump” into the clearinghouse) 
(“Real ID Snippet Unverified,” n.d.).  
It now appears that DHS will be following the federated model based on the Commercial 
Driver’s License Information System (CDLIS). An AAMVA Real ID Verification Systems 
Working Group, working under the direction of the DHS has recommended “using a common 
platform for modernized CDLIS and a state-to-state verification system.” This will allow the 
DHS to move forward with the Real ID verification system while maintaining its promise that it 
will not store data on U.S. citizens in conjunction with the program. Data in this system may be 
accessible to a federal agent in Washington, but it will remain stored and maintained at the state 
level. This kind of architecture has become popular within other areas of the U.S. dossier system; 
as we will see later in the chapter, it is also the basic architecture used to facilitate the sharing of 
suspicious activity reports between state, local and federal agencies. 
While there has been some progress in defining systems for the implementation of Real 
ID’s card issuing standards, at least in terms of outlining a basic architecture for the Real ID 
verification system, the overall five-part requirement remains far away from viability. These 
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specific requirements appear likely to die with the Real ID initiative, but the federal government 
has not given up its claimed right to dictate issuing standards in the future. Of more interest to the 
long term struggle over the NIDS are the use and physical characteristics of the card. 
2) USE OF THE REAL ID 
A critical factor in how any national supported ID system is experienced is the range of 
common life situations where one would be expected to present the card.  Assuming the Real ID 
includes a unique numerical ID linked to a unique individual and is certified by the state, the 
more the Real ID is used, the more it will afford the production and centralized aggregation of 
PII. Requiring residents to carry an ID card at all times is clearly something associated with 
tyranny and oppression. As instances where demands for the card grow, the oppression associated 
with the card system will grow as well.  
The Real ID Act, echoing the original clause in the Immigration Reform Act of 1996, 
states that “[b]eginning 3 years after the date of the enactment of this division, a Federal agency 
may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card issued by a 
State” unless that state’s ID card meets the standards set forth in the Act. The official purposes of 
the Real ID card listed in the act are “accessing Federal facilities, boarding federally regulated 
commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and any other purposes that the Secretary 
shall determine.” Since this is a driver’s license, U.S. residents are also required to carry it 
whenever they are operating a motor vehicle. Although not stated in the original Real ID Act, 
numerous other uses of the card are suggested in the NPRM, including the presentation of the 
card for voting, applying for a job, receiving government benefits, and buying alcohol and 
cigarettes (72 FR 10820). A DHS official has even suggested that Real ID could be required for 
the purchase of some over the counter medicines as a way of combating the methamphetamine 
crisis (Broache, 2008).  
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The Immigration reform bill under discussion in the Senate (S 1348) in the summer of 
2007 contained a Real ID mandate, requiring that employees get Real ID compliant IDs or 
passports from new hires for the purposes of verifying their identity and to store copies of them. 
As the Center for Democracy and Technology has pointed out, requiring a Real ID for 
employment puts to question the government claim that Real ID is a voluntary program (Cope, 
2007).  
The March, 2007 DHS NPRM on Real ID  notes that “under the discretionary authority 
granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security under the Act,” that DHS  “may expand this 
definition in the future,” and asks for public comment on “how DHS could expand this definition 
to other federal activities.” 
The rule would give states, local governments, or private sector entities an option to 
choose to require the use of REAL IDs for activities beyond the official purposes defined 
in this regulation. To the extent that states, local governments, and private sector entities 
make this choice, the rule may facilitate processes which depend on licenses and cards 
for identification and may benefit from the enhanced security procedures and 
characteristics put in place as a result of this proposed rule. (72 FR 10845, 2007) 
It is quite clear that the number of moments where both public and private entities 
demand the card for the provision of benefit or service, or simply demand provision to avoid 
arrest, will expand much as the use of the SSN expanded after its introduction in the mid 1930s. 
In addition to required state and federal uses, the decision not to specifically prohibit private 
entities from requiring presentation and scanning of the Real ID card will almost certainly lead to 
increases in situations where the card is demanded for service.  
3) COMPOSITION AND CONTENT OF THE CARD 
Generally under IRPTA (2004) and more specifically under Real ID Act (2005), the 
federal government has assumed authority to dictate certain physical aspects of the state driver’s 
license such as the particular use of a biometric or other identification scheme. The federal 
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government also assumes the right to dictate certain types of information that must be included. 
To meet the requirements of section 202(b) of the Act, a State is required to include, at a 
minimum, the following information and features on each driver’s license and identification card: 
(1) Full legal name; (2) Date of birth; (3) Gender; (4) Driver’s license or identification card 
number; (5) A digital color photograph; (6) Address of principal residence; (7) Signature; (8) 
Physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or duplication of the 
document for any fraudulent purpose; (9) A common machine readable technology (MRT), with 
defined minimum data elements. States must also include the issue date and expiration date on 
each card (72 FR 10820, 2007).  
The MRT referred to in the Real ID rule and in the Act itself has been the most 
controversial aspect of the Real ID plan among privacy advocates. Intended to allow basic 
information on the card to be read and entered into a processing system automatically, the 
specific form of MRT was not specified in the original Real ID Act, leading many to speculate on 
a range of possibilities. Most controversial among these possibilities was the use of an RFID tag: 
To anyone who’s clued in about RFID, the spychipped driver’s licenses are a complete 
privacy nightmare. They can be silently read from 20-feet away, through a person’s 
wallet, pocket, backpack, or purse — even when the target is in a moving car. They are 
unencrypted and contain a unique ID number that can be used to identify and track 
people miles from the border — indeed, anywhere the government chooses to put a 
reader. 
But it’s not just the government that could use the cards to track and surveil people. 
Anyone with a rudimentary RFID reader can remotely access the the unique ID number 
on the card. Retailers could use them to ID customers as they walk in the door. Marketers 
could use them to track people around the store. Stalkers could use them to track their 
victims. Terrorists could scan for them in crowds and pinpoint Americans traveling in 
other countries. Hackers could duplicate the signal emitted by chipped licenses to 
impersonate people. The list of potential abuses for the ill-conceived ID card are 
staggering. (Albrecht, 2008, n.p.) 
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In the midst of widespread public condemnation of this possibility, the DHS, in the 
March, 2007 NPRM, announced that it had decided not to require the use of RFID in its Real ID 
standard: 
The integrated contactless chip was not deemed an appropriate technology for this 
particular document, as there is not an identifiable need for driver’s licenses and 
identification cards to be routinely read at a distance. (72 FR 10820, 2007, p. 10837) 
One of the major claims to victory here was that public resistance stopped the DHS from 
attempting to require RFID chips in Real ID, forcing a lower technology standard that did not 
afford simple electronic eavesdropping: the 2D barcode. It would be hard to overstate how partial 
this victory was. First, the 2D barcode, while requiring a line of sight to be read, was unencrypted 
and could be read by any private individual or organization with basic barcode reading 
technology. Further, not only did the DHS retain the right to update rules at a later date and 
require RFID in Real ID, but they were also already in the process of issuing tens of thousands of 
identity documents with embedded RFID, from passports to pass cards to Enhanced Driver’s 
Licenses (EDLs). As we will see, the government decided to make these design choices despite 
overwhelming public sentiment against the technology.  
The decision not to include RFID in the Real ID program was made shortly after the 
unsuccessful trial of RFID tags in DHS I-94 immigration forms. In 2006, the DHS ran a trial of 
RFID tags in forms used in the U.S. VISIT program at five points of entry at the northern and 
southern borders. In the trial, RFID readers were placed above the inspection lanes, intended to 
read the tag information as people passed under them. The test showed “numerous performance 
and reliability problems:” 
For example, according to U.S.-VISIT, at the Blaine-Pacific Highway test site, of 166 
vehicles tested during a 1-week period, RFID readers correctly identified 14 percent — a 
sizable departure from the target read rate of 70 percent. (U.S. GAO, 2007, January 31, p. 
18) 
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When the trial was finished, the ability of the readers to read the tags was too unreliable 
to warrant continuing with the I-94 RFID project. The decision to abandon RFID within the U.S. 
VISIT program was confirmed by Chertoff in February 9, 2007 congressional testimony. 
“I mean, this is the real world,” Chertoff said. “I think, yes, we’re abandoning it. That’s 
not going to be a solution. So in the real world, when something fails, we drop it and we 
move to the next thing,” he added. (Lipowicz, 2007d, n.p.)  
A month later in the Real ID NPRM, the DHS officially abandoned any plans to require 
RFID (called contactless chips in the document) within Real ID cards. In the context of the recent 
U.S. Visit test failure and widespread public condemnation of RFID in personal ID cards, it 
appeared that privacy advocates had won a major victory: 
“CAGW activists successfully thwarted RFID-based licenses, saving taxpayers $4.4 to 
$8.4 billion and heading off a grave risk to privacy. However, REAL ID remains 
problematic. It is an unfunded mandate on the states, and despite DHS statements to the 
contrary, moves the country closer to a national ID card,” Schatz concluded. (“CAGW: 
Real ID Regulations,” 2007) 
Although RFID is not part of the final standard for Real ID, it is included in at least three 
different types of federally-administered or federally-approved identity credentials: the U.S. 
passport book, the U.S. pass card, and the Enhanced Driver’s License. The government’s decision 
to implement RFID, in each case, was made despite clear and vocal public rejection of the policy.  
In February, 2005, the U.S. State Department requested public comment on its proposal 
to introduce electronic passports with embedded RFID chips. According to the State Department, 
more than 98 per cent of the 2335 public comments received were negative, many of them citing 
privacy and security concerns (Gross, 2005). 
In October  2006,  the DHS Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, an 
independent committee established by the DHS to provide “advice at the request of the Secretary 
of Homeland Security and the DHS Chief Privacy Officer on programmatic, policy, operational, 
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administrative, and technological issues within the DHS that relate to personally identifiable 
information, as well as data integrity and other privacy-related matters,”(“Privacy Office,” 2009, 
n.p.) produced a draft report advising against the use of remotely read RFID chips in identity 
documents: 
There appear to be specific, narrowly defined situations in which RFID is appropriate for 
human identification. Miners or firefighters might be appropriately identified using RFID 
because speed of identification is at a premium in dangerous situations and the need to 
verify the connection between a card and bearer is low. 
But for other applications related to human beings, RFID appears to offer little benefit 
when compared to the consequences it brings for privacy and data integrity. Instead, it 
increases risks to personal privacy and security, with no commensurate benefit for 
performance or national security. Most difficult and troubling is the situation in which 
RFID is ostensibly used for tracking objects (medicine containers, for example), but can 
be in fact used for monitoring human behavior. These types of uses are still being 
explored and remain difficult to predict. 
For these reasons, we recommend that RFID be disfavored for identifying and tracking 
human beings. (U.S. DHS, 2006, October, p. 1)  
According to committee member and Cato Institute fellow Jim Harper, the DHS quietly 
shelved the project report without letting it out of draft stage.  
“The powers that be took a good run at deep-sixing this report,” Harper said. “There’s 
such a strongly held consensus among industry and DHS that RFID is the way to go that 
getting people off of that and getting them to examine the technology is very hard to do.” 
(Singel, 2006, n.p.) 
In the same month, on October 17, the State Department solicited public comments in the 
Federal Register (71 FR 60928, 2006) on its proposed choice of vicinity RFID technology for its 
new passport card, a cheaper version of the passport that could be used for travel within North 
America. When the final rules for the passport card were issued more than a year later, DHS 
noted that 4000 comments had been received, with the “vast majority” opposed to the use of 
proximity RFID technology within the cards. Of the 4000 submissions, approximately 20 
comments specifically voiced support for the passport card. Despite the overwhelming public 
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sentiment against the use of proximity RFID, the DHS announced that passport cards would 
utilize RFID: 
While State and DHS appreciate the comments received, the vast majority reflected an 
improper understanding of the business model that WHTI [Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative] is designed to meet and how the technology selected would actually be 
implemented. DHS remains committed to vicinity-read radio frequency identification 
(RFID) as the most appropriate technological solution to facilitate document processing 
at land and sea ports-of-entry. Vicinity-read RFID technology should allow CBP officers 
to quickly obtain information about the border crosser and perform terrorist watch list 
checks while they are still awaiting a personal inspection and to read multiple cards 
simultaneously. Therefore, to ensure compatibility and interoperability with the DHS 
border management system, and to secure significant travel facilitation advantages, the 
Department of State will produce the passport card utilizing vicinity RFID technology. 
(72 FR 74169, 2007). 
While the data privacy committee report sat in draft stage and despite overwhelmingly 
negative public comment on the proposal, the U.S. continued its program for introducing RFID 
into citizen identity documents. By 2007, citizens driving across the Canadian border could no 
longer use their normal driver’s license but needed to have their passport or one of the newly 
developed Pass Cards, an identity card with an embedded RFID chip that can be read from over 
20 feet away. 
The goal of the passport card, an alternative to the traditional passport, is to reduce the 
wait at land and sea border checkpoints by using an electronic device that can 
simultaneously read multiple cards’ radio frequency identification (RFID) signals from a 
distance, checking travelers against terrorist and criminal watchlists while they wait. “As 
people are approaching a port of inspection, they can show the card to the reader, and by 
the time they get to the inspector, all the information will have been verified and they can 
be waved on through,” said Ann Barrett, deputy assistant secretary of state for passport 
services, commenting on the final rule on passport cards published yesterday in the 
Federal Register.  (Nakashima, 2008, n.p.) 
More significant is the new program of Enhanced Driver’s Licenses (EDLs) that also use 
the newer, proximity RFID technology. As we will see, this could represent an end around 
strategy for the U.S. government to phase in national ID cards with embedded RFID. 
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ENHANCED DRIVER’S LICENSE 
The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), passed by Congress and signed into 
law as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, will, as of June 1, 
2009 require travelers from Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean and Bermuda, including U.S. 
citizens, to present a passport or Enhanced Driver’s License (EDL) to enter the United States. The 
EDL also functions as a regular driver’s license, but meets specific federal requirements including 
the use of RFID technology. Travelers in the past have been exempt from such requirements and 
could simply show driver’s licenses produced according to local standards, whether the locality 
was a province in Canada or a U.S. state. As the DHS indicates, it is encouraging states to 
“enhance” their driver’s licenses to meet WHTI requirements: 
DHS is pursuing development of alternative documents to meet Western Hemisphere 
Travel Initiative (WHTI) implementation requirements at land and sea ports of entry. 
DHS is encouraging states to submit proposals to enhance their driver’s licenses and 
identification documents to satisfy WHTI requirements. (“Fact Sheet: Enhanced Driver’s 
Licenses,” 2007, n.p.) 
Current U.S. AG Janet Napolitano, who signed one of many state bills outlawing Real 
ID, is an advocate of the EDL: 
“Enhanced driver’s licenses give confidence that the person holding the card is the person 
who is supposed to be holding the card, and it’s less elaborate than Real ID,” Miss 
Napolitano said. (Hudson, 2009, n.p.) 
As of early 2009, the EDL was in use or being planned for 7 states, comprising roughly 
30 per cent of the U.S. population. In Washington State, where the program was first piloted, 
more than 2,000 signed up for EDLs in the first two days of the program (“2,000 Sign up,” 2008).   
Whether or not the Real ID Act gets revised and redeployed or fades into obscurity, the 
U.S. government continues to advance and strengthen its nationwide identity system program. 
The failure of Real ID does not mean that the federal government has given up on its goal of 
building a nationwide information system to verify the authenticity of breeder documents like 
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birth certificates and passports; it does not mean it has given up its newly claimed authority to 
dictate situations which should require presentation of a federally authorized card, nor does it 
mean it will decide to regulate or restrict private uses of the ID card. Most importantly, whatever 
Real ID victory card there was, it has little to do with the struggle to keep RFID tags out of 
federally approved identity documents. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 
2004, which asserts this federal authority, remains in effect regardless of the fate of the Real ID 
Act. 
Ultimately, though much of the Real ID struggle appears to be documented with this 
searchable SIP, “Real ID,” it is very likely that the name itself will become less relevant over 
time. The primary SIP for exploring the struggle over a national ID system may soon be 
“Enhanced Driver’s License” rather than Real ID.  
As we consider the SoR section to follow, it is important to remember that, although they 
can greatly facilitate the states production and collection of PII, a definitive national ID system is 
not a necessary component of problematic state dossier configurations.  
SYSTEMS OF RECORDS 
This section is divided into three sections, the first covering a major SoR, the 
Investigative Data Warehouse, and the second two sections covering important types of records 
that flow across record systems: suspicious activity reports and watch lists. 
INVESTIGATIVE DATA WAREHOUSE 
What is the Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW)? Public officials both inside and 
outside the FBI itself have often confused or conflated the IDW with a number of other FBI 
systems, initiatives and projects, including “Project Trilogy,” the “Virtual Case File System,” 
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Sentinel, and “Project Z.” Just prior to its official launch, FBI director Mueller introduced the 
project to Congress as the Integrated Data Warehouse but it has since been referred to explicitly 
as the Investigative Data Warehouse. Inconsistencies in terminology, even by officials who direct 
the programs, can create ripples of confusion among researchers and activists.   
The IDW began first as a pilot project known as the Secure Counterterrorist Operational 
Prototype Environment (SCOPE) program before being officially launched under the IDW name 
in January of 2004. The data warehouse is related to, but not formally part of, the Trilogy project. 
The Trilogy project, officially launched in November of 2000, was the FBI’s congressionally 
funded project to upgrade the agency’s outdated IT systems (U.S. FBI, 2004). Trilogy, which 
received an initial allocation of $379 million from Congress, was divided into three components. 
The first two components, upgrades to the FBI’s computer networking system and all computer 
hardware, were completed in April 2004. The third component of the project, the upgrading of the 
agency’s antiquated case software, the Automated Case System (ACS), with a Virtual Case File 
system (VCF), was never completed due to management and technology problems (Anderson, 
2005). 
The Investigative Data Warehouse, according to the FBI’s 2004 report to the 9/11 
Commission, “contains all data that can legally be stored together” (U.S. FBI, 2004, p. 54).  
According to congressional testimony delivered by FBI director Robert Mueller on Feb 3, 2005, 
the IDW at that time included “47 sources of counterterrorism data, including information from 
FBI files, other government agency data, and open source news feeds that were previously 
available only through separate, stove-piped systems” (Mueller, 2005, n.p.). In December of 
2006, Senator Patrick Leahy stated that the IDW contained “over half a billion FBI and other 
agency documents” and could be accessed by more than 12,000 users in federal, state and local 
law enforcement (Leahy, 2006). 
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The IDW physically stores the data that it aggregates, rather than simply acting as a 
gateway to other record systems. A complete accounting of data sources feeding into the IDW has 
never been made available to the public. Although privacy advocates including the EFF and EPIC 
have claimed that the FBI is in violation of the Privacy Act for not filing a SORN in the Federal 
Register, the FBI argues that since no new data is created by the IDW, it does not meet the legal 
definition of a “system of records” and thus the Privacy Act does not apply. According to FBI 
spokesman Paul Bresson, the IDW “simply unifies previously and lawfully acquired data from 
other established databases into one place” (Caterinicchia, 2006, n.p.). Based on congressional 
testimony and other public statements from FBI personnel, we know that data for the IDW comes 
from the following agencies: the Treasury Department, the State Department, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the CIA, the NSA and the National Counter 
Terrorism Center. Specific records it is aggregating include the No Fly list maintained at the 
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), suspicious activity reports submitted by bankers to the 
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), the list of missing or 
stolen passports maintained by the State Department, and all databases maintained by agencies 
within the Department of Justice. Data can be retrieved from the IDW using a wide range of 
personal identifiers at speeds several orders of magnitude faster than was once possible with 
legacy systems: 
An agent who has to run a search of a thousand names of potential suspects, for example, 
can now do so in 30 minutes, even with all variations of names, dates of birth and Social 
Security numbers. That same search, through the once-separate 18 databases, used to take 
32,000 hours. The system is also set up so that variations in names and dates, which 
differ from agency to agency, and country to country, can be searched easily. This means 
that leaving off the “19” in a year of birth, for example, won’t keep the FBI from missing 
a huge lead. (Todd, 2006, n.p.) 
The IDW appears to be performing many of the functions of the legacy ACS case 
management system that the abortive VCF project was supposed to replace. Much, but not all of 
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the data entered into the ACS system, is also stored in the IDW. Although it seems clear that the 
IDW, at least for the time being, is being used to distribute case files, FBI spokespeople are 
careful to point out that, as of yet, no replacement has come online for ACS. In addition, data 
gathered by FBI agents using National Security Letters is also stored within the IDW. 
How broad is the coverage of the IDW? What percentage of American citizens is 
included in the database? Given the paucity of publicly available information, this is a difficult, if 
not impossible question to answer. A reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, doing research for 
an article about the FBI, found that the IDW had detailed records on his own life: 
Up popped my name in an investigation of Scott Ritter, the former top Iraq arms 
inspector turned administration critic. I’d interviewed him on the telephone several times 
in the late 1990s. 
Scrolling down, I also saw a note on my 1972 membership in a group of graduate 
students and faculty who wrote scholarly articles against the war in Vietnam, evidently 
related to an investigation of Jane Fonda. There were also excerpts of articles I’d written 
over the years that mentioned bombings and the FBI. 
And there were what looked like my bank transactions, past addresses and telephone 
numbers. 
This was a lot more information about me than the FBI said they had when I requested 
my files in the late 1990s. And from my cursory peek, I could tell my files went deep. 
(Stein, 2006, March 5) 
Further, given the expanded use of National Security Letters by the FBI to retrieve 
information about clients and customers of private companies, and the current policy allowing 
agents to retain information collected on innocent people for possible future intelligence value, it 
appears likely that coverage goes beyond convicted criminals and suspected terrorists. 
The FBI has indicated that it does not see the IDW as the ultimate, one stop database for 
the bureau. The system term that has been reserved for this ultimate data storage system is the 
“Master Data Warehouse” (MDW). At some future date, according to the FBI’s 2004 report to 
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the 9/11 commission, the Master Data Warehouse will become “the system of record for, all FBI 
electronic files” (U.S. FBI, 2004, p. 54). 
ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Given the considerable scope of the IDW, it is important to consider the major loophole 
around the Privacy Act. Since there is no omnibus privacy law other than the Privacy Act, and 
since legal restrictions on private information sharing are sector specific, a wide range of personal 
data may be legally provided from the private to the public sector, either voluntarily or for a fee. 
While some Privacy Act restrictions do apply to government contractors, this appears only to 
hold when the associated database is produced directly under state direction, not when a private 
entity makes available already existing data (“Privacy’s Gap,” 2003).  
A wealth of documentary evidence confirms that the FBI has made long term and 
expanding use of data from private data-mining and telecom firms, including, by its own 
admission, Choicepoint, Verizon, ATT and MCI (O’Brian, 2007).  Following revelations that it 
was sharing data with the NSA’s terrorist surveillance program, ATT released an update to its 
privacy policy that it appeared designed to provide the shield the company from any further legal 
fault finding (Lazarus, 2006). 
At the Open Data 2007 conference in Manhattan, the CTO of a web market research firm 
confirmed that ISPs large and small were selling their click stream data to third parties. Although 
this data is supposedly anonymized to protect the privacy of individual consumers, reidentifying 
virtually all of the data subjects would be trivial given the comprehensive nature of the data. The 
technology web site Ars Technica notes that it is “theoretically possible” to ties the information 
back to a specific ISP account. 
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The data is not sold with accompanying user names or information but merely as a 
numerical user value. However, it is still theoretically possible to tie this information to a 
specific ISP account. Cancel told Ars that his company licenses the data from ISPs for 
millions of dollars. He did not give a specific figure about what this broke down to in 
terms of dollars per ISP user, although someone in the audience estimated that it was in 
the range of 40¢ per user per month—this estimate was erroneously attributed to Cancel 
himself in some reports on the event. Cancel said that this clickstream data is “much 
more comprehensive” than data that is normally gleaned through analyzing search 
queries. (Reimer, 2007, n.p.) 
It is interesting to note that while government agencies are required (with certain 
exceptions) to notify the public via the Federal Register for the creation of a new SoR, private 
companies such as ISPs are under no such obligation. The desire to aggregate full spectrum 
information on a person, to produce their dossier, may spring from different social actors, 
interests and goals. A new practice in financial risk indexing, “identity scoring,” makes an 
argument for aggregating and processing an individual’s comprehensive data shadow to predict 
their range of possible behaviors and more easily identify those attempting to fraudulently use an 
identity. Although one might assume that a credit score index cares only about an individual’s 
financial information, innovations in financial risk management are calling for access to a much 
wider range of data: 
Identity scoring works on the same principle as other behavioral scoring systems such as 
credit scoring or auto insurance scoring — it aggregates data on individuals from various 
sources and uses predictive analysis to generate a model of behavior. 
Unlike typical credit monitoring, identity scoring utilizes all of the available data on an 
individual to make its judgment; everything from law enforcement records to property 
deeds to Internet chat logs can be used to generate an identity score. The end results are 
much more specific and capable of accurately judging a person’s information as being 
authentic. 
Identity scoring systems can be used to monitor all types of personal information, 
including debit card and Social Security number use — and misuse. They enable 
monitoring of individual behavior across multiple enterprises, over periods of time, to 
create the most accurate profile possible of a person’s activities (Kraft, 2007, n.p.). 
By allowing a private firm to maintain their “identity score” they can be freed from the 
danger of identity theft, at least until the criminals crack the scores and modify their own 
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behavior accordingly, so as not to deviate from the expected behavior of their victim. The 
problem of course, is that once this dossier has been produced, it may be acquired by other actors 
whose interests in the data may deviate from and even directly oppose that of the data subject.  
An organization designed to promote social ties between CEOs of critical infrastructure 
industries and the FBI, the InfraGard26, provides another set of channels in which private sector 
PII, in the form of suspicious activity reports, may be transferred to the federal government 
without significant oversight. Much of this data could wind up in the IDW, whether or not a 
particular data subject is suspected of having committed a crime. 
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
What is a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)? If one were to rely on Wikipedia as of April 
23, 2009, one would come to the conclusion that SARs are a practice limited to the financial 
sector: 
A Suspicious Activity Report (or SAR) is a report regarding suspicious or potentially 
suspicious activity, filed with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), an 
agency of the United States Department of the Treasury. 
The purpose of the Suspicious Activity Report is to report known or suspected violations 
of law or suspicious activity observed by financial institutions subject to the regulations 
of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). In many instances, SARs have been instrumental in 
enabling law enforcement to initiate or supplement major money laundering or terrorist 
financing investigations and other criminal cases. Information provided in SAR forms 
also presents FinCEN with a method of identifying emerging trends and patterns 
associated with financial crimes. The information about those trends and patterns is vital 
to law enforcement agencies and provides valuable feedback to financial institutions. 
(Wikipedia, “Suspicious Activity Report”)27 
The Wikipedia entry includes one small warning text that reads “[t]he examples and 
perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject,” but otherwise there 
                                                     
26 Covered later in the chapter. 
27 Retrieved April 23, 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspicious_activity_report 
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is no mention that the definition of SAR is several years out of date. More comprehensive, up-to-
date information about the national suspicious activity reporting requires a more thorough search.  
According to the program manager of the office of the Information Sharing Environment, 
the SAR is an electronic file produced by a rapidly growing number of state agents as part of a 
large scale government initiative to make sure that “most Federal, State, local, and tribal law 
enforcement organizations will participate in a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, 
documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is 
potentially terrorism-related.”28  As this section will show, Suspicious Activity Reports (also 
known as Surveillance Detection Reports (SDRs)) are being produced at a rapidly accelerating 
rate, not only within the financial sector, but in the police, military and private business sectors as 
well.  
The SAR represents a dramatic expansion of the role of domestic intelligence in the U.S., 
more wide spread than such activity was at the height of FBI, CIA and military abuses uncovered 
during the 1973 Church Committee hearings. The emerging SAR is none other than a wholesale 
return of the kind of dossier production and record sharing that was both condemned in public 
and constrained in policy by both law and official guidelines. This represents a radical shift in 
roles for more than eight hundred thousand local police officers, who are now being asked to 
serve as an extension of FBI intelligence apparatus, along with a growing contingent of private 
sector informants from InfraGard members to Terrorist Liaison Officers29, all of them the eyes 
and ears of a new domestic intelligence apparatus under the guidance of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  
                                                     
28  Information Sharing Environment website on SAR initiative, retrieved 8/1/09 from 
http://www.ise.gov/pages/sar-initiative.html 
29 Both InfraGard and Terrorist Liaison Officers are covered later in the chaper. 
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Though specific numbers are hard to come by, it is clear that the number of individuals 
whose “reports” are feeding into the domestic intelligence system is growing rapidly and is 
already unprecedented in American history. This particular class of PII, PII of state suspicion, 
tends to persist within information systems longer than files of specific criminal investigation 
(Treverton, 2008) and circulates through a network of record systems, where some of them 
become triggers for the production of watch lists and other “persons of interest” lists. The 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) system, as we will see, leads to the production of PII that is 
often woven into the state’s counterterrorism narrative. Innocent people on the street engaging in 
First Amendment activities or simply minding their own business may be “interpellated” (Poster, 
1996) into a government counter terrorism database within a narrative of suspicion and threat. 
Before looking in detail at the current sites (institutional, technological, locational) and 
logics of the SAR, I present some important recent historical context. First, I offer some 
background on the financial SAR referenced in the Wikipedia entry. The Financial SAR was the 
first major SAR form and is the still the most thoroughly accounted for in government 
documents. Next, I discuss two recent events that help us to better understand what is happening 
today: 1) The TIPS program and 2) the fall 2006 TALON scandal, in which evidence surfaced 
demonstrating the U.S. Military had been spying on and creating files on Americans engaged in 
First Amendment activities.  
FINANCIAL SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT 
The most well-established form of SAR within the U.S. is the financial SAR, first 
required as part of the (amended) Banking Secrecy Act in 1996. The original act required any 
transaction over 10,000 to be reported to the federal government. In 1997, the notion of 
“suspicious activity report” was introduced for transactions over $5000 in which there was 
suspicion of crime or a link to terrorism. Originally banks, and now a wide range of institutions 
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involved in money-related services (including gambling casinos and precious metal dealers) must 
file SARs whenever they have even the slightest suspicion that banking activity carried out by a 
customer may be related to criminal or terrorist activity. The Comptroller’s Handbook, published 
in 2000, describes a number of scenarios in which they recommend the banker file a SAR. They 
include: 
— A customer’s corporate account(s) has deposits or withdrawals primarily in cash rather 
than checks. 
—The owner of both a retail business and a check cashing service does not ask for cash 
when depositing checks, possibly indicating the availability of another source of cash. 
— The customer engages in unusual activity in cash purchases of traveler’s checks, 
money orders, or cashier’s checks. 
— A spike in the customer’s activity with little or no explanation. (U.S. DOT, 2000, pp. 
12-15) 
In 2004, Riggs Bank was fined $25 million for failing to crack down on money 
laundering activities. In 2005, ABN AMRO bank was forced to pay $80 million. Wanting to 
avoid financial liability for non filing and protect themselves from liability for unnecessarily 
filing reports, banks increasingly err on the side of “caution,” filing whenever customer activity 
has the slightest tinge of suspicious behavior (Bruce, 2006). The number of financial SARs 
produced within the United States has risen steadily, from 62,000 in 1996 to more than 1 million 
in 2005. Once submitted, SARS are sent to and stored within the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FINCEN) maintained by the Treasury Department and shared with other agency 
systems of records such as the FBI’s Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) (U.S. GAO, 2006, 
June 12). 
TERRORISM INFORMATION & PREVENTION SYSTEM (TIPS) 
The Terrorism Information & Prevention System (TIPS), introduced by Attorney General 
Ashcroft as part of President Bush’s Freedom Corps initiative, and originally set to launch in 
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August 2002, was presented as the government’s front line protection against terrorism. The TIPS 
system would deputize millions of American workers to be on the lookout for suspicious activity. 
Specifically, the TIPS program looked to enlist “American workers who, in the daily course of 
their work, are in a unique position to see potentially unusual or suspicious activity in public 
places” (Mathews, 2002, July 29). Among the professions targeted were meter readers, truck 
drivers, mail carriers and train conductors. A pilot program was set to begin with one million 
informants in ten cities, more than 4% of their aggregate population. TIPS volunteers would be 
given a special toll-free telephone number and web site where they could submit reports of any 
suspicious behavior. 
Reaction to the proposed program was overwhelmingly negative. Newspapers editorials 
pointed out that the percentage of citizen spies in the TIPS program would exceed that of cold 
war East Germany’s notorious Stasi program. New York Times’ columnist William Safire 
galvanized opposition with his November 14 column, “You are a Suspect.” CNET columnist Lisa 
Bowman asked, “Is Your Cable Guy a Spy?” (Bowman, July 17, 2002). 
Many expressed concern about whether the reports of suspicious activity would find their 
way into a massive government database. Testifying before congress in late July, Ashcroft said he 
advised against creating a database that would be maintained by Operation TIPS, and “I have 
been given assurances that TIPS will not maintain a database.” But the FBI and other agencies 
might preserve TIPS reports in databases, he said. (Mathews, 2002, July 29) 
The DOJ quickly responded to the criticisms, scaling back the program to specifically 
eliminate those workers, who through their daily jobs, had access to people’s homes. An email 
sent to TIPS volunteers in early August told them they would no longer be needed and that the 
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program would now be limited to “only those who work in the trucking, maritime, shipping, and 
mass transit industries” (Lindorff, 2002, August 30, n.p.). 
Still, concern over the impact of the program on civil liberties remained high. House 
Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) and Senate Patrick Leahy (D-VT) came out strongly against 
the scheme. Armey placed a measure within that fall’s Homeland Security bill explicitly 
defunding the program. Although Leahy supported the defunding measure, Senator Joe 
Lieberman, chairman of the Homeland Security committee, was able to keep the measure out of 
the Senate version. 
The overwhelmingly negative reaction to the program helped sap its momentum, and 
Operation TIPS was quietly shelved. As we will see, however, the basic components of this 
system continue to be developed. The notion of leveraging the public at large to act as source for 
data on suspicious, potentially targeted persons has been “in development” both practically and 
conceptually, ever since. 
JOINT PROTECTION ENTERPRISE NETWORK (JPEN) 
The Joint Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN) was a computer network designed for 
the sharing of unclassified “force protection” information between military installations. The 
network, operated by the United States Northern Command, the division of the U.S. military 
entrusted with protecting the U.S. homeland since October 1, 2002, stored and distributed reports 
regarding known or suspected suspicious activity and incidents at, or somehow threatening, DoD 
installations. According to a 2004 report in the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Association’s SIGNAL magazine, “JPEN has changed hands and names several times since its 
inception” (Lilie, 2004, n.p.). 
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According to the JPEN SORN published in the Federal Register on September 23, 2003, 
the database could store information on  “[a]ny individual, civilian or military, involved in, 
witnessing or suspected of being involved in or reporting possible criminal activity affecting the 
interests, property, and/or personnel on a DoD installation.” Information stored within the system 
included “subject’s name, aliases, Social Security Number, address(es), telephone number, date 
of birth, driver’s license number, passport number, license plate number, vehicle description, 
description of occupants, source of investigation, risk analysis, threat assessment, victim names, 
names of informants, names of law enforcement officers and investigators, and subject’s group 
affiliations, if any” (68 FR 55593). 
A key component of the JPEN system was the Threat and Local Observation Notice 
(TALON) report, a web-based entry form, originally developed as part of the Air Force’s Eagle 
Eyes threat notice system. In May, 2003, recognizing the need for a DOD wide standard, the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense established the TALON report as the “formal mechanism for 
assembling and sharing non-validated domestic threat information among intelligence, counter 
intelligence, law enforcement, security and force protection entities” (U.S.  DOD, 2003, May 2, 
n.p.). TALON reports were generated when one of seven criteria, each with varying degrees of 
specificity, were met. The most specific threats included “tests of security” “bomb threats,” 
“surveillance,” “repetitive activities,” and “elicitation,” any attempt to obtain information from 
security or military personnel by unauthorized individuals. Two more general criteria were “non-
specific threats,” and “suspicious activities or incidents” (Porter & Crumley, 2006, p. 26).  
TALON agents were not trained to target individuals first. Instead, they were trained to 
be on the lookout for any suspicious behavior potentially indicative of a future threat. The general 
idea was that when the agent witnessed a suspicious event, they were supposed to generate a 
report. In practice, agents responsible for generating TALON reports made broad use of these 
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final two categories, generating and storing reports on constitutionally protected First 
Amendment activities including non-violent association and public assembly. 
TALON included multiple source vectors for report data, including the public at large via 
special tip line. Trained agents then entered TALON reports with relevant data. These reports 
became available to other agents as “unverified data” and also flowed “up stream” to systems 
which vetted these unverified reports, deciding whether or not they warranted further 
investigation (Isikoff, 2006).  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers first began to talk 
publicly about the JPEN system in the spring of 2004. Speaking at the AFCEA Technet 
International Conference on May 11, 2004, Myers conveyed his enthusiasm to the assembled 
crowd, suggesting that JPEN had a broader future than just protecting military installations: 
How many of the folks in this room know anything about JPEN? If you don’t know about 
JPEN, then you’ve got to go take a look at it. The Joint Protection Enterprise Network, it 
can be focused on anything, but right now, we’re focused on security at military 
installations. (Myers, 2004, May 11, n.p.) 
The following day, in testimony before Congress, Myers continued to hint at larger plans 
for the unclassified threat information network, stating “[a]though currently operating only on 
military installations, JPEN has the potential to be expanded to share terrorist information with 
Federal, State and local agencies as well” (Myers, 2004, May 12, n.p.). Soon, the DOD did begin 
to share “terrorist information” with the FBI, but not until the JPEN network and its associated 
TALON reports became embroiled in considerable controversy. 
JPEN was operated under the direct management of a newly minted DOD agency, the 
Counter Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA), established per directive of the Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld on February 19, 2002. CIFA’s declared mission was to “transform” the way 
counterintelligence is done “fully utilizing 21st century tools and resources” (Pincus, 2005). The 
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development of threat assessments by CIFA agents involved the exploitation of commercial data 
and the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT) such as publicly available web sites.  
Between March 2004 and December 2005, CIFA had awarded more than 33 million 
dollars in contracts to “corporate giants Lockheed Martin, Unisys Corporation, Computer 
Sciences Corporation and Northrop Grumman to develop databases that comb through classified 
and unclassified government data, commercial information and Internet chatter to help sniff out 
terrorists, saboteurs and spies.” Although CIFA’s size and budget were classified, congressional 
sources told Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus that it had spent more than $1 billion 
through October, 2006. A counterintelligence official estimated that CIFA, at the time, had more 
than 400 full-time employees and 800 to 900 contractors (Pincus, 2007, April 25, n.p.). 
In November 2005, the White House proposed expanding the powers of CIFA, creating 
an intelligence exception to the Privacy Act that would allow the FBI and other agencies to share 
data about U.S. persons with the DOD, CIA and other intelligence agencies, “as long as the data 
is deems to be related to foreign intelligence.” NBC reporters Lisa Myers, Douglas Pasternak, and 
Rich Gardella said CIFA “is becoming the superpower of data mining within the U.S. national 
security community” (Myers, Pasternak & Gardella, 2005, n.p.). 
While the White House was formally pursuing an expansion of powers, CIFA personnel 
were already actively compiling reports on U.S. persons with and without direct connections to 
foreign intelligence. Making liberal use of the general TALON categories of suspicious activity, 
agents compiled written reports on U.S. citizens involved in anti-war protests and peace groups. 
In the fall of 2005, investigative reporters and civil rights organizations began to take a 
strong interest in the activities of CIFA and the nature of their TALON reports. Their findings, 
first broadcast publicly on NBC Nightly news, quickly put the White House and the DOD on the 
163 
 
defensive. The December NBC investigative report published information showing that the 
DODs CIFA had been collecting TALON reports on anti-war groups and other non-violent 
groups. According to the initial NBC report, a 400-page document obtained from the DOD 
contained information on planned protests and other activities of “nearly four dozen anti-war 
meetings or protests.” Even when notations within the document indicated that a particular event 
was not deemed a credible threat, such as a protest against the draft in Fort Lauderdale in which 
the agent writes “U.S. group exercising constitutional rights,” they remained in the database 
anyway, including the names of particular identified people. As many government critics were 
quick to point out, this appeared to violate a long-standing (1982) DOD directive limiting 
collection of data on American citizens (Myers, Pasternak & Gardella, 2005, n.p.). 
The Defense Department reacted quickly to the press reports, stating that it viewed “with 
the greatest concern any potential violation of strict DoD policy governing authorized counter-
intelligence efforts and support to law enforcement,” and noted that its own regulations required 
that information not validated as threatening be “removed from the TALON system in less than 
ninety days.” A Pentagon statement released to the FAS Secrecy News announced that a review of 
the TALON reporting system had been underway since October and that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence had directed several actions after the initial assessment of the database: 
*  First a thorough review of the TALON reporting system to ensure it complies fully 
with DoD and U.S. laws;  
*  Second, a review whether those policies and procedures are being properly applied 
with respect to any reporting and retention of information about any U.S. persons; 
*  Third, a review of the TALON data base to identify any other information that is 
improperly in the data base;  
*  Finally, all Department counterintelligence and intelligence personnel will receive 
immediate refresher training concerning the laws, policies and procedures that govern 
collection, reporting and storing of information related to the warning of potential threats 
to DoD personnel, facilities or national security interests. (“Pentagon Statement on 
Domestic Intelligence Surveillance,” 2005) 
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Even before the results of the investigation were released, DoD spokesman Bryan 
Whitman told Pentagon reporters “[I]t appears as if there may have been things that were left in 
the database that shouldn’t have been left there” (Gilmore, 2005, n.p.). In March, the DOD issued 
a memorandum, “Threats to the Department of Defense,” directing DOD personnel to generate 
Talon reports “for possible international terrorist activity” (U.S. DOD, 2006, March 30). A bit 
more than a year later, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence requested that the TALON 
program be terminated “because the results of the last year do not merit continuing the program 
as currently constituted, particularly in light of its image in the Congress and the media” (U.S. 
DOD, 2007, June 27, p.14). In June, 2006 the JPEN system itself was recommended for closure 
by the commander of Northcom for budgetary reasons (U.S. DOD, 2007, June 27).   
In June, the DOD Inspector General issued its report on CIFA and the TALON reporting 
system (U.S. DOD, 2007, June 27). According to the inspector’s findings, CIFA “legally gathered 
and maintained U.S. person information on individuals or organizations involved in domestic 
protests and demonstrations against DOD” ( p.i). More specifically, it found that CIFA analysts 
were not in violation of DOD directive 5200.27 that permitted gathering such information for law 
enforcement and force protection purposes. The report did find, however, that CIFA violated the 
90-day retention rule specified by this same directive and that it “maintained TALON reports 
without determining whether information on organizations and individuals should be retained for 
law enforcement and force protection purposes” (p. ii).  More specifically, of 1,131 reports 
examined by the IG that had been deleted from the CIFA Cornerstone database, 263 reports, or 
roughly 23 per cent, contained information on protests or demonstrations, and 334 reports, or 
roughly 30 per cent, contained information on U.S. persons.  
On August 4, 2008, CIFA was officially “disestablished” while the “Defense 
Counterintelligence (CI) and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Center” was simultaneously 
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activated. The stated purpose of this change was to more closely align “DoD CIFA and DIA 
HUMINT and CI functions.”  So, although much of CIFA’s mission was retained by the new 
center, CIFA’s law enforcement function was not transferred, officially, at least, ending the 
CIFAs and more generally the DOD’s role in law enforcement (Aftergood,  2008). 
In September, the DOD officially announced the closure of the “TALON reporting 
system” while noting that “intelligence oversight requirements” required the department to 
maintain copies of the data. While the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
America’s Security Affairs worked on a replacement system, DOD personnel were directed to 
submit threat reports to the FBIs Guardian reporting system (“DefenseLink News Release,” 
2007). 
What specifically has been shut down and for what reasons? This still isn’t entirely clear. 
The Cornerstone database, which CIFA used to maintain TALON reports, was officially shut 
down, but the data was retained. Further, the DOD spokesman who announced its 
decommissioning in August was careful to state that this was being done because the intelligence 
value had declined, not because of public pressure or criticism, and that it would be replaced 
(Burns, 2007). CIFA, though officially disestablished, had most of its functions absorbed by the 
new center. The only significant change seemed to be that the new center would not carry on 
CIFAs mission for law enforcement. Threat data gathering would continue, however, and would 
now be funneled to a federal organization with full law enforcement authority, the FBI. 
Rather than going away, the kind of reporting activity in the planned TIPS and the 
implemented TALON programs continues to grow rapidly. The remainder of this section 
describes SAR reporting as it stood late 2008 and early 2009, based on both official government 
documents (SORNS, PIAs, Inspector General Reports) and published investigative journalism. 
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Two particularly important documents, from which I will draw repeatedly, are: 1) the ISE-SAR 
functional standard document (version 1.0) issued by the Information Sharing Environment 
Program manager on October 24, 2008; and 2) the October, 2008 Findings and Recommendations 
of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) (hereafter, Findings and Recommendations), jointly 
published by the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security and the Major Cities 
Chiefs Association. 
SARs are not simply collected; they are produced within very specific contexts which 
impact both the quality of the information and its potential subsequent usage. First, I will consider 
the primary SoRs where SARs are maintained and then examine both established and emerging 
institutional sites of production, from the FBI and military to the more than 800,000 local police 
departments and private sector, via the proto-institutions known as “fusion centers” and the 
InfraGard. Once I have considered these primary, emergent sites of production, I will look more 
closely at the logics of SARs, the how’s and why’s of their production. By examining the specific 
sites and generalized logics of report production we can better identify those aspects that make it 
problematic, that create dangers of more extreme SDS configurations.  
THE MAJOR SITES OF SAR PRODUCTION 
GUARDIAN SYSTEM 
The two primary technological sites — physical systems of records — where the 
production of SARs takes place are the Guardian and E-Guardian systems maintained by the FBI. 
Access to the Guardian system is restricted to FBI agents and other authorized personnel, while 
the e-Guardian system is accessible to the broader state and local law enforcement community. A 
third system of records, the Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS), is maintained by the 
Federal Air Marshalls Service (FAMS) under the TSA. Reports in this system are called 
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Surveillance Detection Reports (SDRs) but they are simply another form of SAR. As I will 
explain more clearly within the logic section, all reports vetted and produced within these two 
institutions fall under the rubric of the overall ISE-SAR initiative. 
In September, 2004, the FBI launched the Guardian system to “facilitate the accurate, 
complete, and timely reporting on the existence and status of terrorist threats.” The system, 
initially only available on the FBI’s intranet, collected reports from FBI agents and legal attaches, 
who were “required to enter … new terrorism threats and suspicious incidents originating in their 
territory and use it to track resolution.”  The FBI has reported that agents are expected to draw 
from multiple sources including: “(1) the general public, (2) other government agency partners, 
(3) state and local law enforcement, (4) ongoing FBI investigations and intelligence assessments, 
and (5) FBI Legal Attaches” (U.S. DOJ, 2008, November, p. 8).  General threats and suspicious 
incidents make their way into agent reports via telephone calls, e-mail, mail correspondence, or 
through the FBI’s website. The Guardian system includes classified information up to the level of 
“secret.” 
Over the course of 2005, more than 51,000 individual reports were entered into the 
system.  By November of 2007, the database contained approximately 108,000 reports on 
“terrorism-related threats…suspicious activity or watch list encounters” (U.S. DOJ, 2008, 
November, p. ii).  Not only had FBI been overwhelmed by the volume of data entered into the 
system, much of it was incomplete or inaccurate.  
From our review of FBI database information, we determined that during fiscal year (FY) 
2006, the public provided the FBI with approximately 219,000 tips that resulted in over 
2,800 counterterrorism threats and suspicious incidents entered in Guardian for 
investigative follow up. (U.S. DOJ, 2008, November, pp. 8-9) 
In the fall of 2008, the Guardian system was extended with a web-based component 
known as e-Guardian. Unlike Guardian, e-Guardian is restricted to unclassified information. E-
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Guardian draws on a much larger field of people to produce SARs than does the Guardian 
system. According to the FBI, e-Guardian will be “available through our secure Law 
Enforcement Online Internet portal to more than 18,000 agencies, which will be able to run 
searches and input their own reports.” Data entered into the eGuardian database is immediately 
accessible at all fusion centers for vetting, where trained personnel decide whether the data will 
be retained and forwarded to the appropriate FBI task force or simply deleted from the system.  
According to an FBI web page, Guardian and eGuardian will “work together, feeding each 
other.”  
eGuardian entries with a possible terrorism nexus will be pushed to Guardian and out to 
our task forces, and unclassified threat and suspicious activity information from the FBI 
housed in Guardian will be pushed to eGuardian and out to the entire law enforcement 
community. It’s an effective one-two punch. (“Connecting the Dots Using New FBI 
Technology,” 2008, n.p.) 
Beauchamp, the FBI’s interim information technology portfolio manager at the Chief 
Information Officer’s Office in late 2007, explained that the eGuardian system was an attempt to 
“try to understand whether it is feasible to capture all suspicious activity data in a single 
repository or whether we need a distributed approach using Web services.” One thing that had 
already become clear by then was that, with over 120,000 users and continued expansion, the 
amount of data stored by the system was exploding (Miller, December 10, 2007). 
The Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), in their online blog, summarized the 
key problems associated with the FBI’s expanding threat reporting system: 
The problems associated with the FBI’s Guardian system offer a glimpse of the 
challenges facing a huge new crop of data recipients under E-Guardian and the ISE. Both 
systems could exacerbate the data integrity problems of Guardian by encouraging state 
and local police to rely on fallible information. Before the new systems are made 
operational, the problems identified in Guardian need to be resolved. Effective oversight 
and data quality measures are crucial safeguards if civil liberties are to be meaningfully 
preserved in an era where government authorities regard intelligence gathering and 
sharing as the key to sound policing. (Geiger, 2008, n.p.) 
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While the FBI were the sole state agents responsible for entering and vetting suspicious 
activity reports within the Guardian system, the unclassified e-Guardian system connected more 
than 800,000 local police officers into the Department of Homeland Security’s extended domestic 
intelligence network. 
A pilot program at the LAPD developed a new training regime for officers to “gather, 
record, and analyze information of a criminal or non-criminal nature, that could indicate activity 
or intentions related to either foreign or domestic terrorism.” Among the types of behavior 
identified that would warrant SAR reports are taking pictures or video footage “with no apparent 
esthetic value,” taking notes, and “espousing extremist views.” Information generated by the 
police officers will be shared with their local fusion centers and from there to FBI SoRs Guardian 
and e-Guardian as well as information systems maintained by the DHS and other U.S. 
intelligence agencies (Sullivan, 2008). According to James Cohen, a senior advisor in the office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, the office is working with other federal agencies and state 
and local officials to “expand the Los Angeles model to 12 other cities and states, as part of a 
federal pilot program” (Gorman, 2008, n.p.).  
On June 10, 2008, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, which as of June 2009 included 
63 cities with populations over half a million, released a formal resolution endorsing the Findings 
and Recommendations and calling for the adoption of suspicious activity reporting practices in 
police departments nationwide (Major Cities Chiefs, 2008). According to the Findings and 
Recommendations, local police departments are advised to incorporate SAR reporting into their 
existing activities, for example, by simply adding a SAR checkbox to existing forms and 
paperwork. 
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Proponents of the program are quick to point out that much of what local police officers 
will do as part of the SAR initiative is simply sharing information they have already been 
creating. While this is true to a point, it is important to remember that the SAR initiative is not 
simply a new box to check on normal paperwork routines; it is also a mindset, a framing of 
suspicious activity heavily influenced by an episodic federal threat narrative, punctuated by threat 
assessments and other memoranda, issued by federal agencies and circulated amongst all 
participants in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE). 
FUSION CENTERS 
The fusion centers can be considered an extension of an initiative to “fuse” intelligence 
information that began with the establishment of the National JTTF in July, 2002. The National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the now more than 100 local JTTFs in more than 100 
cities nationwide have been the initial points of fusion for once “walled” intelligence agencies to 
share and analyze information. The NJTTF, as of 2004, consisted of 57 people from 38 U.S. 
agencies (law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, defense, public safety, and homeland 
security) (“A Closer Look,” 2004).  Ken Love, Acting Chief of the NJTTF in July, 2004, 
describes its basic function: 
It’s a pretty simple concept: we bring together people from every U.S. agency that 
collects and processes terrorist intelligence; we put them in one room and hook them into 
their own and into our FBI intelligence databases; and all of a sudden we have the 
universe of terrorist intelligence on the table — to share, to query, to coordinate, to 
answer questions, and to give direction and support to the 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTFs) around the country that function under us. “Fusion” means that terrorist 
intelligence is instantly shared vertically from HQ to our JTTFs and horizontally to all 
NJTTF agencies. (“Meet the National Joint Terrorism Task Force,” 2004) 
Local JTTF offices have been in existence since 1980, but they have grown in number 
and become much more important since the 9/11 attacks. A fusion center can be considered a 
more general class of the JTTF which involves state, local and private institutions as well. The 
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DOJ’s official Fusion Center Guidelines describe the broad reach of data collection 
accompanying fusion center charters: 
 There is no single source for terrorism-related information. It can come through the 
efforts of the intelligence community; local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
authorities; other government agencies (e.g., transportation and health departments); the 
private sector; and the general public. (U.S. DOJ, n.d., p. 11) 
Although some fusion centers were in operation before the 911 attacks, they were not 
widely deployed nationally until early 2005. In December, 2004 the President’s Homeland 
Security Advisory Council recommended “each State should establish an information center that 
serves as a 24/7 ‘all-source,’ multi-disciplinary, information fusion center” (U.S. DHS, 2005, p. 
4). Between 2004 and 2007, the Department of Homeland Security dispersed $254 million in 
support of the centers, while the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies have personnel 
on site. Fusion centers are generally led by local law enforcement chapters such as the state police 
or the FBI, but also regularly work with DOD personnel and the U.S. Northern Command. 
Because fusion centers are officially administered by state, not federal government, they are not 
subject to federal privacy laws and have developed in different ways. Although most early fusion 
centers began with a focus on counter-terrorism, the role of fusion centers has tended to expand 
over time to a broader orientation toward general criminality. Los Angeles Police Chief William 
Bratton, in a 2008 speech to the National Fusion Center Conference in San Francisco, explained 
the reasoning for this ongoing transformation: 
Now, let’s address the ongoing debate over whether fusion centers should be strictly 
designed to counter terrorism or whether they should address “all crimes, all hazards.” 
To advocate the position that fusion centers should be strictly designed around terrorism 
demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the public safety risk, threat matrices, 
and the need to engage the majority of local law enforcement. It also demonstrates a 
complete lack of understanding about how terrorists are recruited, how terrorists plan and 
execute their operations and the criminal markets that support terrorist organizations. 
The idea of terrorism has come a long way since the days of the Red Brigades. Al Qaeda, 
FARC and other groups have been successful at exploiting the vulnerabilities of their 
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enemies. In our case, they attacked the arrogance and turf battles that were at the heart of 
our failure to communicate. As we heard Secretary Chertoff say in this forum last year: 
“We have to build a network to beat a network.” That is precisely what we will do.  
My position on the role and operation of fusion centers has been adopted by all the chiefs 
from America’s large cities - intelligence must be gathered on all crimes and fully 
integrated into the daily operations of the police department. In our view, intelligence 
should inform and shape the wide range of police services that protect the public. For 
example, it is critical that we receive timely threat intelligence from the federal 
government so that we can determine what measures may be taken by police and 
emergency service agencies (Bratton, 2008, March 19, n.p.). 
According to the GAO, 43 fusion centers were operational nationwide by September 
2007, 34 of which had opened since January, 2004 (U.S. GAO, 2007, October). Fusion centers 
have access to a range of public and private information systems. Most working centers have 
access to unclassified networks such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and 
Law Enforcement Online (LEO).  Most have commercial accounts with data aggregators such as 
Choicepoint, Accurint and Lexis/Nexis. In addition, roughly half of the centers indicated they 
were in the process of gaining access to classified DHS and FBI networks and other federal data 
systems (“Centers Tap into Personal Databases,” 2008). 
Although the role of fusion centers in sharing and distributing information has been 
heavily emphasized, it must not be forgotten that they also play a significant role in producing 
information, including PII. For example, the Denver Post reported in the summer of 2008 that 
fusion centers across the country were beginning to deploy Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) to 
generate reports of suspicious activity within their communities. In Colorado, as of July, 2008, 
181 police, firefighters, paramedics and even utility workers had been trained and were deployed 
after FBI-led training (Finley, 2008). Progressive reporter Mathew Rotchschild, who located a 
TLO position announced for East Bay, San Francisco, noted that in addition to locations around 
the waterfront, TLOs might be situated on the campuses of universities (Rothschild, 2008a).  
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TLOs report to FBI representatives at their local fusion center. Information provided may then be 
written into a formal SAR report, based on the agent’s judgment. 
A major concern about the Fusion Centers raised by privacy groups such as EPIC is the 
way in which they appear to fall through the cracks of the country’s legal infrastructure for 
privacy protection. Although the DOJs guidelines on fusion centers include a section on privacy 
and civil liberties, and fusion centers are recommended to follow the principles of Fair 
Information Practices, these are voluntary guidelines, not legal mandates. EPIC has called for 
formal oversight of fusion centers (“’National Network’ of Fusion Centers,” 2007). 
INFRAGARD 
An increasing number of private sector professionals are being recruited to serve as 
additional channels of domestic intelligence production in the FBI-sponsored InfraGard program. 
The ACLU has compared the program to Ashcroft’s TIPs program: 
“There is evidence that InfraGard may be closer to a corporate TIPS program, turning 
private-sector corporations-some of which may be in a position to observe the activities 
of millions of individual customers-into surrogate eyes and ears for the FBI,” (Stanley, 
2004, p. 12) 
First formed in Cleveland in 1996, the FBI made and promoted a national template for 
the program in January, 2001.  By March, 518 companies, including Coca-Cola and Delta, had 
joined the program. By November of that year, InfraGard totaled 1700 members. Total 
membership exceeded 23,000 members by January 2008 (Rothschild, 2008b). An FBI web page 
describes the program: 
It’s the twenty-first century: a globalized, systems-driven, networked age. Our job is to 
prevent attacks-both physical and electronic-against critical infrastructure: banks … 
hospitals … telecommunications systems … emergency services … water and food 
supplies … the Internet … transportation networks … postal services … and other major 
industries that have a profound impact on our lives. 
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Precisely the point of an eight-year-old alliance between the FBI and the public called 
InfraGard. Our program has over 14,800 private sector members spread across 84 local 
chapters nationwide. That’s more than the total number of FBI Agents. 
These partners represent the full sweep of infrastructure experts in local communities: 
business executives, entrepreneurs, military and government officials, computer security 
professionals, academia, state and local law enforcement, and any concerned citizens. 
The essence of the partnership is information and intelligence sharing. FBI Agents 
assigned to each chapter bring meaningful news and information to the table: threat alerts 
and warnings, vulnerabilities, investigative updates, overall threat assessments, case 
studies, and more. Our private sector partners-who own and operate some 85 percent of 
the nation’s critical infrastructures-share expertise, strategies, and most importantly, leads 
and information that help us track down criminals and terrorists. (“InfraGard: FBI and 
Private Sector,” 2008, n.p.) 
InfraGard members can share information via a secure, exclusive network or in person 
during special meetings and seminars. Members of the InfraGard are trained to supply raw 
suspicious activity reports to their FBI contacts, who may then enter this information into a threat 
reporting system such as Guardian as a formal SAR. InfraGard members are given legal 
immunity for information that they choose to supply (Rothschild, 2008b) and, in return, may be 
rewarded with insider information that even high level government officials may not have access 
too.   
On November 1, 2001, the FBI had information about a potential threat to the bridges of 
California. The alert went out to the InfraGard membership. Enron was notified, and so, 
too, was Barry Davis, who worked for Morgan Stanley. He notified his brother Gray, the 
governor of California. 
“He said his brother talked to him before the FBI,” recalls Steve Maviglio, who was 
Davis’s press secretary at the time. “And the governor got a lot of grief for releasing the 
information. In his defense, he said, ‘I was on the phone with my brother, who is an 
investment banker. And if he knows, why shouldn’t the public know?’” (Rothschild, 
2008b) 
THE LOGIC OF SAR PRODUCTION 
THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 
The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) is the most general logic under which the 
SAR program operates.  The 9/11 Commission found that a lack of information sharing between 
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agencies like the CIA and FBI was one of the primary reasons U.S. intelligence failed to identify 
and mitigate the 9/11 conspiracy. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 1016 of IRTPA (2004) 
called for the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and defined it as “an 
approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information.” The law called for the President to 
designate a Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE) and establish an Information Sharing Council 
to advise the President and the Program Manager. The council includes members from the 
Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Director of 
National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, 
National Counter Terrorism Center, and many other departments with connections to national 
security. 
The PM-ISE lays out the vision of the ISE in its implementation plan: 
We envision a future ISE that represents a trusted partnership among all levels of 
government in the United States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, to detect, 
prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, 
people, and interests of the United States of America. (McNamara, 2006, p. xiii) 
As of June 2009, the first two priorities listed for the PM-ISE office were the 
establishment of fusion centers nationwide and the institutionalization of a Suspicious Activity 
Reporting framework.30  This framework is documented within the ISE-SAR standard and the 
Findings and Recommendations. 
THE SAR PRODUCTION AND SHARING PROCESS  
The information acquisition process for SARs occurs via multiple vectors, including on-
duty police officers, telephone tip lines, and active military personnel. Before a general report of 
suspicious activity can be turned into an official ISE-SAR it must be first vetted within the 
receiving organization. This front line organization could be anything from a small local police 
                                                     
30Ise.gov web site, retrieved 6/11/2009 from http://www.ise.gov/pages/vision.html. 
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office to a major city police precinct to a state fusion center. The rigor and expertise involved in 
the initial evaluation depends in part on where the initial report is received. If it is in a small 
police department, it is quite likely that the initial determination of terrorism connection will be 
made by someone without formal counterterrorism training. This officer will have seen a recent 
“threat assessment” published by the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
(ITACG) located at the NCTC (“Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group,” n.d.) 
or literature produced by his regional fusion center which helps her to make this determination.  
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Assuming the local police agency decides a report qualifies as a SAR, they submit it to 
their local fusion center. If the agent decides it does not warrant forwarding, what happens to the 
report at this time depends solely on local policies regarding general SAR reports.  Surveillance 
detection reports produced by Federal Air Marshals are stored within the Tactical Information 
Sharing System (TISS) for a period of 25 years. SARs produced and stored by local police 
departments are generally retained for up to 5 years. DOD TALON reports, SARs that were the 
subject of scandal in 2005-6 for reporting peace marches as threats, were supposed to be deleted 
from the reporting system within 90s days, but remained long after (U.S. DOD, 2007, June 27). 
At the fusion center, a trained agent evaluates incoming raw SAR reports. If the report is 
determined to be terrorism-related, the fusion center agent then places the report into the ISE-
SAR format and stores it within the “ISE Shared Environment.” The ISE Shared Environment is a 
dedicated server that is networked with all other fusion centers, JTTFs and the FBI’s E-Guardian 
network. Depending on the seriousness of the report, it may also be forwarded directly to 
counterterrorism institutions such as the JTTF. This record then becomes instantly accessible to 
(searchable by) all fusion centers, while remaining in control of the originating fusion center or 
other participating, authorized ISE-SAR institution. 
According to this official U.S. ISE SAR standard, there are only two situational 
categories that should lead to the production of a SAR: 1) intelligence gathering and 2) pre-
operational planning.  Although at first glance this may appear to be a narrow enough definition 
to insure that moments of SAR production are limited to reduce the noise factor and preserve civil 
liberties,  this definition is being extended in both practice and policy. In the past decade, we 
already have historical examples of SAR reporting programs exceeding their mandate and 
producing reports on First Amendment activity. Even the current Findings and 
Recommendations, jointly released by the Department of Justice, Global Justice Information 
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Sharing Initiative and the Department of Homeland Security, cautions that the current ISE 
standard offers too narrow a definition and recommends that the ISE “update the common 
definition for suspicious activity:” 
…  the suspicious activity may be an actual attack or other crime. It may be a report of a 
suspicious association or material that supports activity. Because of these limitations, 
consideration should be given to expanding the definition: “Reported or observed activity 
and/or behavior that, based on an officers training and experience, is believed to be 
indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism” (pp. 3-4). 
There is further guidance on behavior that might fit the profile for an SAR in Appendix C 
of the ISE-SAR standard document. Among other triggers, it indentifies surveillance, the 
“Monitoring the activity of people, facilities, processes or systems,”; Expressed or Implied 
Threat, “Communicating a spoken or written threat to damage or compromise a 
facility/infrastructure;”  Acquisition Of Expertise, “Attempts to obtain or conduct training in 
security concepts, military weapons or tactics, or other, unusual, capabilities, such as specialized 
transport or handling capabilities”; Sector-Specific Incident, “Actions associated with a 
characteristic of unique concern to specific sectors (such as the public health sector), with regard 
to their personnel, facilities, systems or functions”; Recruiting, “Building of operations teams and 
contacts, personnel data, banking data or travel data;” and other, “Incidents not in above  
categories.”  
In early 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued standards for 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that are to be shared across the national ISE (U.S. DNI, 
2008, January 28).  Information that is “personally identifiable” is tagged with a privacy flag, so 
that it can be easily removed to produce an anonymized SAR. The ISE-SARs document tags 
particular types of data as “privacy fields” that must be removed before a SAR qualifies as a 
“Summary-SAR,” the “anonymized” version of the “Detailed-SAR.” While the standards require 
that first and last names and driver’s license numbers be removed, the “anonymized” record can 
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retain the subject’s birth date, height and weight, as well as the state of issue, issue date and 
expiration date of their driver’s license. With these remaining non-privacy fields, reconstructing 
the identity of the SAR subject is a trivial matter. 
SAR PRODUCTION TRIGGERS 
The SAR standard contains much language stressing the flexibility local institutions have 
in defining what constitutes suspicious activity. In the Findings and Recommendations, local 
fusion centers and policing agencies are advised to develop and circulate literature that helps 
people to understand what constitutes suspicious activity. The logics that trigger SAR production 
can have little to do with rational concerns about international terrorism, however, as the 
following two examples help illustrate. 
An investigative report by Tony Kovaleski of the Denver television station KMGH found 
that Federal Air Marshals in Las Vegas Nevada were regularly generating false Surveillance 
Detection Reports (SDRs) simply to meet quotas set by the managers, with the impression that 
the quota   “‘directly reflects on (their) performance evaluations’” and on “‘how much money 
they make.’” The reporter found a department memo, dated July, 2004, which said “[t]here may 
come an occasion when you just don’t see anything out of the ordinary for a month at a time, but 
I’m sure that if you are looking for it, you’ll see something.” Air Marshals interviewed in the 
course of investigation identified specific instances when innocent air travelers had their names 
entered into a report just to meet quotas: 
“To meet this quota, to get their raises, do you think federal air marshals in Las Vegas are 
making some of this stuff up?” Kovaleski asked. 
“I know they are. It’s a joke,” an air marshal replied. 
“Have marshals in the Las Vegas office, I don’t want to say fabricated, but ‘created’ 
reports?” Kovaleski asked. 
“Creative writing — stretching a long ways the truth, yes,” an air marshal replied. 
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One example, according to air marshals, occurred on one flight leaving Las Vegas, when 
an unknowing passenger, most likely a tourist, was identified in an SDR for doing 
nothing more than taking a photo of the Las Vegas skyline as his plane rolled down the 
runway. 
“You’re saying that was not an accurate portrayal of a potential terrorist activity?” 
Kovaleski asked. 
“No, it was not,” an air marshal said. (“Marshals: Innocent People,” 2006, n.p.) 
Don Strange, a former agent in charge of Air marshals in Atlanta, warned that the repercussions 
for someone falsely placed on such a  report could be severe: “[t]hat could have serious impact ... 
They could be placed on a watch list. They could wind up on databases that identify them as 
potential terrorists or a threat to an aircraft. It could be very serious” (“Marshals: Innocent 
People,” 2006, n.p.). 
In early 2009, a conspiracy-oriented website headed by Austin radio and public access 
personality Alex Jones, Infowars.com, released copies of an internal memo distributed by the 
Missouri Information and Analysis Center (MIAC) and the Missouri State Highway Patrol 
entitled, “The Modern Militia Movement.” The document presented a narrative of the rise, fall 
and return to prominence of a terrorist militia movement characterized by white supremacy, fear 
of a “New World Order” and  interest in third party candidates including Ron Paul and Bob Barr. 
Academics contend that female and minority empowerment in the 1970s and 1960s 
caused a blow to white male’s sense of empowerment. This, combined with a sense of 
defeat from the Vietnam war, increased levels of immigration, and unemployment, 
spawned a paramilitary culture. This caught on in the 1980’s with injects such as Tom 
Clancy novels, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, and movies such as Rambo that glorified 
combat. This culture glorified white males and portrayed them as morally upright heroes 
who were mentally and physically tough. 
It was during this timeframe that many individuals and organizations began to concoct 
conspiracy theories to explain their misfortunes. These theories varied but almost always 
involved a globalist dictatorship the “New World Order (NWO),” which conspired to 
exploit the working class citizens. United States troops were thought to already be 
operating in the U.S. in support of the NWO. Much of this rhetoric would become anti-
semitic claiming that Jews controlled the monetary system and the media.... (p. 1) 
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Political Paraphernalia: Militia members most commonly associated with 3rd party 
political groups. It is not uncommon for militia members to display Constitutional Party, 
Campaign for Liberty, or Libertarian material. These members are usually supporters of 
former Presidential Candidate: Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin and Bob Barr. 
Anti-Government Propaganda: Militia members commonly display picture, cartoons, 
bumper stickers that contain anti-government rhetoric. Most of this material will depict 
the FRS, IRS, FBI, ATF, CIA, UN, Law Enforcement and “The New World Order” in a 
derogatory manner. Additionally, Racial, anti-immigration, and anti-abortion, material 
may be displayed by militia members. (p. 8)31 
Shortly after the report was circulated online, it became a large enough topic of public 
interest to require a response from the state of Missouri. On March 25, 2009, Lt. Gov. Peter 
Kinder called for Department of Public Safety Director John Britt to be placed on leave because 
of the report.  Britt apologized for the “political profiling” and promised to take it immediately 
out of circulation. Defending Britt, Col. James Keathley of the Missouri Highway Patrol stated 
that the report was circulated to Missouri policeman without being properly vetted by himself or 
Britt and that the “flawed oversight system” needed to be revamped (Moring, 2009). 
While this material is only from one state, its contents suggest that in at least some states 
the eyes and ears of domestic intelligence are being trained to view those with marginal political 
views and dissidents as potential members of the militia movement and therefore potential 
terrorists. Given the excesses that have occurred in the past, it seems likely that this kind of 
training material, if widely circulated, will lead to the generation of SAR reports on Americans 
whose only “crime” is the exercise of their First Amendment right to speak out in criticism of 
their government. 
WATCH LISTS  
In the years since September 11th, significant public attention has been paid to the 
government’s plan to expand, update and improve a watch list program to keep potentially 
                                                     
31  Copy of complete report retrieved 8/15/2009 from http://www.constitution.org/abus/le/miac-strategic-
report.pdf 
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dangerous terrorists out of the airline system.  The Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening 
system (CAPPS) was first launched in 1998 after the crash of TWA Flight 800, as part of a 
package of new security measures installed at airports. The system, in its original form, flagged 
suspect travelers for extra scrutiny from security, but did not, in and of itself, produce decisions 
about whether an individual could get on a plane. On September 11th, six of the eighteen hijackers 
were flagged by the system for extra security, for the gate inspectors to check their luggage more 
thoroughly or pat them down for weapons. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, all six of 
these flagged passengers eventually boarded the planes that day. 
The controversy and legal struggles over this updated watch list program provide an 
important example of a key SDS tool and the effectiveness of organized public resistance. Before 
looking at this struggle in more detail, across three nominally different systems — CAPPS II, 
Secure Flight and the Automated Targeting System (ATS) — it is important to consider the watch 
list in historical context. Rather than being announced in the form of a Systems of Records Notice 
(SORN) or Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), the FBI’s watch list program from the 1920s to the 
early 70s was exposed in the Church Committee hearings. 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT: HOOVER’S WATCH LISTS 
Between 1919 and 1921, J Edgar Hoover, before becoming director of the FBI, led a 
series of large-scale nationwide arrests called the Palmer Raids, named for then Attorney General 
Mitchell Palmer. Armed with a list of more than 150,000 names, from late 1919 to 1921 FBI 
agents violently apprehended and took into custody anarchists and anti-war advocates they 
believed to be responsible or “fellow travelers” with those who plotted violent overthrow of the 
government. The raids had followed a series of bombings attributed to these violent anarchists, 
including twice at the AG’s residence. The Palmer raids still stand as the largest mass arrest in 
U.S. history, with over 10,000 individuals apprehended and arrested.  Though these raids would 
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be soon condemned within the public eye and by the new President and Attorney General, the 
practice of keeping lists was continued and expanded by Hoover as director of the FBI.  
During Hoover’s tenure at the FBI, the bureau maintained a watch list originally known 
as the “Custodial Detention List.” Candidates for inclusion on the list, begun in 1939, were 
described as having communist “tendencies” or being “communistic.” In 1941, criteria were 
expanded to include “pronouncedly pro-Japanese” individuals. Those on the list were candidates 
for immediate arrest and imprisonment in the event of a national emergency. In 1943, then 
Attorney General Francis Biddle, noting the absence of any Congressional authorization for the 
list, ordered its termination. Hoover, ignoring the AG’s directive, simply renamed the detention 
list to “Security Index” and continued its operation (Donohoe, 2006). 
In 1950, with the passage of the Internal Security Act, the “security index” gained partial 
legal status. The emergency detention provisions of the Act gave the government the authority to 
round up and indefinitely detain dissidents without trial, based on the simple assertion by the 
Attorney General that they would “probably” engage in future illegal conduct. In addition to the 
“security index,” another, larger list called the “reserve list” named people who would be subject 
to “priority investigation” after the arrests of persons on the “security index.” Names on the lists 
included “educators, labor union organizers, lawyers, doctors and scientists” and “individuals 
who could potentially furnish financial or material aid” to an enemy (Goldstein, 2001, p. 324). 
According to one former FBI agent, the combined lists, at their peak, contained more than 
500,000 names (Swearingen, 1995).  
In 1971, with its repeal of the “Emergency Detention Provisions of the Internal Security 
Act of 1950,” Congress outlawed the “security index” program. Rather than dissolve the program 
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outright, Hoover simply changed its name again, this time to the “Administrative Index” or 
ADEX.   
Attorney General Mitchell approved the FBI’s decision to keep an “administrative index” 
on the grounds that the authority to create a list compiled and maintained to assist the 
Bureau in making readily retrievable and available the results of its investigations into 
subversive materials and related matters is not prohibited by Repeal of the Emergency 
Detention Act. While the FBI did not tell Mitchell explicitly that the ADEX would also 
serve as an emergency arrest list in asking for his approval, according to a Senate 
Intelligence Committee staff report, there was “informal” Justice Department knowledge 
of the real purpose of the list. (Goldstein, 2001, p. 439) 
The ADEX combined the Security and Reserve Indices, with Reserve names making up 
the lowest priority category. The minimal criteria for inclusion on the ADEX was that an 
individual be “in a position to influence others to engage in acts inimical to the national defense 
or furnish financial aid or other assistance to revolutionary elements because of their sympathy, 
associations, or ideology.” Church Committee hearings in 1976 uncovered the existence of the 
ADEX list and ordered its termination.  Though official documentation is lacking, there is 
evidence that administration of the ADEX list then shifted from the FBI to FEMA as part of its 
Continuity of Government (COG) program (Dubose, 1987; Sklar, 1988). 
Watch lists can be considered the ultimate reduction of an individual’s state dossier 
system information into a binary categorization: absence/presence. Presence on a particular list is 
a signal for a state agent to act on the listed subject in a particular way. As with the original 
CAPPS list, this action might simply involve increased attention and screening. Today it might 
involve being denied boarding of a particular flight, being immediately apprehended and 
incarcerated, or being denied a job. 
Due to the potential power of the watch list, potential listees and the public at large 
clearly have an interest in knowing the logic of a particular watch list’s production. What are the 
factors that determine whether a particular person is on this or that list? What sources of 
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information contribute to this calculation? Because of national security concerns, state officials 
are naturally reluctant to make this process transparent. At the same time, without the ability of a 
listee to understand and/or challenge the reasons for his/her listing, it creates a particularly 
problematic interface between the state and the subject. 
Since the September 11th Attacks, the idea of watch lists has been particularly salient in 
debates over the emerging surveillance society. Three lists in particular — the consolidated 
terrorist list, the no fly list, and the selectee list — have gotten significant attention from the 
public. These lists are connected with a series of government programs to enhance the security of 
airline travel. 
CAPPS, SECURE FLIGHT, ATS 
CAPPS II, originally scheduled to be launched in 2004, was intended to upgrade the 
existing watch list system in two major areas. First, it was slated to draw on a much higher 
volume of data (including private data) to make its risk assessments. Second, the system added a 
higher degree passenger risk assessment that, if assigned to a particular traveler, would be enough 
to forbid them from boarding the plane (but not necessarily to be taken into custody). 
On January 15, 2003, the Department of Transportation, then the home department for 
the TSA, issued a SORN describing an Aviation Security Screening Records (ASSR) system. 
Although, the term CAPPS was not used in this original SORN, all subsequent references to the 
system by the TSA would use the term CAPPS II. According to the SORN, the system would be 
used “to facilitate the conduct of an aviation security-screening program, including risk 
assessments to ensure aviation security.” The new risk assessment for CAPPS II marked the first 
introduction of a color-coded system in which travelers would be assigned one of three colors 
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(green, yellow, red) indicating their relative degree of risk. To make this determination, a wide 
range of public and private data would be used: 
Passenger Name Records (PNRs) and associated data; reservation and manifest 
information of passenger carriers and, in the case of individuals who are deemed to pose 
a possible risk to transportation security, record categories may include: risk assessment 
reports; financial and transactional data; public source information; proprietary data; and 
information from law enforcement and intelligence sources. (68 FR 45265, August 1) 
Data maintained within the CAPPS II, as outlined in the SORN, could be disclosed to a 
wide range of public and private entities, from private contractors and individuals to agents of 
government, both domestic and foreign, whenever TSA “becomes aware of an indication of a 
violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law or regulation.” Individuals that TSA deems 
to be a threat to aviation security would have their information retained for up to 50 years. The 
DOT announced an effective date for CAPPS II of February 24, 2003. If no comments or 
criticisms were submitted by that date, the CAPPS II system as described in the SORN would be 
implemented. If comments were received, the DOT would issue a new, revised SORN designed 
to address these comments and criticisms. 
The broad coverage and scope of the CAPPS II system as it was announced in January 
drew harsh criticism from the public at large, from newspaper reporters to privacy activists to 
members of Congress. 
there are … serious questions surrounding law enforcement access to data held by 
multiple commercial data providers and whether that access might just be an end run 
around the Privacy Act.... Additionally, part of the purpose behind the Privacy Act was to 
ensure that information the government did collect about individuals was accurate. The 
poor quality of data in the various commercial databases such as credit reports has been 
well documented. There is a significant possibility that the use of multiple-source 
commercial databases would result in a number of incorrect determinations because of 
the bad data stored in these databases — garbage in, garbage out. (“EPIC Comments on 
the TSA,” 2003) 
The only difference between the TIA [Terrorism Information Awareness] program and 
the Department’s current proposals is that the ASSR system would, at least nominally, be 
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limited to those who travel at some time by air. Given the prevalence of air travel in the 
USA, that is not a very significant limitation or distinction. (Hasbrouck, 2003, n.p.) 
In response to criticism, the TSA, now under the DHS, released its revised SORN for the 
CAPPS II system. The revised description, which Hasbrouck (2003) dubbed CAPPS 2.1, 
significantly limited the amount of private data to be used by the system. According to the SORN 
issued on August 1, 2003, the Passenger Name Record (PNR) would be the only commercial data 
submitted to the CAPPS II system.   
The change in flight reservation procedures under CAPPS II required passengers to 
provide four pieces of information to the ticketing agent when making their reservation: full 
name, home address, phone number and date of birth. This data would be entered into the PNR, 
which would then be sent electronically to CAPPS II. Sometime later, prior to the flight date, the 
CAPPS II system would send the information in the PNR to commercial contractors for the 
purpose of verifying the passenger’s identity: 
The CAPPS II system will access PNRs prior to the departure of the passenger’s flight. 
Selected information will be securely transmitted to commercial data providers, for the 
sole purpose of authenticating passenger identity. This authentication will be 
accomplished not by a permanent co-mingling of data, but merely by the commercial data 
providers transmitting back to TSA a numeric score, which is an indication of the 
percentage of accuracy of the match between the commercial data and the data held by 
TSA. This will enable TSA to have a reasonable degree of confidence that each 
passenger is who he or she claims to be. (68 Fed. Reg. 45265, August 1, 2003) 
Risk determinations would not use private data. After obtaining the numeric identity 
verification score from the commercial partner, CAPPS II would perform its risk assessment 
using government databases, including classified and intelligence data, leading to one of three 
assessments: acceptable risk, unknown risk, or unacceptable risk. This assessment would then be 
transmitted to the air carrier, so that, at check-in, the proper action could be carried out, ranging 
from allowing the individual to board the plane after passing through standard gate procedures, to 
law enforcement taking him or her into custody. 
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Although representatives of the TSA argued that this PNR data was already being 
produced by the airlines, the reality was far different. According to a March 15, 2004 working 
paper presented by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for the session of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization’s “Facilitation Division” later that month in Cairo, 
Egypt, not only was the PNR data not already available, but meeting TSA’s requirements could 
involve industry restructuring costing in excess of U.S. $2 billion: 
Since only portions of Airline Reservation Systems are regulated by Industry standards, 
significant parts of the underlying architecture vary. Any movement to impose changes 
on the industry with respect to the way that PNR’s are constructed, stored or exchanged 
would require a massive restructure of the entire industry’s underlying IT base. While no 
firm analysis has been undertaken to identify the final cost of such a restructuring across 
the industry — including within the Travel Agency community — some in the industry 
have estimated that the costs could conceivably exceed U.S. $2 billion. (“Airline 
Reservation System,” 2004) 
As several privacy activists subsequently pointed out, even the revised CAPPS II system 
had significant violations of privacy built into its design, particularly in the way it would create 
legal requirements for the production of dossier data that would then be maintained, free of 
federal privacy laws, by private companies: 
The additional information required by CAPPS 2.1 could be used to correlate each travel 
reservation (currently indexed only by flight number or reservation record locator) with a 
specific person, and to index separate reservations for individual trips into databases 
easily searchable by name, birthday, address, or phone number. CAPPS-II would thus 
enable the government and private travel companies … to create comprehensive lifelong 
dossiers of everywhere each person has travelled, when, how, with whom, whether 
(behind the closed doors of their hotel room) they asked for one bed or two, and many 
other intimate details of their lives as revealed by their travel histories. (Hasbrouck, 2004) 
Further, despite the TSA statement that it would not retain data on most Americans once 
their flights were completed, there are no comprehensive privacy laws that would prevent the 
TSAs private contractors from maintaining this information and even selling it back to the 
government at a later date. In addition, the revised CAPPS II system continued to include a scope 
beyond purely identifying terrorists to include “serious violations of criminal law.” 
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On October 1, 2003, President George W. Bush signed Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (HR 2555), which contained language specifically prohibiting 
the use of funds for the CAPPS II system until the full review by the General Accounting Office 
determined the program had met eight specific criteria, including “a system of due process” for 
people to appeal their listing and “correct erroneous information,” a low number of false 
positives, the establishment of an internal oversight board and the establishment of satisfactory 
privacy and security measures. Despite the clear cut language of the bill, Bush issued a signing 
statement declaring that while the bill’s language was mandatory, he would construe it as “merely 
advisory” (“Homeland Security Appropriations,” 2008, n.p.). 
In August 2004, the DHS announced that the CAPPS II plan would be terminated, and a 
new initiative, Secure Flight, developed in its place. Secure Flight was supposed to address some 
of the key criticisms. For example, Secure Flight would seek only to identify terrorists, not 
suspected violent criminals. The red, yellow, and green colored threat designations were done 
away with, though the underlying three part risk categorization remained. Commercial data would 
no longer be used to determine a passengers risk factor, although it would be used for initial 
identify verification. Risk designation would be determined by the TSA in consultation with the 
TSC. Finally, the new Secure Flight included a new system for passenger redress, to correct 
situations in which innocents inadvertently appeared on the list. 
A key aspect to understand about the creation and use of a watch list is the act of actually 
matching a name on the list to a person standing before the agent.  As names are not true 
indexical identifiers, it is entirely possible for more than one person to have the same name, or a 
single person to engage in transactions where the spelling of his or her name varies due to human 
error or other reasons. From the state perspective, failing to match a terrorist to the list when they 
are standing before an agent could greatly endanger the air system. From a passenger’s point of 
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view, wrongly being matched to a list would likely inconvenience them or have a major impact 
on their life. In 2005 and 2006, major media outlets featured stories of individuals with common 
names like “David Nelson” whose lives had been disrupted by frequent missed flights and  
mistreatment by authorities Also, from the state’s perspective, too many such “false positives” 
will clog the system and reduce the likelihood that real threats will be spotted. For this reason, 
there is a recognized need on both sides to improve the process by which names are matched to 
watch lists. One of the ways to reduce this occurrence, argued the TSA, was to take away this 
responsibility from the airlines and give it directly to the TSA. 
Despite these changes, privacy and human rights NGOs remained firmly against the 
program in principle, and pointed out that the new requirements for airlines to submit Passenger 
Name Records (PNRs) with specific data fields also opened the door to airlines maintaining 
private travel dossiers that they could then sell back to the government at a later date. In 
February, 2006, the GAO released a highly critical report of Secure Flight, noting the apparent 
lack of oversight the program and numerous security and hardware vulnerabilities. The GAO also 
noted major gaps in the information provided to them concerning where personal data would 
come from and how it would be handled. 
By the end of the year, critics began to wonder if the reason Secure Flight appeared to be 
in such disarray was that its proposed functions were already largely being met by a system 
already in place, one focused only on international travel, but that had not been publicly vetted in 
the way that CAPPS II and Secure Flight were:  
ATS is an Intranet-based enforcement and decision support tool that is the cornerstone 
for all CBP [Customs Border Patrol] targeting efforts. CBP uses ATS to improve the 
collection, use, analysis, and dissemination of information that is gathered for the primary 
purpose of targeting, identifying, and preventing potential terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering the United States. Additionally, ATS is utilized by CBP to identify other 
violations of U.S. laws that are enforced by CBP. In this way, ATS allows CBP officers 
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to focus their efforts on travelers and cargo shipments that most warrant greater scrutiny. 
ATS standardizes names, addresses, conveyance names, and similar data so these data 
elements can be more easily associated with other business data and personal information 
to form a more complete picture of a traveler, import, or export in context with previous 
behavior of the parties involved. Every traveler and all shipments are processed through 
ATS, and are subject to a real-time rule based evaluation. (71 FR 64543, 2006) 
This Systems of Records Notice (SORN), published on November 22, 2006, was the 
cause of considerable controversy.  The ATS system, as described in the SORN, appeared to fit 
within the definition of watch list programs forbidden by Congress until specific conditions had 
been met. Now, the TSA was suggesting that such a system had been running all along, since 
1998, and that its activities were covered by the SORN for an existing system, the Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System (TECS), of which ATS was only one module. Although 
ATS differed from Secure Flight in that it focused only on international travel, both systems 
required airlines to submit PNR records and both relied on general watch list data provided by the 
Terrorist Screening Center. In addition to drawing information from commercial databases (the 
PNRs), ATS was recording details about passenger dispositions as they interacted with Customs 
Border Patrol (CBP) agents. 
“Clearly the law prohibits testing or development” of such computer programs, said Rep. 
Martin O. Sabo (D-Minn.), who wrote the three-year-old prohibition into homeland 
security funding legislation. “And if they are saying that they just took some system, used 
it and therefore did not test or develop it, they clearly were not upfront about saying it.” 
(Nakashima & Hsu, 2006) 
The ACLU similarly decried the move: 
“The government tried to institute the CAPPS II program of ‘risk assessments’ on 
passengers several years ago, and a huge uproar rightly followed, and the Congress was 
forced to intervene,” said Steinhardt. “We are stunned to learn that DHS is now 
implementing an even more far-reaching program with virtually no opportunity for the 
public to evaluate or comment on it.” (Government Secretly Tracks, 2006, n.p.) 
Neither the ATS nor the proposed Secure Flight systems rely directly on private sector 
contractors to calculate risk ratings. Rather, they rely on lists maintained by the Terrorist 
Screening Center and, in the case of Secure Flight, by the TSA as well. Although the government 
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does not release data on the specifics of who is on these lists or how they are generated, it does 
periodically provide general numbers. As press reports have often tended to focus on the large 
size of some of these measures, there has been considerable confusion about just what 
government lists are being talked about. For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to 
distinguish between three lists:  the “comprehensive terrorist list,” the no fly list, and the selectee 
list.  Below, a 2008 GAO report distinguishes between the no fly list and the larger selectee list: 
TSA outlines air carrier requirements in the No Fly List Procedures security directive, 
requiring domestic air carriers to conduct checks of passenger information against the No 
Fly List to identify individuals who should be precluded from boarding flights, and the 
Selectee List Procedures security directive, directing domestic air carriers to conduct 
checks of passenger information against the Selectee List to identify individuals who 
should receive enhanced screening (e.g., additional physical screening or a hand-search 
of carry-on baggage) before proceeding through the security checkpoint.  (GAO, 2008, 
September 9) 
As of mid 2008, the TSA reported that 2500 unique individuals (250 Americans) were on 
the no fly list, while 16,000 were on the selectee list and 400,000 individuals were on the 
comprehensive terrorist watch list. These numbers represent a dramatic reduction from the 
previous year, when the no fly list had 44,000 names and the selectee list 78,000. The master, 
consolidated list is maintained in the Terrorist Screening Database at the TSC center. The TSC, 
created in December 2003 by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), was 
designed as a single point of contact to help screeners and police identify people with possible 
ties to terrorism. The DOJ IG report describes the information architecture of this “upstream” 
database: 
The TSC shares the terrorist information contained in the TSDB by sending it 
“downstream” to other government screening systems where frontline screening agents 
can use the information to identify individuals against TSDB records.  The following are 
examples of three databases that contain information from the TSC’s consolidated 
watchlist: (1) an employee of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency at a 
U.S. port-of-entry searches the DHS’s Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) to 
determine if a person should be granted access to the United States, (2) a state police 
officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation and queries the driver’s name in the FBI’s 
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National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system, and (3) a State Department consular 
affairs official searches the Consular Lookout and Support System to determine if a 
foreign national should be granted a visa to visit the United States. The TSC reported that 
approximately 270 million individuals are screened by frontline screening agents and law 
enforcement officers each month. (U.S. DOJ, 2007, September, p. v.)  
It is difficult to say how many different lists are maintained all together, even with the 
TSA alone. A 2003 GAO report listed 12 different watch lists that were maintained by nine 
separate agencies prior to the opening of the DHS. Among these lists were the NoFly and 
Selectee lists maintained by the TSA,  the “Warrant Information” list, containing all individuals 
with existing federal warrants, maintained by the U.S. Marshalls,  the “National Automated 
Immigration Lookout,” containing the names of individual with expired, fraudulent or no 
immigration papers, maintained  by the INS, and the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist 
Organizations File (VGTOF). The report recommends the consolidation, centralization, and 
sharing of watch lists, but notes that software and hardware incompatibilities presented 
considerable obstacles to achieving this (U.S. GAO, 2003).  
According to a report by a USA Today journalist, as of late summer, 2008, the TSA was 
maintaining a list of 16,500 people who had forgotten to bring their IDs to the airport and were 
subsequently forbidden from boarding. These names, according to the report, were listed in a 
larger TSA database that included names of people who had undergone greater scrutiny during 
the screening process or who were questioned by police for suspicious activity. Although the 
story does not mention the database, it appears likely that it is the Tactical Information Sharing 
System (TISS) operated by the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).  According to the February 
2006 edition of The Police Chief magazine: 
The Federal Air Marshal Service Tactical Information Sharing System enables federal air 
marshals and other law enforcement officers to create and instantly send reports of 
suspicious activity to the Federal Air Marshal Service Investigations Division for analysis 
and investigation. The resulting surveillance detection reports (SDRs) are shared in real 
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time with other federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence organizations 
(Quinn, 2006, n.p.). 
Before the USA Today story was published, a TSA representative notified the reporter 
that the policy would change and that they would no longer store the name of individuals who did 
not bring ID. Other suspicious activity, including the attempted use of a fictitious name, would 
continue to be logged, however. Currently, the impact of appearing on these lists appears to be 
limited to air travel restrictions. It is easy to see, however, how a color-coded system of risk 
assessment could move from air-travel to all domestic travel and to the world of work. The 
template of “critical infrastructure” is already in place, providing a natural argument for the 
adoption of a similar system for employers in this domain. In fact, early discussions of the Real 
ID initiative suggested just such a system (McCullagh, 2008). 
WATCH LISTS UNDER THE RULE OF LAW  
Watch lists are particularly problematic for the interface between the state and its subjects 
because of the lack of accountability, due process and judicial oversight: 
One agency, such as the FBI, “nominates” someone to be “placed on a watchlist.” That’s 
just a nomination, not a decision, and at most is directed toward putting a name on a list - 
a purely internal government function — not imposing any sanctions that would be 
subject to due process. Other departments of the or under the direction of the FBI, the 
National Counterterrorism Center and the Terrorist Screening Center, enter the 
nominated names into watchlists. They aren’t really responsible for any decision, of 
course, since they rely on the “derogatory” information provided by the nominating 
agency. Finally, the CBP, TSA, and other departments and agencies order airlines and 
other private companies, including common carriers, to deny services to people on those 
watchlists. But they aren’t making any decisions about who can fly, they say — they are 
merely enforcing a list that someone else has created. 
The end result is that, as intended, it’s impossible to hold any specific agency or 
department responsible for the administrative decision to impose sanctions against a 
particular individual. And that, in turn, makes it impossible to obtain due process or 
judicial review. (“Time to Stop Tinkering,” 2009, n.p.) 
What factors flow into the decision about whether or not a person will be targeted for 
increased, extended surveillance? This is a critical question, with different answers for each 
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country. In the U.S., it is part of conventional wisdom that most citizens are not the object of this 
extended monitoring. It is also part of conventional wisdom that policing agencies don’t generally 
begin to focus their attention on you until you commit a crime. If a specific crime is committed, 
certain people may become suspects, or “persons of interest.” Being present on a list does not 
necessarily mean you have committed a crime, however. Instead, you are a person of interest. 
This term, “person of interest,” turns out to be highly problematic, most importantly 
because it has no formal legal definition: 
Officially, “person of interest” means…well, nothing. No one has ever formally defined 
it - not police, not prosecutors, not journalists. The terms “accused,” “allege,” “arrest” 
and “indict” all are dealt with in the Associated Press Stylebook, but there is no listing for 
“person of interest.” Similarly, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual — the official guide to 
federal criminal prosecution — uses the terms “suspect,” “subject,” “target” and 
“material witness,” but “person of interest” gets no mention. (Shaw, 2006, n.p.) 
 Despite (or perhaps because of) the ambiguity of the term, its use in government circles 
has grown. Linguist Roger Shuy provides a brief etymological history:  
We don’t know exactly when person of interest elbowed its way into use by law 
enforcement but it’s likely to have shown up sometime in the 1970s, and then it really got 
noticed about the time of the 1996 Olympics bombing in Atlanta. You may recall that at 
that time the FBI leaked the name of Richard A. Jewell as a person of interest. Jewel was 
eventually exonerated, sued the media rather successfully for tainting his reputation, and 
got a public apology from the then Attorney General, Janet Reno. The phrase, person of 
interest, seems to be filling a lexical gap these days, undefined and vague though it may 
be, indicating a person who is somewhere between a suspect and a pure guess. You’d 
think law enforcement might have learned a lesson from the Jewell case (and a few others 
since that time), but not so. They’ve used it several times since… (Shuy, 2008,n.p.) 
 The term, as it is used today, is largely a justification for increased scrutiny and 
sometimes a formal announcement of suspicion. It is highly resonant with the Chinese “targeted 
person” (see chapter 6) though perhaps more difficult to quantify. Just how many U.S. residents 
are “persons of interest” at any one time? Clearly, any time an American appears on a “watch 
list” they become a person of interest. But what kind of behavior can get you on such a list? As 
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the number of official seekers of suspicious activity continues to multiply, the number of different 
actions that can get you on a list will expand as well. 
The FBI admits that it is “common” for people to be placed on watch lists inadvertently. 
Chicago FBI spokesman Ross Rice has described one scenario in which a known terrorist dials 
your number by mistake. You pick up the phone and say hello, and the other side immediately 
hangs up.  Although you have done nothing but pick up the phone, you have become associated, 
via the pen trace, with a known terrorist (Gallagher, 2007).  Now you are a suspected terrorist and 
on a list, stored in multiple locations, including the consolidated TSDB at the Terrorist Screening 
Center, which as of late summer 2008 had 400,000 names. 
The problem posed by government watch lists can be considered a subset of the more 
general problem discussed by Gandy (1995).   
There is no question that from the perspective of the service provider, the use of an 
automated classification that supports the avoidance of risk is rational and profitable. 
From the perspective of the individual looking for a job, for housing, for insurance, or 
even for information to guide a purchase decision, the fact that they were denied service, 
or a discount, or were assigned to a queue, provides little information about the nature of 
or the basis for their classification. Indeed, the difficulty in knowing how these different 
pieces of information contribute to one’s classification represents a fundamental 
challenge to the pursuit of informed consent as a condition of fair information use. 
(Gandy, 1995, p. 44) 
In both cases, state government and private companies, the data subject is entirely 
unaware of both the data used and the algorithm applied to make a particular risk assessment. In 
both cases there is a significant asymmetry between the information held by the risk assessing 
actor and that held by the subject, as well as numerous opportunities for the assessment process to 
be compromised by error. While in commercial circumstances such errors may result in a range 
of inconveniences, from not getting the best price at the grocery store to being denied a mortgage 
or job, errors in the state system could lead to an individual being wrongly incarcerated, beaten or 
killed. 
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Neither process, not the state assessment of terrorism/crime risk and not the 
business/profit risk, is transparent to the data subject. Neither process opens up satisfactory 
mechanisms of redress that exist for other forms of state record systems fitting with in a 
SORN/PIA framework. Both processes are fed by potentially unlimited, semantically broad 
sources of data which require techniques for parsing and merging into a single data system. 
Both the state government and private sector entities have similar interests in aggregating 
data and running risk algorithms on that data, so tools developed in either class of institution may 
well apply to the other. There are no current legal boundaries to the sharing of these types of 
innovations, across the public -private boundary. One can expect continued discussion and 
coordination between the public and private sector in this regard, mixing in forums such as the 
second Government ID Technology Summit in 2007 in Washington, D.C., cosponsored by 
Digimarc and Viisage and featuring presentations from a range of government officials. 
CONCLUSION 
This has not, could not have been, a comprehensive description of the state dossier 
system (SDS) in the U.S.. I have shown that the number of SoRs that flow into the U.S. SDS is 
high and that the names of key systems changes regularly. By approaching this topic from a 
general semantic frame rather than initially targeting one or two institutions or SoRs, the process 
of analysis has been more open to identifying more general, transferable and transposable 
components that are likely to underlie any modern state dossier system. While it is natural to 
question whether or not the state has that all-comprehensive database with personal data on 
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everyone (a mother of all databases MOAD), such a potential reality lies outside the purview of 
public records discovery. 32 
Although we have trouble describing with any confidence the potential configuration of 
the U.S. MOAD, we can see evidence of increasingly centralized data warehouses with large 
stores of personal information of both criminals and non-criminals. This information can persist 
for decades and is available to afford a decision, by algorithm or by person, at any future moment 
as long as this data persists. Today, we know that data within the IDW is likely fed into 
algorithms at the TSC, with some of it tripping watch list nominations for the data subjects. 
We must not underestimate the value of “notice” as a Fair Information Principle and how 
its encoding into both the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002 has made the 
present investigation possible. While there is likely to be much we are not aware of, the 
information that has been released to the public to date under the rule of the Privacy Act is of 
high volume and detailed. While other principles are often ignored or put aside on the basis of 
various intelligence and law enforcement justifications, notice remains viable enough that it helps 
to paint a vivid picture of the many ways the U.S. government has changed its orientation to the 
production and collection of personal information. 
If we think of the U.S. SDS in terms of specific projects like TIA, TIPS, CAPSS II, or 
Real ID, it is possible to make the argument that the American system of government has worked, 
that public opinion has helped to stop and defund executive branch plans to extend record 
keeping and data sharing for the “innocent until proven guilty” citizens. But if, instead, we look at 
the generic dossier tools and system components that underlie these programs, government gets 
what it wants. In fact, one could even say there is an air of authoritarianism in the way that the 
                                                     
32 For an extensive discussion of the search for the U.S. MOAD during the original data gathering process, 
please see Appendix A. 
199 
 
U.S. executive branch, along with the DHS and intelligence agencies, have continued to advance 
particular components and record systems against clearly stated public will, including the law. 
Real ID may be dead but the Enhanced Driver’s License, complete with proximity RFID is alive 
and well, available or (as of summer, 2009) immanently available in seven states with a combined 
population of more than 90 million. TIPS was excoriated by the public and outlawed by 
Congress, but a nationwide suspicious activity reporting system is now a major and growing 
program complete with its own XML standard. Watch lists and risk color-codes have been flatly 
rejected by the public and Congress, at least until clear channels for redress are offered, but the 
ATS and Secure Flight programs, indexed to the consolidated watch lists of the TSA, move 
forward anyway. While the ATS program today is limited to those traveling internationally, the 
amount of data that is collected on regular American travelers greatly exceeds the boundaries of 
any reasonable security program. 
We can see that the federal government wishes to avoid certain information architectures, 
but only in certain contexts, so that they can more easily claim that the initiatives underway are 
not part of a national ID or state dossier system. Having a central, federal database linked directly 
to a nationwide ID system appears to be too close to a general model of a dossier system for the 
government to push for. Instead, the new system for verifying identity is likely to be based on a 
federated architecture in which an interface has the power to query and display data but the data 
remains stored, and under the control of, the local system. We see this same pattern as part of the 
new ISE shared spaces concept for the circulation of suspicious activity reports. One can argue 
just how significantly different the federated architecture would be in practice from a more 
physically centralized model, but it would miss the fact that the other systems, like the IDW, do 
store data on their own and can benefit significantly from a nationwide ID system without being 
formally linked to it. 
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Suspicious Activity Reports represent a major change in balance between criminal 
investigations and domestic intelligence, not only returning to an era in which human rights 
abuses are well documented, in which the “dossier” is used as an instrument of political power, 
but exceeding anything known in the past century. Although the TIPS program was firmly 
rejected by the public and outlawed by Congress, the current configuration of SAR reporting 
nationwide is in many ways more sophisticated than the original plan. Rather than anchoring the 
reporting system on a large network of professional of all stripes, the nation’s 800,000 local 
police are beginning to receive training as intelligence agents. Further, under the auspices of 
fusion centers, an as of yet undetermined number of utility workers, fireman and regular police 
are being enrolled as Terrorism Liaison Officers. Given we already have evidence that military 
agents and police have produced and stored files on peace activists and tax protestors within the 
past decade, there is clearly reason to be concerned. 
Watch lists, reasonable in moderation (the “10 Most Wanted”), are distinctly 
undemocratic in character as they grow in use. Since ones presence on a list does not necessarily 
indicate conviction or indictment for a crime, it is not subject to judicial review. Presence on a 
watch list can mean the individual will be mildly inconvenienced, deprived of their First 
Amendment rights to assemble and associate, denied credit or a job, or even be subject to 
physical abuse and harm, all without clear rights to challenge. 
The interaction between watch list and SARs is potentially very dangerous, as it 
combines two activities that are largely exempted from judicial review. As the government 
argues, with sound logic, that publishing its algorithms for identifying suspected terrorists to the 
public, or making its comprehensive list of names publicly available, would dramatically 
compromise their ability to identify and apprehend individuals preparing to do this nation harm. 
While this logic is defensible, it becomes indefensible when the practice of producing watch lists 
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grows to include not just shady international travelers with checkered pasts but the entire mass of 
the traveling public. It is clear that SARs do flow into databases like the IDW and from there to 
the TSDB. Individuals who have been flagged with multiple SARs (which by definition means 
there is suspected association with terrorism) are likely to appear on a watch list and bear the 
consequences on their life chances. If the list turns out to be one that is circulated in the private 
sector, as are the TSA’s no-fly and selectee lists, the chance for harm grows. 
In the next chapter, “Privacy Across Cultures,” I set the stage for introducing China as a 
point of comparison, for the purposes of both honing the language of state dossier system 
problematization and better gauging the severity of the U.S. case today. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY ACROSS CULTURES  
This chapter has two primary goals: 1) to establish common ground for the 
problematization of state dossier systems connecting two highly distinct case studies on the basis 
of information privacy and 2) to advance the academic discourse concerning the role and meaning 
of privacy within the global context of surveillance studies. In the interest of regaining some core 
clarity and analytical utility for the word, this chapter explores the dynamic interrelationship 
between American and Chinese cultural and legal approaches to the negotiation of “privacy.” 
“Privacy,” as used here (with quotes), is meant to be a protean term that stands in for the highly 
complex semantic/discursive networks that surround inter-cultural dialog centered on this English 
word.    
In this chapter I explore this linguistic relation via four points of juxtaposition: privacy 
translated into Chinese as “yinsi,” the notion of “reasonable expectation” of privacy, the public-
private dialectic, and finally the notion of anonymity. These nodes are not entirely distinct from 
each other and have important interactions. 
The diagram to the right is intended 
to provide a quick, visual orientation to a 
linguistic juxtaposition of English and 
Chinese privacy. These are words that come 
to mind, that tend to become part of 
conversations in which privacy is discussed 
and negotiated. Words from each rectangle 
that have similar row-column cell positions 
reflect their equivalence in typical dictionary translations. For, example, privacy and yinsi both 
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occupy the center positions of their respective rectangles; gong and public both occupy the 
middle of a top row. Within a rectangle, words along the central vertical axis are considered to be 
more closely related than those with significant horizontal separation. Maximum vertical 
separation suggests that the terms commonly appear in opposition.  
It is important to note that this map is for heuristic purposes and is not intended to 
represent some definitive “semantic field” surrounding the word privacy. I argue only that, based 
on my comprehensive review of literature falling within the general state dossier system rubric, 
these words appear to play an important role in the privacy discourse of both countries. Given 
today’s U.S. political climate, the word “security” is quite frequently seen and heard in discourse 
on privacy, but perhaps not nearly as frequently in China. Other words, like “secrecy” or “trust” 
could also have appeared, but they are not the subject of the present exploration. This is a 
selective representation. It is intended to help orient the reader to the exposition that follows, and 
to illustrate how such maps can help us to better understand the social dynamics of meaning.  
The first juxtaposition, the linguistic equation of privacy with yinsi, is a critical space to 
start. Translation is a highly complex process rife with unfounded assumptions and embroiled in 
power politics (Liu, 1995). Social systems constitute themselves in language, thus making words 
the basis of the reality we experience (Austin, 1962; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Rorty, 1989; 
Searle, 1995).  The remaining three nodes reflect areas that have their own powerful tensions and 
ambiguities within Western discourse that cry out for a more informed universal pluralism. The 
notion of “reasonable expectation” of privacy is a key term in the legal justification of privacy 
interests in the U.S. and has a common sense interpretation that translates easily across modern 
languages.  The notion of public and private space has been debated for at least as long in China 
as it has in the West, where scholars seem increasingly dismayed at the possibilities for 
conceptual coherence. Finally, anonymity in both language and practice has a complex 
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relationship to the public-private dynamic and to the privacy concept itself that is not always 
clear.  
PRIVACY = YINSI ? 
It is surely telling that the characters that make up yinsi, the Chinese 
word for “privacy”, carry the connotations of illicit secrets and 
selfish, conspiratorial behavior. (“The long march to privacy,” 2006, 
p. 45) 
. . . analytical categories cannot operate fruitfully in a 
transhistorical, transdiscursive mode. But neither do I think that 
cultural relativism provides a viable solution in this fast shrinking 
world of ours, in which geopolitical boundaries are constantly being 
redrawn and crossed, and in which the need for translation and 
interaction is literally thrust on people who had little contact before. 
It seems to me, that to eschew transhistorical/transdiscursive 
approach on the one hand and cultural relativism on the other, one 
must turn to the occurrences of historical contact, interaction, 
translation, and the travel of words and ideas between languages. 
(Liu, 1995, p. 19)  
It is certainly true that in terms of the broadest possible mapping of Chinese and Western 
inter-discursive structure, we can say that the translation for privacy is yinsi. This is the 
translation you will find in any major Chinese-English dictionary. Young Chinese use the term to 
refer explicitly to what most Western academics would agree are a kind of privacy rights, and it is 
the word one sees used in the growing number of privacy-related court cases and mass media 
stories, but there is much more to the Chinese concept of privacy, as I explain in detail below. 
COMPOUND WORDS AND NEOLOGISMS IN CHINESE HISTORY 
There is an important distinction within the Chinese language between individual 
character words and compound words. It is generally accepted that early forms of the Chinese 
language (up to the Qin dynasty, 221 BC- 206 BC) consisted primarily of monosyllabic words 
represented by individual Chinese characters (Tai & Chan, 1999). Compound words began to 
appear during the Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) but have increased substantially in modern 
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times, from roughly 20% percent of the written lexicon before the Qin dynasty to more than 80% 
today (Shi, 2002).  The pre-modern Chinese written language, today known as classical Chinese, 
retained a strong monosyllabic character throughout its use well into the 19th century. Only a tiny 
percentage of the population, scholars and government officials, could understand classical 
Chinese, or manage the often ambiguous, highly contextual meanings which clustered around 
each individual character (Rosemont, 1974). Spoken language tended more toward compound 
words in which the meaning of single characters were joined or blended to produce different, 
usually more specific connotations. The Chinese baihua movement led by literary celebrity Lu 
Xun, began to adopt more common language in written form, making it at once more colloquial 
and understandable to the average Chinese. With its marked increase in the size of its vocabulary, 
baihua was more able to mediate the rapid pace of intellectual and cultural development that was 
occurring at the time. Early 20th century Chinese thinkers began to incorporate a large number of 
compound neologisms, many imported from the Japanese, to translate Western concepts, such as 
the use of the compound quanli for “rights.” It appears that the word yinsi is a recent neologism 
whose use has been heavily influenced by exposure to both Western legal scholarship and popular 
culture in the mid- to late- ‘80s (Zhu, 1997; McDougall, 2004). As is discussed in detail below, 
“privacy rights” (yinsiquan) have growing cultural salience and legal force today.  
It would be a mistake, however, to make the apparently logical inference that the Chinese 
simply imported the concept of “privacy” whole cloth.  As with many other neologisms in 
Chinese discourse, they represent more recombinations and extensions of existing concepts and 
“are in many cases limited to catalyzing change or encouraging trends already underway” (Angle, 
1998, pp. 623-624). 
The transcription of the Chinese word for privacy into its official phonetic transliteration, 
pinyin, has been a cause of some misunderstanding. Although pinyin is a perfectly adequate 
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alphabet to reflect Mandarin phonetics, Chinese is a tonal language. Western journals and 
publications have often used pinyin transliterations without any additional tonal information. This 
can lead to confusion when two compound words with the same sounds but different tonal 
patterns are close in meaning, as is the case with yinsi. The proper pinyin transliteration for yinsi 
(privacy) is more accurately written as yin3si1, reflecting the fact that the first word of the 
compound is pronounced using the third, dipping tone, and the second word is pronounced with 
the first, steady tone.  Yin1si1 (two steady tones), on the other hand, means “shameful secret.” For 
simplicity, I will refer to yin3si1 in this paper as yinsi and will not refer to this other, often 
conflated word again. 
Yinsi  (隱私) is a compound word, consisting of two characters that have independent 
meanings. Yin (隱), by itself, may mean secret, hidden or concealed. Si (私), by itself, can mean 
personal, private or selfish.33  To understand more about the longer, more traditional Chinese 
concepts that inform the modern term yinsi, we must look more into the second word in this 
compound, si, and its meaning in Chinese political and social thought over the last several 
centuries. We will address this in detail, below, as part of a discussion on the public-private 
divide. 
The equation of privacy and yinsi reflects a particular social, political, cultural moment in 
the interaction between China and the U.S. that is inseparable from relations of power and the 
contingencies of history (Liu, 1995; Venuti, 1998).  To say that the Chinese have no equivalent 
concept for privacy is first to assume that there is a clear concept of privacy in the West. This, of 
course, is a highly problematic assumption, as was discussed in chapter one. As a reminder, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on “information privacy” and the two concepts of 
“boundary resources” and “contextual integrity.” 
                                                     
33 See English-Chinese dictionary available at http://www.mandarintools.com/worddict.html 
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In America, the meaning of “privacy” and its relative importance compared to other 
values such as security and accountability has fluctuated over time. Best et al. (2006) identify 
three major developments that may have had an effect on contemporary public sentiment toward 
privacy: 1) the emergence of the Internet; 2) the commencement of the war on terror; and 3) the 
development of a wide array of new surveillance technologies.   
Clearly, the salience of September 11th is much greater for Americans than it is for the 
Chinese, but the populations are both simultaneously experiencing the rise of networked 
electronic communication and technologies of surveillance. The lives of both Chinese and 
Americans are becoming increasingly intertwined on an Internet populated by global institutions 
like Google and Yahoo. The current moment almost demands a cross-cultural understanding of 
privacy, even if concise definitions are elusive and ultimately impossible. 
In the U.S., there remains a great deal of confusion over how “privacy” can be effectively 
invoked within legal and technological contexts. Struggles over what a “reasonable expectation” 
of privacy is, the public-private divide and the meaning and practical utility of “anonymity” 
represent three areas of particular discursive tension. Below, I examine each of these areas in 
turn. 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
All visitors should be aware that they have no reasonable expectation of privacy in public 
or private locations (U.S. State Department Travel Advisory on China, March 2008).  
If “reasonable expectation” is interpreted in a strictly legal sense, the U.S. State 
department might be considered correct in its above assertion. As was noted in chapter 3, 
however, the notion of “reasonable expectation” in legal discourse has weakened constitutional 
protection of the privacy of American citizens over the past several decades. The problem with 
reasonable expectation in the U.S. has been that what is reasonable changes with the winds of 
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culture and politics and allows for no definitive boundaries. Clearly our “reasonable expectation” 
of privacy today is much less than it was in 2000. Even before 2000, changes in the way public 
space was subject to routine surveillance might have been, but were not, curtailed by a strong 
expectation of privacy in public. Today, there are no significant laws protecting American 
citizens from routine surveillance in public by either public or private entities. As we will see in 
China, the public appears to have a stronger privacy consciousness within this context, a fact 
which is also reflected in major municipal laws which restrict the deployment and use of such 
systems.  
The reasonable expectation of privacy for Americans online is in considerable flux today. 
In the summer of 2007, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Americans do not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses of Web sites they visit (Singel, 2007a). 
Although there has been some confusion on the matter, the July 2007 of the U.S. Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruling in the case Warshak vs U.S. held that Internet users do have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the content of their e-mail, whether it is stored on their home computer 
or at a third party ISP. The U.S. Justice Department indicated it planned to appeal the decision.  
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN CHINA 
Even though China (like the U.S.) does not have explicit constitutional protection for 
“privacy,” its statutory system comprises a growing array of legal protections, anchored by the 
declaration of an explicit “right to privacy” in the 2002 draft of the Chinese Civil Code.34  
                                                     
34 Some examples, excerpted from Privacy and Human Rights 2003,  published by Privacy International and 
retrieved July 1, 2008 at  http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/china.htm: 
 
   The Law on the Protection of Minors (1991) provides that "no organization or individual may disclose the 
personal secrets of minors" and "with regard to cases involving crimes committed by minors, the names, home 
addresses and photos of such minors as well as other information which can be used to deduce who they are, may not 
be disclosed, before the judgment, in news reports, films, television programs and in any other openly circulated 
publications. [904] The Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (1992) provides that "women's right of 
reputation and personal dignity shall be protected by law. Damage to women's right of reputation and personal dignity 
by such means as insult, libel or giving publicity to private affairs shall be prohibited."[905] The Law on Lawyers 
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Statutory protection was judged strong enough by analysts for Privacy International’s “2007 
International Privacy Ranking” to rank higher than that of the American legal system.  Although 
this appears on its face to be an absurd assertion, the claim holds up under initial scrutiny (at least 
if we focus solely on the letter of law).  
The formal definition for “right to privacy” introduced into the 2002 draft civil code 
(similar to Restatements in U.S. law) defines the right to privacy in the following way: 
1) the subject of the right to privacy can only be a natural person; 
2) the objects of the right are private activities and personal information; 
3) the scope of the protection of the right is limited by public interest 
 (Cao, 2005, p. 651). 
It should be noted, firsthand, that the promulgation of this new specific right to privacy is not 
simply a product of changing domestic public sentiments and their effect on policy makers, but 
likely results from a range of both domestic and international pressures. According to McDougall 
(2004), the context of the law’s passage “suggests that the code was developed as part of an 
international legal framework dominated by the free market ideologies of the World Trade 
Organization and the government of the United States” (p. 6). 
Note, also, that the third line of the definition maintains the supremacy of the “public 
interest” over privacy in Chinese law. Although it would be easy to suggest that the public 
interest clause essentially renders impotent the right as otherwise defined, issues of “security” 
clearly play a similar role in the U.S.. Further, public concern over private, corporate abuses of 
personal information appears to have drawn a sympathetic ear from the Chinese government. 
There is growing talk of a new national law to regulate such practices. Before rejecting Privacy 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1996) requires lawyers to protect the personal secrets of their clients; [906] the Law on Statistics (1983) provides that 
data collected from investigations shall not be disclosed without the consent of data subjects; [907] and, the Provisional 
Regulations Relating to Bank Management (1986) provide that all information. 
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International’s findings too quickly, it’s worth reminding ourselves that U.S. policy makers are 
unlikely to support generalized privacy laws that would be deemed too restrictive of business 
practices. As we will see below, it is clear from recent citizen actions in public and via China’s 
courts that the “right of privacy” is gaining real force. 
GAUGING PUBLIC SENTIMENT 
Another key aspect of the legal notion of reasonable expectation is the relative salience 
and strength of privacy within the public at large. The public expectations of privacy in America 
today are also in flux. It is commonly stated in contemporary discourse that Americans value 
privacy less than they did before September 11th, that privacy has become an antiquated value in a 
world where instability seems to lurk around every corner. Although there is certainly some truth 
to this assumption, the available data shows a much more complex picture. While it is clear that 
privacy took a back seat for many Americans during the immediate aftermath of the attacks, most 
polls have shown that concern for personal privacy from government institutions has mostly been 
on the upswing since sometime in 2002 (Best et al., 2006). Still, a 2008 national poll conducted 
by Rasmussen Reports shows that Americans, by a narrow margin (51% to 49%), value their 
security more highly than they do their privacy (“51% Say Security,” 2008).  
Another common assumption is that America’s Facebook and MySpace-happy youth do 
not value their privacy in quite the same way that their parents did. There is certainly an element 
of truth to this. A Zogby poll conducted in early 2007 found that only 35.6% of 18 to 24-year-
olds considered the posting of their picture in a swimsuit online to be an invasion of privacy, 
compared to 65.5% for those 25 and older (“Poll Exposes,” 2007). Younger Americans are more 
concerned, however, about their privacy in relation to government institutions than older citizens 
(Berton, 2006).  
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Public opinion polling on privacy related topics is limited in China compared to the U.S., 
but has recently been on the upswing. As we will see, we can also get a reading of public 
sentiment from activity in the courts and direct demonstrations of public will. 
A survey conducted in 1997 of residents of five major Chinese cities showed strong 
privacy awareness for personal feelings, marital relations, diaries and other personal documents, 
with 73.6% agreeing to the statement, “Do not read a colleague’s files and documents without his 
or her permission,” and 71% agreeing to the statement, “Parents should not read their child’s 
diary.” Survey results indicated that privacy was more valued among better educated, higher-
paid, younger, and female respondents (McDougall, 2002, p. 167).  
Chinese citizens share an aversion to spam with their American counterparts. China, once 
the source of much of the world’s spam, has dramatically reduced this problem with concerted 
government and industry intervention. A law regulating the sending of spam drafted by the 
Internet Society of China (ISC) went into effect in March of 2006 (Wu, 2006). Spam was the 
subject of a recent major Chinese Central television investigation, timed to be shown on World 
Consumer Rights Day, March 15.  In March 2008, China’s largest cellular telephone operator, 
China Mobile, was forced to publicly apologize after Internal security lapses allowed seven 
advertising firms to send more than 200 million spam messages via China Mobile and the second 
largest provider, China Unicom. The first civil suit in China over SMS was recently filed in the 
Beijing Xicheng District Court (Jiang, 2008). Much of the talk of a general privacy law, promised 
for 2008 but which appears to be delayed at least a year, has to do with the unrestricted exchange 
of the personal information for which spam is but one problematic manifestation.  
Surveys conducted over the past few years by a leading national newspaper the China 
Youth Daily (CYD) show significant and growing interest in the personal privacy. A survey 
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conducted in May of 2006 found that 91.8% were “worried that their private information can be 
too easily divulged and misused,” while 74% called for tougher laws to protect privacy. A survey 
in January 2007 showed that the China’s online population overwhelmingly (83.5%) disapproved 
of a plan to require real name registration for all bloggers and BBS users.   
Increasingly, emerging public sentiments about privacy are bubbling up into the court 
system. Below are a few examples. 
In early 2004, two recent graduates of Shanghai’s Fuxing High School, male student Wei 
Gang and his (unnamed) girlfriend, sued their alma mater for invasion of privacy. The school, 
which had set up CCTV cameras in the classrooms, filmed and rebroadcast, school-wide, a 
passionate kiss between the two young students. Wei and his girlfriend asked the high school to 
publicly apologize, both in the China Youth Daily and on school campus. In addition, they 
demanded 10,000 Yuan (USD$1,205) for mental anguish, claiming they had been ridiculed at 
school so much that their performance on college entrance examinations suffered and the 
girlfriend even contemplated suicide. The Shanghai Hongkou District People’s Court decided in 
favor of the school, agreeing that it had the right to monitor its students and that their presence in 
a public space negated any privacy claims (“Court Rejects,” 2004). Though they lost their court 
action, the students gained considerable public sympathy (York, 2005). 
In early 2007, Guo Li, a lawyer from Hangzhou, sued Internet search engine Baidu.com 
for publicly exposing a copy of his e-mail online. The case was heard in Hangzhou Xiaoshan 
District People’s Court in December 2007. Guo was suing Baidu and Hi China for 1,000,000 
RMB because of its claimed failure to adequately respond to requests that the exposed e-mails be 
deleted (“Baidu Accused,” 2007). In the spring of 2008, the Hangzhou Court decided in favor of 
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the defendants, arguing that not enough evidence had been provided to suggest that they did not 
respond to Guo’s requests in a timely manner (Qu, 2008). 
In the fall of 2007, Beijing University student Lu Feng decided to take Microsoft to court 
over its decision to implement Windows Genuine Advantage in copies of Windows XP 
distributed in China. Lu argued that WGA tool is akin to spyware, and that both his “right to 
privacy” and the property right in his PC were being violated. Lu’s suit echoed a similar claim 
ongoing in the United States District Court of Seattle, Brian Johnson vs. Microsoft. The First 
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing accepted this case for review, though this is not to be 
taken as a judgment of its technical merits (Fisher, 2007).  
Early in 2008, a young couple in Shanghai decided to sue a metro station after a video of 
the two kissing in the station was posted online at video sites including YouTube. The couple 
claimed that their privacy rights had been violated, an argument that was supported by Chinese 
legal scholars quoted in mass media. Employees of the metro company involved in the video 
distribution were fired from their jobs and the company has been negotiating with the couple over 
financial compensation (“Kissing Couple,” 2008; “Shanghai Subway,” 2008).  
Do the Chinese have a “reasonable expectation” of privacy as they go about their daily 
lives?  Is this expectation protected by law? Although the context may vary, Chinese expectations 
appear comparable to other modern societies. To understand how the expectation of privacy in 
China relates to that in the U.S., we focus now on the notion of public-private divide. 
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIALECTIC 
The public-private dialectic has been applied in radically 
different ways in Western discourse, with each pole mapped to different 
theoretical entities within the social system. Habermas’s (1989) theory of 
civil society, for example, views the public sphere as a domain separate 
from that of the state. The public-private dichotomy may also reflect a 
contrast between government-owned institutions and private institutions 
such as corporations (Weintraub & Kumar, 1997).  
Despite these differences in application, it has been generally 
believed that the boundaries were easily discernible, often physically 
tangible, and could “demarcate a dichotomy of realms” (Nissenbaum, 
1998). The walls of a house or an apartment, for example, physically traced a boundary between 
the private space of the home and the outside world. An open park was a public space, bounded 
by surrounding streets. The skin and clothes of an individual traced a clear boundary between an 
individual and the outside world.  The categories of territorial privacy and bodily privacy mapped 
well onto the public-private divide and, especially within American society, appeared to reinforce 
each other. 
Although much discourse on privacy in the West deals with the notion of a public-private 
dialectic, it has been marked by frustration over the increasing fuzziness of the concepts in the 
world of electronic networked communication and high tech surveillance (Marx, 2001).  Passerin 
d’Entreves & Vogel (2000) note that the two concepts comprise “a family of distinctions that are 
constantly shifting under the twin pressures of social change and political contestation” (p. 1).  
Electronic, networked media, with their nodes increasingly saturating global space, are 
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constrained more by logical and less by physical boundaries. This loss of the role of physical 
boundaries in affording boundary negotiation renders a number of well rehearsed strategies for 
privacy maintenance obsolete. 
With information technology, our ability to rely on these same physical, psychological 
and social mechanisms for regulating privacy is changed and often reduced. In virtual 
settings created by information technologies, audiences are no longer circumscribed by 
physical space; they can be large, unknown and distant. Additionally, the recordability 
and subsequent persistence of information, especially that which was once ephemeral, 
means that audiences can exist not only in the present, but in the future as well. (Palen & 
Dourish, 2003, p. 2)  
There has been a dramatic reduction in the distribution of social resources for personal boundary 
negotiation as a result of these changes to the primary media of communication. As human 
interaction continues to shift to electronic networks, traditional schema for boundary negotiation 
often lose their utility (Meyrowitz, 1985; Shapiro, 1998; Nissenbaum, 1998, 2004).  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN CHINESE DISCOURSE (GONG-SI) 
In Chinese discourse, the binary relation gong-si (公 - 私) roughly mirrors the Western 
binary notion of public-private, occupies more than 2,000 years of history, and has its own 
attendant ambiguities (Rowe, 1990). Evidence that the two words, gong and si, emerged largely 
as paired opposites can be found in the third century BC Chinese dictionary Er ya, which defines 
gong as simply “not si” (wusi), while the first century shuowen defines gong as “turning ones 
back on the private” (Rowe, 1990, p. 316).  
Gong, by itself, can mean “just,” “honorable,” “public,” or “common.” Some important 
compound words in which gong appears include gongan (公安), public security; gongdao (公道), 
justice; gongguan (公關), public relations; and gongmin (公民), citizen. Si, by itself, can mean 
personal, private or selfish. Compound words that si appears in include siren ( 私 人 ), 
individual/private; siyou (私有), privately owned; and sili (私利), personal gain.  
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Although much of China’s neo-Confucian scholarship has considered si to be 
synonymous with selfish interests, there have been important exceptions, especially during the 
late Ming and Qing dynasties (Angle, 2002). Perhaps most notably, the writings of leading 
scholar/journalist of the late 19th and early 20th century, Liang Qichao, argued that the public 
welfare gong de (公德) was dependent upon a bounded private domain si de (私德) where 
thought could be cultivated. 
Just how the gong-si dialectic is applied to real-world events and issues is as varied in 
Chinese culture as it is in the West. It is generally agreed in academic circles that attention to and 
salience of gong has been far greater than si for much of the country’s history (Wakeman, 1998; 
Angle, 1998; McDougal, 2002).  In the past, si might have been used to apply to an emperor, the 
official head of state, where the relationship between gong and si was between the selfish 
interests of the ruler and the true interests of his collective subjects (Zarrow, 2002).  Another way 
of mapping si is to the family or even an individual scholar’s walled study (Furth, 2002), against 
the open sphere of the collective gong public. 
Gong and si are protean terms. In traditional and early modern Chinese thought, si could 
represent both individual and collective interests (usually the family, but also clans) when 
considered in opposition to state interests. Madsen (2007), quoting eminent Chinese sociologist 
Fei Xiaotong, reminds us that the distinction between public and private in Confucian thought is 
“completely relative”: 
Sacrificing one’s family for oneself, sacrificing one’s clan for one’s family - this formula 
is an actual fact. Under such a formula what would someone say if you called him si 
[acting in his private interest]? He would not be able to see it that way, because when he 
sacrificed his clan, he might have done it for his family, and the way he looks at it, his 
family is gong [the public interest]. When he sacrificed the nation for the benefit of his 
small group in the struggle for power, he was also doing it for the public interest [gong], 
the public interest of his small group. . . . Gong and si are relative terms; anything within 
the circle in which one is standing can be called gong (p. 5).  
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Scholars in general appeared to value their solitude as a place for reflection and 
creativity. Focusing on the words of a 17th century poet, Furth (2002) shows how private, 
secluded spaces were valued by the intellectual elite. 
. . . the solitary recluse, as Cao Heng’s poem says, can be indifferent to the gaze of 
others; in the eyes of the world he can appear shameless. He is freed to look at himself, 
turning inward to an interior landscape that, turning the world inside out, reveals a 
universe of his own creation (p. 53).  
GONG, SI, GUAN 
This protean nature of Chinese single character words gives them an inherent semantic 
flexibility across time, space and context that appears to exceed that of the public-private 
dialectic. An important strand of Chinese discourse includes gong and si as part of a tripartite 
distinction with guan (官), the official or state sphere (Rankin, 1993; Wakeman, 1998). In this 
model, gong exists at a medium point between si of the private home and individual and guan as 
the agent of the institutional state.  Strand (1989) offers a compelling portrait of what this 
tripartite distinction meant during the early 20th century: 
In China, the dependence of gentry and merchant opinion on official power (guan) was 
loosened during the late Qing and then broken under the Republic. Urban elites never 
gathered the strength and the will to support a fully autonomous public sphere. But the 
trembling of the state in the 1920s, the weak legitimacy of private interests (si), and the 
positive moral and political evaluation of gong as a zone of discussion and concern 
encouraged newspaper editors, new and old civic leaders, and ordinary citizens to 
improvise tactics and strategies for expressing political views in public. Thus constituted, 
city politics took on a life and a logic of its own as opportunities to engage in political 
discussion and action expanded. (p. 168) 
Rowe (1990) has argued that the gong/guan distinction has persisted into modern times, 
and that “[d]espite the incontestable growth of central state power which culminated in the party 
state of the People’s Republic,” widespread continuing cultural and formal legal salience of this 
tripartite approach “seem to suggest a survival of an articulated intermediary ground between 
state and society more pronounced than that in the contemporary West” (p. 326).  Rowe argues 
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further that the Chinese gong-si dialectic is more abstract and less implicated with spatial 
entailments than is the public-private divide of Western discourse, epitomized, perhaps, by the 
close association between public deliberation and open public squares.  
Gong, then, can be understood as the truly collective interest that may or may not be in 
sync with official state interests. Gong, seen in this light, is none other than si in the aggregate, a 
philosophical approach with roots in early Confucian thought. Mencius, for example, describes 
the interdependence of private desires with the collective good.  
According to Zarrow (2002), “si, though highly suspect, was to be understood as valuable 
in particular contexts” (p. 122). Although not necessarily a mainstream view within Chinese 
historical discourse, one could make an argument (citing notable scholars in a chain back to 
Confucius and Mencius) for si, not simply as an instrumental value, but an intrinsic part of a 
healthy, viable social system.  
THE RISE AND FALL OF SI 
In Chinese studies there is a common term, fang-shou, which refers to cycles of 
tightening and loosening of discursive rights and freedoms. One might think of the relative 
salience of si and its relation to gong as rising and falling across time in a similar fashion (perhaps 
parallel to) fang-shou. Although it is relatively easy to develop such a graph for the salience of si 
on its own, its relation with gong over the same period is more complicated — in part because of 
the addition of guan in this tripartite distinction, but also because of the way the uses and 
“meaning” of gong have changed over the long stretch of Chinese history. One could plot a 
relationship between gong and guan over time as well that would help to contrast periods where 
people felt the government to be acting in their interests (the communist revolution and its 
immediate aftermath) to those when corrupt officials actively disdained the true needs of their 
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people, but again always keeping in mind that the meaning of each of these words, especially 
gong, has had significant temporal and demographic variance.  
As McDougall (2002) reminds us, “the meanings and values associated with si have not 
been uniform in Chinese history” (p. 10). Zarrow (2002) has argued that si rose to prominence in 
late Imperial China through the early Republican period, but began to reverse shortly after the 
1949 communist revolution, reaching a nadir during the Cultural Revolution and the ensuing 
decade. Public expectations of “privacy” were likely at a low point in China during the years of 
the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath in the 1970s. In urban areas, residential space was so 
scarce that parents, children and relatives would often sleep in the same room.  At the same time, 
communist ideology labeled any discussion of individual interests as “spiritual pollution”: the 
collective, gong, was the only reality.  The complete lives (psychological, medical, intellectual, 
social, sexual) of virtually all citizens were kept in duplicate dossiers (dangan), one with the local 
public security bureau and the other with the persons “work unit” (danwei) and were updated and 
consulted regularly by agents of the state when making decisions (Lu & Perry, 1997). 
When Deng Xiaoping’s modern economic reforms began to gather momentum in the mid 
‘80s, public expectations of privacy began to grow with them, both at home and out in public. 
Ideologically, private interests were no longer vilified. Deng’s oft quoted comment, “it does not 
matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice,” gave new legitimacy to private 
venture and the pursuit of individual profit, because it would mean greater wealth for the country 
at large. With modernization came steady growth in the size of available residential space (Lu, 
2005): 
This expansion of physical personal living space has created the objective condition for 
the protection of personal privacy. According to the Blue Book of Real Estate, from 1978 
to 2003, per capita housing space in Chinese cities and towns has grown from 3.6 square 
meters to 11.4 square meters. Compared with Western countries, per capita housing space 
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in China is still not extensive, but it has made a great improvement over the conditions of 
20 years ago. Society leaves a bigger physical space for the personal, which naturally 
makes it possible to extend the scope of what is included under the concept of “privacy” - 
even if this does not necessarily result in strengthening of idea of privacy (Lu, 2005, pp. 
8-9). 
Children (also in decreasing family sizes due to the one child policy)  began to get their 
own rooms and soon were scolding parents for entering  them without knocking, or sneaking a 
look at their diary, in replays of  common scenes in the U.S. and other Western countries. 
Modernization freed the average Chinese worker from cradle to grave dependence on their work 
unit. With worker mobility came the decreasing significance of the dangan; employers tended to 
know much less about their employees than before (Lu & Perry, 1997).  
In this society, people no longer regard individual interests, individual freedom, and 
individual rights as taboo topics of discussion. In contrast with the not-so-distant past, 
individual independence and subjectivity have obviously been promoted in their 
importance and value in social life. Increasing diversity in contemporary Chinese society 
also makes for greater variety in Chinese ideas of privacy. More and more Chinese 
citizens begin to give importance to privacy and express concern over protecting 
emerging rights to privacy. (Lu, 2005, pp. 7-8) 
Increasing salience of si can be understood of an expansion of those conditions and situations that 
modern urban Chinese would include under the rubric of “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 
CHINESE “PRIVACY IN PUBLIC” 
Chinese valuation of territorial privacy and its conceptualization of the public-private 
dialectic appear to be complex enough to include some notion of “privacy in public.” Political 
advisors to Beijing’s municipal government are quoted in the Jan. 30, 2007 People’s Daily, 
voicing concerns over the use of surveillance cameras in public areas. The article points to the 
ease with which digital images can be manipulated and cites privacy concerns. Beijing 
established a city wide regulation on the use of cameras that went into effect on April 1.  The 
regulation requires secure storage for pictures and videos captured by the cameras, and dictates 
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that they be installed only in conspicuous public places.  A similar law was recently passed in the 
city of Chongqing.   
There are no comparable laws in U.S. metro areas such as New York and Chicago where 
there has been a similar expansion of camera surveillance in public places. It would appear that as 
of today, the notion of privacy in public, at least when it applies to physical, public places, has 
gained more traction within the Chinese than the American public.  
ANONYMITY 
Perhaps the first thing we might notice from the juxtaposition 
diagram to the right is that it seems slightly out of phase. The word 
pseudonymity appears in the top region of the top rectangle without any 
Chinese term in a corresponding position. In the lower portion of the 
rectangles, where one word, anonymity, appears in the top rectangle, two 
Chinese words, wuming (無名) and niming (匿名), appear (with niming 
perhaps a closer match to anonymity) in the bottom rectangle.  
It is clear that in both China and the U.S., there has been a change 
in the nature of anonymity as human interaction shifts to the electronic, 
networked environment. The “no one knows you’re a dog” New Yorker cartoon epitomizes the 
early common wisdom on Internet interactions, that many of them were fundamentally 
untraceable. This apparent abundant anonymity led to its strong association with democracy 
(Akdeniz, 2002) but also to excesses such as “flaming” (Alonzo, 2004) where one or more 
discursive participants would engage in highly uncivil discourse, confident any improprieties or 
transgressions would have highly limited reputational fallout. Today, the sentiment appears close 
to reversing itself, where instead of everything we do online being anonymous, everything we do 
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appears to go into some massive digital dossier, forever haunting us with economic, political and 
social karma, both just and unjust (Solove, 2004; O’Harrow, 2006; Solove, 2007). 
As I explained in chapter 2, personally identifiable information, while apparently simple 
in meaning on the surface, is a highly complex concept. It is often understood that anonymity is 
supposed to relate to some absolute condition of non-identifiability, while the word “pseudonym” 
is used to indicate the gray areas where one may be known or knowable to some, but not to all. 
Although it is easy to understand what we mean when we say a given piece of data is anonymous, 
it is more difficult to judge whether such a proposition is logically valid.  
The contents of messages may, on their own, have enough information to allow particular 
individuals to be identified, as a number of Americans learned when AOL made a year of its 
search logs publicly available in an “anonymized” form. Individual records of particular search 
queries were identified with unique numbers, but no data linking these numbers to personal 
identifiers such as names or SSNs was released. Still, enough information was often available 
within the language of the search to trace it back to a particular individual. The New York Times 
published an article identifying one searcher, number 4417749, as Thelma Arnold: 
. . . search by search, click by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 became easier 
to discern. There are queries for “landscapers in Lilburn, Ga.,” several people with the 
last name Arnold and “homes sold in shadow lake subdivision Gwinnett county 
Georgia.” 
It did not take much investigating to follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-
old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., frequently researches her friends’ medical ailments 
and loves her three dogs. “Those are my searches,” she said, after a reporter read part of 
the list to her (Barbaro & Zeller, 2006, paragraphs 3-4).   
In the course of electronic transactions, an individual may be identified by a range of 
attributes including the IP address of the device they are using to access the network or by a more 
formal authentication scheme. Whether the IP address makes someone’s transaction identifiable 
depends on the manner in which IP addresses are linked to individual identities in extant systems 
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of records. If your ISP stores your IP address with your personal information in a customer 
database, anyone with access to that database can use the IP address as a personal identifier.  
In March of 2007, Google publicly announced a new policy to “anonymize” its search 
records after a period of 18-24 months.  
When we implement this policy change in the coming months, we will continue to keep 
server log data (so that we can improve Google’s services and protect them from security 
and other abuses) - but will make this data much more anonymous, so that it can no 
longer be identified with individual users, after 18-24 months. (“Taking steps,” 2007, 
paragraph 1) 
Google’s public announcement that it had made its search logs “more anonymous” provides a 
useful glimpse into just how confused the notion of anonymity has become. Google’s 
anonymization process consists of erasing a portion of the source IP address for the query and 
altering the unique cookie ID attached to the search in an unspecified way. Google admits, 
however, that this process does not guarantee that the government will not be able to identify a 
specific computer or user. 
What is the relationship between anonymity and privacy? Is one necessary for the other? 
Anonymity, especially in the context of Internet interactions, does not necessarily lead to privacy. 
As Schneier (2007a) has pointed out, the contents of anonymous packets sent over the Internet 
can still be read by malicious individuals and institutions unless they are otherwise encrypted. 
U.S. government officials have begun to suggest citizens should give up their anonymity vis-à-vis 
the government while trusting them to respect their privacy (Single, 2007a). Although there was a 
predictable uproar in privacy circles, it remains to be seen whether the broader American public is 
paying much attention. Meanwhile, in China, there are growing signs that anonymity, at least 
among the young Internet generation, has a value that supersedes its role in the U.S.. 
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In a November 2007 poll conducted by J. Walter Thompson, Chinese netizens were far 
more likely to claim that they experimented with alternate identities online than were their 
American counterparts. They also appeared to value online anonymity more, obviously a key 
resource in the negotiation of personal boundaries that may allow for such experimentation: 
Chinese respondents were also more likely than Americans to say they have expressed 
personal opinions or written about themselves online (72% vs. 56%). And they have 
expressed themselves more strongly online than they generally do in person (52% vs. 
43% of Americans). 
That’s largely because of the anonymity that the Internet offers, a key attraction for the 
Chinese. Chinese respondents were almost twice as likely as Americans to agree that it’s 
good to be able to express honest opinions anonymously online (79% vs. 42%) and to 
agree that online they are free to do and say things they would not do or say offline (73% 
vs. 32%). 
“One of the biggest differences between American and Chinese youth is in attitudes 
toward anonymity,” says Doctoroff. “In the U.S., with its cult of celebrity, young 
Americans see the Internet as a way of getting known, of building their personal brand; 
many regard the Internet as a kind of personal broadcasting medium. But whereas 
publicizing your name, face and opinions is seen as a step toward success in the U.S., in 
China it has been a surefire way of veering into dangerous territory. So for young 
Chinese, the Internet is the ideal place to air opinions and hear what others think without 
crossing the line.” (“China Leads the U.S.,” Nov. 23, 2007, n.p.) 
Although there is considerable appreciation for the role that anonymity can play in 
society (at least among the young), there is a very healthy respect for the importance of 
accountability and reputation, and recognition that anonymity can add unacceptable risk to certain 
kinds of social transactions. The public, for example, seems to have responded positively to the 
opening of the national identity registry database. Accessible via cell phone short messaging 
service and the Web, anyone residing in China can log in with a person’s name and ID number to 
verify their identity. If the ID matches the provided name, the database sends back a photo of the 
ID holder to help verify that the ID is held by the authorized user (“China Provides,” 2007).  
Angry Chinese blogger suggests that the reaction to the new system has been positive among a 
wide range of business owners such as hoteliers and store owners, but is marked by suspicion and 
concern within the “activist and industry insider” community (“Confirm a Friend,” 2006). 
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COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL ANONYMITY 
 Hertz (2001) suggests two possible Chinese translations for anonymity: 
In the Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe English-Chinese dictionary, anonymity is translated 
either as niming (hidden or concealed name) or wuming (without a name, but also 
indefinable, indescribable). These two terms are generally used not as nouns but as 
adjectives, as in “an unknown hero” (wuming de yinxiong) or an “anonymous letter” 
(niming xin). Note that the two translations have very different connotations: in the first 
example, the anonymous (wuming) hero has been violently stripped of his . . . particular 
identity (name), literally and figuratively sacrificed to the collective cause; in the second 
example, the anonymous (niming) letter writer has chosen to conceal her identity, indeed 
her face, for reasons that are eminently personal, not collective. (p. 280)  
While it is important and helpful to note the distinctions between wuming and niming, it 
is premature of Hertz to assume that niming could only be in the interest of the individual and not 
the collective. The increasing salience of niming, or online anonymity, can be understood as more 
than a simple increase in the valuation of individual rights and needs that has accompanied 
modernization and digitization.  
XIAMEN PX CHEMICAL PLANT PROTEST 
If we consider a recent event of interest in Chinese history, the successful protest of more 
than a million anonymous citizens against a planned chemical plant, we can begin to get a sense 
of the complex ways that anonymity might mediate the relation between gong and si, (or perhaps 
even better, the tripartite relation between guan, gong and si). We can also begin to think about 
the often tenuous nature of anonymity, both as it relates to technology and social space, and its 
role as a resource when individuals find their interests in tension with those of the state. In the 
spring of 2007, citizens in the seaside city and special economic zone, Xiamen, began to become 
concerned over a new 11 billion Yuan (U.S. $1.4 billion) industrial project in the city’s Haicang 
district designed to produce large amounts of xylene.35 Although the project had overwhelming 
                                                     
35 According to the U.S. labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health Guideline for Xylene, "Chronic 
exposure to xylene may cause central nervous system depression, anemia, mucosal hemorrhage, bone marrow 
hyperplasia, liver enlargement, liver necrosis, and nephrosis [Clayton and Clayton 1981, p. 3295]." 
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support from the city government, citizens in Xiamen were able to make use of Internet bulletin 
boards, e-mail and short messaging services to organize a public protest of more than ten 
thousand people at the city center on June 1st and 2nd, leading to the temporary abandonment and 
eventual halting of the project there. 
A few months after the protest, the city government announced draft rules banning 
anonymous Web postings for city residents (Dickie, 2007). The move caused considerable 
controversy and reignited the debate over the seemingly shelved national policy requiring 
mainland Chinese bloggers to register their real names. 
It appears that the new regulation was a unilateral action by the city government, which 
stands to lose significant tax revenue from the lost project. Guangzhou city’s South Metropolis 
News quoted He Bing of the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing saying, 
“Only the National People’s Congress has the right to legislate on this issue.” It is also doubtful 
whether the city alone can enforce such a measure online, which also includes new rules for pre-
publication vetting of content.  
One could argue that Chinese citizens in Xiamen that day took advantage of their 
anonymity in online forums such as BBS and chat groups to engage in organizational actions 
which would otherwise be highly constrained. Although the individual actions were justified 
based on the way anonymity protected them from state harm, the result was the concerted voice 
of a collective gong that overpowered the more si-like guan (official) interests. It was this 
collective crowd of otherwise wuming (nameless) citizens out in public that electronic niming 
(concealed identity) made possible.  
The Xiamen PX demonstration, perhaps, was dependent less on actual anonymity and 
more on perceived anonymity. Whether or not the initial organizers were truly anonymous as they 
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began to send out the short messages and BBS notices that would help bring millions to the 
streets, their perceived anonymity likely emboldened them to take the actions that quickly 
crystallized into a highly visible public. Those people who chose to take to the streets were 
videotaped and could easily be identified later, but the numbers being what they were nothing 
much could be done. 
CONCLUSION 
One danger is that we remain satisfied with merely juxtaposing such concepts; the second 
is that we thereby remain in such an early stage of an intercultural dialogue, defined by 
what may only look like a common ground or an incompatible view - a common ground 
or incompatible view that in light of further dialogue, however, will dissolve into far 
more complex inter-relationships. (Capurro, 2006, p. 45) 
A complex plural society will speak a complex plural language; or, rather, a plurality of 
specialized languages, each carrying its own biases as to the definition and distribution of 
authority, will be seen as converging to form a highly complex language, in which many 
paradigmatic structures exist simultaneously, debate goes on between them, individual 
terms and concepts migrate from one structure to another, altering some of their 
implications and retaining others. (Pocock, (1971), p. 221 in Rowe (1990), p. 324) 
What might we gain by challenging the basic assumption that the conceptualization of “privacy” 
flows in one direction, from West to East? What insights might there be gained from 
understanding China’s contemporary and historical thinking on the matter, facilitating the “travel 
of words and ideas between languages” that Liu (1995) speaks of (above)? It should be clear after 
this brief exploration that questions about privacy can effectively be moved to an intercultural 
domain that benefits all participants while helping to build global schema of resistance (boundary 
resources) to extreme forms of institutional surveillance.   
A great deal of both modern and traditional Chinese thought and culture is relevant to this 
struggle in Western discourse over how to define and value privacy. If neo-liberal arguments that 
privacy is merely instrumental to other individual and social goods such as security and 
prosperity continue to gain political legitimacy, basic individual and small group interests become 
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vulnerable in a way that may comprise the viability of future social systems. Aspects of Chinese 
thought and culture, including Confucianism and its more modern variant, Neo-Confucianism, 
may offer insight into how to make arguments that the loss of privacy would significantly impact 
the society level as well.  
Any honest assessment of the “reasonable expectation” of privacy in China and the U.S. 
should find that the notion plays a role in both countries, and, more importantly, that this notion is 
in constant flux and is unlikely to serve as the basis for strong legal protection for privacy.  Much 
might be made about the fact that the Chinese right to privacy is legally subordinated to the 
public interest. Nevertheless, few scholars in the West attempt to maintain that privacy trumps all 
other values. There appears to be room for a common, abstract notion of reasonable privacy as 
inherent in a continuously negotiated dialectic tension in information flow that forms the basis of 
more contextual, culturally embedded experiences. 
The notion of territorial privacy is highly relevant to both the U.S. and the Chinese 
experience. While the U.S. legal system is dealing with an intensifying rupture in the link 
between territorial and information privacy first felt in the early 20th century, the Chinese have 
been adjusting to increases in real space that have been a major factor in increasing privacy 
expectations. Further, while the idea of privacy in public still has not been sanctioned within U.S. 
legal discourse, the Chinese public appears to have had at least some influence on the emergence 
of municipal CCTV surveillance laws. 
The semantic link between the words gong and “public” to the notion of public opinion is 
not uniformly associated with physical public space such as a town square. In Chinese discourse, 
gong is often deployed to signal the abstract, non-spatial notion of society’s collective interests. 
The public-private distinction in Western discourse often includes spatial entailments (outside 
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and inside), making it generally less abstract than the gong-si opposition. Perhaps the 
disorientation relative to the public private distinction felt in Western discourse is not as acute in 
Chinese discourse, since the term is more abstract (protean) to begin with. Further, it appears that 
Chinese youth may value the new electronic domain of personal and social life to a greater degree 
than their American counterparts.  
Chinese Internet and cell phone users are clearly concerned with the issue of spam and 
frustrated that individual companies can sell their addresses and phone numbers to other 
countries. It is probably far more likely for this public sentiment to translate into a nationwide law 
that significantly restricts the sharing of PII across private firms than it would be in the United 
States, in which business interests have a more direct claim on politics.  
China does not share the U.S. tradition of politically neutral NGOs acting in the public 
interest, and is in fact only a few decades removed from the oppressive excesses and stifling mass 
surveillance programs of the Cultural Revolution, but the public today has begun to assert itself in 
significant ways. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans in general seem to be more 
aware of the tensions between security and privacy than their Chinese counterparts. More detailed 
study of demographic trends in both countries is needed to help envision more long-term 
scenarios. An important aspect of public sentiment to watch over time will be “trust in 
government.” In the United States, polls show that a large percentage of Americans lack even 
basic trust in their government. For example, a Scripps Howard/Ohio University poll conducted 
in the summer of 2006 found that more than one third of respondents believed  “that federal 
officials assisted in the 9/11 terrorist attacks or took no action to stop them so the United States 
could go to war in the Middle East” (Hargrove, 2006). Would we find similar or greater numbers 
of basic distrust in China? This question is difficult to answer, as Chinese generally refrain from 
direct, public discursive attacks on the government for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, a number 
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of scholars have offered data suggesting that Chinese trust in government is quite strong in both 
urban and rural areas (Chen, 2004; Li, 2004; Wang, 2005; Fewsmith, 2007).  
Whether or not it is possible for any individual to be truly anonymous when they engage 
in communication and information retrieval online is one of the “hard problems” of information 
science. Nevertheless, among young Chinese, the belief that there activities can be anonymous 
clearly has an impact on their willingness to engage in certain kinds of behavior. Further, it is 
quite clear that identification and authorization systems run by both public (state) and private 
entities, systems such as national ID cards, blogger real name registration, cookies, and RFID 
tags, have a great deal to do with the answer. The more people are required to use various forms 
of identification before acting (engaging in financial transactions, traveling, reading and sending 
e-mail) the more these actions are likely to involve the production of PII. In the next chapter, 
which looks at the state dossier system in China, I examine this interplay between state ID and 
record systems in detail. 
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CHAPTER 6: CHINA CASE 
The Chinese dangan (personal file) system of the mid 20th century was what one might 
call an “ideal form” of the state dossier system. That is, the dossier covered a significant 
percentage of the population (most urban residents,) and contained a wide range of detail, 
including the individual’s psychological profile, educational achievements, political attitude, and 
social network.  The sites and logics of personal information production were strictly detailed and 
embedded in daily institutional practices, with little opportunity for resistance. This system, 
which I will describe in the first part of the chapter, did not focus on identification because it was 
built into the social environment and in little need of official attention. Since the dangan system 
was administered locally by intimate acquaintances of their subjects, identification was rarely a 
question. People’s lives in general were watched closely, not only during their working hours, but 
at home and in the local neighborhood. Privacy was in short supply and the notion of anonymity 
had little salience. 
In the late 90s and into the 21st century, however, the production of dossiers has been 
undergoing a radical process of transformation. With China’s reform and opening process gaining 
momentum, the increasingly mobile labor pool has made official ID documentation much more 
important. And now with electronically mediated transactions growing rapidly online, networked 
communication ID technologies have become important as well. At the same time, as these new 
systems of ID have diffused into the social system, there have been important moments of 
resistance that were far less typical before. The sites and the logics of production are also not as 
clear, though there are certainly a number of signals that make it possible to draw a preliminary 
map. 
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In the Chinese case, the disaggregation of primary components of the state dossier system 
— ID technology and systems of records — makes less sense for what I will call the “traditional 
dossier system” that characterized the 1980s. Identification technology does become important in 
the late 1990s, as it plays a central role in enabling new sites and new logics of dossier production 
in the digital era. In this chapter, I first will describe the state dossier system as it existed in the 
1980s and explore four primary sites of production — government departments, schools, work 
places, and local public security bureaus — each with their own slightly different but ultimately 
harmonious logics. Next, I describe three major transitional forces that have helped to 
revolutionize the production of the dossier: 1) labor mobility, 2) globalization and 3) ICT 
modernization. After reviewing these transitional forces, I will look more specifically at the 
current state of the two primary dossier system components, ID systems and systems of records. 
Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize the problem of the state dossier system in China today, in 
particular its unfinished, contingent nature. 
THE TRADITIONAL DOSSIER SYSTEM 
Both the hukou and the dangan are distinct tools of the Chinese bureaucracy, but they 
were designed to operate at different levels of scale. The hukou, a system for registering both 
urban and rural households, has largely been a macroeconomic tool for distributing resources and 
controlling the population as a mass. The dangan, on the other hand, is a bureaucratic product 
designed to reflect the unique essence of individuals, making it easier for the state to locate and 
cultivate necessary human resources while quickly identifying and isolating political enemies. 
Both the hukou and the dangan involve the production of files containing PII, but the dangan has 
generally been far more detailed. 
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HUKOU SYSTEM 
According to Wang (2005), the Hukou system has traditionally had three primary 
functions: 1) distribution of resources and services to citizens; 2) the control of internal migration 
and 3) the monitoring and control of “targeted persons.” The salience of the term hukou, for the 
average Chinese has had little to do with dossiers. Rather, a hukou is a categorical designation 
which marks a major “class” division of society between rural and urban people. Chinese citizens 
with an urban hukou have had access to a wide range of social services and privileges not 
available to rural peasants.   
The standard hukou contains seven categories of information:  birth, death, personal data, 
family relations, migration in, migration out, and changes or corrections. This basic information 
is generated for every Chinese resident. This information is easily visible within the hukou 
booklet and thus accessible to the subjects. More extensive information is also generated by the 
local police officer for the hukou dangan, but this data is considered a state secret and his not 
accessible to the subject or any other unauthorized individuals. We will discuss this more 
extensive file below. For most residents, the hukou dangan contains little information other than 
that captured during the standard registration. 
The hukou, for most of its history, was a paper booklet with several pages containing 
information on people within a given hukou unit — usually a family in urban areas or a village in 
rural areas. The first page contained biographic information on the “hukou holder,” the head of 
the family household or the village leader. Subsequent pages contained information on all other 
people within the household, including children. During this time, identification cards were of far 
less importance. Local danwei (work units) might issue their workers simple ID cards indicating 
their status as a worker, but there was no national standard and the cards had no certifying 
authority outside their originating work units. 
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In the early 60s, in the aftermath of Mao’s failed Great Leap Forward, hukou became a 
key state tool for managing the influx of peasants from rural villages into cities. Peasants who 
attempted to live and work in the cities without state authorization would have to do so without 
access to the socialist safety net, the “iron rice bowl.” Hukou-less migrant workers would have to 
live on the margins, with no access to medical care or education for their children, scraping out 
their living in the black market, thus lowering the incentive to migrate.  
The hukou system has generally operated without significant legal oversight. There is no 
mention of the system in the state Constitution. It came into existence with the 1955 law, “The 
Regulation on Hukou Registration of the People’s Republic of China,” as the government’s 
primary means for managing the distribution of resources. No other legislation was passed 
regarding the system until 1985, when the “Regulation on Residents Personal Identification Card 
in the People’s Republic of China” outlined the new national ID system. Eighteen years later, the 
country’s second generation national ID system was codified in the 2004 Law of Citizen 
Identification Cards. This was the first time that the hukou system was addressed in Chinese civil 
code. Prior to this, changes to the system were proclaimed by order of the State Council some 600 
or more times between 1958 and 2005 (Wang, 2005). 
Over the years, the central government has pushed reform of the hukou system that has 
tended to open up avenues for rural residents to move into the cities. Although some observers 
have suggested that China will soon eliminate the system entirely, such a move appears unlikely. 
While the state has decentralized decisions regarding urban migration to the cities themselves, it 
has centralized the monitoring and control of the “targeted population.” The role of the hukou as 
the identification component of the modern state dossier system will be explored later in this 
chapter. First, however, I examine the traditional personal file system know as the dangan. 
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TRADITIONAL SITES OF DANGAN PRODUCTION  
In Chinese, the word dangan simply means “file.” Without additional linguistic 
differentiation it is often a source of confusion. During the peak of the state dossier system in the 
80s, a person referring to his or her dangan would be generally understood to be referring to the 
comprehensive file about their life held by the personnel department at their local work unit 
(danwei). There are actually a large number of different types of dangan, some reflecting 
different chapters in an individual’s life and others part of distinct social groupings. To 
completely distinguish the personal dossier from any other type of file generated within 
bureaucratic processes, one can use the term renshi dangan, personnel file. Within the category of 
personnel file there are three large sub categories: the cadre dossier (gangbu dangan), the worker 
dossier (gongren dangan), and the student dossier (xuesheng dangan). The hukou dangan, the 
dossier maintained directly by hukou police, is only significant for a small sector of the 
population known as the “targeted people” (zhongdian renkou). Each of these four primary sites 
of dossier production is discussed below. 
CADRE DOSSIER SYSTEM 
The dossier system has its origins in the more narrowly targeted dossier system for those 
individuals who were party members and directly employed by the government in a state or party 
organ: the cadre dossier system. The dangan system for cadres was a key bureaucratic tool during 
the fifties and sixties, enabling both the recruitment of talented individuals for key government 
posts and tight control over their political behavior. Government bureaucrats at the time were 
strongly convinced that thorough knowledge of the people, especially those people likely to 
become part of the communist project, was critical to the nation’s development: 
[We] have to examine whether or not one has unlimited loyalty to the party and people 
and one’s political and historical records, ideology, personality, and attitude toward 
study. [We] have to examine them regularly. Only when we have made a detailed 
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examination of each cadre’s political history, political conditions, political quality, 
ideology, work style, work performance, and ability in a systematic way, can we 
systematically understand cadres, correctly recruit, and use them. (Lee, 1990, p. 330) 
Although the cadre dangan has directly impacted only a small sector of the population, it 
is the most fully developed system upon which systems for the general population have been 
based. The file has traditionally been a physical set of documents intended to follow the 
individual around throughout the life career: 
The principal is not to spread the material from the file over several different units; it is 
assumed that this would prevent the administration from getting a correct picture of a 
person’s all-round situation. (Bakken, 2000, pp. 290-1) 
The dangan file consisted of a mixture of records produced by the subject himself, the 
subject’s peers, the subject’s superiors, and, at times, special investigators carrying out the 
directives of a political clampdown campaign. According to Lee (1991), the dossier subject was 
expected to fill out a number of key forms along with a more free-form autobiography. Although 
there has been some variation across state and party organs, key forms included the “Summary 
Career History,” “Promotion to Cadre” (if newly appointed) and “Application for Party 
membership.” General categories of information on these forms included basic registration 
information seen on any standard hukou form, detailed family background, including the 
occupations of family members prior to the revolution and current economic situation, names and 
employment details of close friends and associates, and information about prior arrests, jailing, or 
executions of key family members. In addition, registrants were asked to provide specific 
information about when and how they became a party member and whether or not the spouse was 
a party member. The autobiography, chiefly an exposition of the subject’s political life, including 
participation in demonstrations or associations from age seven on, provided an opportunity for the 
subject to provide context or additional information not easily included in the basic forms. Most 
cadres had a single physical file which was held by the personnel department above them. Cadres 
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of greater importance had two versions: a highly detailed file, with very tight access restrictions, 
and a digest version, for which there was wider, but still restricted access. 
In addition to the volume of information generated during a cadre’s registration for a new 
position, a key part of the dossier production cycle was the year end appraisal meeting, in which 
the subject’s performance as a cadre was reviewed in detail. Chow (1993) describes the meeting: 
During the year end appraisal meeting, each cadre is to prepare and orally present a 
written report of his work. Contained in the report are a descriptive list of the tasks being 
accomplished, an account of accomplished tasks, and plans for performance 
improvement. After the oral presentation, the “mass” is to assess accomplishments and/or 
failures, including those which are not mentioned in the report; such assessment is to be 
made based on the job description of the position occupied by the cadre. The “mass” will 
also give suggestions for performance improvement. After group discussion, leading 
cadres are to draft a revised report, which includes the original self-appraisal and those 
additional comments from the “mass.” The “mass” will then consider and endorse the 
final report to be signed by the cadre and the leading cadre. The report is to be filed in the 
cadre’s dossier.  (p. 112) 
Key to understand here is that the subject was a direct participant in the production 
process and produced what was in essence a draft of the file that was to be placed in the dossier. 
Although they were not allowed to view the contents of their dossier, they often had a pretty good 
idea of its contents. Those cadres who fit well into the system and were liked by both their peers 
and superiors tended to have a sense of control over the dossier that more marginal cadres did not.  
Cadres who saw the dangan as threatening would be in greatest danger, not during the 
regular, periodical evaluation process, but during another key, but irregular moment of dossier 
record production: the political campaign. These campaigns, used by Mao to ensure that all party 
and state organs held to the “class line,” ended with purges of large number of party members 
who were viewed as obstacles to the communist project.   
During a campaign, the personnel bureau or organizational department holding the 
dossiers would go through each file carefully, looking for evidence that the subject had 
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deliberately falsified material that could hide evidence of political misdeeds or associations with 
other “black marked” individuals. Dossier administrators focused on the autobiography section 
and the numerous supplements the subject provided to it over the course of his life, looking for 
internal inconsistencies. If an important discrepancy was found, special investigative teams could 
be dispatched by the party committee to investigate more thoroughly, including interviews with 
the subject’s associates. The process ended in a formal report added to the dossier, at best noting 
the discrepancy, and at worst categorizing the subject as a target for punishment, producing a 
“black mark” in the dossier that could impact the subject for the rest of his life.  
The handling of dossier files during the course of these investigations, described by Lee 
(1991) helps illustrate the degree to which the party sought to maintain the file’s integrity: 
Investigators are allowed to see dossiers of those specified by the letter only in the 
designated dossier room. No mechanical duplication of a dossier is allowed except for a 
simplified version of the dossier. When part of a dossier is copied, it is verbatim; no 
summarizing or paraphrasing is allowed. The person in charge of the dossier must 
authenticate every page copied in the entire package. 
Control over copied materials is strict because they can enter the dossiers of others as 
supporting evidence. To ensure proper control, the regime authorized each unit 
maintaining dossiers to set up more detailed regulations. As for lending dossiers, “as a 
rule, a dossier cannot be checked out. But under special circumstances, it can be lent with 
approval [of the party committee.] However, lending should follow strict registration, and 
those borrowed should be returned within the due date.” (pp. 337-8) 
In other areas of society, including the labor and education sectors, files on general 
individuals were limited and narrow in scope until 1956, when the cadre dangan system was 
standardized and unified nationally. As part of this process, other sectors of society began to 
follow this model, extending the topical coverage of their files to include more about their state of 
mind and attitudes toward the political system: 
After 1956, this political/ideological component of the worker’s file became the 
“lifeblood” of enterprise management work, for it was argued that it was not enough to 
understand only the individual worker’s circumstance; knowledge of the influence of 
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family members, as well as members of the community, upon the workers was also 
needed. (Dutton, 1992, p. 226) 
EDUCATION DOSSIER SYSTEM 
Since 1956, a Chinese citizen’s first experience with the dossier system has generally 
been through school. The primary person responsible for managing the production of dangan 
material within the educational system is the student’s teacher. In the process, however, both the 
student and their parents are heavily involved. The primary document produced by the school 
teacher is the student evaluation report written every school term. A lot of input for this report 
comes from a process known as the “contact transmission record,” a written document intended 
to bridge communication between the parents, the school, and the student: 
The parents’ meetings should continue at regular intervals, and the already widespread 
practice of home visits by the teacher should be upheld. The contract transmission record 
should ambulate between school and home every week. It should carry notes on the 
students’ moral behaviour, the rules of study, attendance record, test record, level of 
hygiene, delivering of homework, etc. Students themselves should bring the book home 
every Saturday; parents should use the weekend to go through teachers’ evaluations, and 
carefully write down the students’ biaoxian at home; each Monday the students should 
bring the record back to school. The teacher could then inspect it, and direct education 
towards any specific problems. This ‘connection record’ (guanxibu), the home visits, and 
the parents’ meeting (jiachang hui), used together, could gather the best information 
possible about the students. (Bakken, 2000, p. 277) 
It is notable that their early experience with the system is positive; the file is seen primarily as a 
tool for the encouragement of the student’s development. According to Bakken (2000), teachers 
saw the program largely as one of “constructive assessments intended for encouragement” (p. 
293). The character of the dangan appears to shift more towards discipline and away from 
cultivation as the individual moves higher in educational institutions and on into a chosen 
profession, but the file administrator is still someone who interacts with the individual on a 
regular basis. Although the individual is not allowed to see their file, they remain an intimate part 
of the process.  
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WORKPLACE DANGAN SYSTEM 
When a student moves from the educational system to their first job, the personnel file is 
sent from the school to the new place of work, where the file becomes the responsibility of the 
work unit’s party secretary. As in the cadre system, strict secrecy of the files is maintained. The 
dangan is kept in a special room to which only authorized party members have access.  
The mechanism for the production of dossier material and their use follow closely the 
model of the cadre system. The person primarily responsible for dossier production is the 
worker’s production group leader. The political logic of the worker dangan, however, appears to 
lean more toward identifying political enemies than cultivating their spiritual consciousness. 
Since workers are not expected to go far up the political chain of command, attention tends to 
focus on those likely to be sources of dissent. 
Study reports are regularly filled out by production group leaders based on the results of 
political study sessions. In addition, group leaders continually give oral “small reports” 
(xiaobao) on the situation in their groups, including the disposition of individual workers. 
It is likely to be reported if, during political study or the work day, a worker offers a 
heterodox opinion that requires criticism or reflects an unyielding attitude with regard to 
party policy. The report makes its way up the party hierarchy and will sometimes come to 
rest in the personnel department, where it will become part of the worker’s permanent 
record if the person in charge judges the matter to be serious. (Walder, 1987, p. 68) 
The worker’s dangan is the central document their superiors consult when considering 
workers for promotion, punishment for transgressions, or the provision of housing assignments. 
As is the case with the cadre dangan system, elements within these files can also make them 
targets of political campaigns. As a result, workers can become very concerned about possible 
black marks that could affect their and their family’s futures. A major effect of this is the 
depoliticization of workers outside the approved party structure: 
The most important consequence of this system of political surveillance and control is 
that it makes it almost impossible for workers to organize themselves to formulate their 
own proposals and agendas of issues outside of party auspices and without the 
organizations knowledge. The communication among workers so critical for effective 
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political action cannot take place without the Party detecting it and applying sanctions to 
those involved. One activity that has been treated with consistent severity in China is 
political organization outside the Party; it is by definition counter-revolutionary. Where 
this system of surveillance is intact, workers are demobilized as a political force.  
(Walder, 1987, p. 69) 
During the peak of the traditional dossier system, the dossier created a comprehensive, 
imposing data shadow for each and every urban resident, from their early days in school until the 
end of their productive life. For most of this population, these two sites, education and work, were 
the exclusive locations where the production of dossier materials took place. Because the file 
existed in a singular location (excluding the police copy) and was managed on the basis of direct, 
personal contact with the subject, there was a strong belief among administrators that the file 
represented an objective view of the person in question: 
Since the file is based on the objective evaluation process, it is also held that ‘the 
personnel file … is an objective report of a person’s objective aspects or features’. This is 
to apply whether the file concerns cadres, workers, or other individuals; the objective 
features to be reported are the individual’s moral, political, intellectual, and work 
abilities, rewards and punishments, etc. It is explained that the file represents a full 
reflection of a person’s past and present situation; in particular, it is emphasized that the 
file is ‘ a proof of the education a person has got under the leadership of the Party’. The 
file objectively measures the distance from the exemplary and objective norm for each 
individual. (Bakken, 2000, pp. 299-300) 
This distance from the exemplary, frozen within each instance of the file, was the basis upon 
which individual were to develop their self-improvement. In a person’s early experience with the 
dangan, he she would see the file more as a tool of education and betterment than as a tool of 
strict social control, but always in conjunction with the intervention of a higher authority. The 
teacher, for example, can exercise their own discretion as to whether a particular problematic 
episode, such as speaking out of turn in class, makes its way to the permanent file. They also 
work regularly with the parents and the students themselves in conducting their evaluations, 
which ultimately lead to the production of a formal report. 
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Throughout the majority of modern Chinese history, access to the dossier has been highly 
restricted, with the information inside classified as a state secret: 
When critics of the regime demanded public access to personnel dossiers, the regime 
gave three reasons for their being kept secret. First, an individual’s privacy must be 
protected from other individuals (but not from the state). Second, dossiers include facts 
that have been verified as well as suspicions, rumors, and other pieces of potentially 
damaging, but unconfirmed, information that should certainly not be made public. Third, 
a dossier’s confidentiality prevents unnecessary disharmony among the people. (Lee, 
1990, p. 332) 
POLICE DANGAN SYSTEM 
For most Chinese citizens, the local public security bureau has not been a significant site 
for the production of dossier material. All citizens must register with the local office at birth, and 
urban residents have special hukou police assigned to them, charged with maintaining detailed 
files. In practice, however, hukou police keep active files on only a very small percentage of 
citizens. 
As of 2006, more than 300,000 specialized hukou police officers were assigned to 
geographic zones of from 500 to 1000 households, or as many as 2,500 people. These special 
officers were given the responsibility collecting, updating and verifying the hukou information for 
all people within their zone. The information gathering process was guided by a standard form 
with eight categories:  
… basic information (the information on the hukou registration form); current behaviour 
including political activities; family and personal financial status and life style; personal 
friends and relations (including love relations); physical features including body size and 
body shape; usage of accent and slang; personal character and hobbies; and daily 
associations and other “consequential” past activities. (Wang, 2004, pp. 124-5) 
In addition to collecting information to fill in the public security file, hukou police have 
also maintained copies of their people’s school and work dossiers. Given the size of their domain 
and their limited resources, hukou police were simply unable to maintain highly detailed data for 
every resident. A kind of “triage” system emerged where their attention and dossier production 
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activities were focused on a small subset of the people in their zone, the “targeted people,” with 
the remainder largely free of this documentary coverage. 
It is difficult to say with certainty just how many Chinese citizens are targeted in this 
way, as the information is considered a state secret. In March 1985, the Ministry of Public 
Security issued “Regulations on the Management of Targeted People” classifying them into six 
major categories: 1) those under suspicion for counterrevolutionary activities; 2) those under 
suspicion for ordinary criminal activities; 3) those suspected of disturbing social order; 4) “risky 
elements” who might use violence in times of civil unrest; 5) those under control (by the public 
security bureau), who have been deprived of political rights, who are out of prison on parole, who 
are serving a sentence outside of prison, who are under house arrest, or who are on bail awaiting 
trial, and 6) those who, within the past three years, have been released from prison or RTL 
(Reform Through Labor). 
Data collected by the Duihua foundation, a non-profit group dedicated to protecting 
human rights in the U.S. and China, shows that Mohe County, an area of Heilongjiang Province 
near the Russian border with a population of roughly 75,000, had between 6 and 84 people 
targeted over the course of the 1980s, or a maximum of .11% of the population. According to 
Wang (2005), a Tianjin city police station with 35,000 residents had a list of 247 targeted people 
in 1998, or .7% of the population, and a medium sized city in Henan province had 22,000 of its 
1.1 million population listed as targeted, or 2%.  
The group of people involved in the production of records for the hukou police targeted 
dangan is broader, a social circle not as intimately involved with the subjects than in the 
education and work sites. In order to gather the necessary information, hukou police make 
extensive use of informants within the local communities. Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
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liberation, finding informants with useful intelligence on local residents was a fairly 
straightforward process. Local heads of neighborhood committees, often gossipy older women, 
watched and listened to their people carefully and had much to tell the hukou police. What Wang 
(2005) calls a “deep and extensive political cynicism among the citizens” (p. 125) has grown in 
the 90s and into the 21st century, making the average urban citizen far less likely to willingly act 
as the “eyes and ears of public security” (zhi’an ermu). To make up for this change in the social 
landscape, police began to shift from using volunteer informants to paying them directly, often 
using ex-criminals who might have ins to the targeted social networks (Dutton, 2005). 
Local public security bureaus are directed by the central government to target specific 
people, although they may also add people who come to light during local policing activities. For 
targeted people, the police officer must fill out all eight categories of the police form and fulfill 
additional information requests from the central government. In addition, they are expected to 
surveill and interact with the targeted person on a regular basis: 
… the police are instructed to monitor the targeted people openly and secretly as closely 
as possible, review their cases and “educate” them as necessary, and detain them at the 
earliest warning signs. Often, especially during periodical national or regional yanda 
(strike hard against crime) or saohei (sweeping organized crime) campaigns, the targeted 
people, together with undocumented “floating” people, are preemptively detained and 
interrogated without evidence of criminal activities. (p. 126) 
People who fall into this category of “targeted person” clearly exist as second class 
citizens. The far majority of the urban population, however, has not traditionally been subject to 
this process of dossier production. For the average person, their police hukou file “may include 
only a copy of his or her hukou registration application….” (Keane, 2005, p. 217). 
DANGAN “DATA SHADOW”  BY PERSON TYPE  
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The size of the data shadow, cast in the traditional dangan, has varied considerably, both 
over time and according to one’s position in society. During the first yen years of the communist 
regime, only state cadres, personnel working directly within state and party organs, were subject 
to the national dossier system. By the late fifties, most urban residents, from factory workers to 
street sweepers, were in the shadow of an extensive and momentous personal file, beginning with 
their time in secondary school. The size 
of this shadow, however, varied 
considerably according to one’s social 
position and type of employment. A 
decade after Deng Xiaoping’s urban 
economic reforms, many urban residents 
found themselves free of the dangan 
shadow (at least once they left school) 
while peasants have been largely 
independent of the dossier system for 
nearly all of the country’s 60-year history. As the Chinese dossier system is in the midst of a 
rapid period of evolution and change, the size of the data shadow for people from all walks of life 
is again in flux. 
THREE MAJOR FACTORS IN THE TRANSITION OF CHINESE SYSTEM 
Although China has had a nearly prototypical state dossier system for much of its modern 
history, both the logic and sites of file production are undergoing a radical transformation which 
has at least temporarily destabilized the system. So far, for the average Chinese citizen of the 21st 
century, the government dossier is less oppressive a notion than it was for citizens of the prior 
century. Whether or not this destabilization is temporary or the harbinger of a deeper shift in the 
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country’s socio-political environment will in large part be determined over the course of the next 
few years. 
There are at least three significant changes in China’s social environment that have led to 
this shift: 1) the increasing mobility of the working class; 2) growing integration into the global 
economy and 3) the diffusion of personal computers and network communication technology. 
Although these three changes clearly have their own interdependencies, using these three 
categories of change makes it easier to outline a broader narrative of this radical shift. Again, both 
the sites of production, the physical and institutional locations where dossier files are being 
produced, and the logic of production, the schematized processes which generate and use the 
data, have changed dramatically over the past three decades, and, in fact, are still changing. 
FACTOR 1: LABOR MOBILITY 
The growing diversification of China’s economic landscape with private and other non-
state businesses and parallel reduction in constraints on internal migration have completely 
disrupted the standard process of dossier production for a growing percentage of Chinese citizens. 
While the production of information for the educational portion of one’s dangan does not appear 
to have changed significantly, its importance in the world of work has been reduced dramatically. 
Once they go into employment, workers in state firms can expect their dangan to remain a central 
document determining their professional success. For government cadres, the document is of 
extreme importance. For those who work in the private sector, however, active maintenance of 
the dangan file appears to cease. Private firms are not required to receive or maintain the dangan 
for their new employees. Workers in foreign corporations send their sealed dangan file to the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade while those working for domestic firms send them on to the Ministry 
of Commerce.  
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The job of guarding files for people employed in the private sector has been contracted 
out. In the capital, the files of most privately employed workers are guarded by the 
Beijing Talent Centre, which is housed inside a former concubines’ compound at the 
Forbidden City. Wu Yong, a senior manager there, calls the centre a “service business”. 
The Talent Centre lacks the power of a party chief to annotate people’s files, and merely 
has them for safekeeping. (“X-files,” 1998) 
We cannot assume that dossiers are no longer maintained on individuals in the private sector, just 
that the method of administration has changed. It is likely that dangan are forwarded and then 
digitized, where they become the basis for new virtual dossier to replace them. 
A significant bureaucratic response to the increase in worker mobility was the institution 
of a national ID card. Prior to the issuance of the national ID card, Chinese citizens had to rely on 
letters of introduction from former employers and non-standard IDs that were easily forged. To 
identify people, the Chinese state relied largely on the local context. The person’s school or work 
unit administrators knew them by face, so this rarely became an issue. As state administrative 
agents increasingly encountered people with which they had no prior interaction, the importance 
of authentic ID documents started to grow. 
FACTOR 2: GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
China’s interest in opening to the world has been clear since party chairman Deng 
initiated the Four Modernizations in 1978. Part of the reform and opening process has been the 
opening of domestic markets to foreign players, the marketing of Chinese goods on the world 
stage, and the formal entry of China into the World Trade Organization. This integration has 
brought new logics to dossier production that flow from global models of risk management. 
Global, financial risk schema have encouraged an entirely new level of financial records 
production, while a growing number of private institutions are learning the value (both in use and 
exchange) of records of personal information. At the same time, foreign companies hire Chinese 
workers with no knowledge or interest in the traditional practice of the dangan. They still 
248 
 
maintain personnel records that may end up within the dossier system, but the logic of production 
there is far different than that of the 1980s communist party work unit. 
International standards are also beginning to have an impact on the configuration of 
China’s current state dossier system. Within the domain of identity systems, for example, China 
was pressured to produce passports for its citizens with an embedded RFID chip. The U.S. 
threatened China with a revocation of visa waiver status for travelers who came to the U.S. 
without RFID chips embedded in their passports. The process of dossier production is no longer 
entirely within China’s control. In some cases, the government must request that private, foreign 
institutions provide records in which it has an interest, with at least the possibility of a “no” 
answer.  
FACTOR 3: ICT MODERNIZATION  
Over the past several decades, the Chinese government has overseen the rapid 
modernization of its telecommunication infrastructure, nationwide diffusion of personal 
computers and cell phones, and adoption of electronic communication and record storage within 
all levels of government, commercial markets and increasingly among the general public. 36 The 
modernization has been impressive not only in scale but in pace. Since former party chairman 
Deng Xiaoping’s call to open and modernize the country in 1978, China has been on a path 
toward modernization that has only been accelerating in recent years.  
In the first fifteen years of modernization under reformist Deng, national telephone 
penetration had risen from roughly 0.4 per hundred in 1978 to 2.2 in 1993. The Chinese 
                                                     
36 Although it would be possible to consider the diffusion of telecommunications technology and China's 
integration into the global system to be so intertwined as to be analytically inseparable, there is an important reason for 
separating them here. In focusing on technology, the emphasis is on changes to the dossier system enabled and 
catalyzed by the specific technological affordances of electronic networked communication and storage. One of the 
affordances of this new technology is the rapid influx of information China begins to absorb as it becomes more 
integrated with the global system. 
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government invested more than $50 billion into improving telecommunications infrastructure, 
helping to boost the penetration of fixed line phones to over 20 per cent by the year 2000. With an 
additional 5-year commitment of $120 billion announced by the MII in 2001 (“China to Pour, “ 
2001), fixed line penetration has continued to grow, now hovering at close to 30% nationally. 
Soon after fixed line build out gained momentum, cellular phone penetration began to surge as 
well, passing fixed line penetration, with over 40% nationally  as of early 2008 (Hanlon, 2008). 
The number of personal computers in use in China rose more than two orders of magnitude 
between 1990 and 2005, from just 4 for every 10,000 to 4.05 per 100 people in 2005 (“ADB 
Country Partnership,” 2008). More than 40 million PCs were sold in China in 2008 (Chao, 2009). 
Similarly, the number of Internet users in China has risen from 620,000 in 1997, to 22 million in 
2001, to more than 300 million in 2009. 
China’s technological modernization has been achieved via a combination of policies, 
including government funded programs, opportunities for foreign investment and technology 
transfer, and the cultivation of its own indigenous telecom and computing industry. In the past 
two decades, formal government programs for improving China’s communication capacity have 
included the Golden Projects, officially announced in 1993, Government Online, launched in 
1999, and the comprehensive e-government initiative outlined by the State Council in 2002.  
This process has not always been firmly in the grasp of the central government. The 
achievement has been much like rolling a bolder down hill; the initial force necessary to get 
things moving has unleashed a gathering momentum that the state can, at best, only nudge in 
certain directions. China’s leaders have been aware of the potentially disabling potential of ICTs 
since at least 1989, when the fax machines and electronic BBSs helped bring the clash between 
mew media savvy pro democracy students and the Party to a violent conclusion. This has not 
slowed their enthusiasm for modernization, in part because the very same new media explosion 
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that caused them to lose control in those early days of June enabled them to indentify and 
apprehend many of the students who defied orders to disperse.  
The video cameras installed for traffic monitoring in the center of the city proved 
particularly useful. The definitive account of the whole event is in the hands of the 
Bureau of Public Safety. The operators of these remote-controlled cameras could pan and 
zoom in on the faces and actions of individuals in the square and environs. Being CCD-
type cameras, they even work in very low light. Still frames of the faces of prominent 
activists in the square also turned up on television, broadcast all over the country to catch 
movement organizers on the lamb. (Wark, 1994, p. 131) 
In the 20 years since Tiananmen, there has been an ongoing tension between the state’s 
view of ICT as powerful tools of purely economic liberalization and their role as “technologies of 
freedom” affording new opportunities for human association and social innovations outside of 
state guidance. More recently, scholars have argued that cyberspace can support authoritarian or 
even totalitarian forms of government at least as well as it can facilitate democracy and the spread 
of human rights (Boas & Kalathil, 2003).  
China’s Golden Shield project, formally initiated by the State Planning Commission and 
Ministry of Public Security in July of 2001, can be understood in part as the state’s focused 
expression of this tension: the state’s collective effort to ensure that the ICT revolution remains in 
its control. The official goal of Golden Shield was “the adoption of advanced ICTs to strengthen 
central police control, responsiveness, and crime combating capacity, so as to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public security work” (Qiu & Hachigian, 2004, p. 17). The project 
was designed to be implemented in two phases, with Phase One (2002-2004) focusing on 
building infrastructure and a common operation platform, and Phase Two (2005-2006) 
emphasizing the development of applications.  
Golden Shield is an umbrella term for a number of interrelated initiatives, from the 
electronic networking of local and provincial ministries of public security, to the monitoring and 
control of Internet information flows, to the digitization of the hukou residential card and many 
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other projects. Of most relevance to this dissertation is how, as part of the Golden Shield project, 
the Ministry of Public Security is attempting to move the traditional dossier system into digital 
form, a plan it first formally announced in 2000: 
The MPS announced last year that within three years it would have created a nationwide 
computerized database containing personal details and ID numbers for every adult in the 
country. In the past the Chinese government has kept a cumulative file (called the 
dangan) on every individual’s performance and attitudes from kindergarten, and 
throughout adult employment. This information will now be digitized and Chinese 
citizens will be issued new, second-generation identification cards that will contain their 
dangan on an embedded microchip. Currently, Chinese ID cards consist of a laminated 
paper card featuring a person’s name, photo, birthday and ID number…. The second 
generation smart card is likely to be a “proximity card” — in other words it can be 
scanned instantly, from several feet away, without the subject necessarily being aware 
that he or she is being identified. (Walton, 2001, p. 19) 
The focus of attention within western academic and mass media literature has been the 
Internet censorship initiative, a bias which has become so pronounced that the term “great 
firewall of China” has, incorrectly, become virtually equated with the “Golden Shield.”37  The 
Chinese government’s ongoing and evolving efforts to block unwanted information from flowing 
into or within its borders certainly distinguish it from the U.S. state, which does not attempt to 
interfere significantly with data flows. As we will see, other aspects of the Golden Shield 
program with more direct parallels to our study of dossier systems largely mirror similar policy 
efforts in the U.S.  
The Golden Shield project is clearly very important to China’s central government. The 
size of China’s overall surveillance market, estimated at $500 million in 2003, is projected to 
exceed $40 billion by 2010. (Bradsher, 2007a) In 2005 alone, $1 billion was invested by the 
Ministry of Public Security (“China Public Security and Surveillance,” 2007). This is clearly a 
significant portion of government expenditure on ICT modernization which may continue to grow 
in the next several years. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the state has modernized 
                                                     
37 See, for example, http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-11/ff_chinafirewall 
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telecommunications and accelerated the diffusion of ICTs primarily for two reasons: to boost 
economic development and improve government administration. These have been and continue to 
be the driving factors of modernization. This fact can often get overlooked in research that 
focuses on the Orwellian frame: 
In spite of the overwhelming investment that China was making in building 
infrastructure, it seemed that only business analysts were impressed. Academics tended to 
focus solely on the way in which China attempted to control the internet at the individual 
user level. A survey of the published literature on China and the Internet concluded that 
an overwhelming number of studies sought to analyse the government’s attempt to 
control the internet over Internet dissidents and cybercitizen’s use of the resources of the 
web (Kluver and Chen 2003). The common picture that emerges is of the government 
trying to hold back a wave of political dissent against the authoritarian government, while 
attempting to use the Internet primarily for economic benefit (Boas and Kalathil 2003; 
Chase and Mulvenon 2002). This view is common not only in academic research, but 
also is especially pronounced in journalistic coverage of the Chinese Internet (McMillan 
and Hwang 2002). (Kluver, 2005, p. 83) 
While informatization may help the central government to vastly increase its authority, 
the jury is still out. It would be a mistake to see China’s continuing support of cyber-development 
as driven primarily by the desire to monitor and control the populous. This is an ongoing struggle 
whose outcome is highly contingent. In the rest of the chapter, we examine this struggle more 
closely, first considering the emergence of new identity systems and then the rapid growth in 
digital systems of records. 
ID SYSTEMS 
Identification technology was not a particularly salient component of China’s traditional 
dossier system because it was produced locally and participants tended to know each other quite 
well. As the urban population became more mobile, however, it became more and more important 
to develop a nationally standardized document to attest to identity. The first document was in 
low-tech paper form. Not only was the original ID easy to forge, but administrators had not even 
fully thought out the necessities for a unique numbering system, leaving close to a million people 
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across the country with duplicate ID numbers. Over the past several years China has engineered a 
major upgrade of the national ID card system and is now focusing its attention on expanding its 
online ID systems. In this section I will discuss the first national ID card, the second generation 
ID card, and finally, state efforts to implement comprehensive virtual ID systems online.  
FIRST NATIONAL ID CARD 
The State Council decree to establish a national ID card was announced in the People’s 
Daily on April 7, 1984. “Personal identity cards are extremely necessary to tighten social 
security, to uncover, control and smash every type of serious criminal activity, to protect the well-
being of the state and the people and safeguard the socialist modernizations,” the announcement 
said. Highlighting the benefits to be expected by citizens from the new ID initiative, the 
announcement stated “citizens will find it more convenient to handle legal matters, register to 
vote, take college entrance examinations, seek employment, collect parcels or send remittances 
by mail, get medical care, travel and buy train, boat or air tickets” (Bradley, 1984, n.p.). The first 
step in this project, detailed in the “Trial regulations for identification cards for citizens of the 
PRC” was to establish a pilot ID card program in Beijing and to use that experience to draft a 
formal national ID law.  
The following year, Liu Fuzhi, head of the Ministry of Public Security, explained to the 
Xinhua daily news service why a new system of identification was so important to the country’s 
development:  
For the sake of people’s own convenience and to protect their legitimate rights and 
interests more effectively, the issue of uniform, legally valid citizens’ identification cards 
by the state is essential. With this legal document, which is easy to carry, all a citizen 
needs to do is to show it whenever his identity has to be proven. Not only will the people 
benefit from the convenience, various departments concerned can also simplify 
formalities and improve their efficiency. 
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After adopting the citizens’ identification card system and when our citizens have been 
issued uniform identification cards, management can be efficiently organised, social 
stability can be better maintained, the discovery, control and punishment of all types of 
criminals who have mingled among the people will become more effective and the safety 
of the state and the people as well as socialist modernisation can thus be safeguarded. 
(“Minister of Public Security Explains Need for Identity Cards,” 1985, n.p.)  
Draft regulations for the national ID card were adopted by the Standing Committee on 
September 6, 1985. Detailed rules for implementation of the regulations on residents’ 
identification cards were passed by the Standing Committee a year later on November 3, 1986 
and were officially promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on the 28th of November. 
These detailed regulations included a specific listing of the situations and locales citizens would 
be expected to present their card: 
(1) registering as a voter; (2) registering one’s residence; (3) signing on for military 
service; (4) registering one’s marriage; (5) enrolling at a school or taking up employment; 
(6) handling notarization matters; (7) going to controlled border areas; (8) carrying out 
exit formalities; (9) taking part in litigation; (10) applying for a motor vehicle driver’s 
license, a ship navigator’s license, and a non-motor vehicle driver’s license; (11) applying 
for a license for operating an individual business; (12) handling individual credit loan 
matters; (13) taking part in social insurance and drawing social relief funds; (14) going 
through the formalities for boarding a civil aircraft; (15) registering at a hotel; (16) 
withdrawing remittances and claiming mail; (17) consigning articles for sale on 
commission; and (18) dealing with other matters. 
The ID numbers associated with the original ID cards were not controlled at the central 
government level, leading to duplicate ID numbers among what some estimate to be more than a 
million people (“Overlapped ID numbers,” 2005). ID cards were printed paper stock and very 
easy to forge. Identity theft and fraud became an increasingly common occurrence in the urban 
areas.  
In 1999, the State Council issued the “Decision on Implementing a Citizen Number 
System” calling for every Chinese citizen to have a unique, unchanging, lifelong citizen identity 
number (CIN). The CIN is an eighteen digit number consisting of four blocks. The first block, six 
digits, indicates the administrative region for the hukou, which may range from a small 
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neighborhood in a small city to an entire town in the rural areas. The second block, eight digits, 
encodes the individual’s birth date. The third block, three digits, is a “sequence number” used to 
distinguish those born on the same day in the same region. Finally, the last digit is a verification 
number used to check the validity of the number and card (Keane, 2005). The new, second 
generation card, described later in this section, took advantage of the CIN and included 
technology, RFID, to reduce the possibility for ID fraud.  
The Chinese government continued to push the use of the national ID card. In January 
1993, a circular from the Ministry of Public Security and thirteen other government departments 
underlined the importance of using the ID and the ID number when consulting or generating 
information about individual citizens: 
The resident identification card is an official state document for certifying the identity of 
individual citizens. Departments should instruct their subordinate enterprises and 
institutions to formulate, institute or amplify the necessary rules and regulations in the 
light of the characteristics of their functions. They should check citizens’ resident 
identification cards when the latter go through procedures in their political, legal, 
economic and social activities relating to their rights and obligations as citizens; and 
make the checking of resident identification cards an institutional and standardized 
system. 
The circular asks all departments to use the data on the citizen’s resident identification 
card - such as name, sex, nationality, date of birth - in their vocational work, in the 
issuance and registration of relevant documents, registers, certificates, forms, bills, 
instruments and cards relating to citizens’ rights and interests. (“Identification: Ministries 
Seek,” 1993) 
A few months later, however, an incident in the city of Guangzhou involving of the death 
of young migrant worker Sun Zhigang while in police custody would spark a public outcry 
against police treatment of citizens found out in public without proper documentation. In March 
2003, Sun was jailed for not having his “temporary residence permit” and later died after a brutal 
beating in police custody. Hard hitting investigative reporting by the city’s Southern Metropolis 
Journal was distributed widely on the Internet and resulted in the case becoming the focus of 
public attention (“84 Days,” 2003). In the wake of the scandal, the central government was forced 
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to transform migrant detention centers like the one where Sun had been mistreated into voluntary 
service centers, while at the same time abolishing the temporary residence permit requirement 
that had been present in Chinese law for 20 years. Although the government later reintroduced the 
permit system, citing the need to manage the migrant worker problem, there continue to be active 
calls for the abolishment of the system, and the topic is considered fair game in the media (Qiang, 
2006). In the months following this event, the government was forced to take a more conciliatory 
approach and rearticulate the rights of Chinese citizens surrounding their use of the cards. Some 
of these changes are reflected in the new, 2003 “Law on ID cards,” covered in the following 
section. 
NEW EMPHASIS ON IDENTIFICATION: THE SECOND GENERATION ID CARD 
China’s “second generation” national ID card was the culmination of a number of trends, 
the answer to a range of policy problems that the original national ID card had only partially 
solved. The first national ID card was instituted at the leading edge of Deng’s urban economic 
reforms and made possible rapid, short term increases in the mobility of the labor class. The 
second generation card was deployed within a different political, economic and technological 
environment. Deng’s reforms have helped to spur three decades of rapid economic development 
and technological modernization. While the original card was printed on simple card stock, of 
little impact on the national economy, the new card has helped to jump start a multibillion dollar 
domestic industry in RFID design and production. 
Of the nearly $5 billion spent on RFID globally in 2007, $1.9 billion was spent in China, 
leading the market. The second generation ID project accounted for the bulk of this business, 
valued at $6 billion from design to implementation. The project has stimulated China’s domestic 
RFID card, reader and supporting software markets such as data and system integration. Prior 
RFID card systems such as the social security card (deployed in more than 20 cities as of 2003,) 
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were more open to direct western participation, but the second generation ID project is being 
developed primarily by domestic firms (Batson, 2003). According to the market research firm 
IDTechEx, China’s top 8 RFID manufacturers in 2007 were all contractors to the national ID 
project. The Huahong Group and its two subsidiaries provided both chip design and 
manufacturing, while Datang Microelectronics received government orders for chip design and 
chip module encapsulation. Smart card orders for Datang and Eastcom Peace helped them to a top 
8 ranking among all global smart card manufacturers (“RFID in China the Biggest,” 2007). 
Despite the government’s policy to keep the ID card project among domestic firms, some foreign 
firms, including French Thales SA and Israeli On Tack Innovations, claim to have provided 
technology via joint venture (Batson, 2003). 
In addition to production of the physical ID card, numerous IT firms have been 
contracted to develop supporting data and system integration services. Chief among them is the 
Shenzhen-based China Information Security Technology (NASDAQ: CPBY, formerly China 
Public Security Technology). CPBY has led the main pilot project in Shenzhen to test the ability 
to integrate once distinct information systems (health, social security, crime, education) into the 
national Basic Population Information Database (BPID). 
The system is an integral part of the entire Shenzhen Residence Card program. Through 
an integrated information transfer platform, the new system will facilitate several social 
programs in Shenzhen, including social welfare management, one-child policy family 
planning management, education management and house rental management. 
The system will enable various government agencies to access information regarding 
immigrant populations and improve public management capabilities. In the near future, 
the Shenzhen Residence Card Information Management System may be expanded to be 
compatible with other applications, such as Trans Card (an e-currency card used in 
Shenzhen for buses, subways and other small purchases), and could be used to access 
medical history, personal credit history, and driving records (“China Public Security 
Technology Wins Shenzhen Card System Contract,” 2007, n.p.. 
The Pinnacle fund, the primary investor in China Public Security Technology  prior to its 
April 2008 merger with China Information Security, tripled its stake in the company between 
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February and September 2007. According to a New York Times report, U.S. hedge funds poured 
more than $150 million into Chinese surveillance companies in 2006 alone (Bradsher, 2007a). 
First generation cards were so easy to forge that they spawned new forms of fraud 
capitalizing on the falsely placed trust of people willing to accept their proffered authenticity. 
Because of its comprised capacity for authentication, the national ID card was of limited value in 
monitoring “targeted populations” such as political dissidents and criminals. The second 
generation card was designed to dramatically reduce the potential for fraud and facilitate the rapid 
production and transfer of personal data from citizen subjects to agents of the state. The key 
technology affording these goals is an embedded Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chip. 
The High Frequency (HF) chip could be read by a reader within a range of 20 to 30 centimeters 
(Lemon, 2006). According to an official of the Shenzhen public security bureau, the encryption of 
personal data stored on the ID card chip was so sophisticated that it could take “as much as ten 
million years” to decrypt (“New Card Ensures Privacy,” 2006). While one must be skeptical 
about such a claim, it attests to the public’s growing sensitivity to unauthorized disclosure of their 
personal information.  
The new card dramatically reduces the likelihood of fraud while becoming the key 
enabler of an entirely new logic of dossier material production. Data regarding a Chinese citizen 
can now be automatically generated and associated with their ID with little human effort, simply 
with the waving of an RFID card reader. In Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, police 
swept public streets and transportation hubs with wireless ID readers, which then linked up to the 
national crime database. This allowed the police not only to identify people with criminal records, 
but afforded the automatic creation of “mobility data” to be fed into the dossiers of all citizens 
whose IDs were swept (“Xinjiang Police Tightens Security Checks,” 2008). 
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The embedding of RFID technology affords a much higher rate of PII generation. 
Computer systems can be designed to generate PII simply when the card is read by a reader, 
eliminating the need for a human dossier administrator to produce the text on their own. If the 
country becomes strict about the use of the card in public places, a great deal of useful PII could 
be generated automatically. The public has begun to push back, however, against the strict 
enforcement of carrying the ID. The 2003 ID law appears far less aggressive in mandating 
particular uses and ties it to law in ways that the 1985 law did not. 
To promote the new ID card, the Chinese government focused on the ways in which the 
cards would help improve the lives of Chinese citizens. First and foremost, it was emphasized 
that the card would help to protect individual rights. The possession of a card would ensure that a 
citizen could travel and get access to social services. Second, the new card would reduce identity 
fraud, thus reducing the impact of financial fraud on individual citizens.  
Part of this public relations campaign included calling the card a “citizen card” rather 
than a “resident” (jumin, 居民)  card. A People’s Daily article in the fall of 2002, announcing the 
planned system, explained the significance of the distinction: “While residents refer to those who 
live in a settled place, citizens refer to people with the nationality of a certain country who enjoy 
the rights as well as bear the obligations according to laws of this country” (“China Starts 
Working out Law,” 2002). The change in terminology also appeared to be a way of separating the 
national ID initiative from the increasingly controversial hukou system, widely viewed with 
disdain by the public as a state sanctioned system of segregation and exclusion. The final title for 
the law, however, “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Identity Card of Residents,” 
retained the term resident. 
260 
 
The Chinese government also stressed the legal limitations on the invasiveness of the 
system, writing into law a list of protections against abuse. In a June 28, 2003 release via the 
Xinhua news agency, the government outlined these new restrictions: 
The Resident Identification Card Law has made strict stipulations about the inspection 
and retention of ID cards. According to the law, with the exception of public security 
organs carrying out measures of residence surveillance according to the Criminal 
Procedure Law, “no organizations or individuals are permitted to seize resident 
identification cards”. If the people’s police “violate the law by inspecting and seizing 
resident identification cards and infringe upon citizens’ legitimate rights and interests”, 
they are liable to administrative sanctions based on the seriousness of the cases and if 
their action constitutes criminal violation of the law, they are liable to criminal 
investigation for legal responsibility according to the law. (“Lawmakers Hail,” 2003) 
According to the new law, the second generation ID card contains the following limited 
information: name, sex, nationality, date of birth, permanent domicile, ID number, photograph of 
the citizen, the card’s issuing organ and the expiration date. This information is stored in two data 
formats: printed visibly on the card and stored directly on the embedded RFID chip. The key, of 
course, is the ID number, which allows the production and storage of dossier material on remote 
databases indexed by the unique number. The law refers to the ID number as the “citizens unique 
and life-long identity code.” 
The 2003 law differs from the 1985 law in its listing of specific uses of the card. Rather 
than listing 17 specific uses and an open 18th category, the 2003 specifies the following four 
contexts in which the ID is to be used: 
(1) Changing the registered items of the permanent residence; 
(2) Military service registration; 
(3) Marriage registration and adoption registration; 
(4) Applying for handling the exit formalities; 
Further, a fifth, open ended use category limits additional uses of the card to “other circumstances 
as provided for by the laws and administrative regulations that the citizen shall use the identity 
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card to prove his (her) identity.” Although this leaves the use of the national card open ended as 
did the 1985 law, the specific wording here appears to limit those uses to ones specifically 
enumerated in civil law. 
NEXT STEP: FROM PHYSICAL TO VIRTUAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS 
In addition to the physical card, China is intent on developing systems to reliably keep 
track of citizen’s identities when they are online. Over the past three years, the Ministry of 
Information Industry and the Ministry of Public Security have been implementing a steady stream 
of “real name” policies for cell phone users, web site owners, online gamers, bulletin board users, 
instant messages and bloggers.  
Having a universal registration system for online activity would serve at least two 
purposes for the dossier administrators. First, it would be the most reliable way to ensure the flow 
of dossier information, linking all online activity to specific, verifiable users. Second, the users, 
engaging in the ritual logging in process, would be reminded of ubiquitous monitoring of their 
activity, with the hope that they would be less likely to challenge the legitimacy of the state as 
they engaged in discourse with their fellow netizens. Such a system is not currently in place, 
however, in part because of significant resistance to “real name” policy from the public. 
In mid October, 2006, officials at the MII in private meetings with members of the 
Internet Society of China (ISC), an industry association group, which under MII’s auspices, sets 
policies and standards for online business. The MII requested that the ISC study and develop a 
policy for the registering of real names for all bloggers. Within days of the meeting, rumors 
quickly began to circulate on the Internet about the impending policy, leading to a confirmation 
of the rumors by the People’s Daily on October 23rd. The article quoted the ISC secretary general 
Huang Chengqing: “[we] suggest, in a recent report submitted to the ministry, that a real name 
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system be implemented in China’s blog industry.” Huang also noted that much was still needed to 
be worked out about the policy and that this would take time. The article claimed a recent survey 
by the ISC showed that half of all Internet users would support such a policy. 
Eight days later, one of China’s most liberal newspapers, Southern Weekend, published a 
detailed account of the MII’s meetings with the ISC blogging research team, suggesting that both 
industry leaders and the public were against such a policy in far greater numbers than the 
People’s Daily article suggested. 
The numbers provided by the Internet Society show that half of the netizens support a 
real-name blogger registration system.  In the joint Internet poll conducted by New 
Cultural Daily and Sohu.com as of November 1, 25% supported and 75% opposed the 
real-name blogger registration system. 
Bokee.com president Fang Xingdong was the first to introduce blogs into China.  He said 
straight out that he is against any real-name blogger registration system.  In his view, a 
real-name blogger registration system that violates the basic laws of the Internet will be 
“the biggest mistake in the history of the Internet in China”…. 
Fang said it is simply impossible for websites to verify the identification information of 
blog applicants, as it would involves huge costs of manpower and money beyond their 
means. (Zhao, 2006, n.p.) 
In December 2006, the People’s Daily published an opinion column from an unnamed 
judicial official in Jiangsu province, entitled “Bloggers should get real in virtual world.” In the 
article, the author confirms the planned rolling out of a new “real name” policy for certain parts 
of the Internet including blogs and describes his support for the policy. 
The authorities believe that requiring bloggers to use their real names will benefit the 
healthy development of Internet blogs. The free development of blogs in the past few 
years has led to a chaotic situation. Some have used blogs to disrupt social order and have 
harmed the interests of the majority. A real-name system will safeguard freedom of 
speech and also guarantee the sound development of blogs.  
.... 
In fact as early as 2005 a blog-related lawsuit emerged associate professor Chen Tangfa 
from Nanjing University accused a blog company of having failed to properly deal with 
insulting comments about him that were spread by an anonymous blogger on the Internet. 
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Chen won his lawsuit in August in what was the first blog infringement case to come into 
public view. Though the court ordered the company to post a formal apology, it is hard to 
punish the many anonymous bloggers who wantonly vent their anger while infringing 
upon others’ rights on the Internet. And as slander cases involving blogs emerge in an 
unending flow, there are increasing calls for the implementation of a real-name system. 
In the virtual world of the Internet, it is a thorny issue for infringement victims to 
preserve evidence. The infringers attack anonymously and it is only possible to track their 
temporary IP addresses. So there is a clear need to develop identification technology. 
(“Bloggers Should Get Real,” 2006, n.p.) 
Negative reactions from China’s net using public continued make their way into 
mainstream media coverage. In early January, China Youth Daily published a national poll of 
1,843 Internet users in which 83.5 per cent were opposed to the plan. A People’s Daily article 
citing the CYD survey noted that citizens were in support of a similar policy for cell phones, 
since they understood its role in reducing fraud and cutting down on the scourge of SMS 
spamming. The article concludes with a clarification of the immanent ISC policy, noting that 
bloggers would still be free to choose online pseudonyms, and that “real identities will remain 
confidential and protected if they do ‘nothing illegal or harmful to the public’” (“Real-name 
Online Registration,” 2007, n.p.).  
An article published in Liaoning Legal News argued that the state in fact had no legal 
authority to compel Internet users to identify themselves and thus could not simply compel real 
name registration by way of ISC policy. The argument refers to the text of the 2003 ID law in 
which only four specific instances are listed where ID presentation is required. The 5th instance 
would require the passage of a national law. As a result, not only real name polices for blogs, but 
also those for online gaming and mobile phones have no legal basis. The article recommended 
that such laws be passed, noting that law abiding citizens should have nothing to fear from such 
laws (Martinsen, 2007). 
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When the government-supported industry association Internet Society of China (ISC) 
released its “draft self discipline code” for bloggers in May, 2007, real name registration was 
listed as “encouraged” rather than mandatory (Chen, 2007). 
A few years earlier, however, public protest against a state anonymity reducing policy did 
not have as much success. On March 16, 2005, as part of the communist party’s “ideological 
education” campaign, China’s most popular university BBS, ShuiMu Tsinghua, stopped 
permitting access to all but actively matriculating students registered with their real names. A 
number of other university BBS’s across the country were similarly constrained or completely 
closed around this time (“China Tightens Rules,” 2005). This limited shut down of ShuiMu 
Tsinghua ended a tradition of anonymous posting and wide ranging discussion in which current 
students, faculty and alumni living all over the world deliberated on topics from the Iraq war to 
SARS to controversial issues of Chinese history. 
Unlike censorship of web sites like the BBC, CNN and Voice of America, seen as a minor 
nuisance with little impact on most people’s lives, the shutdown of the SMTH and other 
University bulletin boards affected a large number of students and alumni and was largely viewed 
with great disdain. In the wake of the BBS crackdown, users reacted strongly. The access 
restrictions caused widespread protests, both online and, more cautiously, offline. Some Tsinghua 
students wrote essays and poems expressing their concern and sadness about the shutdown, while 
board moderators distributed ASCII BBS “posters” to relay their message of mourning and 
protest.38  On March 18th, in a rare instance of offline protest, around a hundred students circled a 
monument on the Tsinghua campus engraved with the logo “actions are greater than words.” The 
students covered the monument with origami cranes and other paper figures, traditionally 
symbols of mourning. Among the more ingenious modes of online protest included the ironic use 
                                                     
38 Photos of the ASCII posters and the offline protest are available at http://maomy.motime.com/post/431462 
(Accessed 3 June 2006) 
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of quotations by Mao Zedong to criticize the shutdown, such as “it is right to rebel!” This left 
BBS moderators with the dilemma of either removing otherwise legitimate quotations of 
Chairman Mao, or allowing the veiled criticism of the shutdown (O’Kane 2005). 
Despite the outpouring of popular discontent, the policy has remained. One difference, 
perhaps, was that there was no BBS industry concerned about the “cost” of the plan. BBSs at 
universities were entirely non-profit ventures. 
The Chinese public distaste for mandatory online registration slowed the process down 
somewhat, but it continues on many fronts. For example, a new practice in Beijing internet cafes 
that is likely to expand nationally is photographing and ID card scanning of every first-time 
customer. An October 16th Xinhua News article, paints a vivid picture of this new policy: 
When Zhang Lihong entered Suosi Internet cafe in Xicheng District, Beijing Oct. 16, she 
noticed something new on the counter- a machine with a digital camera and scanner. 
“Please have your photo taken, and your ID card scanned here,” the clerk stood up and 
said. 
Zhang was confused and wanted to know why she had to do this. The clerk explained that 
authorities are trying to crack down on Internet misuse in the city. 
The 24-year-old’s photo and a copy of her resident identity card were sent to the 
Municipal Law Enforcement Agency of Beijing and placed in a file. 
Zhang was then given a four-digit password, escorted to a computer, and told to enter her 
information on an interface to activate the computer. 
“You don’t need to go through the same process again when you visit Internet cafes like 
us,” the clerk explained. “By providing your ID number, you can check in after we verify 
your filed information.” (“Photo, ID Now Required…” 2008, n.p.) 
The country’s lesser known IP policy, on IP addresses rather than intellectual property, 
also seeks to eliminate anonymity. There is strong recognition within the state bureaucracy that 
IPV6, the next generation Internet protocol, has the capacity to assign every individual one or 
more unique IP addresses so that all of an individual’s online activity can be tracked and stored. 
During a March 2006 visit to Paris, Hu Qiheng, chair of the Internet Society of China, told an 
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International Herald Tribune writer, “[t]here is now anonymity for criminals on the Internet in 
China . . . . With the China Next Generation Internet project, we will give everyone a unique 
identity on the Internet” (Crampton, 2006, paragraph 3). Just how significant the role of IPV6 
could be in anonymity online is open to some debate. Internet policy discourse about the topic 
tends to point out that the protocol has considerable room for built-in anonymity, but it depends 
on specific implementations. Chinese ISPs could conceivably implement the protocol in ways 
that make it much easier to identify people via their IP addresses. 
More recently, the Chinese government has been working closely with the U.N. on 
developing a global strategy for IP identification. The Chinese government has proposed 
technical standards for “IP Traceback,” a technology intended to eliminate the possibility for 
online anonymity via applications such as the Tor Network. A UN drafting group named Q6/17 
met in Geneva in late September of 2008 to discuss the development of this system (McCullagh, 
2008). As Bruce Schneier has noted, it is not clear how the UN expects to dictate global Internet 
policy, but the participation of the U.S. National Security Agency in the IP Traceback drafting 
group suggests developments here are worth following (Schneier, 2008). 
SYSTEMS OF RECORDS 
The new focal site for the production of the digital dangan is no longer the local work 
unit but the Basic Population Information Database (BPID) under the administration of the 
Ministry of Public Security. While it is the site where much of the PII produced may ultimately 
wind up, the creation of the data can and does occur anywhere within the state’s boundaries; PII 
is produced under the administration of many of the golden projects — golden card, golden tax, 
golden health, golden social security, Golden Shield — but also outside state control altogether. 
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The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has remained as the institutional site of one’s 
“criminal dossier,” but now maintains digital dossiers on the general population as well. The 
physical sites of production and some aspects of the logic, most importantly “how” the PII is 
produced, have been radically transformed. Two entirely new sites of PII record production have 
emerged as well: 1) the moment of transaction, where individual “financial identity” is 
constructed and 2) private companies (domestic and foreign). Both sites continue to expand in 
both size and importance.   
This affordance of electronic networking, being able to access personal records 
instantaneously from great physical distances, has made possible the emergence of another 
entirely new dynamic of dossier record production. Data which eventually finds its way into the 
dossier may be originally produced within private institutions, often for entirely different 
purposes. In other words, these private institutions produce PII under different logics but if it has 
some utility to the state it may attempt to requisition the information. 
To get a picture of just how state dossier record production has changed, I consider first 
Beijing’s comprehensive informatization polices dating back to the early 1990s, and their impact 
on the generation and circulation of digital PII records nationwide. Then I consider record 
production via three major site lenses: the general population database, the construction of 
financial identity, and finally the “criminal” lens of the MPS. It is within this “criminal” lens that 
I will consider the new role of private companies as an important new institutional and physical 
site of dossier record production. 
BLUEPRINT FOR MODERNIZATION 
The groundwork for these major changes was laid in part by the state’s comprehensive 
informatization policy, which began to accelerate in the early 90s. In 1992, the General Office of 
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the State Council developed a nation-wide office automation program, requiring all government 
agencies to use personal computers and electronic filing systems in their day to day operations in 
order to manage administrative decision making and improve public service (Seifert & Chung, 
2009). In 1993, China began the first major steps toward a nationally integrated digital 
bureaucracy, with an ambitious plan to modernize the financial system and grease the wheels of 
robust economic growth.  
As the opening intensified in the early 90s, this comprehensive plan to “wire” China in 
record time, a massive undertaking in both financial and engineering terms, became known as the 
Golden Projects. The Golden Projects, as originally promoted by Ministry of Electronics and 
Industry (MEI) chairman Hu Qili, were three in number: 1) the Golden Bridge, an ambitious 
expansion and  modernization of telecommunications infrastructure; 2) the Golden Card, a 
modern financial system and central bank centered on the use of smart card debit and credit cards 
and 3) Golden Customs (also Gate), a plan to link the Ministry of Foreign Trade with the Ministry 
of Customs and facilitate state support and management of global trade. The three projects 
comprised the blueprint of what Ure and Liang (2000) have referred to as a “China national 
information infrastructure,” or CNII.   
A second major goal of the informatization process was to improve government 
administration, in particular to make provincial and local government more transparent to central 
authorities. The popular phrase “the mountains are high and Beijing is far way” colorfully 
illustrates a historical problem Chinese central governments have had managing far flung 
territories. Local and provincial governments had often been reluctant to share information with 
the central government. Even when they did it was often false, designed to give the impression 
that targets were met, thus ensuring the flow of funds from the central government. Further, 
Beijing’s push to accelerate telecom modernization forced it to give provincial and local 
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governments more freedom to attract foreign investment and develop projects on their own. 
Although the decentralization policy was successful in stimulating ICT development, its 
momentum began to further threaten the central government’s ability to monitor and control local 
government activity and opened new opportunities for corruption and graft on a large scale. 
In part to counter this trend, the 1999 Government Online project called for all 
government departments, from central government ministries to provincial and local city 
governments, to connect both to the public Internet (waiwang) and the government Intranet 
system (neiwang). This was expected not only to improve visibility to the central government but 
to make local government more accountable to the citizenry.  
From 1997 to 2005, the number of China government top level domains (TLDs) went 
from 323 to 19,800, evidence of a rapid increase in the presence of Chinese government intuitions 
on the public Internet. At the same time, government offices began to interconnect on the 
government intranet backbone as well. By the end of 2003, 97 percent of regional government 
agencies had established computer networks for internal usage, while 75 per cent of them had 
connected internal networks among their subordinate departments, bureaus, cities, and counties 
(Qiu & Hachigian, 2004). 
Two years later, the state government launched two more projects designed to get greater 
Chinese society beyond state institutions wired into the national network: Enterprises Online and 
Households Online. Though more informal and consisting of fewer explicit targets than 
Government Online, the goal was to quickly get more than a million small enterprises, 10,000 
medium sized enterprises, and 100 large enterprises connected to the Internet as well as for 
families to begin using the Internet for personal use (Zhang, 2002). Left largely to market forces 
for implementation, these programs have been a great success. China’s e-commerce market 
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exceeded $6 billion in 2007 and total Internet users as of 2008 surpassed 300 million. Online 
industry is booming, fueling economic growth, while opening literally hundreds of thousands of 
new potential sites for PII production, and a robust telecom infrastructure capable of moving 
these data around. 
Now that we understand how the general environment for the digital production of 
information has changed, it is time to consider key record systems of interest: the basic 
population database, the financial identity database, and finally the criminal database.  
GENERAL POPULATION DATABASE  
The new focal site of production for the new digital dangan, the Basic Population 
Information Database (BPID), has been primarily under the purview of the Golden Shield project 
managed by the Ministry of Public security. It has also been identified as one of the four primary 
databases in the country’s “e-government” plan, release by the State Council in 2002. “Document 
No. 17” outlined a common framework for the development of e-government infrastructure and 
applications. Using an enumeration style common in government proclamations, the document 
indentified the key e-government initiatives as: “two networks, one portal, four databases, and 12 
Golden Projects.” All of these initiatives have been underway for more than a decade, but their 
identification and enumeration within the common rubric of “e-government” help make clear how 
the government itself frames the issue of ICT modernization today. 
The two networks refer to a basic information infrastructure comprising an internal 
network (neiwang) for government departments and an external network (waiwang) connecting to 
private citizens and businesses. The internal network, essentially an intranet, is physically 
separated from the external network, the public Internet, for security considerations. Data stored 
in the major government databases, including PII, is exchanged between government departments 
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over this internal network. While major state departments develop nodes on the internal network, 
local governments are encouraged to develop sites in the external network, albeit with some 
content “logically separated” from general public access using passwords and firewalls.  
The one portal initiative, perhaps the vaguest of the four, emphasizes the state 
government’s interest in having information for public use centrally accessible to citizens at all-
in-one portal sites. As of 2004, this initiative resulted in each major government department 
having its own “one portal” site for general access by the public (Qiu & Hachigian, 2004). 
The four databases identified in the State Council document as central to the operation of 
e-government are 1) the Basic Population Information Database (BPID), 2) the Basic Juridical 
Person Information Database (BJPID), for commercial entities and non-profit organizations 3) the 
Natural Resource, Space and Geography Information Database (NRSGID), and 4) the Macro 
Economic Information Database (MEID).  
The BPID was formally initiated in October, 2002, led by the Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS) with the cooperation of the State Family Planning Commission, National Bureau of 
Statistics, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the State Administration of Taxation. The 
BPID is the largest and most comprehensive database of personally identifying information and 
connects to both the internal, government only network and the external, public Internet. The 
BPID has emerged in part via the digitization of the hukou system, a sub-project identified under 
the umbrella of the Golden Shield. 
The high volume of data produced and maintained within the hukou system began to 
migrate to electronic systems in 1986. By 2002, nearly all local police stations had computerized 
their hukou system, more than one thousand cities and counties joined regional computer 
networks to share hukou data covering some 83 percent of the population, and 250 cities had 
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signed on to a national network for immediate hukou verification of close to half the population 
(Wang, 2004). 
The digitizing of hukou data culminated in the completion of the BPID in 2006. The 
database, housed in Beijing at the National Citizen Identity Information Center (NCIIC) is said to 
have more than 1.3 billion entries, or one for every citizen, indexed by their unique national ID 
number.  Although the government has not released a full accounting of the kinds of information 
that the database contains, it is clearly supposed to be a meta-database into which flow data from 
a range of other systems of records, including financial records, crime reports, education, social 
security and health information.  
The population database operates in a tiered access mode similar to the traditional dossier 
system. All Chinese citizens are given at least limited access to this database, provided they have 
either a cell phone or web browser. Basic access allows citizens to check on the authenticity of a 
stranger’s proffered identification.  By entering the ID number and a name, the citizen can 
quickly determine whether the ID offered is authentic or not. If the ID and name match, the 
citizen is then shown a photograph for on the spot biometric identification. 
MOMENT OF TRANSACTION AND THE FINANCIAL IDENTITY 
As the primary reason for state support of informatization was economic, it follows 
logically that the first new site of PII production to emerge was in the financial sector (under the 
initial administration of the People’s Bank of China). After the initial program to diffuse office 
automation equipment into government agencies, the Golden Card project laid the groundwork 
for a rapid modernization of the financial system, both standardizing and radically increasing the 
volume of financial data production — macro, micro and individual.  
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Promoting his plan to Party elite, MEI chairman Hu Qili described the Golden Card 
project as a way to rapidly modernize the financial system with an electronic payment and 
clearing infrastructure using smart debit and credit cards linked to the central bank, the People’s 
Bank of China. Among the project’s ambitious goals were 200 million debit/credit cards in use by 
2000-2003 (Lan, 2004).  
The Golden Card project has been hugely successful, helping to establish a booming 
business for smart cards (with over 80 per cent of equipment manufactured within China) and 
transform the country’s financial system, improving supervision and management while 
dramatically improving efficiency. The total number of cards in use rose from 4 million in 1993 
to more than 920 million in September, 2005 (Guo, 2006). Participating merchants, including 
stores, hotels and restaurants, increased from 20,000 to 200,000. ATMs increased from 4,700 in 
June 1995 to 490,000 in 2003, with card-enabled trade reaching 11.5 trillion Yuan in 2002. The 
bank card system has evolved into a web of interbank and inter-district information exchange 
networks for customer service, financial administration, marketing, risk and fraud management, 
and other uses (Ke, 2005). Instrumental in shifting both the public and private sectors from non-
standardized, spotty, paper-based accounting to a system of detailed financial record production, 
the Golden Card project was soon extended with other golden projects such as golden tax, golden 
macro, golden finance, golden audit, and golden enterprise, to further expand the production of 
financial records.  
As China has begun to take an interest in capital markets and the growth of its consumer 
economy, the need for a far more robust credit system has become apparent. Traditionally, 
Chinese consumers have paid for purchases with cash and do not spend beyond their means. 
When money is needed in the short term for emergencies, people have normally turned to 
members of their extended family. Banks that have loaned money to consumers for the purchase 
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of a car or home have done so at great risk, largely because of the unavailability of 
comprehensive credit histories for their customers. Banks, under the direction of the People’s 
Bank of China, have begun to adopt the risk analysis schema of their western counterparts. 
The development of a state certified “economic identity” for Chinese citizens is clearly 
taken seriously by the state government. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) began trial runs for 
a nationwide individual credit database in 2004 and officially launched the system in early 2006.  
At a press reception for the official launch of the individual credit database, PBOC Deputy 
Governor Su Ning explained the importance of the new system to the country: 
A modern market economy is based on credit, where the circulation of commodities and 
financing are dependent on credit. In the absence of a credit culture, debts can go 
unrepaid, lenders are troubled by arrears, and the market is swarmed with fake and 
shoddy goods. As a result, huge risks face enterprises and individuals, affecting the 
normal functioning of the economy. Therefore, a socialist market economy has to be built 
on the basis of a proper social credit system. 
A credit registry, as a vital part in a social credit system, provides credit information 
products that enable provider of credit or buyer of a financial product to assess the 
creditworthiness of the party who applies for a credit or the seller of a financial product 
for the benefit of preventing credit risks and maintaining financial stability. At the same 
time, by accurately recognizing corporate and personal identity and recording credit 
information, the system helps promote enterprises and individuals to value a good credit 
record. Whether a fully fledged credit registry system is available, is an important signal 
of whether the financial system is solidly based and market economy is maturing. A 
credit registry system can be regarded as the corner stone of a modern financial system 
and the basis of financial stability. It is of far-reaching significance for building a credit 
society. (Su, 2007, n.p.)  
By early 2006, the database included the names of 340 million people, with roughly 10 
percent of those names having credit information recorded. The database draws on a continually 
expanding array of information sources with all data linked to the individual’s unique national ID 
number. In the summer of 2007, the PBOC announced that it was in talks with the State 
Administration of Taxation and the Supreme Court of China to track tax payments and civil 
compensation. In addition to regional banks, companies providing financial guarantees, telecom 
companies and public utilities would be allowed access to the data. The PBOC database has also 
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been linked with the criminal database maintained by the Ministry of Public Security.  In the 
summer of 2008, the bank announced plans to add brokers and insurance companies. 
Although the database does appear to gather information on individual credit records, 
there is as of yet no commercial market for this information. According to the “Provisional Rules 
on Management of Individual Credit Information Database,” promulgated by the PBOC on 
October 1, 2005, commercial banks and credit cooperatives can consult the database for the 
purposes of reviewing applications for credit. Other uses of the database are strictly forbidden and 
could accrue fines of from 10 to 30,000 Yuan. There is also very strong public sentiment against 
the sharing of personal data between businesses, so any change in this policy would face 
significant opposition. Since Chinese people still tend to prefer the use of cash over credit cards, 
it is not clear that transaction data would be of as much use beyond basic risk analysis. This is 
changing, however. China had more than 104 million credit cards in use by March, 2008, up more 
than 90% from the prior year (Zhang, 2008).   
DIGITAL CRIMINALS: THE MPS GOLDEN SHIELD, AND THE TARGETED PEOPLE 
The Ministry of Public Security remains an important site of production institutionally, 
but the physical location of data storage and the ways it is produced are also under dramatic 
transformation. Personal data that finds its way into the MPS dossier system today may be 
produced by private companies (domestic and foreign,) usually for reasons outside state national 
and public security goals. Further, the eyes and ears of public security are increasingly 
technologically augmented, with assistance from both the home grown security industry and 
multinationals.  
As we consider the role of the MPS in the production of PII, we must remember its 
traditional role and the logic of the “targeted person” during the peak of the traditional dossier in 
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the 1980s which allowed security agents to focus their energy and manage limited resources. 
Although virtually all urban citizens had extensive dossiers maintained by their work units and 
copies of these dossiers were stored at the local PSB, only a small percentage of citizens had 
police agents actively producing reports about them. In part due to resource limitations, active 
production of a criminal file only took place for those within the targeted population. 
Does the MPS still focus most of its resources on the small fraction of “targeted people?” 
If it does, how does the size of this population compare to traditional proportions? As we will see 
below, it is quite clear that the production logics of the 21st century MPS dossier system still 
appear to focus on a “targeted population,” but it is not yet clear how the size of this population 
compares to the 1980s. 
In addition to digitizing the storage of standard hukou information, China launched its 
first international crime database in 2000. The database contains information for criminals 
previously processed throughout the country. In late 2005, the new system was credited with a 
steady increase in city arrest rates in Shanghai. The database’s “most wanted list” as of that year 
contained more than 300,000 names, 4000 of them wanted for crimes committed in Shanghai. 
The names of Chinese citizens coming in to register for temporary residence permit, or detained 
for other reasons, are run through the system to check for an existing criminal record (“Internet 
database tracks,” 2005).  
Other, more specialized databases focus on other targeted populations, such as those in 
banned religious groups like Falun Gong. According to Hao Fengjun, a Chinese dissident who 
once worked for a Chinese government project to combat cults, the Tianjin branch of the “State 
Council Leadership Team for Preventing and Handling Cults” maintains a database containing 
the names of 30,000 Falun Gong practitioners (Einhorn, Elgin and Burrows, 2006). 
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Still more specialized crime databases have also been identified, such as the database of 
suspected drug traffickers announced by MPS Vice Minister Zhang Xinfeng in August 2005 
(“China to Set up National,” 2005), and the database for people involved in pyramid-selling 
schemes jointly administered by the Ministry of Public Security and the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce (“China to Set up Database on Pyramid Scheme,” 2006). 
The logic of a “targeted population” still operates today in the process of digital criminal 
records production, but with some important modifications. While the eyes and ears of the public 
security bureau used to be men and women on the streets in the local neighborhood, the eyes and 
ears are now increasingly electronic, often equipment supplied by western companies in support 
of the Golden Shield system. Technology transfer from the west for the surveillance components 
of the Golden Shield project has been ongoing since at least late 2001, and has been chronicled by 
numerous western researchers (Walton, 2001; Gutman, 2004; Bambauer, 2006). Major 
contributors over the past several years include Cisco and Narus. 
Cisco designed, built and sold a national system of internet surveillance, called 
PoliceNet, for China’s public security bureau, which is now deployed in “all but one of China’s 
22 provinces” (Bambauer, 2006). Chinese telecommunications research firm ChinaNex has 
estimated that Cisco earns $500 million a year from the China market and maintains 60% market 
share in the market for “routers, switches, and other sophisticated networking gear.” According to 
a report from Reporters without Borders, Cisco sold “several thousand routers at more than 
16,000 Euros each for use in building the regime’s surveillance infrastructure” (“Google-Yahoo 
Market Battle...,” 2004, n.p.). 
Another provider of advanced Internet surveillance technology to China is Narus. 
Consider this April 5, 2006 press release which details the company’s entry into the China 
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market, providing Shanghai Telecom with the capacity to identify and block “unauthorized VOIP 
applications:” 
Narus, Inc. today announced that it has penetrated the Chinese telecommunications 
market with its first customer win in the region, Shanghai Telecom Co., Ltd. Through the 
use of the ultra high-performance NarusInsight™ IP traffic processing system, Shanghai 
Telecom will be able to detect and mitigate rogue VoIP traffic on their network, 
enhancing the quality of experience for the users of properly configured and authorized 
VoIP services.  
In an effort to provide the highest-quality VoIP experience to its customers, Shanghai 
Telecom turned to NarusInsight’s ability to provide a total network view by performing 
deep-packet inspection (layers 2 through 7) of IP traffic, while correlating across every 
link of the network at extremely high speeds. This total network view is essential to the 
security, management and deployment of Shanghai Telecom’s IMS-based services such 
as VoIP, IPTV, PTT, etc. This is Narus’ first installation in China, and comes on the 
heels of an unprecedented agreement with the China Information Technology Security 
Certification Center (CNITSEC), which recently certified NarusInsight to protect China’s 
major telecom carriers against network attacks. (n.p.) 
Although the press release here focuses on its use by Shanghai telecom in restricting 
unauthorized VOIP traffic, it is clear that this “IP traffic processing system” can facilitate many 
forms of real-time surveillance and intervention in communication networks. Among the Fortune 
500 companies listed as part of Narus’s customer base is AT&T, which, interestingly enough, has 
been embroiled in a domestic surveillance scandal of its own, featuring another Narus product, 
the Narus STA, or “semantic traffic analyzer,” which was allegedly installed by NSA personnel 
on a major ATT network access point in San Francisco.  
HUMAN MONITORING 
To complement this technological approach to monitoring, the Chinese government 
employs an army  of “Internet police” employed to monitor blog and bulletin board posts focused 
on keywords provided to them by their superiors. Many are employees of private Internet 
companies running bulletin board discussions or chats and not direct agents of public security. 
The actual number of such people doing monitoring is not easy to verify, though some estimates 
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have exceeded 30,000. Nevertheless, such a number would be a 1:1000 ratio of Internet monitors 
to users. Perhaps as a subtle recognition of their limitations, China began displaying animated 
cartoon police, Jing and Cha, to keep state monitoring at the forefront of online user 
consciousness so that they can police their own behavior. 
“The Internet police has existed for a long time. This time we publish the image of 
Internet Police in the form of a cartoon, the purpose is to let all internet users know that 
the Internet is not a place beyond of law, the Internet Police will maintain order in all 
online behaviors,” said Director Chen of the Information Center, Internet Security and 
Surveillance division, of Shenzhen Public Security Bureau. (Qiang, 2006, n.p.) 
In addition to monitoring real-time data streams on the Internet, the Ministry of Public 
Security has interest in more aggregate, processed data sets that may be stored at the facilities of 
private companies including email providers, search engines and social networking sites. As 
China has continued to open its economy, a range of international businesses have developed 
large-scale operations within its borders. Virtually all of these companies produce some form of 
PII on their customers, some of it of greater potential interest to dossier administrators. These 
international companies can and do make decisions that can have dramatic effect on the volume 
and types of PII that are created and remain available to the state over time. 
PRIVATE COMPANIES: NEW VECTORS FOR DOSSIER PRODUCTION? 
Both domestic and private companies in China today are producing PII in the course of 
their operations that become objects of interest of the MPS. From the available examples so far, it 
is reasonable to assume that the far majority of PII produced within the private sector will be 
released to the MPS on demand. It is critical to remember that the logics of record production 
within these private firms may be very different from MPS production logics, which are centered 
around the identification of threats. ISPs and telecom companies operating in China are required 
to maintain their records for sixty days to be released to the MPS on demand, but may destroy 
them after this time. Below are three examples to show the role that private companies are 
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playing: 1) the case of Shi Tao, a Chinese journalists jailed in part on PII released by Yahoo; 2) 
the discovery that Skype’s telephone and chat service in Hong Kong was streaming personal data 
to MPS servers in Beijing; and 3) and the role of private mobile phone companies. 
SHI TAO 
Chinese journalist Shi Tao was arrested in December, 2004 for “illegally providing 
secrets to state entities.” Shi Tao was tried and convicted for sending the notes from a meeting he 
was attending at the Dangdai Shangbao (Contemporary Business News) where he worked in 
Changsha, Hunan Province. The meeting, held on April, 20, 2004, was called to discuss a memo 
from the Central Propaganda Department advising the media how to prepare for the then 
upcoming 15th anniversary of the June 4th pro-democracy crackdown at Tiananmen. Shi Tao and 
his fellow journalists were warned not to voice opinions critical of the central government and to 
report any suspicious meetings between journalists and democracy activists. That evening, using 
his Yahoo email account, Shi Tao mailed the notes of his meeting to the New York-based website 
Democracy Forum, which published them in its Internet newsletter hours later. 
Shi Tao’s arrest and conviction (April 27th, 2005) was based in part on evidence supplied 
to the Beijing State Security Bureau by Yahoo. According to the text of the criminal verdict, 
Yahoo account information allowed the Security Bureau to conclusively establish his identity: 
Account holder information furnished by Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd., which 
confirms that for IP address 218.76.8.201 at 11:32:17 p.m. on April 20, 2004, the 
corresponding user information was as follows: user telephone number: 0731-4376362 
located at the Contemporary Business News office in Hunan; address: 2F, Building 88, 
Jianxiang New Village, Kaifu District, Changsha. (“Changsha Intermediate People’s 
Court of Hunan Province Criminal Verdict,” 2005, p. 10)  
In response to widespread public criticism, Yahoo General Counsel Michael Callahan 
told a U.S. Congressional hearing on February 15, 2006: 
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The Shi Tao case raises profound and troubling questions about basic human rights.  
Nevertheless, it is important to lay out the facts. When Yahoo! China in Beijing was 
required to provide information about the user, who we later learned was Shi Tao, we had 
no information about the nature of the investigation.  Indeed, we were unaware of the 
particular facts surrounding the case until the news story emerged.  Law enforcement 
agencies in China, the United States, and elsewhere typically do not explain to 
information technology companies or other businesses why they demand specific 
information regarding certain individuals.  In many cases, Yahoo! does not know the real 
identity of individuals for whom governments request information, as very often our 
users subscribe to our services without using their real names.   
A year later, a copy of what was purported to be the original Beijing State Security Bureau letter 
appeared on the U.S.-based Chinese-language website Boxun.com. Although neither Yahoo nor 
the Beijing State Security Bureau have spoken to its authenticity, the Dui Hua Foundation, a 
highly respected human rights organization with offices in Hong Kong and San Francisco, has 
stated they believe the document to be authentic. Dui Hua released an English translation of the 
document.39  
Beijing State Security Bureau 
Notice of Evidence Collection 
[2004] BJ State Sec. Ev. Coll. No. 02 
 Beijing Representative Office, Yahoo! (HK) Holdings Ltd.: 
According to investigation, your office is in possession of the following items relating to 
a case of suspecting illegal provision of state secrets to foreign entities that is currently 
under investigation by our bureau. In accordance with Article 45 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of the PRC, [these items] may be collected. The items for collection are: 
Email account registration information for huoyan1989@yahoo.com.cn, all login times, 
corresponding IP addresses, and relevant email content from February  22, 2004 to 
present.  
Beijing State Security Bureau (seal)  April 22, 2004  
Assuming the document is authentic, it challenges the Yahoo general counsel’s claim that 
Yahoo “had no information about the nature of the investigation.” Shi Tao was sentenced to 10 
years in prison.  
                                                     
39 Retrieved February 5, 2008 from http://www.duihua.org/press/news/070725_ShiTao.pdf. 
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SKYPE AND TOM.COM: LOGGING USER CHAT TRANSCRIPTS 
Activists at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab discovered a cluster of eight 
message-logging computers operated by the HK company Tom.com as part of its joint venture 
with Ebay’s Skype service. Tom.com has been distributing Skype IP-telephony and chat software 
for use in mainland China. Although it has come to light previously that Skype and other Internet 
services in China were abiding by local regulations and censoring sensitive content, Tom’s 
practice was taking this a step further and actually logging text conversations containing certain 
trigger words. These words included standard black-listed phrases like “Free Tibet” and “Falun 
gong,” but also the terms “earthquake” and “milk power,” referring to the fall 2008 scandal of 
tainted baby milk. 
What made this case so problematic was that Skype had explicitly stated before that, 
although it did censor taboo chats, communications data was simply disregarded and not retained. 
Instead, the University of Toronto researchers discovered that anytime a sensitive keyword 
appeared in a chat the entirety of the text was stored on one of these servers along with personally 
identifying information of the chat participants, such as their IP addresses and their Skype IDs. 
This information was being retained not only for Chinese citizens using the Tom-Skype software 
to engage in chat, but also any foreign counterparts they might be chatting with. The computers 
were also storing calling records for Skype voice conversations containing names and in some 
cases phone numbers of the calling parties. According to the researchers, these 8 servers had 
archived more than 166,000 censored messages from 44,000 users in just two months 
(Villeneuve, 2008). 
As Internet furor both inside and outside China grew, the CEO of Skype issued a 
carefully worded statement, apologizing and announcing that the practice would cease. 
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Acknowledging that the trust of Internet users had been put at risk, the CEO said that their joint 
venture partner, Tom.com, had been engaging in the practice without their knowledge. 
MOBILE PHONE TRACKING AND SEARCH DATA 
Chinese domestic ICT companies likely provide information to the Chinese government 
upon demand, as they have no legal authority to resist and are unlikely to suffer any public 
relations damage if the news were to get out. The average Chinese citizen simply expects that the 
government gets access to its personal data.  
The head of China’s biggest mobile phone company, which has more than 300 million 
subscribers, stunned delegates by revealing that the company had unlimited access to the 
personal data of its customers and handed it over to Chinese security officials when 
demanded….. 
 “We know who you are, but also where you are,” said the CEO of China Mobile 
Communications Corporation, Wang Jianzhou, whose company adds six million new 
customers to its network each month and is already the biggest mobile group in the world 
by users. 
He was explaining how the company could use the personal data of its customers to sell 
advertising and services to them based on knowledge of where they were and what they 
were doing. 
When pressed about the privacy and security implications of this, he added: “We can 
access the information and see where someone is, but we never give this information 
away ... only if the security authorities ask for it.” (Plowright, 2008, n.p.) 
What Chinese citizens and consumers are more likely to complain about is the sharing of 
this kind of information with other private companies. Nevertheless, this general sentiment has 
not kept the lid on the emergence of a nascent market for personal information commodities. 
Consider this 2006 press release by the mInfo company, based in Shanghai.  
Data published by mInfo are based on actual usage information over the last year across 
its SMS, WAP, kJava and IM mobile search systems. mInfo is the only provider in China 
offering search over all four models enabling nearly all mobile users in China to access 
its service. This gives it a much broader view on what users are looking for versus most 
other vendors that only provide WAP-based search…. 
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In general, mobile searchers are looking for answers surrounding their daily lives. 
mInfo’s data shows that searches were spread fairly evenly amongst the basic subject 
areas of Local Search (41%), Informational Search (31%) and Rich Content Search 
(28%). Local search involves finding directory information for locations such as bars, 
hotels and ATMs. Informational search relates to finding things such as stock quotes, 
sports scores, price promotions and flight schedules. Rich content search relates to 
finding ring tones, pictures, mp3, games, etc. mInfo offers over 30 search categories 
within these three areas. Mobile search traffic seems to pick up each day around noon and 
ramps steadily until about 10pm when traffic peaks. Fridays and Saturdays are the most 
heavily trafficked days for mobile search services. (“What were China’s 450 million,” 
2007, n.p.) 
CONCLUSION 
While China’s recent history includes a period in which much of the urban population 
experienced a highly effective and oppressive state dossier system, the primary means by which 
dossier materials are produced have been in a process of rapid change. As this period of transition 
is still ongoing, it is difficult to say yet how China’s digital dossier system will ultimately 
compare to the capacity of the traditional system. While new technologies afford unprecedented 
volumes of PII production and aggregation, the public has a growing fondness for anonymity and 
privacy. 
Even given a near total capacity of the Chinese state to requisition PII on demand, data 
cannot be requisitioned if it is not first produced. Chinese companies have only begun keep 
digital records within the past decade and still lag behind U.S. companies in volume and detail of 
PII production. China is catching up rapidly, however.  The Internet market is booming and the 
new businesses springing up there have become quite adept at gathering, storing and 
manipulating personal information.   
So far, there remain spaces of anonymity within the Chinese electronic networking 
systems and in public as well as a strong and perhaps growing public voice in support of it. 
Chinese citizens as a group have succeeded in limiting the required uses of their national ID 
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cards. They have maintained the right to blog online with the presumption of anonymity. 
Although we can begin to call this presumption into question (especially with the diffusion of 
IPV6 ) there remains an active public interest in it that will continue to develop, one that could 
establish a legitimate discursive identity within China’s project of modernization. Although it is 
certainly too early to tell, there are major positive signs that should not be ignored. 
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CHAPTER 7: SYNTHESIS 
Few would challenge the proposition that China maintains a state dossier system or that 
this system facilitates an oppressive interface between the state and the public. Countless 
academic and popular press articles refer to China’s surveillance systems in Orwellian terms. 
That the U.S. and China come from two entirely different political traditions is indisputable, but 
these case studies have shown that the practical differences today, when it comes to the ongoing 
evolution of state dossier systems and the specific constraints they encounter, are not as 
significant as we might assume. Now that I have reviewed the two cases on their own terms, I 
will juxtapose them more directly here in four sections: The Four Drivers Compared revisits the 
four drivers of dossier systems outlined in chapter two (technology, political economy, law and 
public sentiment); Towards a Vocabulary of State Dossier Systems explores in more detail the 
linguistic toolkit that has been developed for state dossier system analysis, including terms like 
the sites and logics of production and the targeted person; the Defense of Claims section reviews 
some of the more potentially controversial propositions that have been presented here and the 
evidence on which they are based; finally, the chapter offers Concluding Thoughts.  
THE FOUR DRIVERS COMPARED 
TECHNOLOGY 
Both the United States and China rely on advanced technologies from western 
corporations like Cisco, Nortel and Narus. While the West is a major source of advanced 
surveillance technologies ranging from hardware to software, China produces most of the CCTV 
cameras that are deployed in the U.S., including the newest generation of wireless IP cameras that 
can be more easily accessed by centralized, state, local and federal policing institutions. In recent 
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years, a new phase of home grown surveillance technology development is occurring in China 
with investment from western financial firms. 
Today, one can argue that the Chinese second generation ID card technology affords a 
much greater range of dossier production possibilities than does the 2D bar code on the U.S. Real 
ID. While the Chinese card can be read from a distance in any direction (360 degrees) from the 
card, the Real ID card requires a direct line of sight. Given this basic comparison, it is clear that 
the number of real world situations in which a state agent could identify and generate or retrieve 
data on a target individual would be much greater than comparative scenarios with the 2D bar 
code. 
It is important not to overstate the significance of RFID as a driver of dossier production. 
There are a range of other devices diffused through the global social system that afford ubiquitous 
ID and location for those who carry them, such as cell phones and GPS devices. The user has the 
option of not carrying a particular device. He can leave his cell phone behind, or temporarily 
remove the battery. He can buy a used car that does not carry the built in GPS device, or choose 
to queue up in the slow non-EZPASS lane at the toll booth. He might choose to leave the ID at 
home as well, but the viability of that option will depend in part on the governing legal and policy 
regime. It is not difficult to imagine a future in the U.S. in which one would need to present state 
ID to board any form of public transportation. In such an environment, the choice to leave one’s 
ID at home might come at the expense of mobility. A card that must be presented to board public 
transportation or when making use of public thoroughfares is likely to have a significantly higher 
effective coverage than any of these other devices.  
Although the majority of adults today carry cell phones whenever they are out in public, 
availability of this identifying information is much more limited. Only the person’s cell service 
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provider has ready data access. Other private businesses do not generally have access and even 
state and federal law enforcement are subject to legal access restrictions of the ECPA. Nothing in 
the final rules proposed for Real ID limit private commercial access to basic identifying 
information stored within the MRZ (machine readable zone). Given federal court approaches to 
reasonable expectations of privacy in public, it is highly unlikely that citizens will benefit from 
constitutional protections over the collection of a person’s location information broadcasted by 
their ID card. Under the current legal and policy regime, the constraints on taking advantage of 
the indexical identifying information presented by the RFID embedded ID card are far less 
significant than those for other devices. It will be up to the legislative branch to provide statutory 
protection to return some balance, and give back legal boundary negotiation resources to the 
public.  
One could argue that RFID’s are really only generating PII at the point of transaction, 
increasing the speed and efficiency, but not necessarily the volume, of personal data production. 
Taking heed of Marx’s “surveillance slack,” we must not assume that simply because it is 
technologically possible to produce PII in circumstances where it was once not possible (or at 
least resource intensive) it means that this data will be produced. This is an important point, but it 
is also important to recognize the degree to which former constraints on data production have 
been eliminated and the potential for actors in both public and private agencies to see enough 
value in this information to take advantage of these affordances. In addition to the ID card itself, 
the average person will be carrying a growing number of other tagged objects — clothing, credit 
cards, money, media — that help narrate their personal story, facilitating profiles for risk and 
reward. While the objects individually may still bear some traces of anonymity (depending in part 
how commercial RFID legislation evolves,) the card would act as a continual indexical identifier, 
increasing the value of the information beyond its immediate commercial context.   
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As was discussed in chapter 4, however, while the Real ID program appears to be on its 
last legs, other federally supported ID technologies are waiting in the wings to take its place. Both 
the U.S. Passport Card and the Enhanced Driver’s License contain proximity RFID chips with 
read ranges exceeding 30 feet, much greater than the 20 to 30 centimeter read range of the chips 
embedded in China’s ID card. Despite organized public resistance in opposition to the 
deployment of RFID within human identity systems, it appears that the U.S. government is 
determined to roll out these cards in greater and greater numbers. 
Although it was fashionable early on to speak of fax machines, cell phones and the 
Internet as “Technologies of Freedom,” as time has passed it has now become equally fashionable 
to frame new communication technologies as powerful tools of state surveillance. As was noted 
in Chapter 6, there has been some cooperation between the U.S. and China in a UN committee to 
decrease or eliminate anonymity online via the embedding of new technologies into the TCP/IP 
protocol. The IP Traceback initiative overseen by the secretive Q6/17 committee appears to be 
looking for ways to prevent such things as anonymous blog posting via proxy server with the 
implementation of new technology.  
Technologies of resistance designed in the U.S. such as the Tor project, client-server 
software that facilitates anonymous Internet browsing, are widely used in China. Software tools 
to generate fake online IDs have been developed and widely used in China to circumvent 
requirements for online gaming, but the pace of both raw technological development and 
international standards appears to favor state monitoring over individual and collective resistance. 
This is, of course, a difficult future to predict. I will, however, consider some general projections 
of technological development and their impact on potential configurations of state dossier 
systems in the coming decades. 
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There is no doubt that advances in ICTs have dramatically increased the possibilities for 
the state to aggregate and process information, but these advances have not and never will lead to 
unlimited information processing capacity. Today, both public and private institutions are 
motivated to store any and all information they come across if it may have potential value 
sometime in the future. The cost of data storage continues to drop at rates faster than Moore’s law 
so, ignoring the privacy implications, this default storage policy appears to be very sound logic 
given the current and likely future state of the technology. 
According to research conducted by the IDC, however, this picture is in the process of 
changing, not because the advancement of 
storage technologies is expected to slow 
down, but because the overall rate of 
information production is expected to 
exceed this rate. As of 2007, according to 
IDC estimates, all of the empty, available 
data storage media (primarily disk drives, 
tapes and optical storage) totaled 
approximately 264 exabytes, approximately equal to the total volume of information produced in 
that year. Since most of the information produced in a given year (despite the increasing trend for 
businesses to save their data,) is what is known as transient data and is either overwritten or 
disappears into the ether, modern society experiences no shortage of storage capacity today. As 
this gap widens, however, it “will put pressure on those responsible for developing strategies for 
storing, retaining, and purging information on a regular basis” (Gantz et al, 2008, p. 4). 
Another related question connected to technological affordance is the relation between 
data volume and capacity for analysis. Prior to the age of data mining, any file or record of 
291 
 
information would need to be processed by a human being. Increases in the volume of this data 
could quickly overwhelm human cognitive capacity and subsequently impair their ability to 
produce accurate, actionable intelligence. With the advent of data mining, however, the picture 
appears to become cloudier. The capacity for computers to process and analyze large data sets, 
while not infinite, far exceeds human capability and thus appears to change the balance. The 
Total Information Awareness program was based on the assumption that sophisticated software 
programs could churn through the totality of available data and divine patterns of terrorist 
machinations that would enable state authorities to apprehend the terrorists before they struck. If 
data storage were to become a noticeably scarce resource for government and industry, this could 
put pressure on innovations in processing algorithms or impact the evolving logic of dossier 
production. It is difficult to predict with any confidence how this dynamic socio-technological 
process will turn out. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The political economy of the U.S. and China, in general terms, are much more similar 
today than they were in the 70s and 80s. Today, large, privately owned corporations in both 
countries compete for the same sources of capital, bid to overlapping pools of customers, and 
conduct their business within an increasingly international set of trade regulations and law. 
Surveillance is being at least partially driven in both countries by market logic. According to the 
Washington-based market research firm Homeland Security Research Corporation (HSRC), the 
U.S. Homeland Security (HLS) industry is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 50%, 
reaching $34.8 billion by 2010 “assuming no new major terror attack.” In China, one estimate 
projects that its market surveillance hardware and services will be in excess of U.S. $43 billion by 
2010 (Meyerson, 2007). Many of the multinational corporations which are benefiting from the 
emerging surveillance industry, such as Cisco, IBM, Nortel, and Narus are operating in both 
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countries. A significant portion of financing for the leading Chinese surveillance companies is 
coming from U.S. investment firms. China Security and Surveillance Technologies (CSST), for 
example, which listed on the New York Stock Exchange on October 31, 2007, received more than 
$110 million in convertible loans from the Chicago-based hedge fund, Citadel Group (Meyerson, 
2007). 
As the U.S. state dossier system is a hybrid of public and private institutions, any 
restrictions on private activity related to dossier systems is likely to have a constraining effect on 
the system as a whole. Historically, however, the federal government has refrained from 
regulating related private activity.  Although the HEW committee in 1972 recommended 
prohibiting the use of SSNs in private business activity, the final form of the Privacy Act 
contained no such provisions. With a similar policy opportunity arising with the U.S. Real ID 
program, the federal government again refrained from regulating its use in private business. In 
China, the 2003 National ID Card law formally prohibits non-state entities from seizing a 
citizen’s ID card and narrowly restricts the basis upon which even state agents such as police may 
demand the card. While China’s legislature continues to moot its own privacy law, the lack of a 
free market tradition makes it more likely that restrictions on the commercial exchange of private 
information could be put in place. Given the growing role of law in the business world, it remains 
likely that such a law would be enforced. Restrictions on the collection and exchange of personal 
financial information other than for purposes of reviewing a credit application have prevented the 
emergence of a commercial market for such information. The Chinese public also remains 
strongly opposed to the private exchange of this information. 
The interest of private corporations in surveillance infrastructure goes beyond its own 
profitability and extends to its function in helping to protect control over intellectual property. 
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The International Federation for the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), for example, issued a report in 
2007 which argues for aggressive surveillance worldwide, including in China: 
As an industry, we enforce our rights decisively, and this will continue. In 2006, we had 
significant legal victories, led by a U.S.$115 million settlement against Kazaa. We were 
told we could never track down such offenders on the internet. We were told they would 
hide in places where we could not find them! (“IFPI:07 Digital Music Report,” 2007, p. 
3) 
At one time you were considered a new media philistine if you wanted to regulate the 
internet. But then Google promised the Chinese government that censorship was possible. 
Then Google blacklisted BMW in the internet world for anti-social behaviour. It seems 
policing is acceptable for all sorts of things but not intellectual property! (p.3)  
Whether China does succeed in harnessing digital channels for a new vibrant legitimate 
music market very much depends on how seriously a commitment the country and its key 
operators will make to protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights. The 
recording industry supports the U.S. Government’s moves to raise the pressure on China, 
if necessary via the WTO, to ensure effective enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
(p. 7) 
LAW 
It is important to recognize the issues involved when attempting to compare two highly 
contrasting countries on the dimension of law. We do not have any reason to assume the authority 
of the law is the same in each country. At the same time, a law is a particular kind of document 
that represents a formal production of the governor of a social system. It is the product of tensions 
between the state and its people and among classes and sectors of the population, regardless of 
whether are not these tensions are mediated in a formal democratic system. One can make 
inferences from that document about these tensions and often identify a range of stakeholders.  
It is clear if one studies recent Chinese history that citizens are not as pliable vis a vis the 
state regarding identity systems as they once were, and they have gained new interests in their 
informational privacy vis a vis the commercial businesses they interact with on a daily basis. The 
2003 National ID law enumerates a much smaller set of circumstances in which citizens must 
present their ID than the 1984 law. The far majority of Chinese citizens do not feel pressure to 
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carry their ID cards despite the law. Law targeted at the commercial sector is growing rapidly 
along with enforcement mechanisms. Although admittedly difficult to make a direct comparison, 
private firms doing business in China must increasingly come to terms with statutory regulations. 
The role of private companies in the production of records for the dossier system is 
critical in both the U.S. and China. Constraints on commercial practice can significantly limit the 
potential of the state to assemble dossiers, since it would reduce the scope of extant (produced) 
PII. Given the U.S.’s modern legal history (some of it described in chapter 3,) it appears highly 
unlikely that the U.S. would ever significantly constrain the private sector in its production and 
retention of PII.  The Chinese public, already sensitive to abuses of personal information by 
private companies, is exerting some pressure for more accountability. The legislature is more 
likely to respond in the China case, as “free market” and other liberal democratic discourses have 
less traction. 
Although it certainly exists within a tradition of the rule of law that China clearly lacks, 
the U.S. legal system is experiencing its own period of transition and internal contradiction as it 
adjusts to both the rapidly changing technological environment and the increased concern for 
security subsequent to the September 11th attacks. Due to the bright line distinction between 
information in storage and that in transmission and the comparatively weak protection of 
information privacy in stored data, the U.S. federal government has many legal options open to it 
for the collection and aggregation of personal information. A long standing policy to avoid 
interfering with the personal information practices of private businesses coupled with a growing 
reliance of the state on these same private institutions for the bulk of its intelligence activity 
(Shorrock, 2008) means that a shrinking and increasingly insignificant percentage of U.S. 
personal information practices falls under the purview of either the Privacy Act or the Fourth 
Amendment. As we understand more about the manner in which state dossier systems are 
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produced, we begin to understand that the U.S. legal system does not constrain its development in 
any significant way. Though some restrictions on real time state surveillance remain, the state’s 
ability to get personal information from the private sector, both voluntarily and via force of 
administrative subpoena (NSLs), has few practical limits. 
Further, the growing practice of watch lists allows the government to not only collect a 
wide range of PII on non-criminal U.S. persons but to act on this information entirely outside of 
judicial review. The process by which citizens are nominated for inclusion on a particular list is 
kept secret for national security reasons, while the agency that subsequently acts on such a listing, 
inconveniencing, detaining, or otherwise physically interfering with the lives of the listed 
subjects,  is not deemed legally responsible for acts based on incorrect information. 
While one might argue that the law in China has no true authority over the state in the 
way that the Constitution has over the U.S. government, this dissertation has established that the 
Constitution does not place any significant constraints on dossier practices. Dossier practices 
within fusion centers, for example, lie almost exclusively outside the jurisdiction of federal laws 
and policy. At the same time, we must be careful not to understate the significance of notice 
requirements in the Privacy Act. While it is indeed true that agencies may choose not to give 
notice by assuming an exception for their particular record system, details that have emerged in 
SORNs and PIAs made the research in this dissertation possible 
A dangerous trend, however, has been emerging. There appears now to be a growing 
assumption within the executive branch that it can selectively ignore aspects of the law that it 
believes interfere with the prosecution of the War on Terror. A recent book by Jack Goldsmith 
(2007), the Terror Presidency, provides a first-hand account of disregard for law in the Bush 
Administration in the context of the national surveillance program. The Bush administration 
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tested and in fact exceeded constitutional and statutory limits on real-time surveillance. The 
adoption of signing statements has dramatically reduced the effective resolution of congressional 
law and the courts seem to be deferring to executive will on these matters (Sewell, 2006). A 
report by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 2006 noted that the Bush administration’s use 
of signing statements during bill signings was “contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional 
system of separation of powers” (“The President v Congress,” p. 5).   
Although it would be tempting to label this selective contempt for the rule of law as a 
particular excess of the Bush administration that will not be repeated, one could argue that this 
approach is a characteristic of the post-9/11 U.S. state that is persisting into subsequent 
presidential administrations. Despite an explicit campaign promise to stop the practice of signing 
statements, Obama, as of June 2009, had issued more signing statements than had Bush at the 
same time in his presidency (4 to 1). Human rights activists have already criticized the Obama 
administration for its position on administrative detention and warrantless wiretaps, arguing that 
in many ways the Obama administration’s position is even more extreme (Greenwald, 2009; 
Jones, 2009). 
PUBLIC SENTIMENT 
Despite the strong tradition of privacy in Western culture and in U.S. legal history, its 
ranking compared to other social values, namely security, has changed dramatically since the 
September 11th Terrorist Attacks. Young Americans appear to value privacy less in the context of 
interpersonal relations, but they actually value privacy more than older Americans in the context 
of government surveillance (Berton, 2006). Although privacy has not been as important a cultural 
value in China as in the West, there has been a nascent privacy movement in recent years (Lu, 
2005), culminating in the state’s relenting to public pressure to abandon its Real Name project 
and to preserve, at least officially, anonymity in blogging for Chinese citizens (Dickie, 2007). 
297 
 
Public sentiment can have a major effect on public policy no matter what the political 
system. Before public sentiment can play this role, however, the public must be educated and 
aware of the problem at hand. The public must understand why state dossier systems are a threat 
to the public interest and what characteristics of a state’s orientation to the personal information 
of its citizens are problematic. Chinese under the age of 40 today live with the memory of China’s 
totalitarian oppression and have a particular appreciation for the freedoms in today’s modern 
society that many Americans take for granted. In the U.S., polls have shown that support for 
privacy is greatest when asked about in the abstract (Best, Krueger and Ladewig, 2006). Support 
for privacy in general remained relatively stable from 1997 through 2003, actually rising by a few 
percentage points immediately after the 2001 attacks. In 1997, 78 percent of the population 
agreed that it was “essential that they have the right to privacy” (p. 376). Yet while support for 
privacy remains high in the abstract, it drops when the questions become more specific or when 
the privacy right is juxtaposed to other interests like the fight against terrorism. In June 2002, a 
comparable percentage of Americans (79 per cent) agreed that it “was more important to 
investigate terrorist threats than to avoid intrusions on personal privacy” (p. 378). While this 
number dropped the following year, it was still 73 per cent. In May, 2006, the Washington Post 
asked respondents a similar question, and found that 65 per cent of Americans felt federal 
government investigation of terrorist threats outweighed any accompanying intrusions of personal 
privacy (“Washington Post-ABC News Poll,” 2006).  
It is interesting to note some common aspects of successful public efforts to limit or hold 
back the advancement of the state dossier system. In China, student opposition to the Real Name 
system for university bulletin board systems, despite its creativity, was not able to turn back state 
policy. It was not until Real Name opposition expanded to include the commercial Internet sector, 
which, beyond any moral arguments, saw the requirements as likely to accrue large and 
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unnecessary costs, that resistance became strong enough. Similarly, in the U.S., the “success” of 
Real ID opposition would likely have had a much different result if states had not been concerned 
about the federal imposition of an “unfunded mandate.” 
Without considering the specifics of the political systems in each country, one can say 
that the idea of democracy is that institutions are in place that can successfully translate the will 
of the people into the active machinery of government. Authoritarian or totalitarian governments, 
on the other hand, often operate in direct opposition to or ignorance of the people’s will. In 
countless situations, in plans to put RFID in identity documents, in travel systems which 
categorize travelers according to their terrorism risk, in tips systems which invoke the public and 
certain private sector positions to report suspicious activity of their fellow Americans, we see a 
repeated pattern in which the U.S. government pushes through policy, pushes through particular 
components of the state dossier system, despite acute public opposition. In most situations, this is 
accomplished via a change in name rather than substance. We get ATS Instead of CAPPs, the ISE 
instead of TIPs, Guardian instead of TALON. But in other situations, the desired state policy, 
such as the use of proximity RFID tags in identity documents, is simply rammed through despite 
overwhelming public resistance. 
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TOWARDS A VOCABULARY OF STATE DOSSIER SYSTEMS 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I discussed the importance of language and framing 
in the problematization of particular surveillance practices. Over the course of research and 
writing, I have developed a set of terms and phrases, a “toolkit” for the discursive 
problematization of state dossier systems, terms that can be used across individual state dossier 
systems. Some of the most significant terms 
used in the problematization, terms that can be 
abstracted from particular case contexts and 
used as part of a general model of the state 
dossier system, include: system of records, ID 
system, production, targeted person, boundary 
resource and identity. Many of these terms are 
existing terms of art, while some have emerged 
from the research process. For example, I 
leverage the terms “contextual integrity” and 
“boundary resource” without attempting to 
alter or expand their definitions in any way.  
For the much more general, but even more 
critical term “privacy,” I explored the dynamics and demonstrated the cross-cultural value of the 
concept in great detail in chapter 5. In other cases, such as the term “personally identifiable 
information” and its variants, I attempt to draw the term in sharper relief than has commonly been 
the case.40  Still other terms, like production, and the “sites and logic of production,” represent 
                                                     
40 I have contributed what I hope is a set of more precise terms to illuminate often overlooked distinctions 
and help clarify the degree of anonymity or identification associated with a given record. I will not repeat that 
discussion here; it's on page 13, chapter 2. 
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what I hope is a new and useful way of linguistically modeling state run dossier system. The 
phrases “targeted person” and “person of interest” are local, case-based phrases that represent a 
common aspect of all state dossier systems: the categorization of particular subsets of people for 
heightened scrutiny. This is what Lyon (2002) calls “categorical suspicion” and manifests in the 
watch list.   
In any model, the interrelationships between model components are critical and the state 
dossier system is no exception. One must be careful here, because it is easy to mistake a 
particular architecture within a system for a general rule. These terms can be clustered in different 
ways depending on the semantic rules we approach 
them with. In the illustration (figure 11), I group 
the terms according to the following categories: 
object, process, principle, and state. Objects tended 
to become case nodes, while processes, principles 
and states play a significant role in analysis. There 
are different ways these terms might cluster and 
otherwise interact with one another.  I begin with 
one very basic relationship which I do claim is a general rule of state dossier systems: that 
between the ID system and the system of records.  
While this distinction is important, it is critical to remember that it can be expressed in 
many different information architectures. There might be one ID system and one system of 
records that functions as a state’s dossier system  (as one might simplistically model the current 
Chinese system) or it might consist of multiple, interconnecting systems of records leveraging a 
range of ID systems with varying scope and reliability. Further, the distinction is not mutually 
exclusive; ID systems can only function when linked to a system of records that holds the 
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associated identities. The Commercial Driver’s License Information System (CDLIS), for 
example, is the basis for authentication of commercial driver’s licenses nationwide. Nevertheless, 
many, many distinct systems of records containing personal information are designed, produced 
and maintained without the designers needing to pay attention to ID systems at all, as they piggy 
back on an existing system such as the  driver’s license or social security number.  
Production is an important term, perhaps the most distinctive term within this linguistic 
tool kit. The records within these systems do not simply exist out there. They are always first 
produced, and produced according to specific logics and specific sites of production that shape 
the quality and ultimate effect that the records have on the interface between the state and its 
people.  Although the terms “watch list” and “suspicious activity report” were used exclusively 
within the U.S. case, they are clearly applicable to the China case as well.  
PRODUCTION 
China’s dossier system is currently undergoing a major transition from the production of 
single, localized paper files to an at once highly distributed and highly centralized system of 
electronic records and identity cards. During this transition, both the sites and logics of personal 
information production are in the process of dramatic 
change, opening up new possibilities for resistance in 
the process. In the United States, a new class of PII, 
PII of suspicion, is being produced on state authority 
at an accelerating rate. The Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR) system leads to the production of 
PII that are woven into the state’s counterterrorism 
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narrative. Innocent people on the street engaging in First Amendment activities or simply 
minding their own business may be “interpellated” (Poster, 1996) into a government counter-
terrorism database within a narrative of suspicion and threat. 
The entailments associated with the use of the term production (instead of the more 
passive “collection” or “gathering”) are highlighted with the accompanying terms “site” and 
“logic” of production. These terms allow us to focus on the specific institutional and social 
settings in which particular kinds of personal information are produced, while highlighting points 
of leverage for law and policy. Below I offer some general impressions about the sites and logics 
of personal information production that are applicable to the research and analysis of any state 
dossier system. 
SITE ANALYSIS 
WHAT? 
What is the specific content of the record and in what medium is the record embodied? At 
the site of production, personal information is not simply being captured or collected but a 
specific form of record is being produced. The record has precise semantic content that plays 
roles in discursive formations that sustain communities of meaning and action from the small 
group to the institutional level. The specific physical manifestation of the record — as a manila 
folder of 10 white cotton pages or as an electromagnetic disturbance on the surface of a hard disk 
— places specific constraints on the extent and scope of the dossier systems it might populate.  
These details have tremendous impact on how this information subsequently circulates, how it is 
associated with other information, how it is used and what impact it has on its subject.  
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WHO? 
Although the subject of the personal information within a particular dossier system record 
is clear (it is indexed to the subject), the record itself may have been directly produced by the 
subject, it may have been produced by someone intimately involved with them, it may have been 
produced by a third party who had little or no regular association with the subject, and it may 
even have been produced by a machine. Clearly, who (or what) produces the record has a great 
deal to do with the particular qualities of the record and the relative influence the subject has over 
its production. 
WHERE? 
The answer to the where question of dossier record production could be either physical, 
institutional or lexical-semantic.  
PHYSICAL 
This question of physical storage is complex. The site at which personal information is 
produced may not be the same location where it is ultimately stored. A surveillance detection 
report (SDR) produced by a Federal Marshall patrolling an airport waiting lounge may only be 
temporarily stored in his or her handheld device before it takes more permanent form in the 
federal TISS database. 
A record, for it to be observed, must manifest via some physical substrate, even when the 
medium is electronic. Ultimately, a record is stored on at least one specific, physical server. The 
location of the server is often more than a curiosity as it may determine the particular laws or 
regulations it may be subject to. This is important not only at the national level but also within 
national borders. Data stored locally within a particular U.S. state, for example, may be under 
different legal requirements than that stored on a federally owned server in Washington, D.C. The 
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Information Sharing Environment, especially the notion of shared spaces, operates this way, 
making locally maintained, locally regulated data accessible to the federal government while it 
remains outside the domain of what are usually stricter federal laws and policies. 
INSTITUTIONAL 
Understanding the institutional location of personal information production tells us not 
only the organization responsible for the record, but also much about the role this information is 
intended to play.  
LEXICAL-SEMANTIC 
Though the lexical-semantic location may seem too abstract and theoretical, it is actually 
of considerable importance. When someone is searching for information today, more important 
than the information’s physical or institutional location is its position within textual space, 
navigable via three overlapping topologies: semantic, lexical, and link. Records may be 
associated by shared meaning (searching Google for information on restaurants in Philadelphia,) 
by the presence of a specific lexical identifier such as a unique identity number, or via a hypertext 
link. 
LOGIC ANALYSIS 
WHY 
What is the motivation for a particular moment of production? Why is the producer 
making the effort to produce such a record of personal information in the first place? Are they 
logical reasons or are they based on faulty reasoning? I identify four key factors that drive these 
moments of production: use value, exchange value, legal or policy requirement, and 
technological affordance.   
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USE VALUE 
When the state is publicly selling a new initiative, use value justifications are usually at 
the forefront. Use value means that the producer is storing the subject’s personal information 
based on the belief that it will serve some direct use in the provision of service to that subject or 
to a collective for whom these individual behaviors are relevant. The data might add to some 
general understanding about human nature, for example, that allows a company to better navigate 
and capitalize on its targeted market.  For a government agency, use value might mean that 
storing the information would allow it to make better decisions about distributing limited 
resources, or indentify potentially dangerous individuals who are a threat to the public welfare or 
national security.   
EXCHANGE VALUE 
Exchange value means the agent is producing the information based on the belief that 
they will be able to sell it on the open market for cash, or to trade it for some other benefit.  The 
growing market for data mining companies in the U.S. drives companies in many different sectors 
to produce information on their customers that they may not otherwise need, that may not have 
direct use value within the context of their business.  
Companies within the financial sector, from banks to casinos and gold dealers, may 
produce suspicious activity reports for their “negative exchange value,” meaning that they 
produce SARs out of the knowledge that not producing them could cost them significant amounts 
of money. Wanting to avoid financial liability for non filing and protect themselves from liability 
for unnecessarily filing reports, banks increasingly err on the side of “caution,” filing whenever 
customer activity has the slightest tinge of suspicious behavior.  
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LEGAL OR POLICY REQUIREMENTS 
This category covers a wide range, from explicit legal requirements to policies 
established by particular agencies for the production and retention of data.  U.S. banks, for 
example, are required by law to generate reports of all transactions exceeding $10,000 in value 
and any transactions over $5,000 deemed suspicious. Local police are given policy guidelines that 
identify particular situations in which the production of a SAR report is warranted. The Chinese 
government requires that all ISPs within the country record and store activity logs for its 
customer base for at least 90 days. 
TECHNOLOGICAL AFFORDANCE 
Technological affordance means that some technological device in use by the agent is 
configured in such a way that the data is stored as a matter of course, and the agent would have to 
make a decision to specifically not produce this data. An example of this would be someone 
buying a PC with an installed web browser configured to store and log all browsing behavior. The 
subject participates in the production of these logs without having to make any conscious choice 
to do so. 
The accelerating diffusion of RFID technology into both commercial environments and 
state administered ID systems, is likely to lead to an increase in production of PII worldwide. 
Border agents and police in both China and the U.S. are already actively using RFID sweeping 
technologies to identify people of interest at national borders or in areas marked by social unrest.  
HOW 
There are many ways this question could be addressed that focus on the kinds of 
resources that are used, including people, technology, data, and formal procedures that play roles 
in the actual process of production.  
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Personally identifying information cannot be produced without first the act of 
identification. If, for example, a mediated interaction between a business and consumer is 
anonymous in the first place, the production of PII related to the transaction is highly unlikely. 
Identification may still be possible if the subject provides enough information about herself such 
that the combined attributes of descriptive identification are unique among the population, but 
this process is dependent upon the resources of the identifying agent or institution.  An IP address 
alone is not likely to be transformed into a person’s unique identity by Amazon.com, simply 
because the local ISP that may have this information has no reason to share it with them.  Once a 
new visitor has registered as a customer, however, Amazon.com could potentially store that 
person’s IP address associated with their name.  
States, in this context, are likely to have the widest range of resources available to extract 
indexical identification from large amounts of descriptive information. Recently, for example, a 
FOIA request for information about records held in the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Automated Targeting System (ATS) showed that the IP address of the individual making the 
plane reservation was stored by the commercial air carrier in its Passenger Name Record (PNR) 
and shared with the federal government (O’Neill, 2008). Without ubiquitous ID systems 
embedded into all of our common physical and virtual spaces, however, indexical identification is 
likely to take place when the deployment of limited resources is warranted, not as part of 
automatic dossier record production for all state subjects.  
In China, in the traditional dossier system, the act of identification was so deeply 
embedded within the context — all the producers knew each other, usually quite intimately — 
that there was no need to pay attention to their particular identification technology (in this case 
their cognitive capacity to identify the individual they were writing about by face). As the 
production process has shifted from one, physical location, to a more distributed, mediated 
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process, the importance of identification as a necessary informational resource for the production 
of PII has grown. At the same time, ID systems have become an important site of struggle and 
potential resistance. While there is now a mandatory national ID card with a unique number for 
each citizen and the state encourages Internet users to register their activities and expression 
under their real names, there is a growing level of interest and appreciation for anonymity and 
privacy that is creating new opportunities for resistance to the state dossier system that were not 
present decades ago.  
Even with the satisfactory ID of a subject individual, the actual production of a record of 
information is dependent upon a set of often standardized procedures. The production of a SAR 
report, for example, is detailed with the ISE SAR Standard and requires individuals in particular 
roles to make certain decisions and decide if the given information should continue upstream to a 
national database. A form, such as that filled out by a local hukou police officer in China, dictates 
that the officer enter particular categories of information, thus actively shaping the content, 
character and quality of the record.  
WHEN? 
It is possible to look at one in at least two ways when it comes to the production of 
personal information. First, when is the actual moment of production, the time at which this 
datum first comes into existence?  If we are answering this question for a specific moment of 
production, such as when a given SAR containing PII about Sarah Q. Public, is recorded and 
stored in a local data system, this is better thought of as a specific site question. When becomes a 
question of logic when it dictates a particular calendar time when a record is to be produced. This 
production may be facilitated by the presentation of an ID token such as a national identity card, 
so we might ask at what times the state expects us to present ID. In addition to the specific time 
or moment of production, we can also ask how long the record will persist. What is the specific 
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data retention policy associated with this data? A specific “Time to Live” (TTL) may be 
embedded into the data object, either by code or simple policy, or it might persist indefinitely, 
sometimes sitting unnoticed in storage and at other times percolating through the dossier system.  
Records produced within the culture of suspicion, as part of domestic intelligence rather 
than criminal cases, tend to have a much longer shelf-life than those attached to specific criminal 
investigations. 
From a purely law enforcement perspective, if a lead is not deemed worth following, that 
is the end of the matter. For intelligence purposes, however, it might become a piece of 
information to be tucked away to see whether it is repeated or forms part of a later 
pattern. That is perhaps the sharpest difference between case-based law enforcement 
investigations and intelligence investigations. A traditional case-based approach to law 
enforcement investigation closes off alternative lines of analysis. Once a decision was 
made to go to trial, information that might emerge contradicting the theory of prosecution 
would not be ignored, but resources would no longer be devoted to a wide-ranging or 
exploratory investigation of the crime. The emphasis would be on seeking evidence to 
confirm one hypothesis (“Fred killed Jack”) and not on seeking information to confirm 
alternatives (“Mary is the killer,” or “Jack killed himself”). Intelligence, in contrast, 
constantly seeks different information to undermine, as well as to confirm, its preferred 
approaches. It is also eager to revisit past assumptions (Treverton, 2008, p. 18). 
Many of the interlocking information systems which store and forward SARs in the U.S. 
have their own polices for how long records should be stored before being deleted, but this does 
not always reflect practice. Surveillance detection reports produced by Federal Air Marshals are 
stored within the Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS), for a period of 25 years.  SARs 
produced and stored by local police departments, according to the current standard, are allowed to 
store them for up to 5 years.  DOD TALON reports, SARs that were the subject of scandal in 
2005-6 for reporting peace marches as threats, were supposed to be deleted from the reporting 
system within 90 days but remained long after. 
Is there really a significant difference between “collecting” and “producing” information?  
This is not to deny that personal information is being collected, nor to argue that it is not 
important to seek ways to limit and these acts of collection. Instead, it is to bring attention to 
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aspects of the problem that may exist outside the perspective of this dominant frame, to bring 
attention to the contingent nature of our data shadows and data doubles and suggest leverage 
points for regulative policy. The process of collecting personal information is often not passive in 
relation to the record that is eventually stored. Paying attention to these moments helps us to 
understand how particular institutional and technological contexts shape the character and 
function of our evolving data doubles and data shadows. Once information is produced and stored 
by a private firm or government agency, restricting what happens subsequently to that data 
becomes considerably more difficult. 
THE TARGETED PERSON 
In the illustration to the right, there a four 
dossier model entities that interact with and 
reproduce one another. 41   Our key interest, what 
ultimately represents the basic human rights concern 
with the state dossier system, is the targeted person. 
The targeted person is ultimately produced and 
reduced by the state. It is produced in the sense that 
the person so named has a specific set of records — 
a dossier — produced and maintained within a state database. It is reduced in the sense that, when 
this specific data double is used to stand in for the subject, their life chances are constrained via 
subsequent state interference, justified via the legally inscrutable watch list.  
This specific form of the term comes from the China case, where it refers to a sub-section 
of the Chinese population that receives the bulk of attention from state policing institutions. The 
targeted person, though it has many benefits for state bureaucracy, is an effective response to 
                                                     
41 These are all key terms of art that were classified as "objects" in the linguistic toolkit (above). 
311 
 
limited state resources. Since the Chinese state does not have a police force of infinite size, and 
since individual police officers do not have unlimited mental and physical capacities to observe 
and report, the “targeted person” concept allows those resources to be concentrated where they 
are most effective. In the U.S., the term “person of interest” refers to someone under state 
observation, someone for whom the state likely has a detailed dossier to which certain state 
agents are actively referring. Although the term is often used in official statements to refer to 
individuals who have been named as an important suspect in a crime but who have yet to be 
charged (Richard Jewel, for example), it lacks an official legal definition. The growing 
phenomenon of the watch list is nothing less than the emergent classification of different “persons 
of interest” based upon why the state may be interested in them. Being a “person of interest,” 
leaves the subject absent significant legal recourse. It is a category worthy of more academic 
attention. 
The role of “targeted people” in helping the state to manage limited resources is worth 
exploring in each individual case, and will likely change along with the evolution of technology 
and the social systems in which they are embedded. What is the particular logic of the targeted 
person classification? In other words, what is it that leads a state to identify a person as 
“targeted”? Are there resources for aggregating, storing and processing information so abundant 
that effectively the whole population is targeted and the distinction becomes moot? Or does the 
state begin to adopt an index of escalating attention categories, such that a greater set of resources 
are brought to bear as “interest value” increases? 
DEFENSE OF CLAIMS 
The following table shows basic document types along the left-hand column with major, 
potentially controversial dissertation claims along the top row. Government documents and 
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investigative journalism, when propositionally in sync, afford credibility. The claim, for example, 
that the U.S. military spied on, created, and stored personal information on U.S. peace activists 
who presented no violent or criminal threat in 2005 (“Dossier Abuses”) is verified not just by 
MSNBC journalists but also by government documents including a U.S. DOD Inspector General 
report and a direct statement of DOD official to the press. The historical parallels under prior 
administrations in the 60s and early 70s are attested to not only by the epic scholarship of Donner 
but also by the highly detailed, publicly accessible congressional reports from the Church 
Committee. 
Data Type U.S.: 
Dossier Abuses 
Few legal 
constraints 
China: 
production 
transition 
Anonymity gap Rise of 
rights 
Government 
Docs 
X X X X X 
Journalism X X  X  
NGO reports X X X  X 
Trade Press   X   
Western 
media 
X X X X  
Scholarship X X X  X 
Blogs X X X X X 
 
That China is undergoing a major transition in the sites and logics of state dossier 
production, yielding gaps of anonymity (“anonymity gap”) that appear to persist despite the 
government’s clear desire to eliminate them, and that these gaps are not necessarily qualitatively 
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inferior to similar gaps in the U.S., is a complex claim comprising a set of propositions which 
may each be defended based on multiple, triangulating source types. I established the original 
sites and logics of dossier production in China on the basis of extant China studies scholarship 
and state run media, which serve as two key anchors for triangulation. Data speaking to the 
ongoing transition of the dossier system, both technological and bureaucratic, was drawn from 
state run media, academic scholarship, and authoritative blogs. 
COMPARABILITY OF U.S. AND CHINA 
Perhaps the most radical claim in this dissertation is that the Chinese and U.S. dossier 
systems are in fact comparable. Given the dramatically different governmental structures and 
socio-political histories of the two countries, how can we begin to pretend that particular laws are 
in anyway comparable, or that the expression of the dossier system as a tool of oppression, or the 
power of the people to resist can be within even the same order of magnitude? Dossiers are 
bureaucratic technologies that function across the political spectrum; they are tools of government 
(Hood, 1983; Hood & Margetts, 2007), instruments for gathering information and affecting 
behavior at the point where the state comes into contact with citizens. 
The fact that a common set of language tools emerged from the study of the two cases, 
and can be used to talk efficiently about them, is a powerful testament to at least some level of 
comparability. Both states have an interest in ID and record systems and both have identifiable 
sites and logics of record production, as well as one or more classes, groupings, categorizations of 
people who deserve heightened scrutiny and attention. Both are subject to the bounded rationality 
of institutions and the individuals that comprise them. Both have states and corresponding publics 
who may object to a certain dossier system policy and both have responded to and rejected these 
demands in different instances. Both states have powerful actors circulate measures of public 
opinion as part of the ongoing negotiation between state and public interests. 
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The most direct independent correlation with this particular proposition comes from the 
research work of two organizations now doing global rankings of surveillance regimes on an 
annual basis: Privacy International and Cryptohippie, Inc.. Privacy International, in cooperation 
with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, began to release annual 
global privacy rankings beginning with the year 2006. Based primarily on data produced in its 
annual privacy and human rights (PHR) report, which itself is gathered via both publicly 
available documents and a network of area experts,42  the rankings for 2006 were broken down 
according to thirteen categories, including “constitutional protection,” “identity cards and 
biometrics,” and “communication data retention.” Countries received a numeric score from 1 to 5, 
with 1 representing the most negative, privacy-free state, the “endemic surveillance society” 
(ESS). In both 2006 and 2007, China was ranked as an ESS, posting the worst overall score (1.3) 
along with Malaysia and Russia. The U.S. was not far behind. In 2006, the U.S. overall score was 
2.0, putting it in the second worst category of “extensive surveillance society.” In 2007, its score 
dropped to 1.5, moving it into the class of “endemic surveillance society” shared with Russia, 
China and Malaysia. 
For 2008, a separate organization, Cryptohippie, Inc., without describing its 
methodology, released its own ranking based on seventeen factors, many of them similar to 
Privacy International. According to Cryptohippie, the U.S. ranked worse than China in five 
categories: “border issues,” “data storage ability,” “data search ability,” “telephone data 
retention” and “cell phone records.” While China was worse in seven categories, including “daily 
documents,” “constitutional protection,” “ISP data retention,” and “habeas corpus.”  
                                                     
42 I participated in research process for PHR 2005 as an EPIC law clerk. 
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Before continuing, it is important to recognize that the intention of Privacy International 
and Cryptohippie was to compare nation states in terms of surveillance and privacy and not the 
narrower formulation of dossiers that is the subject of this dissertation. In many cases this 
distinction is not significant, such as when the specific criterion of comparison deals with an issue 
of identification systems or communications data retention. In other cases, the ranking may make 
sense if one is thinking about surveillance in general, which includes constraints on the state’s 
capacity for real time surveillance, but might look different if one is focusing on the state’s 
capacity to produce and aggregate records of personal information. If we look specifically at the 
practice of state dossier systems, the U.S. may currently rank as more extreme than China.  
While it is understandable that both Privacy International and Cryptohippie both show 
China with less constitutional protection against state surveillance than the U.S., these 
constitutional protections are much less significant if the focus is on dossier systems. As I have 
described earlier, the distinction between information in storage and that in transmission renders 
much personal data outside of the boundary of the Fourth Amendment, at least as currently 
interpreted by the courts. 
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In the comparative ranking on identification cards and biometrics, Cryptohippie’s 2008 
ranking shows China as worse than the U.S. while Privacy International showed the two 
countries’ shifting positions in 2006 and 2007. While China was ranked worse in 2006, (2 to 3), 
the U.S. dropped to the worst possible score (1) for 2007 while China’s score remained the same. 
Is it possible that conditions changed again in 2008 or were the two studies based on different 
functional definitions of these categories and/or differing data? Cryptophippie’s definition of its 
“Daily Documents” category is “Requirement of state-issued identity documents and 
registration.” Privacy International has an extensive note explaining its “Identity card and 
biometrics” category: 
We assessed the extent and nature of identification practices and proposals in each 
country, including data sharing between identity and other systems. Any requirement in 
legislation to present identity was also taken into account, as was any requirement in law 
to disclose biometric data. The development of conventional elements of enforced 
compulsory identity schemes was also taken into account. These include national identity 
registers, national numbering systems, national identity cards, the establishment of legal 
obligations to disclose personal data and the creation of new crimes and penalties to 
enforce compliance with legislation. (p. 5) 
Looking on the surface of the national ID issue, it is easy to see how one might come to 
the conclusion that China’s system is worse than the U.S.. After all, China has a mandatory 
national ID card with an embedded RFID chip that residents are required by law to carry, while 
the U.S. Real ID initiative to implement national standards for state driver’s licenses appears to 
have been soundly rejected on the basis of both cost and human rights concerns. Deeper 
investigation, as I have shown, yields a different picture. Further, while the Chinese law officially 
requires citizens to carry the national ID at all times, the law is not enforced. Most Chinese do not 
carry the ID with them. In the U.S., on the other hand, most Americans carry their driver’s license 
with them at all times, in part due to the legal requirement that you carry your license whenever 
you drive. 
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Although it ranks China worse in Constitutional privacy protections, Privacy 
International, for both 2006 and 2007, has ranked the U.S. worse than China in terms of statutory 
privacy protections. As I explained in the historical and legal context chapter for the U.S. case, 
there is a bright line distinction in U.S. law between information that is in transmission and that in 
storage. Since these global rankings are based on the more general definition of surveillance and 
statutory law is in general more specifically targeted than constitutional law, we cannot simply 
assume that the comparison would be the same.  
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
There has been a tendency in recent surveillance scholarship to dismiss the power of the 
state to put itself at the panoptic center of the global surveillance matrix. So many acts of 
surveillance and monitoring are going on in so many contexts by so many actors that it would be 
absurd to assert that the state can somehow be at the center of all of it. It is indeed a “surveillant 
assemblage.” Personal records that persist, however, are distinct from real-time surveillance. 
Personal records can flow over time from system to system and state institutions tend to have a 
much higher “document gravity” than private institutions. The state has unique authority to 
demand that an individual or private institution provide information or surrender a particular 
document, even the power to seize a document. States have unique power to interfere with the 
lives of their subjects and unique power to constrain or afford the process of dossier production. 
The state also has unique authority to act physically on personal information that they attend to. 
From democracies to authoritarian regimes, states can and do take authority to regulate the 
private sector, to varying effect. Individual corporations cannot pass laws affecting everyone 
within a particular national border. This power must be continually scrutinized. When exercised 
to excess, authoritarian and even totalitarian scenarios become more likely. In other words, they 
are afforded by the very presence of widespread dossiers on large sectors of the population. As 
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Arendt (1951) reminds us, the never ending struggle against totalitarianism has determined the 
very existence of politics. 
SUSPECT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY 
Watch lists and SARs in the ISE create an environment of perpetual suspicion. Under the 
legal cloak of domestic intelligence operations, reports on our potentially threatening actions will 
be logged, stored, circulated and re-circulated, feeding into a progression of commercial (off-the-
shelf) and specially developed data mining algorithms to categorize the “risky” subject, with 
growing numbers of completely innocent citizens finding themselves subject to harassment, 
detention, or worse. Basic suspicion becomes the state’s defense for collecting or producing a 
particular record on a target subject, but the record persists and at a later date may fuel more 
suspicion, and thus the generation of new suspicious activity reports, in a potentially never-
ending vicious cycle. Citizen subjects under such a system will become quite literally “suspect 
until proven guilty.” 
The public must constantly scrutinize the PII production logic of the state. Under the 
Total Information Awareness program the U.S. has argued that it must produce as much 
information as possible, that from such high volumes of data the patterns of terrorists can be 
discovered. They can be isolated apprehended and dealt with prior to their actually committing 
their planned act of terror. This logic, however, has been vigorously challenged in the academy 
(Chakrabarti & Strauss, 2002; Martonosi & Barnett, 2006; Jonas & Harper, 2006). In its 2008 
report, the National Research Council summarized some of the critiques: 
Modern data collection and analysis techniques have had remarkable success in solving 
information-related problems in the commercial sector; for example, they have been 
successfully applied to detect consumer fraud. But such highly automated tools and 
techniques cannot be easily applied to the much more difficult problem of detecting and 
preempting a terrorist attack, and success in doing so may not be possible at all. … 
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Automated identification of terrorists through data mining (or any other known 
methodology) is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology 
development efforts… 
Because data of questionable quality are likely to be the norm in counterterrorism, 
analysts must be cognizant of their effects, especially in fused or linked databases, and 
officials must carefully consider the consequent likelihood of false positives and privacy 
intrusions. (“Protecting Individual Privacy,” 2008, pp. 2-4) 
A recent conference paper produced under a DARPA research grant, however, argues 
that critiques of “information awareness systems” are overly simplistic and often contain 
unfounded assumptions (Jensen, Rattigan & Hannah, 2003). For example, most mathematical 
critiques, the paper asserts, assume that the system produces only binary decisions (terrorist or 
non-terrorist) rather than a graded scale of values.  
Increased attention should be given to the logic of both individual record systems and the 
more general logic driving the domestic intelligence system as a whole, as overproduction can 
have significant impact on the life chances of individuals. Under the emerging configuration of 
the ISE, it appears likely that documents will continue to be produced for many reasons unrelated 
to the war on terror or even the fight against crime. The producing state agent may be attempting 
to meet a quota or avoid a fine, or, based on literature provided to them by their local fusion 
center or national threat reporting center, they may conclude that the possession of particular 
political documents indicates likely “domestic terror” associations. 
BOUNDARY RESOURCES V. CONNECTING THE DOTS 
The change in the production and role of records of personal information in the United 
States has been quite dramatic since the September 11th attacks. Quite clearly, the principles of 
state policy designed to constrain the production of official and quasi-official documentation of 
suspicion via the practice of domestic intelligence have been largely reversed. The state appears 
to have taken the position that boundary resources of any kind are toxic to the nation’s security. 
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The notion of “anonymity” online, for example, has no real place during the 21st century war on 
terror. In October, 2008, Donald Kerr, the principal deputy director of U.S. national intelligence, 
told a conference audience in San Antonio, Texas that anonymity is now an anachronism: 
[I]n our interconnected and wireless world, anonymity - or the appearance of anonymity - 
is quickly becoming a thing of the past. 
Anonymity results from a lack of identifying features. Nowadays, when so much 
correlated data is collected and available — and I’m just talking about profiles on 
MySpace, Facebook, YouTube here — the set of identifiable features has grown beyond 
where most of us can comprehend. We need to move beyond the construct that equates 
anonymity with privacy and focus more on how we can protect essential privacy in this 
interconnected environment. 
Protecting anonymity isn’t a fight that can be won. Anyone that’s typed in their name on 
Google understands that. Instead, privacy, I would offer, is a system of laws, rules, and 
customs with an infrastructure of Inspectors General, oversight committees, and privacy 
boards on which our intelligence community commitment is based and measured. 
Kerr is essentially saying that we should be focusing now on how the government will 
safeguard the data it has on us, rather than questioning its right to have it.  
Physical boundary resources once available to us in relative abundance (the walls of a 
study, the locked drawer, an isolated house) have become less useful in the current mode of 
electronic networked communication. The Chinese, who, for example, have more recently 
experienced the novel value of private bedrooms as a valuable boundary resource, and who have 
suffered for decades under the particularly weighty and comprehensive traditional state dossier 
system, may be more motivated to see that boundary resources can be logically transferred to 21st 
century social systems.  
As we react to these changes, we can develop new schema that provide new kinds of 
boundary resources — soft logical resources such as language and metaphor, or harder resources 
like law and code. It is critical that western privacy activists recognize the value in continued and 
expanded dialog with Chinese actors in the state and public.  
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DOSSIER SYSTEMS AND THE CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Within the context of the SDS as a problem, it becomes vitally important whether what is 
being produced is contextual indexical information (see chapter 2, p. 45) or de-contextualized 
with a unique, persistent identifier. The persistent identity is the physical person upon which the 
state, on its own authority, may ultimately act.  For most businesses, especially modern, mediated 
business, they may very well never see their customer and their specific real, physical identity is 
often never of concern. For a state’s action against a citizen to be just, they must be defensible via 
the presentation of some dossier identity, a set of propositions about the whereabouts and actions 
of a specific, persistent individual. 
It is quite possible to develop an infrastructure for electronically mediated commerce 
where data doubles do not contain personally identifying information, where they can contribute 
to better customer service and convenience without necessarily adding weight to the individual’s 
data shadow. Consider, for example, an online bookseller’s customer database with contextual 
indexical identifiers. The customer invokes the identifier with something only they know, such as 
a username and password.  When the system receives this unique set of logon credentials it then 
associate’s the entity’s browsing and purchase behavior with this contextual identifier, putting the 
customer in control of this data double and thus allowing them to contribute personal information 
without adding to the stock of personally identifying information about them. It is possible to 
isolate both payment and shipping systems, which do require indexical identification, without 
facilitating the combination of this data. 
In the case of Suspicious Activity Reports, certain basic policy changes could maintain 
the primary goal of the report system while protecting innocent people from unnecessary 
government intervention in their lives. By focusing on the activity rather than the person, SARs 
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can provide police and military important intelligence to be on the alert for particular types of 
behavior that are clearly threatening without needlessly implicating innocent individuals in 
groundless witch hunts. 
DOSSIER SYSTEMS AND THE CYBERNETIC DEFINITION OF SURVEILLANCE 
Under the original definition of surveillance that informs this dissertation, I point out that 
the personal information flowing back to the state is really only significant if it leads to the state 
acting in some way that impacts an individual’s life. We know from history that as state ID and 
record systems become more pervasive and less tolerant of the contextual integrity of its people’s 
private lives, the public interest suffers. Nevertheless, given that the U.S. has had a full-fledged 
state dossier system for several years now, one would expect to see signs of an emergent friction 
at the interface between state agents and the public. While this has not been the focus of this 
dissertation, signs of political oppression are increasingly obvious.  
On Oct 23, 2001, FBI agents visited San Francisco retiree Barry Rheingold to question 
him about his political views shortly after he complained while watching a television report at his 
local gym, “[t]his war is not just about getting terrorists, [i]t’s also about money and corporate oil 
profits.” On October 26, 2001 FBI agents visited the home of a college freshman in North 
Carolina to investigate the report of an “un-American poster” on display in her home (Chang, 
2002). While these incidents occurred very soon after 9/11 and may be excused as excesses 
arising out of the moment, the interference in what must fairly be described in the political lives 
of Americans has continued and even expanded in the 8 years since, in a manner highly 
reminiscent of phase 1 of U.S. dossier history. 
In 2005 and 2006, Maryland State Police built intelligence files on numerous people 
engaged in First Amendment activities of speech and assembly with no demonstrable or 
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conceivable connection to domestic terrorism. Files included personal details on activists for 
Amnesty International, the NAACP, the Campaign to End the Death Penalty, the International 
Socialist Organization, and United Catholic Charities. According to the ACLU of Maryland: 
Agents collectively spent at least 288 hours on their surveillance over the 14-month 
period in 2005 and 2006, the ACLU of Maryland says. Agents “monitored private 
organizing meetings, public forums, and events held in several churches, as well as anti-
death penalty rallies outside the state’s SuperMax facility and in Lawyer’s Mall in 
Annapolis.” 
Although Maryland Police admitted that more than 50 people engaged in non-violent, peaceful 
speech and assembly were categorized as terrorists in a state database that was made accessible to 
federal agencies, more recent revelations suggest that numbers were much higher. The effect of 
this kind of state police operation is hard to ignore. Wanting to avoid the hassle that comes with 
appearing on a federal terrorism database, some people ratchet down their activity. Jennifer 
Flynn, an aids activist in New York who was actively monitored in public by what appeared to be 
unidentified state agents, describes her and her associates’ feelings that have followed this 
increase in scrutiny: 
“I feel like I’ve stepped back, in a way,” she says. “I feel I’m not as vocal as I was. I’m 
still going to sign a petition. I’m still going to organize a rally. I do it. But now I’m 
deathly afraid.” 
... 
Flynn says the damage is done. She sees it in the attitudes of other activists. There’s less 
desire. More trepidation. 
“When you use scare tactics, you really are curbing our right to dissent against the 
government,” she said. “The only thing this is serving to do is squash public dissent. By 
going after the organizers of a rally, you really are sending a message – ‘Don’t hold a 
rally.’” (Parascandola, 2007,n.p.) 
With increasing frequency, U.S. citizen activists and academics critical of the U.S. 
government are finding that they have lost their freedom to travel: 
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Jan Adams and Rebecca Gordon, American peace activists, tried to check in at the San 
Francisco airport for a trip to Boston in August 2002. Airport personnel who said that 
these middle-aged women were on the “master list” called the police and notified the 
FBI. At least twenty other peace activists are confirmed to be on the list: A 74-year-old 
catholic nun who works for peace was detained in Milwaukee; Nancy Oden, a leader of 
the Green party, was prevented from flying from Maine to Chicago. Free speech 
advocates are on the list: King Downing of the ACLU was detained in the Boston airport 
in 2003. David Fathi, also of the ACLU, was detained as well. Scholars who defend the 
Constitution are on the list: in 2007, Professor Walter F. Murphy, emeritus of Princeton, 
one of the nation’s foremost Constitutional scholars, who had recently spoken critically 
of Bush’s assault on the Constitution, was detained for being on a “watch list.” A TSA 
official confirmed informally that it was probably because Murphy had criticized the 
President, and warned him that his luggage would be ransacked. (Wolf, 2007, pp. 95-6) 
In addition to negatively impacting the lives of innocent American citizens, too much PII 
flowing towards central state policing institutions begins to choke information systems designed 
to provide early warning of criminal and terrorist acts, increasing the rate of “false positives” and 
thus squandering limited resources. In order to properly regulate the level of PII production, 
policy analysts must carefully consider the “whys” and “hows” of PII production. If there is a 
claimed use from a particular moment of production, is the given explanation logical? Is the PII 
produced for exchange, legal requirement or technological affordance without a clear use value?  
If “use value” is claimed by the particular producers, does the claim withstand scrutiny? How do 
we design ID systems to limit the production of PII? Focusing on authentication rather 
identification unless there is a justifiable need is clearly one way to do this. 
As privacy advocates take stock of the rapidly developing global surveillance state, it will 
behoove them to understand that, from a policy perspective, the moment of production has 
multiple points of leverage. After the fact, the situation quickly becomes intractable. Personally 
identifying information does not simply exist out there to be collected and distributed. Its 
existence is contingent upon institutional, economic, and technological contexts that are very 
much within the regulatory domain of policy. If instead, we take the ongoing explosion of 
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personally identifying information, the growing weight of our collective data shadow, as a natural 
phenomenon outside our control, we become complicit in our own incapacitation. 
… because and insofar as people consider social facts as things, because and insofar as 
they experience and describe them as natural, failing to recognize that they casually 
reconfirm their matter-of-factness and transcendent singularity, they rebound upon 
individuals with the force of things, which carry real and hard consequences for their 
every day behavior. (Pels, 2002, p. 73) 
It would be difficult, based on the data gathered during this research, to make a definitive 
statement on which of the two counties has stronger constraints on the emergence of a totalitarian 
dossier system. This should call attention to the seriousness of the current configuration and 
developing trends within the U.S. system, while at the same time offering hope of resistance 
within what may appear to be very different political systems with different expectations about 
the power of popular will. 
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APPENDIX A: SEARCHING FOR THE MOTHER OF ALL DATABASES 
(RESEARCH NOTE) 
The state must collect a wide range of personal information and the volume and quality 
of this information directly impacts the state’s capacity to serve the public interest. It is important, 
however, that these individual systems remain separate enough so that the information contained 
within them maintains its contextual integrity. In other words, the data should be tightly bound to 
the particular institutional service: unemployment, health insurance, crime control. To avoid the 
risks associated with totalitarian regimes, it is important that these individual systems have 
sufficient enough distribution of boundary resources (Altman, 1981) — be they laws, technology, 
or cultural norms — so that citizens have spaces to experiment and play with their own identities. 
Record systems must remain separate enough so that it would be simply inaccurate to speak of 
them as a “state dossier system,” or in more Kafkaesque terms, a Mother of All Databases 
(MOAD).  
That China has a MOAD is not a controversial proposition. There is no doubt much more 
to the system than the national population registry described in chapter 6, but that it exists is 
beyond dispute. According to U.S. law, the federal government cannot maintain such a system. 
This, after all, was the main purpose of the Privacy Act. Given the very different post-9/11 world 
and the state’s claim to surveillance capacity for national security, a committed SDS researcher 
obviously starts off with this question. Does the U.S. have a single, massive database (system of 
records), containing broad and detailed information on every citizen? The question does not have 
a simple yes or no answer. 
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I have gathered and analyzed a very large volume of data, government documents, 
congressional testimony, mass media, and NGO reports. I have set no preconceived boundaries 
on the type of data that I might consider; only that I encounter the document within the semantic 
boundaries established as part of the state dossier system (SDS) problem frame. Data retention 
focused primarily on the state rather than private actors and avoided selecting particular 
institutions or well known system of records (SoRs) as the starting point for research. At first, 
these boundaries were very broad, consisting of keyword sets like “united states,” “surveillance” 
and “database” but later evolved into more directed searches, more specific keyword sets and 
identified SIPs (statistically improbable phrases) that were used for RSS feeds and online 
database queries (e.g. Investigative Data Warehouse, fusion center, InfraGard). While the real-
time RSS data feed was refined over time, the most significant changes were made at the archival 
search level, as I sorted through particular nodes of interest and evolved a reference list of the 
most significant SIPs and one word terms via a process I call “SIP snowball sampling.” To 
review, this method is used to navigate the large extent data set of SDS-related records via the 
notation of significant names and phrases and then conducting further archival searches with 
these phrases (SIPs) as keywords. 
The figure (16) to the right 
provides a more detailed view of SIP 
progression for the SoR component of the 
U.S. SDS case study.  To simplify this 
illustration, I focus on SoR names and a 
handful of proto-institutions (fusion 
centers, InfraGard), while leaving out other 
terms that were encountered in the course 
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of research such as laws, established institutions, and the names of private firms. Since I was 
approaching the U.S. case from the very general state dossier frame, my initial question related to 
whether or not the U.S. had a single database containing detailed information on all U.S. citizens, 
a single Mother of All Databases (MOAD), similar to China’s population registry. Total 
Information Awareness (TIA) became the initial, focal SIP for research, as it is has been the most 
salient phrase, the most closely connected term within current or recent public discourse related 
to the MOAD question since its initial appearance and seemingly short life in 2002. As I actively 
gathered investigative reporting, congressional testimony, and other government documents 
containing the TIA SIP, a number of realizations became clear. First, that the TIA program 
continued after being defunded by Congress in everything but name. Second, that the new names 
under which these programs proceeded were so generic as to insure they would be lost in a sea of 
search noise — names like “basketball” and “topsail.” During this research phase, other 
candidates for the MOADB, with history going back decades prior to the September 11th Attacks, 
came to light. 
Dating back to the 1980s and known to government insiders as “Main Core,” this poorly 
(publicly) documented SoR reportedly collects and stores — without warrants or court orders — 
the names and detailed data of Americans considered to be threats to national security. According 
to several former U.S. government officials with extensive knowledge of intelligence operations, 
Main Core in its current incarnation apparently contains a vast amount of personal data on 
Americans, including NSA intercepts of bank and credit card transactions and the results of 
surveillance efforts by the FBI, the CIA and other agencies. One former intelligence official 
described Main Core as “an emergency internal security database system” designed for use by the 
military in the event of a national catastrophe, a suspension of the Constitution or the imposition 
of martial law. Its name, he says, is derived from the fact that it contains “copies of the ‘main 
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core’ or essence of each item of intelligence information on Americans produced by the FBI and 
the other agencies of the U.S. intelligence community” (Shorrock, 2008, n.p.). 
The reality of such a system is always elusive, however, and unlikely to yield to even the 
most intensive examination of publicly available documents. Shorrock’s sources were former 
intelligence officials, not publicly available texts. There are no official documents, no Systems of 
Record Notices in the Federal Register, no Privacy Impact Assessments, no Justice Department 
Inspector General reports accessible to the general researcher attesting to the existence of “Main 
Core,” and so continuing to focus on this SIP is not a particularly good fit for the chosen method. 
Another SIP, “Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW),” emerged as a more practical 
candidate for a MOAD, as its existence was attested to by not only investigative reporters but also 
by its home institution, the FBI in the form of congressional testimony and well-reported public 
press conferences. The IDW was clearly a significant SoR that contained a massive amount of 
information on American citizens with no criminal record. Although the FBI was publicly 
demonstrating IDW, public information about it was limited. Further, it became clear that many 
government officials responsible for either managing or overseeing the data warehousing project 
had difficulty agreeing just what they were talking about. That is, the name, the indexical 
identifier, the SIP, for this particular SoR, always remained somewhat cloudy. To illustrate, 
below are a series of exchanges that occurred during congressional hearings focusing on the need 
for a new all encompassing information architecture at the FBI to better fight the threat of 
terrorism. The names of SoRs and related IT initiatives are underlined:  
MUELLER: We have been an organization with stovepipes. Each division had their own 
computers four years ago; different software packages. We have an overarching 
architecture now, and it’s important for us that when we come up with a new software, a 
piece of software, piece of hardware, that it is approved by the CIO and it fits into the 
overarching architecture. 
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And so I am going away from, sort of, looking at this project as a monolithic project 
that’s going to be 39 months. It’s going to be iterative project. It will have a number of 
components that will address not just our case management system, but other areas where 
we need to upgrade our IT. 
MOLLOHAN: Increasing capability as you go along. Are you still calling this virtual 
case file? 
MUELLER: No. 
MOLLOHAN: What are you calling it? 
MUELLER: We are looking for names. We’ve had Trilogy and virtual case file that have 
dominated our thinking for the last three and a half years, and the latest thing I saw here 
was Project Z, but I’m not certain that I want to go with Project Z. [p. 582] 
MS. BAGINSKI: We can, in fact, in the Investigative Data Warehouse, which actually 
started out as something called the Secure Operational Prototype. It was all based on 
terrorism. We can do the string that you’re talking about, the multiple word. 
SEN. LEAHY: You can do that in Tri — ? 
MS. BAGINSKI: In Trilogy, is that what you mean, sir? 
SEN. LEAHY: In Trilogy, yeah. 
MS. BAGINSKI: IDW is actually something that I would call separate from the Trilogy 
package that you guys, you and I have been talking about. 
SEN. LEAHY: Could you do it in Trilogy though? 
MS. BAGINSKI: Trilogy is not a data warehouse that you would search against. That’s 
why I’m having the trouble answering the question. Trilogy is hardware, as you pointed 
out, desk — you know, computers and desktops, local area networks, wide area networks 
for the connectivity. And it is the case management application. The case management 
application then feeds the integrated data warehouse that I’m describing. That allows me 
to do your search. [p. 525] 
LEAHY: Thank you. During the May 2 oversight hearing, you testified about the 
investigative data warehouse, IDW. 
MUELLER: Yes. 
LEAHY: This was put up after 9/11. It now contains over half a billion FBI and other 
agency documents. Nearly 12,000 users — federal, state, local law enforcement — can 
access through the FBI network. Now, I’ve long advocated they use technology in the 
FBI to carry out your programs. But I’m worried, partly because I read about the ATS 
program and the data-mining: Does this have adequate security? Does the IDW database 
share information or otherwise interface with the ATS data- mining program? 
MUELLER: The ATS data-mining program? I’m not familiar with what you’re referring 
to, sir. 
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LEAHY: Just talking about the ATS. 
MUELLER: You mean DHS? 
LEAHY: The DHS — well, they call it ATS. I realize we’re using acronyms, but this is 
the one that checks on everybody crossing our borders. And you have the Department of 
Homeland Security’s automated targeting system. 
Does your database interface with that? Does it share information with it? 
MUELLER: I do not believe so. But, again, I would have to go back and check. I do not 
believe so. 
LEAHY: Well, this is very important to me. I wish you could get back to me in the next 
few days... 
MUELLER: Will do so. 
LEAHY: ... and let me know directly. [p. 549] 
No one, not high level officials at the FBI, not senior members of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Intelligence, seem to know just what name to call the FBI’s data warehousing project. 
As research continued, it became clear that searching for the name of the posited Mother of All 
Databases (MOAD) is something akin to seeking the true name of God. For a researcher 
attempting to understand the configuration of the U.S. Dossier System, this poses an interesting 
problem. Without having a consistent name or label to apply to a subject of interest, gathering 
data which speaks to it becomes much more than a simple, directed keyword search. The SIP 
snowball method provides a way to continue gathering data while remaining open to important 
new directions.  
Even if one chooses to work at a lower level of individual, smaller scale SoRs that are 
mentioned within Privacy Act SORNs and E-Government Act PIAs and appear to contribute 
significantly to the overall configuration of the U.S. dossier system, these record systems appear 
to number in the hundreds.  A 2007 report published by the DHS Privacy Office noted that DHS, 
since its inception as a government agency, has published 51 System of Records Notices 
(SORNs) announcing new or planned record systems per requirements of the Privacy Act and 
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was processing an additional 207 legacy SORNs that needed to be reviewed and either re-
published or retired (Teufel, 2007).  According to a 2004 survey of 128 federal agencies and 
departments,43 the GAO identified 122 separate data mining projects involving the collection and 
analysis of personal information. 
A study by the RAND Corporation of the U.S. domestic intelligence system maps the 
number and complexity of the interlocking data systems that comprise the U.S. domestic 
intelligence apparatus. Virtually all of the SoRs, of which there are more than 50 in the chart, 
contain PII on U.S. citizens. In addition to the IDW, large-scale SoRs of significant interest to the 
SDS problem frame include Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight and Semantic 
Enhancement (ADVISE), OneDOJ, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), the DOD’s 
Joint Protection Enterprise (JPEN) system, the Treasury Department’s Treasury Enforcement 
Communications System (TECS) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), and 
the IRS’s REVEAL system. Some of these programs have been shut down and then replaced by 
similar or identical programs with different names. ADVISE, for example, was shut down after 
unfavorable comments in the public about the way it echoed the “forbidden” TIA program, but 
was soon replaced with another initiative, the System to Assess Risk (STAR) (Nakashima, 2007). 
The JPEN system was shut down in 2007 with most of its functions absorbed by the FBI’s 
Guardian system.  
To recap, the number of U.S. government databases containing significant amounts of PII 
is large and systems often change their name. Further, as impressive as the RAND chart might be, 
it barely scratches the surface of key SoRs within the U.S. state dossier system, as a very large 
number of databases are in private hands or within government IT systems that, because of their 
                                                     
43 The CIA, NSA and the Department of the Army, DOD, did not respond. 
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national security or law enforcement role, are excluded from Privacy Act or E-Government Act 
reporting requirements.  
While important to the understanding of the U.S. dossier system, it quickly became 
apparent that relying on the SoR as the primary lens for data gathering, at least within this U.S. 
case, would not necessarily yield a broad enough picture of the problem. As a result, in later 
stages of data gathering and analysis I began to pay more attention to SIPs that fell at a lower 
level of analysis than specific SoRs. In other words, I began to focus more on types of records 
than on specific database systems. I indentified two types of records — suspicious activity reports 
(SARs) and watch lists — as particularly important and problematic components of the U.S. SDS 
with potentially even more serious interactions. 
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APPENDIX B:  DOCUMENT SOURCE BREAKDOWN 
Overall: data is broken down into the following seven overall categories.  
1) government documents 
2) investigative journalism 
3) NGO reports 
4) trade press 
5) western media 
6) academic scholarship 
7) authoritative blogs 
 
Below, I break down the categories in some more detail for the U.S. and China case studies. 
U.S. CASE 
Government Documents:  Includes laws, privacy impact assessments (PIAs), systems of 
records notices (SORNs), Inspector General reports, congressional testimony, notices of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRMs), memos, and other documentation  from multiple 
departments and agencies including the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
U.S. Congress, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal and State courts, and the Program manager for the 
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE).  
Investigative journalism:  Rothschild’s work on Infragard & TLO; Single, R. on Real 
ID; Pincus on TALON; Shorrock on Main Core. 
NGO reports:  American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC), Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), Privacy International, 
Cato Institute,  Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) 
Trade press: Federal Computer Week, IEEE Security & Privacy, IEEE Intelligent 
Systems, Business Week, Physorg.com, RFIDNews, Washington Technology, Security 
Focus.com, AIMGlobal, Security Focus, Government Technology, Bank Rate.com, 
Forbes, Security Management,   E-Commerce Times 
Western media: NYT, Washington Post,  MSNBC,  Christina Science Monitor,  USA 
Today, St. Louis Dispatch, CQ.com 
Academic research texts: books and journal articles in the following areas: Surveillance 
Studies, Privacy, U.S. intelligence history, U.S. law. Cited law journals include: John 
Marshall Journal of Computer Information and Law, Harvard Law Review, UCLA 
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Pacific Basin Law Journal, Yale Law Journal, Boston University International Law 
Journal, Stanford Law Review, Cornell International law Journal, Georgia Law Review, 
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology  Law, NYU Law Review, Southern 
California Law Review. 
CHINA CASE 
Government documents: Primarily state run media, national, including the People’s Daily, 
China Daily, and Beijing Review, and regional such as the Southern Weekend  (Nanfang 
Zhoumou) and the Shanghai Star. Also the texts of national laws and other relevant 
documents in the public domain, such as those from court cases. 
NGO Reports: Privacy International, Human Rights Watch, Duihua Foundation, Reporters 
without Borders 
Trade Press: China IT & Telecom, China Leadership Monitor, China Economic Review, 
China Business News Online, Pacific Epoch.com, Printed Electronics World 
Western media: NYT, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, AP, UPI, Business 
Week, BBC 
Academic: China studies scholarship in books and journals, including: The China 
Quarterly, China Leadership Monitor, Chinese Journal of International Law, Journal of 
Public Policy, and Journal of International Affairs. Major books and articles covering: 
privacy and human rights, the hukou system, and the national ID card.  
Authoritative blogs: the China Media Project, EastWest-North-South, Rebecca McKinnon, 
Global Voices Online, China Law Blog, Danwei.org  
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